Cārvāka / Lokāyata

AN ANTHOLOGY OF
SOURCE MATERIALS AND SOME RECENT STUDIES

Edited by
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
in collaboration with
Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
NEW DELHI

SHOUT
SHARE
IT

Cārvāka / Lokāyata

AN ANTHOLOGY OF
SOURCE MATERIALS AND SOME RECENT STUDIES

Edited by
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
in collaboration with
Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
NEW DELHI

First published 1990
Second Edition 1994
Third Edition 2006

©Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1990

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without written permission of the publisher.

Published by
Member Secretary for
INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
Darshan Bhawan,
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area,
Mehrauli Badarpur Road, New Delhi-110062

Distributed by
Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
54 Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi-110055

ISBN: 81-85636-11-7

Printed in India
Durga Print-O-Graph
Delhi-110091

Contents

Preface ix

Editor's Note xiii

PART I
The Source Materials

Chāndogya Upaniṣad (viii. 7–9)
The Asura View 1

Maitrī Upaniṣad (vii. 8–9)
On the Ancient Heretics 6

Pāyāsi Suttanta
Denial of the Doctrine of Karma 8

Sāmañña-phala-sutta
The Non-conformists in Buddhist India 32

Ancient Grammatical Literature 73

Arthaśāstra (ii. 1)
Earliest Enumeration of Philosophies 73

Epics and Purāṇas
See Muir's Article in Part II (No. 20), where all relevant sources are quoted 75

Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's Commentary 75
(*a*) On Inference 76
(*b*) Bhuta-caitanya-vāda 85

Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya with Nyāya-kandalī
Self as Distinct from Body etc. 93

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāya-mañjarī 109
(*a*) Dehātmavāda 110

(*b*) On Inference 132
(*c*) Stray References 154

Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali
Dehātmavāda 158

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla 159
(*a*) On Lokāyata 160
(*b*) On Svabhāvāda 222

Saṅkara's Śārīraka-bhāṣya 234
On Dehātmavāda 234

Vācaspati's Bhāmatī 240
On Dehātmavāda 240

Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha
The Cārvāka Philosophy 246

Haribhadra with Commentaries by Maṇibhadra and Guṇaratna 257
(*a*) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* on Lokāyata with Maṇibhadra's Commentary 258
(*b*) Guṇaratna on above 266
(*c*) Guṇaratna on Bhūtacaitanya-vāda 278
(*d*) Guṇaratna on Kālavāda etc. 293

Prabhācandra's Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa and Nyāya-kumuda-candra 298
(*a*) Bhūta-caitanya-vāda 298
(*b*) Refutation of *anumāna* 312
(*c*) Akhyātivāda 316

Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India 343
A Quaint Legend of Refuting Lokāyata 343

Kṛṣṇamiśra's Prabodhacandrodaya 344
Caricature of Cārvāka 344

PART II
Modern Scholars

J. MUIR: *Verses Illustrating the Cārvāka Tenets* 351
RHYS DAVIDS: *On Lokāyata* 369
H. P. SASTRI: *Lokāyata* 377
G. TUCCI: *A Sketch of Indian Materialism* 384
D. R. SASTRI: *A Short History of Indian Materialism* 394
TH. STCHERBATSKY: *History of Materialism in India* 432
GOPINATH KAVIRAJ: *Lokāyata and Svabhāvavāda* 441
ANANTA KUMAR BHATTACHARYYA: *Cārvāka-darśana* 452
ERIC FRAUWALLNER: *The Materialism* 474

PART III
On the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

SUKHLALJI SANGHAVI and R. C. PARIKH 492
WALTER RUBEN 505
K. K. DIXIT 520

Index 531

Preface

In 1959 my book *Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism* was first published, the seventh edition of which is now in press. Besides being published in a number of Indian vernaculars, it is also brought out abroad as translated into Russian, Chinese and Japanese languages. There is thus reason to presume that my own understanding of the Lokāyata—later called Cārvāka—is likely to be known to a fairly wide circle of readers. Hence it is not in need of being mentioned here over again.

While looking back at one's own work of about three decades ago, one naturally feels the need of certain revisions. So do I, while turning over the pages of the book. But I also feel that these are mainly concerning the elegance of presentation without affecting its main argument or methodology. So I have preferred to leave the book as it is. Whatever new points that have occurred to me during the last thirty years concerning the materialist tradition in Indian thought, I have preferred to work out in the form of separate monographs, of which I should like to mention here only a few: *What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy, Indian Atheism, Science and Society in Ancient India* and the recently published populariser *In Defence of Materialism in Indian Philosophy*.

Nevertheless, since my *Lokāyata* required a good deal of argumentation with ramifications and digressions in various forms, I was often told by my friendly critics to prepare a separate volume documenting in full all the major references to Lokāyata in the source-books of Indian philosophy as well as allowing full scope of speaking for themselves to the more eminent modern scholars with whom I felt obliged to differ in defence of my own understanding of the view.

The identification or understanding of the view itself is not easily done, for the fact remains that what comes down to

us as the Lokāyata in our traditional texts—philosophical or otherwise—does not always concur. In spite of the bold attempt of Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* to present it as a systematic philosophy, what is said in various other works hardly agrees with it. Even the great Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, as will be found in the present volume in his stray references to Cārvāka/Lokāyata in the same *Nyāyamañjarī*, is not fully consistent.

In my own book on the *Lokāyata*, I did my best to work out a coherent understanding of it, following a methodology that appeared to me scientifically satisfactory. But the claim that it is the only acceptable understanding of the subject would be dogmatic, if not also arrogant. The sense of objectivity demands that I must concede to other possibilities of reconstructing the view from its fragmentary survivals mainly in the writings of those that had no taste for it. What is imperative, however, is that the modern scholars undertaking such a task must be provided with data about it as comprehensive as is feasible. This, if presented in the form of a handy collection, should have its obvious advantage.

When, therefore, the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, resolved to get such a handy volume prepared and when, moreover, I was myself asked to prepare it, I felt happy and even grateful to the Council for giving me an opportunity long looked forward to. Hence is this volume. The general plan followed for its preparation is explained in the Editor's Note and is thus not in need of reiteration.

3 Sambhunath Pandit Street DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA
Calcutta 700020

Acknowledgements

For permission to incorporate in the present work copyright materials (either in the form of newly done translations or more or less revived form of existing translations) we are profoundly grateful to the following:

1. Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda
2. Shri Udayan Bhattacharyya
3. Shri Biswanath Bhattacharyya
4. Messrs Motilal Banarsidass.

Editor's Note

The present work is the outcome of a project assigned to me by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi.

My original idea, which I mentioned while submitting to the Council my plan of work, was to prepare an anthology of articles written on the materialistic trend in traditional Indian philosophy usually mentioned as Cārvāka or Lokāyata, although often also as Bārhaspatya. This would include articles written not only in the English language but also in Indian vernaculars, as well as in European languages other than English. Eventually, however, such an idea had to be substantially modified, mainly because it was found that most of such articles are—at least substantially—reiterations of the main contents of the first chapter of Mādhavācārya's *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. Hence, I have tried to concentrate specially on those studies that have something very different to say than what has already been said by Mādhava.

The special points sought to be emphasised in such articles, often differ startlingly from each other—not to speak of their differing from the textbook version of Cārvāka/Lokāyata, which is, of course, derived mainly from Mādhava. However each view expressed seeks to draw its sanction from some traditional Indian source with an authenticity of its own. It was thus considered necessary, first of all, to be clear about the source materials concerning the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, which may enable the reader to form his own view of the view itself. Surprisingly enough, these source materials are not confined to philosophical texts alone in their strictest sense: we come across these in the purāṇas and epics, in grammatical literature, in the treatise primarily on statecraft called the *Arthaśāstra* and even in dramas intended for popular consumption like the

Prabodhacandrodaya. Besides, some of the philosophical texts, although profoundly original, are generally neglected by modern scholars. Such, for example, are *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* and *Nyāyakumudacandra* by Prabhācandra, a great logician of the ninth century AD professing Jainism as his personal creed.

Besides, as is rather well known, a furore has been recently created in our academic world by the publication of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*, particularly because a traditional scholar of the stature of Sukhlalji Sanghavi endorsed the claim that here, at last, was found an original work belonging to a hitherto unknown school of the Cārvākas. It is true that the furore is now fading out, making room for the view that the text—rather than expounding any shade of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata position—is actually a work in defence of scepticism, or at best, agnosticism. Nevertheless, in an anthology of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata it would be unrealistic to ignore this text altogether.

In view of the considerations mentioned above, the original plan of the project submitted to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research had to be amended by way of splitting the work into three main parts—the first containing the source materials, the second containing modern studies in the Cārvāka/Lokāyata that seem to go against the textbookish stream and the third, a survey of Jayarāśi's *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*.

As for the source materials, some are available in English translation and some remain hitherto untranslated into English. On re-examining what is already available in English, however, it was felt that these are not necessarily satisfactory: a few of these may be used with some minor or major modifications, while a few others require fresh translations.

I therefore requested my young friend Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya, with whom I have worked on various assignments for the last two decades, to translate not only those texts which have not been translated before, but also to prepare fresh translations of works of which some sort of English rendering have

already been published. The final manuscript embodies so much of his labour that only by violating my personal conscience am I entitled to call it my own. On my earnest request he has formally agreed to lend his name as a collaborator, which I feel gratified to use in the title page of the present anthology.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, without whose moral and material support it would have been most difficult—if at all possible—to prepare the present work.

We are grateful to the publishers and copyright holders for permission granted to include materials in the present anthology.

DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA

PART I

The Source Materials

Chāndogya Upanisad (viii. 7–9)

As one of the principal Upaniṣads, the text is usually viewed as pre-Buddha, and hence, might have belonged to *c.* seventh century BC.

Since in the extract quoted here we have the earliest reference to a view identifying the body with the self, which is reminiscent of one of the typical tenets of the Lokāyatas/Cārvākas, S. N. Dasgupta is inclined to read in it an expression of the same, though the text does not mention the word Lokāyata or Cārvāka and attributes the view to the Asuras

TEXT

Chāndogya Upaniṣad (viii. 7–9)

viii. 7

1. Thus declared Prajāpati: 'The self (*ātman*) is free from evils, without age, without death, without sorrow, without hunger, without thirst; its desire inevitably comes true, its contemplation (*saṃkalpa*) inevitably comes true. Such a self is to be searched for, and one should desire to ascertain its nature. One who realises (the nature of) that self, after searching for it (in the prescribed way), attains all the worlds and obtains all the desires.'

2. Both the gods and the Asuras listened to it (i.e., the words of Prajāpati). They said: 'Well, we shall search for that self—the self searching out which one attains all the worlds and obtains all the desires.' Then, from among the gods, Indra went away and from among the Asuras, Virocana. The two, without getting acquainted with each other, carrying fuel in hand (i.e., the traditional mode of approaching the preceptor) came into the presence to Prajāpati.

3. The two spent thirty-two years observing celibacy (*brahmacarya*). Then Prajāpati said to them: 'Desiring what are you living here?' They replied: 'The self is free from evils, with-

out age, without death, without sorrow, without hunger, without thirst; its desire inevitably comes true, its contemplation inevitably comes true. Such a self is to be searched for and one should desire to know its nature. One who realises that self, after searching for it, attains all the worlds and obtains all the desires. Sir, this is known to be declared by your very self. We are living here only desiring that self.'

4. Prajāpati said to the two: 'The very person (*puruṣa*) that is seen in the eye is the self about whom I have spoken. It is immortal, it is fearless and it is the *brahman*.' (Then the two asked for clarification:) 'Sir, of the one that is reflected in the water and the one that is (reflected) in the mirror, which one is actually that (self)?' (Prajāpati replied:) 'In fact, the same one is reflected within all these.'

viii. 8

1. (Prajāpati said:) 'Look at yourself in an earthen plate (*śarāba*) full of water. Tell me then whatever you do not understand concerning the self.' Accordingly, they looked in an earthen plate full of water. Prajāpati said to the two: 'What do you see?' The two replied: 'Sir, we see everything of it. We see the self as the exactly corresponding one, even to the hair, even to the fingernails.'

2. Prajāpati said to the two: 'Adorn yourselves well, put on good clothes, make yourselves clean and then, look in an earthen plate full of water.' The two adorned themselves well, put on good clothes, made themselves clean and looked in an earthen plate full of water. Then, Prajāpati said to the two: 'What do you see?'

3. The two said: 'Exactly as we two are, well-adorned, dressed in good clothes and made clean; we find ourselves to be the same, well-adorned, dressed in good clothes and made clean.' Prajāpati said: 'That is indeed the self. It is immortal, it is fearless, it is the *brahman*.' At this, the two went away with a peaceful mind.

4. Seeing them (leaving in this way) Prajāpati said: 'These

two are going away without realising, without ascertaining, the self. Whosoever they may be, gods or Asuras, if they have such doctrines (*upaniṣad*) (i.e., such notions about the self), they will surely be defeated.'

But, then, Virocana, quite peaceful in mind, went to the Asuras and preached this doctrine to them: 'Here oneself alone is to be adored, oneself alone is to be looked after. It is by adoring and looking after oneself alone that one can attain both the worlds, this one as well as the other.'

5. From then on, even till today, the followers of Asura (*āsura*) are said to be the ones who never give away anything, have no faith and never perform any sacrifice. And strange enough is the doctrine of the Asuras. They adorn the body of a person who has died, with clothes and ornaments which (they collect) by begging. They think that by this they will win the yonder world.

viii. 9

1. Then Indra, even before he had reached the gods, found that there was cause for concern. (He thought:) 'Just as it becomes well-adorned when this body is well-adorned, it has good clothes (when this body) has good clothes, and it becomes clean (when this body) is made clean, so also, it becomes blind (when this body) becomes blind, it becomes sick (when this body) becomes sick, it becomes disfigured (when this body) is disfigured, and it perishes immediately upon the destruction of the body. I do not find anything worth enjoying in it.'

2. Fuel in hand, he went back. Prajāpati said to him: 'O the munificent one (*maghavat*)! With a peaceful mind, you went away, along with Virocana. Desiring what have you come back?' He replied: 'Sir, just as it becomes well-adorned when this body is well-adorned, it has good clothes (when this body) has good clothes, and it becomes clean (when this body) is made clean, so also, it becomes blind (when this body) becomes blind, it becomes sick (when this body) becomes sick, it becomes dis-

figured (when this body) is disfigured, and it perishes immediately upon the destruction of the body. I do not find anything worth enjoying in it.'

3. He (Prajāpati) said to Indra: 'O the munificent one! It is indeed so. Well, I shall explain it to you once again. Stay with me for a further period of thirty-two years.' Then he (Indra) lived (with Prajāpati) for a further period of thirty-two years.

Maitrī Upaniṣad (vii. 8–9)

Though usually considered to be a comparatively later Upaniṣad, mainly because Śaṅkara did not comment on it, there is no definite reason to view it as post-Buddha. The special importance of the passage chosen is that it shows that even in those ancient days the country was teeming with all sorts of heretics, the description of some of which cannot but be reminiscent of what still persists in the country as representing the folk-cults, inclusive of the Kāpālikas (who are mentioned by name in the text), identified by H. P. Sastri with the Lokāyatas. Significantly, in this Upaniṣad also, the heretics are said to represent the view of the Asuras. Besides, we have in this passage the first reference to Bṛhaspati deliberately propagating this false knowledge among the Asuras in order to bring about their downfall—a legend accounting for the Lokāyata view being alternatively known as Bārhaspatya.

IEXI

Maitrī Upaniṣad (vii. 8–9)

vii. 8

Now, O king (are discussed) the obstacles to knowledge.

Well, the mixing of those fit for heaven with those who are unfit for heaven is that from which originates 'all delusions' (*mohajāla*). It is like one who, in spite of the pleasure-garden right in front, embraces the tuft of grass below.

One should never live with those others who are:

Perpetually hilarious (*nitya pramudita*), perpetually roving about (*nitya pravasita*), perpetually begging (*nitya yācaka*), perpetually living on crafts (*nitya śilpa-upajīvin*);

Further, those who are seeking alms in the cities; performing sacrifices for those unfit for sacrifices; disciples of a Śūdra and in spite of being a Śūdra are well-versed in the scriptural lore;

Further, those who are 'knaves, have matted hairs, dancers, mercenaries, roving mendicants, stage-actors and deserters of royal service', etc., (*cāṭa-jaṭa-naṭa-bhaṭa-pravrajita-raṅgāvatāriṇaḥ rāja-karmaṇi patitādayaḥ*);

Further, those who with a view to earn money claim:

'We shall remove the spell of evil spirits, goblins, ghosts, demons, snakes and planets, etc.';

Further, who in vain wear red robes and ear-rings, the Kāpālins;

Further, who try to deride the Vedic rites by cheating and creating illusions with futile arguments and perverted instances of observation.

All such persons are but palpable thieves and unfit for heaven. Thus it is declared:

People confused by the deception of the soul-denying doctrine,
And by false observations and arguments,
Fail to understand the distinctive peculiarity of Vedic lore.

vii. 9

Really speaking, Bṛhaspati, taking the disguise of Śukra, created this ignorance for the security of Indra and the destruction of the Asuras. It is because of this (ignorance) that they (Asuras) consider good as evil and evil as good. They claim: Let people consider as *dharma* that which is destructive of scriptures like the Veda, etc.

Therefore, we (the pious ones) must not discuss all this: it is improper, fruitless and conducive to mere worldly pleasure.

Pāyāsi Suttanta

The *Pāyāsi Suttanta* as translated by T. W. Rhys Davids with his own introduction is given here (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, vol. iii, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, vol. ii, London, 1910, pp. 346–74).

Its main point of interest is the denial of rebirth and *karma*, a view attributed to King Pāyāsi, (who in the Jaina text with a similar theme, *Rāyapasenaijja*, is mentioned as King Paesi). The denial of rebirth and *karma*—the main planks of practically all the systems of Indian philosophy—is undoubtedly reminiscent of the materialists' viewpoint.

Frauwallner, however, goes to the extent of arguing that such materialism suited the political purpose of the early despots, because it removed the moral scruples that were hindrances to their own actions. See his essay on materialism in our present collection.

Pāyāsi Suttanta

(INTRODUCTION BY RHYS DAVIDS)

This Dialogue is one of the few which refer to events that took place in the community after the Buddha's death. We hear from Dhammapāla (in his commentary on the *Vimāna Vatthu*, p. 297) that the Dialogue was believed, when he wrote (that is, at Kāñcipura in South India in the fifth century), to have taken place after the erection of the cairns (*thūpas*) over the ashes of the Teacher. He does not say how long after; and the length of the interval is not very important, for all the Dialogues were put together at least over fifty years after the Buddha's death. The difference is only this, that whereas the Dialogues in which the principal part is ascribed to the Buddha himself may well, and very often undoubtedly do, contain material much older than the date of the redaction of the *Dīgha*, this Suttanta (and that is also true of the few others that fall into the same category) may not. The difference is not great.

In this particular case we find nothing fresh in the Suttanta. The climax, led up to at the end, shows us a messenger from the gods coming down from heaven to teach the doctrine of

generosity (*dāna*) by laymen. We have discussed in the Introduction to the *Mahā-govinda Suttanta* the reasons which induced ancient authors to bring down a divinity from heaven to support any particular opinion. Why was it done here? It seems scarcely necessary.

True, the doctrine does not occupy a very high position in the earliest documents. It does not appear at all in the thirty-seven points (afterwards called the Bodhi-pakkhiyadhammā) in which the Buddha, just before his death, summed up his teaching.

It does not appear in the *Dhammapada*, an anthology of verses current in the community on twenty-six subjects which the makers of the anthology held of most importance. There is a miscellaneous section into which verses on charity might well have been introduced, had it been considered a point of equal value with the rest; but it is not there. It is the first and lowest in the list of the ten *Pāramitās*, the virtues necessary to the attainment of Buddhahood. But this list is a late one, and is not found in the Four *Nikāyas*, or even in the *Vinaya*.

On the other hand, there are several incidental references to giving in charity, and always by way of approval, in the Dialogues and the *Saṃyutta*. And in the *Aṅguttara* (which contains a good deal more of the milk for babes than the other three of the great *Nikāyas*) there is a special Dāna Vagga with seven short Suttas on the subject, and six or seven more are scattered through the work.

It is clear, therefore, though this particular virtue is ranked after the thirty Wings of Wisdom, that it is accorded, in the earliest Buddhism, a very respectable place. Nevertheless, at this particular juncture, when the death of their Master had weakened the prestige of the Order, it is quite possible that the brethren, finding their numbers in excess of the sources of income and support, should have found it advisable to invoke the help of a *deus ex machina* to set the discrepancy right.

The rest of the Suttanta throws some light on the reputation in which Kassapa, the Boy-Wanderer, was held by his fellows. As becomes a flowery speaker (*citra-kathī*), he is lavish in illustration and tells a number of stories, some of them quite good and all of them bearing a great or a lesser relation (usually lesser) to the particular point in dispute. They are

sufficient, however, to throw dust into the eyes of Pāyāsi, whose arguments, futile as they are, do not depend so exclusively on analogy, that most misleading of guides.

TEXT

Pāyāsi Suttanta

(Rebirth and Karma)

Thus have I heard.

1. The venerable Kumāra Kassapa[1] was once walking on tour in Kosala together with a great company of *bhikkhus*, to the number of about five hundred, and coming to the Kosalese city named Setavyā, he there abode. And there the venerable Kumāra Kassapa dwelt to the north of Setavyā, in the Siṃsapā-tree Grove. Now, at that time the chieftain Pāyāsi was residing at Setavyā, a spot teeming with life, with much grass-land and wood-land, with water and corn, on a royal domain granted him by King Pasenadi of Kosala as a royal gift with power over it as if he were the king.[2]

2. Now at that time there came over Pāyāsi an evil view of things, to this effect: 'Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds, well done or ill done.'

Now the brahmins and householders of Setavyā heard the news: 'They say that the wanderer Master Kassapa, disciple of the wanderer Gotama, walking on tour with a great company of *bhikkhus*, to the number of about five hundred, has arrived at Setavyā and is staying there to the north of the town, in the Siṃsapā-tree Grove. Now regarding that Master Kassapa, such is the excellent reputation that has been raised abroad: 'Wise and expert is he, abounding in knowledge and learning, eloquent and excellent in discourse, venerable too and an Arahant. And good is it to interview Arahants like him.' Then the brahmins and householders of Setavyā, coming out from the town in companies and bands from each district so that they could be counted,[3] went by the north gate to the Siṃsapā-tree Grove.

3. Now at that time, Pāyāsi, the chieftain, had gone apart to the upper terrace of his house for his siesta. And seeing the people thus go by, he said to his doorkeeper: 'Why are the people of Setavyā going forth like this towards the Siṃsapā-tree Grove?' Then the doorkeeper told him the news. And he said: 'Then, good doorkeeper, go to the brahmins and householders of Setavyā and say to them: 'Pāyāsi, sirs, bids you wait; he will come himself to see the Wanderer Master Kassapa.' That Boy Kassapa will be winning over at the outset those foolish and inexpert brahmins and householders of Setavyā to think:

'There is both another world and there are beings who are born not of parents. And there is fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done.' But, my good doorkeeper, these three things do not exist.'

'Even so, sir,' said the doorkeeper, and carried out his master's bidding.

4. So Pāyāsi, the chieftain, surrounded by the brahmins and householders of Setavyā, came to the Siṃsapā-tree Grove and finding the venerable Kassapa, exchanged with him the greetings and compliments of politeness and courtesy and took his seat on one side. And as to the brahmins and householders of Setavyā, some of them bowed before the venerable Kassapa and took their seats on one side; some of them exchanged with him greetings and compliments of politeness and courtesy and then took their seats on one side; some of them saluted him with joined hands and took their seats on one side; some of them called out their name and family and did likewise; some of them took their seats on one side in silence.

5. And when he was seated, Pāyāsi spoke thus to the venerable Master Kassapa: 'I, Master Kassapa, am of this opinion, of these views: neither is there another world, nor are there beings reborn not of parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done.'

'I, Prince, have neither seen nor heard of any one holding such a view, such an opinion. How then can you declare as you do, that "there neither is another world, nor rebirth as inheritor of the highest heavens, nor fruit or result of deeds well-done or

ill-done"? Wherefore, Prince, I will cross-question you herein and do you reply in what way you may approve. What think you: yonder moon and sun, are they in this world or in another world? Are they divine or human?'

'This moon and sun, Master Kassapa, are in another world, not in this; they are gods, not human.'

'Then, Prince, let this be taken as evidence that there is both another world and rebirth as inheritor of the highest heavens and fruit and result of deeds done well or ill.'

6 'Even though Master Kassapa says thus, it still appears to me that not one of these things exists.'

'Have you, Prince, any proof to establish that they do not exist?'

'I have, Master Kassapa'.

'As how?'

'Here it is, Master Kassapa, I have had friends, companions, relatives, men of the same blood as myself, who have taken life, committed thefts, or fornication, have uttered lying, slanderous, abusive, gossiping speech, have been covetous, of malign thoughts, of evil opinions. They have fallen ill of mortal suffering and disease. When I had understood that they would not recover from that illness, I have gone to them and said: "According to the view and opinion held, sirs, by certain wanderers and brahmins, they who break the precepts of morality, when the body breaks up after death, are reborn into the Waste, the Woeful Way, the Fallen Place, the Pit. Now you, sirs, have broken those precepts. If what those reverent wanderers and brahmins say is true, this, sirs, will be your fate. If these things should befall you, sirs, come to me and tell me, saying: 'There is another world, there is rebirth not of parents, there is fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done.' You, sirs, are for me trustworthy and reliable and what you say you have seen will be even so, just as if I myself had seen it." They have consented to do this, saying, "Very good." But they have neither come themselves, nor dispatched a messenger. Now this, Master Kassapa, is evidence for me that there is neither another world, nor rebirth not by human parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well done and ill.'

7 'Well then, Prince, I will yet ask you this and do you answer even as you think fit. What think you? Take the case of men who have taken a felon redhanded and brought him up, saying: "My lord, this felon was caught in the act; inflict what penalty you wish." He replies: "Well then, sirs, bind this man securely, his arms behind him, with a strong cord; shave his head; lead him around, to the sound of sharp drum, from street to street, from cross-road to cross-road and out at the southern gate; there, south of the town in the place of execution, cut off his head." They, assenting with "Very good", proceed to carry out these orders and, in the place of execution, make him sit down. Now would the felon gain permission of this sort from his executioners: "Let my masters, the executioners, wait till I have visited my friends and advisers, my kinsmen by blood, in this or that village or town and come back"? Or would the executioners cut off the head of this vain talker?'

'They would not grant the permission, Master Kassapa; they would cut off his head.'

'But this felon, Prince, is human and cannot get leave from human executioners. How much less, then, would your friends and relatives, after death in the Pit, gain permission from the keepers of the Pit, saying: "Let my masters, the Pit-keepers, wait till we have gone and told the chieftain Pāyāsi that there is both another world and rebirth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill"? Be this exposition a proof to you, Prince, that these things exist.'

8 'Even though Master Kassapa speaks thus, it still appears to me that not one of these things exists.'

'Have you, Prince, any further proof to establish that they do not exist?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.'

'As how?'

'Here it is, Master Kassapa. I have had friends and compa-

nions, kinsmen, men of the same blood as myself, who have abstained from taking life, from committing thefts, or fornication, from lying, slandering, rude or frivolous speech, who have not coveted or had malign thoughts or evil opinions. They have fallen ill of mortal suffering and disease. When I had understood that they would not recover from that illness, I have gone to them and said: "According, sirs, to the views and opinions held by some wanderers and brahmins, they who keep the precepts of morality, when the body breaks up, are after death, reborn into the bright and happy world. Now you, sirs, have kept those precepts. If what those reverend *samaṇas* and brahmins say is true, this, sirs, will be your fate. If these things should befall you, sirs, when you have been there reborn, come to me and let me know that there is both another world, rebirth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done. You, sirs, are for me trustworthy and reliable and what you say you have seen, will be even so, just as if I myself had seen it." They have consented to do this, saying "Very good"; but they have not come and let me know, nor have they dispatched a messenger. Now this again, Master Kassapa, is evidence to me that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parentage, nor fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done.'

9. 'Well then, Prince, I will make you a simile, for by a simile some intelligent persons will recognize the meaning of what is said. Just as if a man were plunged head-under in a pit of mire. And you were to order men, saying: "Well now, masters, pull the man out of that pit." They, saying "Very good," were to comply and pull him out. You were then to say to them: "Well now, masters, brush the mire smearing him from off his body with split bamboo." And they were to obey you. And you were to say to them: "Well now, masters, shampoo this man's body a treble massage with yellow shampoo powder." And they were to do so. And you were to say to them: "Now, masters, rub him with oil and bathe him three times, using fine chunam." And they were to do so. And you were to say to them: "Well, masters, now dress his hair." And they were to do so. And you were to say to them: "Now, masters, deck him with a costly garland and costly unguent and costly garments." And they were to do so. And you were to say to them: "Well, masters, take him up on to the palace and amuse him with the pleasures of the five senses." And they were to do so. Now what think you, O chieftain? Would this man, well bathed, well anointed, shaved and combed, dressed, wreathed and adorned, clad in clean raiment, taken to the upper palace and indulging in, surrounded by, treated to, the five pleasures of sense, be desirous of being plunged, once more, into that pit of mire?'

'No indeed, Master Kassapa.'

'And why?'

'Foul, Master Kassapa, is a pit of mire, foul and counted as such, stinking, disgusting, repulsive and counted as such.'

'Even so, Prince, are human beings in the eyes of the gods, foul and counted as such, stinking, disgusting, repulsive and counted as such. The smell of man offends the gods a hundred leagues away. What then? Shall your friends and companions, your kinsmen and connexions who, having kept the precepts, are reborn into the bright and happy place, come and bring you word that there is another world, that there is rebirth other than by parentage, that there is fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done? Let this exposition, chieftain, be evidence to you that these things exist.'

10. 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, it still appears to me that not one of these things exists.'

'Have you any further evidence, Prince?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.'

'As how?'

'Here it is, Master Kassapa. I have had friends, companions, kinsmen, men of the same blood as myself, who kept the precepts, abstaining from taking life; from taking what was not given, from inchastity, lying speech and strong intoxicating liquors. They have fallen mortally ill; and I, having told them how some *samanas* and brahmins say that, after such a life, one

would be reborn in the communion of the Three-and-Thirty Gods, have asked them, if they were so reborn, to come and let me know that there was another world, birth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done. They have promised to do so, but they have neither come and told me, nor sent a messenger. This, Master Kassapa, is evidence to me that not one of those things exists.'

11 'Well then, Prince, I will reply by asking you something and do you answer as you think fit. That which humanly speaking is a century, this, to the Three-and-Thirty Gods, is one night and day. Of such a night, thirty nights are the month—of such a month, twelve months are the year—of such a year, the celestial thousand years are the life-span of the Three-and-Thirty Gods. Those of whom you now speak will have attained rebirth into the communion of these Gods. If it should occur to them thus: "Let us, for two or three days, indulge ourselves, surrounded by and steeped in the five pleasures of sense and thereafter let us go and tell the chieftain Pāyāsi that there is another world, rebirth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done"—would they, then, have come to you and told you so?'

'Certainly not, Master Kassapa; for we should have been dead long before. But who lets Master Kassapa know all these things: that there are Three-and-Thirty Gods, or that the Three-and-Thirty Gods live so many years? We do not believe him when he says these things.'

'That, Prince, is just as if there were a man born blind who could not see objects as dark or bright, as blue, yellow, red or brown; who could not see things as smooth or rough, nor the stars, nor moon, nor sun. And he were to say: "There are none of these things, nor any one capable of seeing them. I don't know them, I don't see them; therefore they don't exist." Would one, so speaking, speak rightly, Prince?'

'Not so, Master Kassapa. The visual objects of which you speak do exist and so does the faculty of seeing them. To say "I don't know them, I don't see them; therefore they don't exist":

that would not be speaking rightly.'

'But even so methinks, do you, Prince, talk like the blind man in my parable when you say: "But who lets Master Kassapa know that there are Three-and-Thirty Gods, or that the Three-and-Thirty Gods live so many years? We do not believe him when he says these things." For, Prince, the other world is not, as you imagine, to be regarded with this fleshly eye.

'Those wanderers and brahmins who haunt the lonely and remote recesses of the forest, where noise and sound there hardly is, they, there abiding, strenuous, ardent, aloof, purify the eye divine; they, by that purified eye divine, passing the vision of men, see both this world and that other world and beings reborn not of parents. In this way, Prince, is the other world to be seen and not, even as you imagine, by this fleshly eye. Let this be a proof to you that there is another world, that there are beings reborn not of parents, that there is fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done.'

12 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, yet it still appears to me that not one of these things exists.'

'Have you any further evidence, Prince?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.'

'As how?'

'Here it is, Master Kassapa. I see wanderers and brahmins moral and of virtuous dispositions, fond of life, averse from dying, fond of happiness, shrinking from sorrow. Then I think, Master Kassapa: "If these good wanderers and brahmins were to know this—'When once we are dead we shall be better off'—then these good men would take poison, or stab themselves, or put an end to themselves by hanging, or throw themselves from precipices. And it is because they do not know that, once dead, they will be better off, that they are fond of life, averse from dying, fond of happiness, disinclined for sorrow. This, Master Kassapa, is for me evidence that there is no other world, no beings reborn otherwise than of parents, no fruit and no result of deeds well and ill-done.'

13 'Well then, Prince, I will make you a simile, for by way of

a simile some wise men discern the meaning of what is spoken Once upon a time, Prince, there was a brahmin who had two wives. By one he had a son, ten or twelve years of age; the other was pregnant and near her time. Then the brahmin died. Now the boy said to his mother's co-wife: "Whatever treasure there is, lady, or grain, or silver, or gold, all that is mine. There is nothing here for you whatever; make over to me lady, the heritage of my father!" Then the brahminee made answer to him: "Wait, my lad, till my child is born If it will be a boy, one portion shall be his; if a girl, she shall wait on you " But the boy reiterated his claim again and yet again. Then the brahminee, taking a sword, entered an inner room and ripped up her belly, saying: "If I can only find out whether it is a boy or a girl!" Thus did she destroy both her own life and her unborn infant and her wealth also, through the foolish and thoughtless way in which, seeking a hertiage, she met with ruin and disaster Even so you, Prince, foolish and thoughtless that you are, will meet with ruin and disaster by seeking, without wisdom, another world. Moral and virtuous wanderers and brahmins do not force maturity on that which is unripe; they, being wise, wait for that maturity. The virtuous have need of their life. In proportion to the length of time such men abide here, is the abundant merit that they produce and accomplish for the welfare of many, for the happiness of many, out of compassion for the world, for the advantage, the welfare, the happiness of gods and men. Let this then be a proof to you, Prince, that there is another world, that there is rebirth other than of parentage, that there is fruit and result of deeds well and ill-done.'

14 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, it still appears to me that not one of these things exists.'

'Have you further evidence, Prince?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.'

'As how, Prince?'

'Here it is, Master Kassapa. Take the case of men who having taken a felon red-handed bring him up, saying: "This felon, my lord, was caught in the act. Inflict on him what penalty you wish." And I should say: "Well then, my masters, throw this man alive into a jar; close the mouth of it and cover it over with wet leather, put over that a thick cement of moist clay, put it on to a furnace and kindle a fire." They saying "Very good" would obey me and . . . kindle a fire. When we knew that the man was dead, we should take down the jar, unbind and open the mouth and quickly observe it, with the idea: "Perhaps we may see the soul of him coming out!" We don't see the soul of him coming out! This, Master Kassapa, is for me evidence that there neither is another world, nor rebirth other than by parentage, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.'

15 'Well then, Prince, I will in reply ask you something and do you answer as you may please. Do you not admit, Prince, that when you are taking a siesta, you see dreams of enjoyment in garden, grove, country or lake side?'

'I do admit it, Master Kassapa.'

'Are you at that time watched over by attendant women—hunchbacks and dwarfs and maidens and girls?'

'That is so, Master Kassapa.'

'Do they see your soul entering or leaving you?'

'Not so, Master Kassapa.'

'So they who are living do not see the soul of you who are living entering or leaving you (when you dream). How then will you see the soul of a dead person entering or leaving him? Let this be a proof to you, Prince, that those things do exist.'

16 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, it still appears to me that not one of those things exists.'

'Have you any further evidence, Prince?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.'

'As how?'

'Take the case, Master Kassapa, of men taking a felon red-handed and bringing him up saying: "My lord, we caught this felon in the act. Inflict what penalty you wish." And I say: "Well then, my masters, take this man and weigh him alive; then strangle him with a bowstring and weigh him again." And they do so. While he lives, he is more buoyant, supple, wieldy,

When he is dead, he is weightier, stiffer, unwieldier. This, Master Kassapa, is evidence for me that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than by human parentage, nor fruit nor result of deeds well-done or ill-done.'

17. 'Well now, Prince, I will give you a simile for by way of a simile some wise men discern the meaning of what is said. It is just as if, Prince, a man were to weigh in a balance a ball of iron that had been heated all day and was burning and glowing with heat; and were to weigh it later on in a balance when it was cool and quenched. When would that ball of iron be lighter, softer and more plastic? When it was burning and glowing with heat, or when it was cool and quenched?'

'When, Master Kassapa, that ball of iron, with its lambent and gaseous concomitants, is burning and glowing with heat, then it is lighter, softer, more plastic, but when, without those lambent and gaseous concomitants, it is cool and quenched, it is then heavier, more rigid, less plastic.'

'Even so, Prince, when this body has its concomitants of life, heat and intelligence, then it is lighter, softer and more plastic. But when it lacks those three concomitants, then it is heavier, more rigid, less plastic.

'Let this, Prince, be a proof to you that there is both another world, rebirth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds well and ill-done.'

18. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, it still appears to me that not one of those things exists.'

'Have you any further evidence, Prince?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.'

'What might that be like?'

'Take the case, Master Kassapa, of the men taking a felon red-handed and bringing him up, saying: "My lord, this felon was caught in the act. Inflict on him what penalty you wish." And I say: "Well, my masters, kill this man by stripping off cuticle and skin and flesh and sinews and bones and marrow." They do so. And when he is half dead, I say: "Lay him on his back and perhaps we may see the soul of him pass out." And they do so, but we see the passing of no soul. Then I say: "Well then, lay him bent over . . . on his side . . . on the other side . . . stand him up . . . stand him on his head . . . smite him with your hand . . . with clods . . . on this side . . . on that side . . . all over; perhaps we may see the soul of him pass out." And they do so, but we see the passing of no soul. He has sight and there are forms, but the organ does not perceive them; he has hearing and there are sounds, but the organ does not perceive them; he has smell and there are odours, but the organ does not perceive them; he has a tongue and there are tastes, but the organ does not perceive them; he has a body and there are tangibles, but the organ does not perceive them. This, Master Kassapa, is for me evidence that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.'

19. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for by way of a simile some wise men discern the meaning of what is said. Once upon a time, Prince, a certain trumpeter, taking his trumpet of chank-shell, travelled to the folk on the border. When he came to a certain village, he stood in its midst and blew thrice on his trumpet, then laying it on the ground sat down beside it. Now, Prince, those border folk thought: "Whose is this sound so charming, so lovely, so sweet, so constraining, so enervating?" Coming together they asked the trumpeter. "This, my masters, is what men call a trumpet, the sound whereof is so charming, so lovely, so sweet, so constraining, so enervating." They laid the trumpet on its back and said: "Speak, master trumpet! Speak, master trumpet!" No sound did the trumpet make. They laid the trumpet curving down-ward, on this side, on that side, they stood it upright, they stood it topsy turvy, they struck it with their hands, with a clod, with a stick, with a sword, on one side, on the other, on every side, saying: "Speak, master trumpet! Speak, master trumpet!" Then, Prince, the trumpeter thought: "How silly are these border born men! Why will they seek so senselessly for the trumpet's sound?" And while they looked on, he took his trumpet, blew thrice upon it and, taking it

with him, went away. Then, Prince, those border born men thought thus: "When forsooth there was with that trumpet a man and an effort and air, that same trumpet made sounds. But when there was with it neither man, nor effort, nor air, that same trumpet made no sounds." Even so, Prince, when this body has its concomitants of life, heat and intelligence, then it goes about and comes back, it stands and sits and lies down, it sees forms with the eye, hears sounds with the ear, smells odours with the smell, tastes tastes with the tongue, touches the tangible with the body, cognizes things with the mind. But when it lacks those three concomitants, it can do none of these things. Let this, Prince, be to you a proof that there both is another world, rebirth other than of parents, and fruit and result of deeds well and ill-done.'

20. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, it still appears to me that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.'

'Have you any further evidence, Prince?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.'

'What may that be like?'

'Take the case, Master Kassapa, of men who have taken a felon red-handed and bring him up, saying: "My lord, we caught this felon in the act; inflict on him what penalty you wish." And I say "Well, my masters, flay this man alive, perchance we may see the soul of him passing out." They do so, but no passing of his soul do we see. And in cutting out his integument and his flesh and his nerves and breaking his bones and extracting the marrow thereof, still no soul of him do we see. This, Master Kassapa, is for me evidence that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.'

21. Well now, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning of what is spoken. Once upon a time, Prince, a fire-worshipping Jaṭila was dwelling in a leaf-hut in a woodland spot. Now the people of a certain countryside migrated. And their leader,

after spending one night near the Jaṭila's hermitage, went away. Then the Jaṭila thought: "If I were to go to that leader's camp, I might perhaps get something useful." And rising up bedtimes, he came to the leader's camp and there he saw, abandoned and lying on its back, a little baby. And when he saw it, he thought: "It is not fit that I should let a human being die while I look on. What if I were to carry this baby to my hermitage and foster, tend and rear it?" So he carried the baby to his hermitage and fostered, tended and reared it. When the boy had attained the age of ten or twelve years, it happened that the Jaṭila had something or other to do in the countryside. So he said to the boy: "I want to go to the countryside, my lad; keep up the fire; do not let it go out. If it should go out, here is a hatchet, here are sticks, here is the fire drill, so that if you do let the fire out, you can rekindle it again." And having thus instructed the boy, the Jaṭila went off to the countryside. Intent upon his play, the boy let the fire out. Then he thought: "Father told me, 'Tend the fire, my lad; let it not go out. If it should go out, here is a hatchet, here are sticks, here is the fire drill, so that if you do let the fire out, you can rekindle it again.' What if I were now to do so?" Then the boy chopped the fire drill with the hatchet, thinking: "Perhaps that's how I shall get fire." No fire got he. He split the fire drill in twain, in three, four, five, ten, a hundred pieces, he made it into pieceмeal, he then pounded it in a mortar and winnowed it in the wind, thinking that so he might perhaps get fire. No fire got he. Then the Jaṭila, having accomplished his business, came back to his own hermitage and said to the boy: "Why, child, you have let the fire out!" "Father, the fire went out because I was busy at my game. Then I thought of what you had told me and I set about rekindling it. And I chopped the fire drill, with the hatchet to get fire, but no fire came. And I went on till I had smashed the fire drill into atoms, pounded it in a mortar and winnowed it in the wind, but I never got any fire!" Then the Jaṭila thought: "How silly, how unintelligent is the lad! Why will he be seeking fire in this senseless manner? And while the boy looked on, he took a fire drill,

and making fire said to him: "This is how to make fire, my lad. One doesn't try to get it as you, so silly and unintelligent, were trying." Even so, Prince, have you, silly and unintelligent, sought after another world. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions. Let them not involve you for long in bale and sorrow!'

22. 'Even though Master Kassapa, says this, I still cannot bring myself to renounce this evil set of opinions. King Pasenadi the Kosalan knows me, and so do foreign kings, as holding to the creed and the opinion that there is neither another world nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well and ill-done. If I, Master Kassapa, renounce these opinions, people will say of me: "How silly is Prince Pāyāsi, how unintelligent, how badly he grasps anything!" In wrath thereat will I keep to it. In guile will I keep to it. In self-respect will I keep to it!'

23. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile; for it is by way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning of what has been said. Once upon a time, Prince, a great caravan of a thousand carts was going from the East country into the West country. Wherever it went, it consumed swiftly straw, wood, water and verdure. Now in that caravan were two caravan leaders, each commanding one half of the carts. And this occurred to them: "This is a great caravan, one of a thousand carts. Wherever we go, we consume everything. What if we were to divide this caravan into two, five hundred carts in each."

'So they divided that caravan into two equal portions. Then one of the leaders collected large quantities of straw, wood and water and started (his carts). On the second or third march the leader saw a swarthy red-eyed man coming from the opposite direction, armed with a quiver, wearing a lotus wreath, his garments and hair wet and driving a chariot drawn by asses, its wheel splashed with mud. When he saw this man he said: "Whence come you, Sir?"

' "From such and such a district."

' "Whither go you?"

' "To such and such a district."

' "Has there, Sir, been any great fall of rain recently in the jungle?"

' "Yes indeed, Sir, there has been a great rain in the jungle just in front, the roads are well watered, there is much grass and wood and water. Throw away the grass and wood and water, Sir, you have already got; with light-laden carts you will go quite quickly; do not tire your teams."

'Then the leader told his carters what the man had said, and bade them throw away their provender and wood, that the caravan might travel more quickly.

' "So be it, sir," the carters replied, and did so. But at their first camp they saw no grass or wood or water, nor at the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth or seventh camp. So they all met with ruin and disaster. And then that fiend, the *yakkha*, devoured all the men and the cattle in that caravan, leaving only the bones behind.

'When the second caravan leader knew that the other caravan had got well on its way, he took in large supplies of grass and wood and water and set out. And he too met a swarthy red-eyed man, and exchanged with him the same remarks and was also bidden to throw away his provender.

'Then that leader said to his carters: "This man, sirs, says that there has recently been much rain in the jungle, that the roads are watered and there is plenty of grass and wood and water. And he advises us to throw away our provender, so that with lightened carts, we may travel quicker and not weary our teams. But this man, sirs, is not a friend of ours, nor a kinsman, nor of our blood. Why should we act as if we trusted him? Our stock of provender is not to be thrown away; let the caravan proceed with the goods we brought; let us not part with what we have."

' "So be it, sir," agreed the carters, and went on with the stock they had loaded. And at seven successive camping places they saw no grass or wood or water; but they saw the other caravan that had come to grief. And they saw the skeletons of the men and cattle devoured by that *yakkha* fiend.

'Then the caravan leader said to the carters: "That caravan, my masters, met with ruin and disaster, through having that silly caravan leader for its guide. Well then, let us leave here such of our wares as are of little value and take from that caravan such wares as are of great value." "So be it, master," replied the carters and made the transfer and passed safely through the jungle, through having this wise caravan leader for their guide.

'Even so you, Prince, silly and unintelligent, will meet with ruin and disaster in that you seek so senselessly after another world, even like that former caravan leader. They who fancy that they can believe whatever they hear, will meet with ruin and disaster, even like those carters. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions; renounce them, I say! Let them not involve you long in bale and sorrow!'

24. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, I still cannot bring myself to renounce this evil set of opinions. King Pasenadi the Kosalan knows me and so do foreign kings, as holding to the creed and the opinion that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents by human parentage, nor fruit or result of deeds well and ill-done. If I, Master Kassapa, renounce these opinions, people will say of me: "How silly is prince Pāyāsi, how unintelligent, how badly he grasps anything!" In wrath thereat will I keep to it. In guile will I keep to it. In self-respect will I keep to it!'

25. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning of what has been said. Once upon a time, Prince, a certain swineherd was going from his own village to another village. There he saw a heap of dry dung thrown away. Seeing it he thought: "That's a lot of dry dung thrown away which will feed my pig. What if I were to carry it away?" So he spread out his cloak and collecting the dry dung, tied it into a bundle and lifting it on to his head went on. In the after-part of his journey there fell a heavy shower of rain out of season. He, splashed with muck to his nail-tips, bearing his oozing, dripping dung-burden, went on his way. And men seeing him said: "Mercy, you must be mad, you must be out of your senses! How can you tote along that oozing, dripping load of dung, splashed with muck to your nail-tips?" "It's you that are mad, you that are out of your senses; by this my pigs will get food." Even so, methinks, Prince, do you talk, like this dung-carrying simile. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions, renounce them, I say! Let them not be long a cause of bale and sorrow to you.'

26. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, I cannot bring myself to renounce this evil set of opinions. King Pasenadi the Kosalan knows me and so do foreign kings, as holding to the creed and the opinion that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents by human parentage, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done. If I, Master Kassapa, renounce these opinions, people will say of me: "How silly is Prince Pāyāsi, how unintelligent, how bad is his grasp of things!" In anger thereat will I keep to it. In guile will I keep to it. In self-respect will I keep to it!'

27. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning of what is said. Once upon a time, Prince, two gamesters were playing with dice. One gamester swallowed, as it came, each adverse dice. The other gamester saw him do this and said: "Look here, friend, you've won outright; give me the dice; I will make a votive offering of them." "Good, friend," said the other and handed over the dice. Then the second gamester smeared over the dice with poison and proposed to the former: "Come along, friend, let's play." "Good, friend," replied the other. Again, therefore, they played and again, that gamester swallowed each adverse dice. The second gamester saw him doing so and said:

The man knows not the swallowed dice
With sharpest burning is smeared o'er.
Swallow, you false cheat, swallow now!
Bitter the hour at hand for you!

'Even like the simile of the gamester, Prince, methinks, is what you say. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions,

renounce them, I say! Let them not be long a source of bale and sorrow to you!

28 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, I still cannot bring myself to renounce this evil set of opinions. King Pasenadi the Kosalan knows me and so do foreign kings, as holding to the creed and the opinion that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done. If I, Master Kassapa, renounce these opinions, people will say: "How silly is Prince Pāyāsi, how unintelligent, how bad is his grasp of things!" In wrath thereat will I keep to it. In guile will I keep to it. In self-respect will I keep to it.'

29. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning of what is said. Once upon a time, Prince, a certain country-side migrated. And one man said to his crony: "Let's go, friend, to that country-side; perhaps we may come upon some treasure." "Good, friend," assented the other. And they came to where, in that country-side, there was a certain village street. There, they saw a heap of hemp thrown away. Then, one said to the other: "Here's a heap of hemp: you make some into a bundle, I'll do the same and we'll carry it away." The other consented and they did so.

'Bearing this burden, they went on to another village street. There, they saw a heap of hempen thread thrown away and one said to the other: "This heap of hempen thread thrown away is just the thing we want hemp for. Well then, friend, you throw away your load of hemp, I'll throw away mine and we'll take away each a load of hempen thread." "I've brought this load of hemp a long way, friend and it's well tied up—that's enough for me; you choose for yourself." So the former changed his load for one of hempen thread.

'Then they came to another village street. There they saw a heap of hempen cloths. And the one said to the other: "This heap of hempen cloths is just the thing we want hemp for, or hempen thread for. Well then, friend, you throw away your load of hemp. I'll throw away my load of hempen thread and

we'll each take a load of hempen cloth." "I've brought this load of hemp a long way, friend, and it's well tied up—that's enough for me; you choose for yourself." So the former changed his load for one of hempen cloth.

'Then they came to another village street. There they saw a heap of flax; and to another where they saw linen thread; and to another where they saw linen cloth. And at each place the one crony made a change for the better, the other retained his hemp. Further they saw cotton-down, cotton thread and calico; and the same thing happened. Further they saw iron, copper, tin, lead, silver, gold. So that in the end the one crony had a load of gold, the other of hemp.

'So they came to their own village. There the crony who brought a load of hemp pleased neither his parents, nor his own family, nor his friends and won neither pleasure nor happiness. But the other with his load of gold both gave and won pleasure.

'Even like the simile of the load of hemp, methinks Prince, is what you say. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions, renounce them, I say! Let them not be long a source of bale and sorrow to you.'

30. 'With Master Kassapa's first simile I was pleased, I was charmed; moreover I wanted to hear his ready wit in questions, for I regarded Master Kassapa as one who was to be opposed. It is wonderful, Master Kassapa, it is marvellous! Just as if one were to set up what has been upset, or were to reveal that which has been hidden away, or were to point out the road to the bewildered, or were to bring a lamp into the darkness, so that they that have eyes may see—even so has the truth been declared in many a figure by Master Kassapa. And I, even I, betake myself for refuge to Gotama the Exalted One, to the Doctrine and to the Brotherhood. May Master Kassapa accept me as a disciple, as one who from this day forth as long as life endures, has taken him as his guide. And I should like, Master Kassapa, to offer a great sacrifice. Let Master Kassapa instruct me herein that it may bring me long welfare and happiness.'

31 'At the sort of sacrifice, Prince, where oxen are slain, or goats, or fowls and pigs, or diverse creatures are put an end to; and those that take part in the sacrifice have wrong views, wrong intention, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong endeavour, wrong mindfulness, wrong rapture, such a sacrifice, Prince, is neither of great fruitfulness nor of great profit, nor of great renown, nor of widespread effect. It is just as if a farmer, Prince, were to enter a wood taking with him plough and seed, and were there, in an untilled tract, in unfavourable soil, among unuprooted stumps, to plant seeds that were broken, rotten, spoilt by wind and heat, out of season, not in good condition, and the gods were not to give good rain in due season. Would those seeds attain growth, increase and expansion, or would the farmer get abundant returns?' 'No indeed, Master Kassapa.'

'So is it, Prince, with that sort of sacrifice. But where, Prince, neither oxen are slain, nor goats, nor fowls and pigs, nor are diverse creatures put an end to, and those that partake of the sacrifice have right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right rapture, such a sacrifice is of great fruitfulness, of great profit, of great renown, of widespread effect. It is just as if a farmer, Prince, were to enter a wood, taking with him plough and seed, and were there, in a well-tilled tract, in favourable soil well-cleared of stumps, to plant seed that was unbroken, free from mildew, unspoilt by wind or heat, in season and in good condition and the gods were to give good rain in the due season. Would those seeds grow, increase, expand and would the farmer get abundant returns?'

'He would indeed, Master Kassapa.'

'So is it, Prince, with that sort of sacrifice, where no creatures are put to death, and those that take part therein are of high character. Such a sacrifice is of great fruitfulness, profit, renown and widespread effect.'

32 Then Prince Pāyāsi instituted a gift to wanderers and brahmins, the poor, wayfarers, beggars and petitioners. In

that gift such food was given as gruel and scraps of food and coarse robes with ball-fringes. And at that gift a young brahmin named Uttara was passed over. When the largesse had been distributed he mocked, saying: 'By this largesse I have met Prince Pāyāsi in this world, but how about the next?' Pāyāsi heard of this and sent word to Uttara asking him if it were true that he were saying this.

'Yes, sir,' replied Uttara.

'But why have you been saying this, my dear Uttara? Do not we who are seeking merit look for results from giving?'

'In your gift, sir, such food as gruel and broken meats are given which you sir, would not touch with your foot, much less eat; also coarse ball-fringed robes which you, sir, would not deign to use as carpets, much less to wear. You, sir, are pleasant and dear to us; how are we to associate what is pleasant and dear with what is unpleasant?'

'Well then, my dear Uttara, arrange that such food shall be given as I eat and such garments be given as I wear.'

'Very good, sir,' replied Uttara, and did so.

Now Prince Pāyāsi, inasmuch as he had bestowed his gift without thoroughness, not with his own hands, without due thought, as something discarded, was, after his death, reborn into the communion of the Four Great Kings, in the empty mansion of the Acacia. But the youth Uttara, who had objected to that gift and had bestowed his gift thoroughly, with his own hands, with due thought, not as something discarded, was, after his death, reborn in a bright and happy world, into the communion of the Three-and-Thirty Gods.

33 Now at that time the venerable Gavampati used frequently to go for his siesta to the empty mansion of the Acacia. And Pāyāsi, now one of the gods, came up to him and saluting him, stood on one side. To him so standing, the venerable Gavampati said: 'Who art thou, friend?' 'I sir, am Prince Pāyāsi.'

'Wert thou not once of the opinion that there was no other world, no rebirth other than of parents, no fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done?'

'I was indeed, Sir, but through his reverence Kumāra Kassapa detached myself from that evil set of opinions.'

'But the youth Uttara, who objected to thy gift, friend, whereunto has he been reborn?

'He, Sir, having objected to my gift and having himself bestowed a gift thoroughly, with his own hands, with due thought, not as something discarded, has, since he died, been reborn in the bright and happy world into the communion of the Three-and-Thirty Gods. I, sir, inasmuch as I bestowed my gift without thoroughness, not with my own hand, without due thought, as something discarded, was after my death reborn into the communion of the Four Great Kings, in the empty mansion of the Acacia. Wherefore, Gavampati, Sir, go thou into the world of men and tell them: "Give ye your gifts with thoroughness, with your own hands, with due thought and give not as if ye were discarding somewhat. For so did not Prince Pāyāsi; and he, after his death, was reborn into the communion of the Four Great Kings, in the empty mansion of the Acacia. But the youth Uttara, who bestowed his gifts in the right way, was after his death reborn in the bright and happy world, into the communion of the Three-and-Thirty Gods."'

34. So the venerable Gavampati came back to the world of men and there, told these things.

(The Pāyāsi Dialgoue is ended.)

Sāmañña-phala-sutta

The *Sāmañña-phala-sutta* as translated by T. W. Rhys Davids with his own introduction is given here (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, vol. ii, reprinted, London 1925, pp. 56–95)

The special interest of this dialogue is that it practically forms the main source for modern scholars for the understanding of a number of the most prominent 'heretics' or non-conformists of Buddha's time, inclusive of a certain Ajita Keśakambalī who is generally taken as a representative

of extreme materialism and hence a follower of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata view.

Sāmañña-phala-sutta

(INTRODUCTION BY RHYS DAVIDS)

The first Dialogue deals with the most fundamental conceptions that lay at the root of the Buddha's doctrine, his Dharma, his ethical and philosophical view of life. The second puts forth his justification for the foundation of the Order, for the enunciation of the Vinaya: the practical rules of canon law by which life in the Order is regulated. The Rules themselves are not discussed. It is only certain ethical precepts that are referred to in so many words. The question is a larger and wider one than the desirability of any particular injunction. It is as to the advantage, as to the use, of having any Order at all.

King Ajātasattu of Magadha, after pointing out the advantages derived from their occupations by a long list of ordinary people in the world, asks whether the members of the Order, who have given up the world, derive any corresponding advantage, visible in this life, from theirs. The answer is a list of such advantages, arranged in ascending scale of importance, each one mentioned being said to be better and sweeter than the one just before described.

The list of ordinary occupations given in the question is interesting evidence—especially as compared with the later lists of a similar kind referred to in the notes—of social conditions in the Ganges valley at the time when this Dialogue was composed. And the introductory story, in which the king explains how he had put a similar question to the founders of six other orders, and gives the six replies he received, is interesting evidence of the views held by the authors of the Dialogue as to beliefs current at the time.

The replies are no less interesting from the fact, pointed out

by the king, that they are not to the point. Each of the six teachers goes off into a general statement of his theory instead of answering the question put. But as the works, if any, of all these teachers—save one Nigaṇṭha Nāta-putta—have been irretrievably lost, the summary here given of their doctrines is of great importance as evidence of the sort of speculation they favoured. The six paragraphs are short and obscure, and this is just what we should expect. As is the case with the accounts given by early Catholic writers of opinions they held to be heretical, the versions of these six sets of belief are neither adequate nor clear. But a number of other references to these six theories are found, as pointed out in the notes, both in the Buddhist and in the Jain records. And it would be premature to discuss our six paragraphs until the whole of the available evidence is made accessible to scholars. It is noteworthy that in at least two of these answers some of the expressions used seem to be in a Prakrit differing in dialect from the Pali of the Piṭakas. And these are not the only instances of the preservation in the Piṭakas of ancient dialectical varieties.

The answer which the Buddha is represented to have given, in his turn, to the question raised by the king, takes (as is so often the case) the form of a counter-question. 'The very man whom, under ordinary circumstances, you would treat as slave or servant—what treatment would you mete out to him after he had joined an Order?' The king confesses that he would treat him as a person worthy of honour and respect. And neither in question nor answer is there any reference specially to the Buddhist Order. It is taken for granted, alike by the Buddha and the king, that anyone who had devoted himself to the religious life, whatever the views or opinions he held, or the association he had joined, would, in accordance with the remarkable tolerance of that age and country, be treated with equal respect and courtesy. And the same note runs all through the Dialogue. The Buddha shows the advantages of the 'life of a recluse', not necessarily of a follower of his own. And most of what he

says would apply as much to his strongest opponents as to the members of his own Order.

The following, in a constantly ascending order of merit, are the advantages, visible in this life, which he claims for such a recluse:

1. The honour and respect shown to a member of a religious order.
2. The training in all those lower kinds of mere morality set out in the very ancient document called 'The Sīlas'. The importance of this document has been discussed in the Introduction to the Brahma jāla. The details of it may be summarised here as follows:

   a. Mercy and kindness to all living things (§ 43).[1]
   b. Honesty.
   c. Chastity.
   d. Truthfulness, peacefulness, courtesy, and good sense in speech (§ 44).
   e. Abstinence from luxury of twelve different kinds, and freedom from trickery and violence (§ 45).
   f. Not injuring plants (§ 46).
   g. Not laying up treasure, of seven kinds (§ 47).
   h. Not frequenting shows, of twenty-six specified kinds (§ 48).
   i. Not playing games, eighteen being mentioned by name (§ 49).
   j. Not using luxurious rugs, etc., of twenty different kinds (§ 50).
   k. Not using toilet luxuries, of which twenty-two are specified (§ 51).
   l. Not saying vain things, of which twenty-seven instances are given (§ 52).
   m. Not using sophistical and rude phrases when talking of higher things (§ 53).
   n. Not acting as go-between (§ 54).

o Not practising trickery and mystery under the guise of religion (§ 55).

p Not gaining a living by low arts, such as auguries (§ 56); advising as to the best sorts of various things (§ 57); prophesying as to war and its results (§ 58); astrology (§ 59); foretelling famine or plague or the reverse (§ 60); arranging marriages, using spells, or worshipping gods (§ 61); various sorts of medical trickery (§ 62).

3 The confidence of heart and absence of fear resulting from the consciousness of right doing (§ 63).

4 The habit of keeping guarded the door of his senses (§ 64).

5 The constant self-possession he thus gains (§ 65).

6 The power of being content with little, with simplicity of life (§ 66).

7 The emancipation of heart from the Five Hindrances to self-mastery—covetousness, ill-temper, laziness, worry and flurry, and perplexity (§§ 68–74).

8 The joy and peace that, as a result of the sense of this emancipation, fills his whole being (§ 75).

9 The practice of the Four jhānas (§§ 75–82).[2]

10 The Insight arising from knowledge (ñāṇa-dassana) (§§ 83, 84).

11 The power of projecting mental images (§§ 85, 86).

12 The five modes of mystic Insight (abhiññā); §§ 87–96—

a The practice of Iddhi.

b The Heavenly Ear—hearing heavenly sounds.

c Knowledge of others' thoughts.

d Memory of his own previous births.

e Knowledge of other peoples' previous birth (the Heavenly Eye).

13 The realisation of the Four Truths, the destruction of the Āsavas and attainment of Arahatship (§§ 97, 98).

Now it is perfectly true that of these thirteen consecutive propositions or groups of propositions, it is only the last, No. 13, which is exclusively Buddhist. But the things omitted, the union of the whole of those included into one system, the order in which the ideas are arranged, the way in which they are treated as so many steps of a ladder whose chief value depends on the fact that it leads up to the culminating point of Nirvāṇa in Arahatship—all this is also distinctively Buddhist. And further, the whole statement, the details of it, the order of it, must have soaked very thoroughly into the minds of the early Buddhist. For we find the whole, nearly the whole, of it repeated (with direct reference by name to our Sutta as the oldest and most complete enumeration of it) not only in all the subsequent Dialogues translated in this volume, but also in many others.

In these repetitions the order is always the same, and the details (so far as they occur) are the same. But one or other of the thirteen groups is often omitted, and the application of those of them that remain is always different—that is to say, they are enumerated in support, or in illustration, of a different proposition.

A comparison of some of these other applications of the list is full of suggestion as to its real meaning here.

In the Ambaṭṭha, the point is as to caste. The Kṣatriya caste is the most honourable, but wisdom and conduct are higher still. What then is the right conduct, what the right wisdom? The conduct (*saraṇa*) is all the above paragraphs from 2–9 inclusive; the wisdom (*vijjā*) is the rest, 10–13.[3]

In the Soṇadaṇḍa, the question is: 'What is the true Brahman?' After, by his usual Socratic method, leading Soṇadaṇḍa to acknowledge that the only two essential requisites are goodness and intelligence, these last are explained as above (2–9 and 10–13).

In the Kūṭadanta, the question is as to the right sort of sacrifice. After rejecting animal sacrifice we have generosity (of various kinds, each better than the last), faith, training in the precepts, and 2–13, set forth as each of them a better sacrifice than the last.

In the Gāliya, the question is whether the soul is the same as,

or is other than, the body. The answer is a counter-question. Repeating our sections 2–13 (omitting 11 and 12) the Buddha asks, at the end of each subdivision, whether men who do *that* would be likely to trouble themselves as to speculations about the soul? And the answer being, of course, 'No', rejoins that neither does he.

In the Poṭṭhapāda the question is as to the way in which various recluses attain to mystic trance. The Buddha's answer is that it is by training; and the training should be first in morals (our groups 2 and 3) then in the things mentioned in our groups 4–9, and then in the Four Arūpa Vimokkhas. The Dialogue then takes up other questions, omitting our groups 10–13.

In the Kevaḍḍha the talk is on miracles, mystic powers. And the Buddha, disparaging all others, calls attention to our groups 2–13.

In the Lohicca the question is as to who is the right sort of teacher; and the answer is that it is the one whose pupil carries out our groups 2–13.

In the Tevijja the question is as to the way by which one can attain to union with God (*Brahmā-sahavyatā*). The answer gives our groups 1–8, and then adds the Four Brahma-vihāras.

In the shorter of the two Hatthipadopama Suttas (No. 27 in the Majjhima), the question discussed between a Brahman and an ascetic is as to the ascendancy of the Buddha over the other teachers of the time. The Buddha himself giving afterwards the full reason, repeats our group 2 (omitting however clauses *f* to *p* inclusive),[4] then repeats our groups 6,3,4,5,7,8,9, then omitting groups 10 and 11, quotes two only, the last two (omitting the first three)[5] of the five Abhiññās in group 12, and concludes with group 13 in full.

In the Mahā Taṇhā-saṅkhaya Sutta (No. 38 in the Majjhima), we have the same sequence—our group 2 (omitting *f* to *p*), then 6,3,4,5,7,8 and 9. The rest is omitted.

In the next Sutta, the longer of the Assapuras, after a summary in different words of most of the contents of our group 2, we have our group 4, then two paragraphs not in our Sutta, then

our groups 5,7,8,9, and the last two only out of group 12, and then (as a climax) our group 13—all enumerated to show what is the true Brahman, the true Samaṇa.

Then again in the Sakuludāyi, No. 79 of the Majjhima, it is declared to be not for the sake of realising happiness that recluses take up the celibate life in the Order under the Buddha, but for the sake of those matters set forth in our groups 2–9,[6] inclusive of the two last of the Abhiññās, and above all for the sake of the attainment of Arahatship. Beşides the differences pointed out above between the Suttas preserved in the Dīgha, and in the Majjhima, respectively—differences due, I think, solely to the difference in the subjects under discussion—there are also a few verbal differences, amounting to scarcely more than 'various readings', due, perhaps, to the divergent traditions of the Dīgha-bhāṇakā and the Majjhima-bhāṇakā (the students and repeaters of the two collections in which the Dialogues are handed down to us).

However this may be, it is clear that the sum and the sequence of the paragraphs in our Sutta is regarded as of great importance, not as a statement of Buddhist ethics, or of Buddhist philosophy, or of the Buddhist religion, but as a statement of the advantages that may be looked for as the result of life in an Order. And further, that the statement has to be slightly modified and shortened when the question is the narrower one of life in the particular community which we call the Buddhist Order.

The difference is interesting—in the scheme for the Buddhist Order, the ñāṇa-dassana, the power of projecting a mental image (apparently of oneself, which seems like the earliest germ of the modern Yoga ideas about the astral body), the powers of Iddhi, the power of hearing heavenly sounds (something like hearing the music of the spheres), and the power of knowing the thoughts of others, are all omitted.

In the abstract given above, I have called these last three, together with the power of calling to mind one's own and other peoples' previous births, the Five Abhiññās or Intuitions. And this is in accord with the passages on which Childers's article

sub voce is based. But these powers are not so called either in our text, or in any other Dialogue yet published. The use of the word *abhiññā* in this technical sense would seem, therefore (to judge from the published texts), to be a sign of the later date of the book in which it occurs.[7] In the oldest portions of the Piṭakas the word is always used in the general sense of insight, and if any special limitation is hinted at, it is simply the insight of Arahatship that is emphasised (as in *Dhammapada* 423, which is a quotation from *Iti-Vuttaka*, No. 99, and is quoted also at Aṅguttara I. 165).[8]

The Eightfold Path is not mentioned in our Sutta. This is not merely because it is not possible always to mention everything. The Path does not come within the special advantages of life in the Order. To enter upon the Path to Arahatship, to walk along it, is not peculiar to members of the order. A *bhikṣu* might reach the goal either along that path, open also to laymen,[9] or by the process set out in our Sutta. They are two quite distinct methods of training, of which our Sutta deals only with one.

It is essential, in order to understand Buddhist ethics, to bear in mind that there are (and must be in such a system) several different lines along which both speculation and edifying teaching run. These are:

1. The course of conduct laid down for the ordinary Buddhist layman, contained in the Gahapati-vaggas found in the various *nikāyas*.[10]

2. The rules as to the outward conduct of the members of the Order, laid down in the Pātimokkha and in the Khandhakas.[11]

3. The system of self-training in higher things prescribed for members of the order. Of this, our present Sutta is a striking example.

4. The method of self-training laid down for those who have entered upon the Path to Arahatship. (The Four Truths, the Eightfold Path, and the Āsavas.)

In the first of these, Buddhism goes very little beyond the current ethics of the day. In the second, a very great deal has been simply incorporated from the rules found expedient by previous recluses, both Brahman and non-Brahman, though there are numerous differences, both of the positive regulations included, and also of things deliberately omitted. Even the third, as we have seen, cannot be considered, except in a very limited sense, as exclusively Buddhist. It is in the fourth that the essential doctrines of Buddhism are to be found. All four have, no doubt, become welded together into a more or less consistent whole. But to understand the whole, the relation of its various parts has to be kept constantly in view.

This will explain an apparent contradiction. The last Sutta quoted, the Sakuludāyi, states that the aim of the religious or celibate life as led in the Buddha's Order, is the attainment, in order, of the various things set out in our Sutta (groups 2–9, 12 and 13).

Now in other passages, other things are stated to be the aim.

Thus in the Saṃyutta (IV, 51), the Buddha himself is represented as explaining that the celibate life (the *brahmacariyā*)[12] is led by his followers for the sake of the complete understanding of pain (*dukkha-pariññā*). Further on in the same book (VI, 253 = V. 6, 27), this is thrice repeated, with the suggestive addition that there is one way to this—the Noble Eightfold Path.

Again, in the Aṅguttara (IV, 7) the higher life is said to be for the sake of getting rid of, of cutting through, seven Bonds which prevent one from attaining Arahatship. The argument on pp. 88, 99 (though the word *brahmacariyā* does not occur) comes to much the same thing. And further on in the same book (IV, 272), the object is stated to be for the sake of getting rid of five particular sorts of envy.

Nāgasena is, therefore, quite right when he says that the object of renouncing the world to life in the Order is for the sake of righteousness and peace[13] and in another place, that it is to the end that sorrow may pass away.[14] All these explanations belong to the Path, not to the rules of the Order. They are not really inconsistent with the other aim that our Sutta sets out.

And they are only additional proof, if such were needed, that it is no more possible to sum up in a single phrase (as some writers have tried to do) the aim of Buddhism, or the object of life in the Order, than it would be to sum up in a similar way the aim of Christianity, or the object for which men enter a Christian Order. The aims are necessarily as various as the character and circumstances of the various individuals who take them up. And Nāgasena does not hesitate to add—and to add in speaking to a king—that some had joined the Order in terror at the tyranny of kings, some in fear of robbers, some because they were harassed by debt, and some perhaps merely to gain a livelihood.

This also would apply to other Orders both in India and elsewhere, and is quite consistent with our Sutta, which only purports to set forth the advantages the early Buddhists held to be the likely results of joining, from whatever motive, such an order as their own.

Sāmañña-phala-sutta

(THE FRUITS OF THE LIFE OF A RECLUSE[15])

I EXI

1. Thus have I heard. The Blessed One was once dwelling at Rājagaha in the Mango Grove of Jīvaka, the children's physician,[16] with a great company of the brethren, with twelve hundred and fifty of the brethren. Now at that time the king of Magadha, Ajātasattu, the son of the Videha princess,[17] on the Uposatha day, held on the fifteenth, on Komudi (white water-lily), the full moon day of the fourth month,[18] at night, when the moon was full, was seated on the upper terrace roof of his palace surrounded by his ministers. And the king, on that sacred day, gave utterance to a hymn of joy, saying:

'How pleasant, friends, is the moonlight night!

How beautiful, friends, is the moonlight night!
How lovely, friends, is the moonlight night!
How soothing, friends, is the moonlight night!
How grand a sign, friends, is the moonlight night!

'Who is the recluse or Brahman whom we may call upon to-night, who, when we call upon him, shall be able to satisfy our hearts?'[19]

2. When he had thus spoken, a certain minister said to the king: 'There is, Sire, Pūraṇa Kassapa, the head of an order, of a following, the teacher of a school, well known and of repute as a sophist, revered by the people, a man of experience, who has long been a recluse, old and well stricken in years. Let your Majesty pay a visit to him. It may well be[20] that, on calling upon him, your heart, Sire, shall find peace.' But when he had thus spoken, Ajātasattu the king kept silence.

3–7. The other five ministers spoke in the same terms of Makkhali of the cow-pen, of Ajita of the garment of hair, of Pakudha Kaccāyana, of Sañjaya of the Belaṭṭha clan, and of the Niganṭha of the Nāta clan. And still, to each, Ajātasattu the king kept silence.

8. Now at that time Jīvaka the physician was seated, in silence, not far from Ajātasattu the king. And the king said to him: 'But you, friend Jīvaka, why do you say nothing?'

'The Blessed One, Sire, the Arahat, the all-awakened-one, is now lodging in our Mango Grove, with a great company of the brethren, with twelve hundred and fifty brethren. And this is the good report that has been said abroad as to Gotama the Blessed One: "An Arahat, fully awakened, is the exalted One, abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge of the worlds, unsurpassed as a guide to mortals willing to be led, the teacher of gods and men, a blessed Buddha." Let your Majesty pay a visit to him. It may well be that, on calling upon him, your heart, Sire, shall find peace.'

'Then, friend Jīvaka, have the riding-elephants made ready.'

9. 'Very good, Sire!' said Jīvaka the physician in assent to

the words of the king. And he had five hundred she-elephants made ready, and the state elephant the king was wont to ride, and had word brought to the king: 'The elephants, Sire, are caparisoned. Do now what seemeth to you meet.' Then the king had five hundred of his women mounted on the she-elephants, one on each; and himself mounted the state elephant; and he went forth, the attendants bearing torches, in royal pomp, from Rājagaha to Jīvaka the physician's Mango Grove.

10. And the king, when close upon the Mango Grove, was seized with a sudden fear and consternation, and the hairs on his body stood erect. And anxious and excited, he said to Jīvaka: 'You are playing me no tricks, Jīvaka? You are not deceiving me? You are not betraying me to my foes? How can it be that there should be no sound at all, not a sneeze nor a cough, in so large an assembly of the brethren, among twelve hundred and fifty of the brethren?'

'Fear not, O king. I play no trick; neither deceive you; nor would I betray you to the foe. Go on, O king, go straight on! There, in the pavilion hall, the lamps are burning.'

11. Then the king went on, on his elephant as far as the path was passable for elephants, and then on foot, to the door of the pavilion; and then said to Jīvaka: 'But where, Jīvaka, is the Blessed One?'

'That is he, O king, sitting against the middle pillar, and facing the East, with the brethren around him.'

12. Then the king went up, and stood respectfully on one side. And as he stood there and looked on the assembly, seated in perfect silence, calm as a clear lake, he broke out: 'Would that my son, Udāyi Bhadda, might have such calm as this assembly of the brethren now has!'

'Do your thoughts then go where love guides them?'

'I love the boy, and wish that he, Udāyi Bhadda, might enjoy such calm as this assembly has.'

13. Then the king bowed to the Blessed One, and stretching forth his joined palms in salutation to the Order, took his seat aside, and said to the Blessed One: 'I would fain question the

Blessed One on a certain matter, if he give me opportunity to set forth the question.'

'Ask, O king, whatsoever you desire.'

14. 'There are, Sir, a number of ordinary crafts: mahouts, horsemen, charioteers, archers, standard-bearers, camp marshalls, camp followers, high military officers of royal birth, military scouts,[21] men brave as elephants, champions, heroes, warriors in buckskin, home-born slaves, cooks, barbers, bath attendants, confectioners, garland-makers, washermen, weavers, basket-makers, potters, arithmeticians, accountants, and whatsoever others of like kind there may be. All these enjoy, in this very world, the visible fruits of their craft. They maintain themselves, and their parents and children and friends, in happiness and comfort. They keep up gifts, the object of which is gain on high, to recluses and Brahmans—gifts that lead to rebirth in heaven, that rebound to happiness, and have bliss as their result. Can you, Sir, declare to me any such immediate fruit, visible in this very world, of the life of a recluse?'[22]

15. 'Do you admit to us, O king, that you have put the same question to other recluses or to Brahmans?'

'I do, Lord'

'Then tell us how they answered it, if you do not mind.'

'I have no objection where the Blessed One, or others like him, are'

'Then speak, O king.'

16. 'Once I went to Pūraṇa Kassapa.[23] And after exchanging with him the greetings and compliments of friendship and courtesy, I seated myself beside him, and put to him the same question as I have now put, Lord, to you.'

17. 'Then Pūraṇa Kassapa said to me: "To him who acts, O king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to punish, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trembles or causes others to tremble, to him who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or

adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass, of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges, striking and slaying, mutilating and having men mutilated, oppressing and having men oppressed, there would be no guilt thence resulting; no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving alms, and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit, nor increase of merit." Thus, Lord, did Pūraṇa Kassapa, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of non-action.[24] Just, Lord, as if a man, when asked what a mango was, should explain what a bread-fruit is, so did Pūraṇa Kassapa, when asked what was the fruit, in this present state of being, of the life of a recluse, expound his theory of non-action. Then, Lord, it occurred to me: "How should such a one as I think of giving dissatisfaction to any recluse or Brahman in my realm?" So I neither applauded nor blamed what he said, and though dissatisfied, I gave utterance to no expression of dissatisfaction, and neither accepting nor rejecting that answer of his, I arose from my seat, and departed thence.'

19. [In the same manner I went to five other teachers, and receiving to this same question an answer not to the point, I behaved in each case as just set forth. And the answers of the five were thus:][25]

20. 'When one day I had thus asked Makkhali of the cow-pen,[26] he said: "There is, O king, no cause, either ultimate or remote, for the depravity of beings; they become depraved without reason and without cause. There is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the rectitude of being; they become pure without reason and without cause. The attainment of any

given condition, of any character, does not depend either on one's own acts, or on the acts of another, or on human effort. There is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength or human vigour. All animals, all creatures (with one, two, or more senses) all beings (produced from eggs or in a womb), all souls (in plants)[27] are without force and power and energy of their own. They are bent this way and that by their fate, by the necessary conditions of the class to which they belong, by their individual nature: and it is according to their position in one or other of the six classes that they experience ease or pain.

"There are fourteen hundred thousands of the principal sorts of birth and again six thousand others, and again six hundred. There are five hundred sorts of Karma, and again five (according to the five senses) and again three (according to act, word, and thought); and there is a whole Karma and a half Karma (the whole being a Karma of act or word, the half a Karma of thought).

"There are sixty-two paths (or modes of conduct), sixty-two periods, six classes (or distinctions among men),[28] eight stages of a prophet's existence,[29] forty-nine hundred sorts of occupation,[30] forty-nine hundred sorts of wandering mendicants, forty-nine hundred regions dwelt in by Nāgas, two thousand faculties, three thousand purgatories, thirty-six places where dust accumulates, seven sorts of animate and seven of inanimate production, and seven of production by grafting, seven sorts of gods, and of men, and of devils, and of great lakes, and seven principal and again seven hundred minor sorts of Pacuṭas[31] of precipices, and of dreams.

"There are eighty-four hundred thousand periods during which both fools and wise alike, wandering in transmigration, shall at last make an end of pain. Though the wise should hope: 'By this virtue or this performance of duty, or this penance, or this righteousness will I make the Karma (I have inherited), that is not yet mature, mature'—though the fool should hope, by the same means, to get gradually rid of Karma that has matured—neither of them can do it. The ease and pain, mea-

sured out, as it were, with a measure, cannot be altered in the course of transmigration; there can be neither increase nor decrease thereof, neither excess nor deficiency. Just as when a ball of string is cast forth it will spread out just as far, and no farther, than it can unwind, just so both fools and wise alike, wandering in transmigration exactly for the allotted term, shall then, and only then, make an end of pain."

'Thus, Lord, did Makkhali of the cow-pen, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of purification through transmigration.'

23. 'When, one day, I had thus asked Ajita of the garment of hair, he said:[32] "There is no such thing, O king, as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in the world no recluses or Brahmans who have reached the highest point,[33] who walk perfectly, and who having understood and realised, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others.

'"A human being is built up of the four elements. When he dies, the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the wind to the air; and his faculties[34] pass into space. The four bearers, on the bier as a fifth, take his dead body away; till they reach the burning-ground men utter forth eulogies; but there his bones are bleached, and his offerings[35] end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not."

'Thus, Lord, did Ajita of the garment of hair, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of annihilation.

26. 'When, one day, I had thus asked Pakudha Kaccāyana, he said: "The following seven things, O king, are neither made nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created; they are barren (so that nothing is produced out of

them), steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed. They move not, neither do they vary, they trench not one upon another, nor avail aught as to ease or pain or both. And what are the seven? The four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—and ease, and pain, and the soul as a seventh. So there is neither slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives any one of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances."

'Thus, Lord, did Pakudha Kaccāyana, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound the matter by expounding something else.

28. 'When, one day, I had thus asked the Nigaṇṭha of the Nāta clan, he said: "A Nigaṇṭha, O king (a man free from bonds), is restrained with a fourfold self-restraint. He lives restrained as regards all water; restrained as regards all evil; all evil has he washed away; and he lives suffused with the sense of evil held at bay. Such is his fourfold self-restraint. And since he is thus tied with this fourfold bond, therefore is he, the Nigaṇṭho (free from bonds), called Gatatto (whose heart has gone; that is, to the summit, to the attainment, of his aim), Yatatto (whose heart is kept down; that is, is under command), and Ṭhitatto (whose heart is fixed)."[36]

'Thus, Lord, did the Nigaṇṭha of the Nāta clan, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of the fourfold bond.

31. 'When, one day, I had thus asked Sañjaya of the Belaṭṭha clan, he said: "If you ask me whether there is another world—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don't say so. And I don't think it is thus or thus. And I don't think it is otherwise. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is, nor is not, another world. And if you ask me about beings produced by chance; whether there is any fruit, any result, of good or bad actions; or whether a man who has won the truth continues, or not, after death—to each or any of these questions do I give the same reply."[37]

33. 'Thus, Lord, did Sañjaya of the Belaṭṭha clan, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, show his manner of prevarication. And to him, as to all the others, I expressed neither approval nor dissatisfaction, but neither accepting nor rejecting what was said, I arose from my seat, and departed thence.[38]

34. 'And now, Lord, I put the same question to the Blessed One. Can you show me any immediate fruit, in this world, of the life of a recluse, such as those who follow each of the occupations I have mentioned are, each of them, able to show?'

'I can, O king. And to that end I would put a question to you. Answer it as you think most fit.

35. 'Now what do you think, O king. Suppose, among the people of your household, there were a slave who does work for you, rises up in the morning before you do and retires earlier to rest, who is keen to carry out your pleasure, anxious to make himself agreeable in what he does and says, a man who watches your every look. Suppose he should think, "Strange is it and wonderful, this issue of meritorious deeds, this result of merit! Here is this king of Magadha, Ajātasattu, the son of the Videha princess—he is a man, and so am I. But the king lives in the full enjoyment and possession of the five pleasures of sense—a very god, methinks—and here am I, a slave, working for him, rising before him and retiring earlier to rest, keen to carry out his pleasure, anxious to make myself agreeable in deed and word, watching his very looks. Would that I were like him, that I too might earn merit. Why should I not have my hair and beard shaved off, don yellow robes, and going forth from the household state, renounce the world?"

'And suppose, after a time, he should do so. And having been admitted into an Order, should dwell restrained in act and word and thought, content with mere food and shelter, delighting in solitude. And suppose your people should tell you of this, saying: "If it please your majesty, do you know that such a one, formerly your slave, who worked for you, and so on (all as before), has now donned yellow robes, has been admitted into an Order, and dwells restrained, content with mere food and shelter, delighting in solitude?"

'Would you, then, say: "Let the man come back; let him become a slave again, and work for me"?'

36. 'Nay, Lord; rather we should greet him with reverence, rise up from our seat out of deference towards him, and press him to be seated. And we should have robes and a bowl, and a lodging-place, and medicine for the sick—all the requisites of a recluse—made ready, and beg him to accept them. And we should order watch and ward and guard to be kept for him according to the law.'

'But what do you think, O king. That being so, is there, or is there not, some fruit, visible in this world, of the life of a recluse?'

'Certainly, Lord, that is so.'

'This then, O king, is the first kind of the fruit, visible in this world, which I maintained to arise from the life of a recluse.'

37. 'Can you, Lord, show me any other fruit, visible in this world, of the life of a recluse?'

'I can, O king. And to that end I would fain put a question etc., (as before, to the end of § 36, the case now put being that of a free man who cultivates his land, a householder, who pays taxes and thus increases the King's wealth, but gives up his little property and his position in his clan, and enters an Order).'

39. 'Can you, Lord, show me any other fruit, visible in this world, of the life of a recluse, a fruit higher and sweeter than these?'

'I can, O king. Give ear therefore, O king, and give good heed, and I will speak.'

40. 'Suppose, O king, there appears in the world one who has won the truth, an Arahat, a fully awakened one, abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy, who knows all worlds, unsurpassed as a guide to mortals willing to be led, a teacher for gods and men, a Blessed One, a Buddha. He, by himself, thoroughly knows and sees, as it were, face to face this universe,—including the worlds above of the gods, the Brahmas,

and the Māras, and the world below with its recluses and Brahmans, its princes and peoples,—and having known it, he makes his knowledge known to others. The truth, lovely in its origin, lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation, doth he proclaim; both in the spirit and in the letter, the higher life doth he make known, in all its fullness and in all its purity.[39]

41. 'A householder[40] or one of his children, or a man of inferior birth in any class, listens to that truth; and on hearing it, he has faith in the Tathāgata (the one who has found the truth); and when he is possessed of that faith, he considers, thus, within himself:

'"Full of hindrances is household life, a path for the dust of passion. Free as the air is life of him who has renounced all worldly things. How difficult it is for the man who dwells at home to live the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity, in all its bright perfection! Let me then cut off my hair and beard, let me clothe myself in orange-coloured robes, and let me go forth from the household life into the homeless state."

'Then, before long, forsaking his portion of wealth, be it great or small, forsaking his circle of relatives, be they many or be they few, he cuts off his hair and beard, he clothes himself in orange-coloured robes, and he goes forth from household life into the homeless state.'

42. 'When he has thus become a recluse, he lives self-restrained by that restraint that should be binding on a recluse.[41] Uprightness is his delight, and he sees danger in the least of those things he should avoid. He adopts, and trains himself in, the precepts. He encompasses himself with good deeds in act and word. Pure are his means of livelihood, good is his conduct, guarded the door of his senses. Mindful and self-possessed, he is altogether happy.'

43. 'And how, O king, is his conduct good?'

'In this, O king, that the Bhikṣu, putting away the killing of living things, holds aloof from the destruction of life. The cudgel and the sword he has laid aside, and ashamed of roughness, full

of mercy, he dwells compassionate and kind to all creatures that have life.'

'This is part of the goodness that he has.'

[Here follow the whole of the Sīlas (the paragraphs on minor morality), in the words already translated above in the Brahmajāla Sutta, §§ 8 to 27. Only, for 'Gotama the recluse' one should read 'the Bhikṣu'; and alter, in each case, the words of the refrain accordingly.]

63. 'And then that Bhikṣu, O king, being thus master of the minor moralities, sees no danger from any side; that is, so far as concerns his self-restraint in conduct. Just, O king, as a sovereign, duly crowned, whose enemies have been beaten down, sees no danger from any side; that is, so far as enemies are concerned; so is the Bhikṣu confident. And endowed with this body of morals, so worthy of honour, he experiences, within himself, a sense of ease without alloy. Thus is it, O king, that the Bhikṣu becomes righteous.'

64. 'And how, O king, is the Bhikṣu guarded as to the doors of his senses?'[42]

'When, O king, he sees an object with his eye, he is not entranced in the general appearance or the details of it.[43] He sets himself to restrain that which might give occasion for evil states, covetousness and dejection, to flow in over him so long as he dwells unrestrained as to his sense of sight. He keeps a watch upon his faculty of sight, and he attains mastery over it. And so, in like manner, when he hears a sound with his ear, or smells an odour with his nose, or tastes a flavour with his tongue, or feels a touch with his body, or when he cognizes a phenomenon with his mind, he is not entranced in the general appearance or the details of it. He sets himself to restrain that which might give occasion for evil states, covetousness and dejection, to flow in over him so long as he dwells unrestrained as to his mental (representative) faculty. He keeps watch upon his representative faculty, and he attains mastery over it. And endowed with this self-restraint, so worthy of

honour, as regards the senses, he experiences, within himself, a sense of ease, into which no evil state can enter.[44] Thus is it, O king, that the Bhikṣu becomes guarded as to the doors of his senses.

65. 'And how, O king, is the Bhikṣu mindful and self-possessed?

'In this matter, O king, the Bhikṣu, in going forth or in coming back, keeps clearly, before his mind's eye (all that is wrapt up therein—the immediate object of the act itself, its ethical significance, whether or not it is conducive to the high aim set before him, and the real facts underlying the mere phenomenon of the outward act). And so also, in looking forward, or in looking round; in stretching forth his arm, or in drawing it in again; in eating or drinking, in masticating or swallowing, in obeying the calls of nature, in going or standing or sitting, in sleeping or waking, in speaking or in being still, he keeps himself aware of all it really means.[45] Thus is it, O king, that the Bhikṣu becomes mindful and self-possessed.

66. 'And how, O king, is the Bhikṣu content?' 'In this matter, O king, that the Bhikṣu is satisfied with sufficient robes to cherish his body, with sufficient food to keep his stomach going. Wheresoever he may go forth, these he takes with him as he goes—just as a bird with his wings, O king, wheresoever he may fly, carries his wings with him as he flies. Thus is it, O king, that the Bhikṣu becomes content.[46]

67. 'Then, master of this so excellent body of moral precepts, gifted with this excellent self-restraint as to the senses, endowed with this excellent mindfulness and self-possession, filled with this excellent content, he chooses some lonely spot to rest at on his way—in the woods, at the foot of a tree, on a hillside, in a mountain glen, in a rocky cave, in a charnel place, or on a heap of straw in the open field. And returning thither after his round for alms, he seats himself, when his meal is done, cross-legged, keeping his body erect, and his intelligence alert, intent.

68. 'Putting away all hankering after the world,[47] he

remains with a heart that hankers not, and purifies his mind of lusts. Putting away the corruption of the wish to injure, he remains with a heart free from ill-temper, and purifies his mind of malevolence. Putting away torpor of heart and mind,[48] keeping his ideas alight,[49] mindful and self-possessed, he purifies his mind of weakness and of sloth. Putting away flurry and worry, he remains free from fretfulness, and with his heart serene within, he purifies himself of irritability and vexation of spirit. Putting away wavering, he remains as one passed beyond perplexity; and no longer in suspense as to what is good, he purifies his mind of doubt.

69. 'Then just, O king, as when a man, after contracting a loan,[50] should set a business on foot, and his business should succeed, and he should not only be able to pay off the old debt he had incurred, but there should be a surplus over to maintain a wife; then would he realise: "I used to have to carry on my business by getting into debt, but it has gone so well with me that I have paid off what I owed, and have a surplus over to maintain a wife." And he would be of good cheer at that, he would be glad of heart at that:

70. 'Then just, O king, as if a man were a prey to disease, in pain, and very ill, and his food would not digest, and there were no strength left in him; and after a time, he were to recover from that disease, and his food should digest, and his strength come back to him; then, when he realised his former and his present state, he would be of good cheer at that, he would be glad of heart at that:

71. 'Then just, O king, as if a man were bound in a prison house, and after a time he should be set free from his bonds, safe and sound, and without any confiscation of his goods; when he realised his former and his present state, he would be of good cheer at that, he would be glad of heart at that:

72. 'Then just, O king, as if a man were a slave, not his own master, subject to another, unable to go whither he would; and after a time he should be emancipated from that slavery, become his own master, not subject to others, a free man, free

to go whither he would; then, on realising his former and his present state, he would be of good cheer at that, he would be glad of heart at that:

73. 'Then just, O king, as if a man, rich and prosperous, were to find himself on a long road, in a desert, where no food was, but much danger; and after a time, were to find himself out of the desert, arrived safe, on the borders of his village, in security and peace; then, on realising his former and his present state, he would be of good cheer at that, he would be glad of heart at that:

74. 'Just so, O king, the Bhikṣu, so long as these five Hindrances are not put away within him, looks upon himself as in debt, diseased, in prison, in slavery, lost on a desert road. But when these five Hindrances have been put away within him, he looks upon himself as freed from debt, rid of disease, out of jail, a free man, and secure;

75 'And gladness springs up within him on his realising that, and joy arises to him, thus gladdened, and so rejoicing, all his frame becomes at ease, and being thus at ease, he is filled with a sense of peace, and in that peace, his heart is stayed.[51]

75A. 'Then, estranged from lusts, aloof from evil dispositions, he enters into and remains in the First Rapture—a state of joy and ease born of detachment,[52] reasoning and investigation going on the while.

'His very body does he so pervade, drench, permeate, and suffuse with the joy and ease born of detachment, that there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith.

76. 'Just, O king, as a skilful bathman or his apprentice will scatter perfumed soap powder in a metal basin, and then besprinkling it with water, drop by drop, will so knead it together that the ball of lather, taking up the unctuous moisture, is drenched with it, pervaded by it, permeated by it within and without, and there is no leakage possible.

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, higher and sweeter than the last.

77. 'Then further, O king, the Bhikṣu, suppressing all

reasoning and investigation, enters into and abides in the Second Jhāna, a state of joy and ease, born of the serenity of concentration, when no reasoning or investigation goes on—a state of elevation[53] of mind, a tranquillisation of the heart within.

'And his very body does he so pervade, drench, permeate, and suffuse with the joy and ease born of concentration, that there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith.

78. 'Just, O king, as if there were a deep pool, with water welling up into it from a spring beneath, and with no inlet from the east or west, from the north or south, and the god should not from time to time send down showers of rain upon it

'Still, the current of cool waters rising up from that spring would pervade, fill, permeate, and suffuse the pool with cool waters, and there would be no part or portion of the pool unsuffused therewith.

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last.

79. 'Then further, O king, the Bhikṣu, holding aloof from joy, becomes equable;[54] and mindful and self-possessed, he experiences in his body that ease which the Arahats talk of when they say: "The man serene and self-possessed is well at ease," and so he enters into and abides in the Third Jhāna.

'And his very body does he so pervade, drench, permeate, and suffuse with that ease that has no joy with it, that there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith.

80. 'Just, O king, as when in a louts tank the several lotus flowers, red or white or blue, born in the water, grown up in the water, not rising up above the surface of the water, drawing up nourishment from the depths of the water, are so pervaded, drenched, permeated, and suffused from their very tips down to their roots with the cool moisture thereof, that there is no spot in the whole plant, whether of the red lotus, or of the white, or of the blue, not suffused therewith.

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last.

81. 'Then further, O king, the Bhikṣu, by the putting away

alike of ease and of pain, by the passing away alike of any elation, any dejection, he had previously felt, enters into and abides in the Fourth Jhāna, a state of pure self-possession and equanimity, without pain and without ease.

'And he sits there so suffusing even his body with that sense of purification, of translucence, of heart, that there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith.

82. 'Just, O king, as if a man were sitting so wrapped from head to foot in a clean white robe, that there were no spot in his whole frame not in contact with the clean white robe—just so, O king, does the Bhikṣu sit there, so suffusing even his body with that sense of purification, of translucence, of heart, that there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith.

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, and higher and sweeter than the last.

83. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm, and imperturbable, he applies and bends down his mind to that insight that comes from knowledge. He grasps the fact: "This body of mine has form, it is built up of the four elements, it springs from father and mother, it is continually renewed by so much boiled rice and juicy foods, its very nature is impermanence, it is subject to erosion, abrasion, dissolution, and disintegration;[55] and therein is this consciousness[56] of mine, too, bound up, on that it does depend."

84. 'Just, O king, as if there were a Veluriya gem, bright, of the purest water, with eight facets, excellently cut, clear, translucent, without a flaw, excellent in every way. And through it a string, blue, or orange-coloured, or red, or white, or yellow should be threaded. If a man, who had eyes to see, were to take it into his hand, he would clearly perceive how the one is bound up with the other.[57]

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last.

85. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm, and imperturbable, he applies and bends down his mind to the calling up of a mental image. He calls up from this body another body, having form, made of mind, having all (his own body's) limbs and parts, not deprived of any organ.[58]

86. 'Just, O king, as if a man were to pull out a reed from its sheath. He would know: "This is the reed, this the sheath. The reed is one thing, the sheath another. It is from the sheath that the reed has been drawn forth."[59] And similarly, were he to take a snake out of its slough, or draw a sword from its scabbard.[60]

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this life, and higher and sweeter than the last.

87. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm and imperturbable, he applies and bends down his mind to the modes of the Wondrous Gift.[61] He enjoys the Wondrous Gift in its various modes—being one, he becomes many, or having become many, becomes one again; he becomes visible or invisible; he goes, feeling no obstruction, to the further side of a wall or rampart or hill, as if through air; he penetrates up and down through solid ground, as if through water; he walks on water without breaking through, as if on solid ground; he travels cross-legged in the sky, like the birds on wing; even the Moon and the Sun, so potent, so mighty though they be, does he touch and feel with his hand; he reaches in the body even up to the heaven of Brahmā.

88. 'Just, O king, as a clever potter or his apprentice could make, could succeed in getting out of properly prepared clay, any shape of vessel he wanted to have—or an ivory-carver out of ivory, or a goldsmith out of gold.

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, and higher and sweeter than the last.

89. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm and imperturbable, he applies and bends down his mind to the Heavenly Ear. With that clear Heavenly Ear, surpassing the ear of men, he hears sounds both human and celestial, whether far or near.'

90. 'Just, O king, as if a man were on the high road and were to hear the sound of a kettledrum or a tabor, or the sound of chank horns and small drums, he would know: "This is the sound of kettledrum, this is the sound of a tabor, this of chank horns, and of drums."[62]

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of recluse, visible in this life, and higher and sweeter than the last.

91. 'With his heart thus serene (etc., as before), he directs and bends down his mind to the knowledge which penetrates the heart. Penetrating with his own heart the hearts of other beings, of other men, he knows them. He discerns:

The passionate mind to be passionate, and the calm mind calm;

The angry mind to be angry, and the peaceful mind peaceful;

The dull mind to be dull, and the alert mind alert;

The attentive mind to be attentive, and the wandering mind wandering;

The broad mind to be broad, and the narrow mind narrow;

The mean mind to be mean, and the lofty mind lofty;[63]

The steadfast mind to be steadfast, and the wavering mind to be wavering;

The free mind to be free, and the enslaved mind enslaved.

92. 'Just, O king, as a woman or a man or a lad, young and smart, on considering attentively the image of his own face in a bright and brilliant mirror or in a vessel of clear water would, if it had a mole on it, know that it had, and if not, would know it had not.

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last.

93. 'With his heart thus serene (etc., as before), he directs and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the memory of his previous temporary states. He recalls to mind his various temporary states in days gone by—one birth, or two or three or four or five births, or ten or twenty or thirty or forty or fifty or a hundred or a thousand or a hundred thousand births, through many an aeon of dissolution, many an aeon of evolution, many

an aeon of both dissolution and evolution.[64] "In such a place; such was my name, such my family, such my caste,[65] such my food, such my experience of discomfort or of ease, and such the limits of my life. When I passed away from that state, I took form again in such a place. There I had such and such a name and family and caste and food and experience of discomfort or of ease, such was the limit of my life. When I passed away from the state, I took form again here"—thus does he call to mind his temporary states in days gone by, in all their details, and in all their modes.

94. 'Just, O king, as if a man were to go from his own to another village, and from that one to another, and from that one, should return home. Then he would know: "From my own village I came to that other one. There I stood in such and such a way, sat thus, spake thus, and held my peace thus. Thence I came to that other village; and there I stood in such and such a way, sat thus, spake thus, and held my peace thus. And now, from that other village, I have returned back again home."[66]

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse. Visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last.'

95. 'With his heart thus serene (etc., as before), he directs and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the fall and rise of beings. With the pure Heavenly Eye,[67] surpassing that of men, he sees beings as they pass away from one form of existence and take shape in another; he recognises the mean and the noble, the well-favoured and the ill-favoured, the happy and the wretched, passing away according to their deeds: "Such and such beings, my brethren, in act and word and thought, revilers of the noble ones, holding to wrong views, acquiring for themselves that Karma which results from wrong views, they, on the dissolution of the body, after death, are reborn in some unhappy state of suffering or woe. But such and such beings, my brethren, well-doers in act and word and thought, not revilers of the noble ones, holding to right views, acquiring for themselves that Karma that results from right views, they, on the dissolution of the body, after death, are reborn in some

happy state in heaven." Thus with the pure Heavenly Eye, surpassing that of men, he sees beings as they pass away from one state of existence, and take form in another; he recognises the mean and the noble, the well-favoured and the ill-favoured, the happy and the wretched, passing away according to their deeds.[68]

96. 'Just, O king, as if there were a house with an upper terrace on it in the midst of a place where four roads meet, and a man standing thereon, and with eyes to see, should watch men entering a house, and coming forth out of it, and walking hither and thither along the street,[69] and seated in the square in the midst. Then he would know: "Those men are entering a house, and those are leaving it, and those are walking to and fro in the street, and those are seated in the square in the midst."

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse. Visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last.

97. 'With his heart thus serene, (etc., as before), he directs and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the destruction of the Deadly Floods.[70] He knows as it really is: "This is pain." He knows as it really is: "This is the origin of pain." He knows as it really is: "This is the cessation of pain." He knows as it really is: "This is the Path that leads to the cessation of pain." He knows as they really are: "These are the Deadly Floods." He knows as it really is: "This is the origin of the Deadly Floods." He knows as it really is: "This is the cessation of the Deadly Floods." He knows as it really is: "This is the Path that leads to the cessation of the Deadly Floods." To him, thus knowing, thus seeing, the heart is set free from the Deadly Taint of Lusts,[71] is set free from the Deadly Taint of Becomings,[72] is set free from the Deadly Taint of Ignorance.[73] In him, thus set free, there arises the knowledge of his emancipation, and he knows: "Rebirth has been destroyed. The higher life has been fulfilled. What had to be done has been accomplished. After this present life there will be no beyond!"

98. 'Just, O king, as if in a mountain fastness there were a pool of water, clear, translucent, and serene; and a man, standing

on the bank, and with eyes to see, should perceive the oysters and the shells, the gravel and the pebbles and the shoals of fish, as they move about or lie within it: he would know: "This pool is clear, transparent, and serene, and there, within it, are the oysters and the shells, and the sand and gravel, and the shoals of fish moving about or lying still."[74]

'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last. And there is no fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, that is higher and sweeter than this.'[75]

99. And when he had thus spoken, Ajātasattu the king said to the Blessed One: 'Most excellent, Lord, most excellent! Just as if a man were to set up that which has been thrown down, or were to reveal that which is hidden away, or were to point out the right road to him who has gone astray, or were to bring a lamp into the darkness so that those who have eyes could see external forms—just even so, Lord, has the truth been made known to me, in many a figure, by the Blessed One. And now I betake myself, Lord, to the Blessed One as my refuge, to the Truth, and to the Order. May the Blessed One accept me as a disciple, as one who, from this day forth, as long as life endures, has taken his refuge in them. Sin has overcome me, Lord, weak and foolish and wrong that I am, in that, for the sake of sovereignty, I put to death my father, that righteous man, that righteous king! May the Blessed One accept it of me, Lord, that I do so acknowledge it as a sin, to the end that in future I may restrain myself.'

100. 'Verily, O king, it was sin that overcame you in acting thus. But inasmuch as you look upon it as sin, and confess it according to what is right, we accept your confession as to that. For that, O king, is custom in the discipline of the noble ones,[76] that whosoever looks upon his fault as a fault, and rightfully confesses it, shall attain to self-restraint in future.'

101. When he had thus spoken, Ajātasattu the king said to the Blessed One: 'Now, Lord, we would fain go. We are busy, and there is much to do.'

'Do, O king, whatever seemeth to thee fit.'

Then Ajātasattu the king, pleased and delighted with the words of the Blessed One, arose from his seat, and bowed to the Blessed One, and keeping him on the right hand as he passed him, departed thence.

102. Now the Blessed One, not long after Ajātasattu the king had gone, addressed the brethren, and said:

'This king, brethren, was deeply affected, he was touched in heart. If, brethren, the king had not put his father to death, that righteous man and righteous king, then would the clear and spotless eye for the truth have arisen in him even as he sat there.[77]

Thus spake the Blessed One. The brethren were pleased and delighted at his words.

NOTES

[By Rhys Davids]

1. Details a-d (though the fact is not referred to here) are the opposites of the three bad acts of the body, and the four bad acts of speech *kāya-* and *vaci-duccaritāni*, so often referred to in the Suttas, and in the Abhidhamma. The three others (of the mind), making up the ten given in my manual, p. 142, are omitted here because they belong to the higher morality.
2. Buddhaghoṣa (p. 219) says that though the Four Arūpa Vimokkhas are not explicitly mentioned, they are to be understood (thus making up the Eight Samāpattis). This may be so: but it gives the impression of a later writer reading his own opinion into the older text. They are put into the text at Poṭṭhapāda, pp. 183, 184, and it is difficult to see why they should not have also been inserted here, if they were really implied.
3. Nos. 11 and 12 are possibly meant, both here and in all the other Suttas, to be omitted. The wording is ambiguous. Buddhaghosa, who talks here (see p. 268) of nos. 10–13 as the Eightfold *paññā*, apparently means to include them (he could not otherwise get eight). But the argument of the Mahāli seems to exclude them. The texts always jump from the last words of 10 to the last words of 13. Now as, in the Mahāli, no. 12 is excluded, it is clear that there, at least, only nos. 10 and 13 are meant. And there is no difference between the phraseology in the Mahāli and that used in the other Suttas.

4. From which we may infer that, as respects those matters, he saw no differences between himself and the other teachers.
5. So that the power of Iddhi, of hearing heavenly sounds, and of knowing other people's thoughts, are apparently supposed to be common ground between the Buddhists and the other sects. They are included in our Sutta because they are supposed to be part of the advantage of life in an Order—in any Order, that is, not only the Buddhist.
6. Majjhima II, 37, 38. Perhaps the *pe* is meant to be supplied from the twenty-seventh Sutta just quoted—the difference, however, as we have seen, is not of great importance.
7. The oldest case of the technical use of the word, so far as I know, is in the introductory story of the Mahā Vibhaṅga on the fourth Pārājika (Vin. III, 87). This is later than the Old Commentary on the Pātimokkha, from which it incorporates many passages, and this again is later, of course, than the Pātimokkha itself.

   Neither the Five nor the six Abhiññās are given as groups among the groups of Fives and Sixes in the Aṅguttara. The word Abhiññā is used in the divisions containing the Fives and Sixes exclusively in its ordinary sense (III, 277, 451; comp. IV, 348). And this is the more instructive as what were afterwards called the Six Abhiññās are actually given in full (IV, § 17–19, § 6–11) in the same words as in the Ākaṅkheyya Sutta (No. 6 of the Majjhima, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas'), and very nearly as in our Sutta, here under discussion. But they are not called Abhiññās.
8. Compare also A. I, 100; II, 249; III, 3, 9, 277.
9. For a list of twenty-one laymen Arahats see A. III, 451; and there are other instances recorded.
10. A good summary of this is in the Sigālovada Sutta, an abstract of which is given in my Manual, pp. 143 foll.
11. Translated in 'Vinaya Texts' (S.B.E.).
12. That is, of course, 'the best course of life' with the connotation of celibacy. The German 'Wandel' is a good rendering of Cariyā. We have no expression so good. See Saṃyutta V, 16, 17.
13. Milinda I, 31 (of my translation).
14. *Ibid.*, I, 51; compare I, 101.
15. Gogerly's translation of the first part of this Sutta, and Burnouf's translation of the whole of it, have been reprinted in Grimblot's 'Sept Suttas Palis'. These versions, of remarkable merit for the time when they were made, are full of mistakes which the since-published editions of the Commentary, and of numerous allied texts, enable us now to avoid. I have not thought it necessary to point out the numerous passages, occurring indeed in nearly every sentence, in which the present translation

differs from theirs. It should be mentioned here, however, that Burnouf has missed the whole point of the dialogue by misunderstanding the constantly repeated phrase *sandiṭṭhikaṃ sāmañña-phalaṃ* from which this title is taken. He renders it throughout as meaning 'foreseen and general fruit', which is grammatically impossible as regards *sandiṭṭhikaṃ*, and rests on a false derivation as regards *sāmañña*. This last word means, of course, 'samaṇaship, being a *samaṇa*, living as a *samaṇa*, a recluse, a religieux.'

16. *Jīvakassa komārabhaccassa*. Buddhaghosa (Sum. I, 133) naturally follows the compilers of the Khandakas (V. I, 269) in interpreting the adjective as 'brought up by the Prince.' But see the note at 'Vinaya Texts,' II, 174; which shows that the more likely meaning is 'the bringer-up of children' (child-doctor). Several cures, however, wrought by him are recorded; and the patients are always adults. There is no other reference at all to his being a child-doctor, and the Khandaka which gives the interpretation is a very ancient document.
17. See the note in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 1. Buddhaghosa (p. 139) says she was the daughter of the king of Kosala.
18. This is interesting, as it shows that the year, for the compilers of our Sutta, began in Sāvana (middle of July to middle of August), that is, with the rainy season. There were three Uposatha days in each month, on the 7th, 14th, and 15th day of the month. The full moon night of Kattika (middle of October to middle of November) is called Komudi (from Kumuda, a white water-lily), because that flower is supposed to bloom then. Burnouf is wrong in translating Komudi as the name of the month.
19. The same lines recur, but in a different order, at Jāt. I, 105. Dosinā, the etymology of which puzzled Childers and also Buddhaghosa (p. 141), is *jyotsnā*.
20. *Appeva nāma*. Both Gogerly and Burnouf take this to mean 'to a certainty,' but compare D. I, 179, 205; V. II, 85, 262.
21. *Pakkhandino*, 'rushers forth.' The exact meaning of some of these military terms is still uncertain, and was apparently uncertain to Buddhaghosa. They all recur, with some differences of reading, in the Milinda (p. 331, in a later and much longer list), and also in the Aṅguttara (IV, 107), as the names of the constituent elements of a standing army.
22. Burnouf has made a sad mess of this important and constantly repeated clause. He has: 'Is it then possible, Sir, that one should declare to them (that is, to the craftsmen just mentioned) in this world, such a result (of their actions) as foreseen and as the general fruit of their conduct?' But the king asks the Buddha to tell him (the king himself) whether the members of the Order derive, from their life, any benefit corresponding to that which the craftsmen derive from theirs.

23. According to Buddhaghosa (p. 142) he was one of the teachers who went about naked.
24. *Akiriyaṃ vyākāsi*. Gogerly interprets this: 'he replied by affirming that there are no future rewards and punishments.' Burnouf has simply: 'm' a donné une réponse vaine.' But the corresponding word in the subsequent sections summarises the theory of the teacher questioned. On this theory, compare A. I, 62; V. I. 235.
25. In the text the framework of the interview is repeated each time in the same words as above. Only the answers differ. The answers all recur in the Majjhima I, 513 foll.
26. There is a good deal in both the Buddhist and the Jaina texts about this Makkhali Gosāla, whose followers were called Ājīvakas, and who was regarded, from the Buddhist point of view, as the worst of the sophists. Some of the Jaina passages, and also Buddhaghosa here, are referred to by Hoernle, 'Uvāsaka dasāo,' pp. 108 ff.: and in the Appendixes. The principal Piṭaka passages are M. I, 31, 198, 238, 250, 483, 516, 524. S. I, 66, 68, III, 69, 211; IV, 398. A. I, 33, 286; III, 276, 384. V. I, 8, 291; II, 111, 130, 165, 284; IV, 74. See also Jāt. I, 493 and G. V, 68. As the sect is thrice mentioned in the Asoka Edicts as receiving royal gifts, it is certain that it retained an important position for several centuries at least. See Senart, 'Inscriptions de Piyadasi,' II. 82, 209.

    From the beginning of the answer down to the end of p. 53 recurs at S. III, 211, and the rest of it at *ibid.*, p. 212, and the first part of the answer is ascribed at *ibid.*, p. 69 to Pūraṇa Kassapa.
27. *Sabbe sattā, sabbe pāṇā, sabbe bhūtā, sabbe jīvā*. Buddhaghosa gives details of these four classes of living beings, showing how they are meant to include all that has life, on this earth, from men down to plants. The explanation is very confused, and makes the terms by no means mutually exclusive. They are frequently used in the same order in the Jaina-Sūtras, and Professor Jacobi renders them accordingly: 'Every sentient being, every insect, every living thing, whether animal or vegetable.' 'Jaina-Sūtras,' II, xxv. This is much better; but we have, in our version, to give the sense in which the Buddhists supposed Gosāla to have taken the words.
28. Compare the corresponding theory of the Jains as given in the Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra in Jacobi's Jaina-Sūtras, Vol. ii, p. 213: and that of Pūrana Kassapa quoted in Aṅguttara III, 383.
29. Buddhaghosa gives the details 'babyhood, playtime, trial time, erect time, learning time, ascetic time, prophet time, and prostrate time' with (very necessary) comments on each. One may compare Shakespeare's 'Seven Ages of Man'.
30. *Ājīva*. The Siamese edition reads *ājīvaka*.
31. I think this is the right reading, but don't know what it means.

32. This answer recurs S. III, 307, M. I, 515 (compare Dh. S. 1215, 1362, 1364), as the view of a typical sophist.

33. *Sammag-gato*. Buddhaghosa gives here no explanation of this word, but the Jātaka Commentary on Jāt. III, 305 says it means the man who has attained the highest fruit; that is, Arahatship. *Gato* is used here in the same sense as it has in Tathāgato, in *gatatto* (in the Niganṭha paragraph below), and in *vijjā-gato* (S.N. 730, 733, 743), that is, who has not only attempted to go to, but has actually reached, the aim (common alike to the orthodox Vedāntist Brahmans and to each of the various schools of independent, dissenting, thinkers and recluses) of the conquest over ignorance, of the grasp of truth.

34. *Indriyāṇi*, the five senses, and the mind as a sixth.

35. *Āhutiyo*. See Buddhavaṃsa XXVII, 10; Kathā Vatthu 550. The phrase is omitted in the parallel passage in the Jaina 'Sūtrakṛitāṅga pointed out by Jacobi, 'Jaina-Sūtras,' II, xxiv.

36. The series of riddles in this difficult passage is probably intended to be an ironical imitation of the Niganṭha's way of talking. Gogerly has caught the general sense fairly enough, but his version is very free and wrong as to two of the words, and it gives no idea of the oracular form in which the original is couched. Burnouf's rendering is quite wide of the mark.

The first of the 'Four Restraints' is the well-known rule of the Jains not to drink cold water, on the ground that there are 'souls' in it. See the discussion in the Milinda (II, 85–91 of my translation).

Professor Jacobi ('Jaina-Sūtras,' II, xxiii) thinks the 'Four Restraints' are intended to represent the four vows kept by the followers of Parśva.

But this surely cannot be so, for these vows were quite different.

37. The text repeats the whole paragraph put above (p. 27 of the text) into the mouth of the Eel-wriggler.

38. Of these six teachers, Pūraṇa denies the evil Karma in a bad act and *vice versa*; Ajita, in preaching annihilation at death, shuts out the possibility of any effect to be worked by Karma; and Makkhali rejects both Karma and its effect. The theory of Pakudha seems to exclude responsibility; the Niganṭha simply begs the question, by asserting that a Niganṭha has attained the end; and Sañjaya gives no answer at all.

The only one of these six theories of life on which independent evidence is at present accessible is that of the Niganṭha (the Jain theory). But no attempt has yet been made to summarise it, or set it out in a manner intelligible to Western readers. It is very much to be hoped that this want may soon be supplied by one or other of the excellent scholars familiar with the texts.

39. Buddhaghosa applies these last two adjectives to the truth, not to the life. But it seems more in accord with the next paragraph to refer them to the life.

40. *Gahapati*, which Buddhaghosa takes here in the sense of peasant, ryot.

41. *Pātimokkha-saṃvara-saṃvuto*. Buddhaghosa, I think, takes this to mean 'restrained according to the rules of the Pātimokkha.'

42. On the following important and constantly repeated paragraph compare M. I, 180, 268; K. V. 424–6, 463–4; Mil. 367; Asl. 400, etc.

43. *Na nimittaggāhī hoti nānuvyañjanaggāhī*. The phrase *nimittaṃ gaṇhāti* means either to seize upon anything as the object of one's thought to the exclusion of everything else (see for instance, Vin. I, 183, and Buddhaghosa's note on it given in the 'Vinaya Texts,' II, 9), or to seize upon the outward sign of anything so keenly as to recognise what it is the mark of (Vin. III, 17). And when the object is a person of the other sex this phrase is the idiom used for our 'falling in love with'. Buddhaghosa gives, as an instance of the *nimitta*, the general conclusion that the object seen, heard, etc., is a man or woman; of the *anuvyañjana*, the perception of the detail that he or she is smiling, talking, etc.

44. *Avyāseka*, literally 'with no besprinkling' (of evil, says Buddhaghosa).

45. A small volume might be written on the various expansions of this text in the Piṭakas. Several whole Dialogues are devoted to it, and various Suttas in others of the oldest texts. Buddhaghosa has many pages upon it here, and deals with it also at length in the Visuddhi Magga and elsewhere. What is above added in brackets explains the principal points of what is implied, according to the Piṭakas, in this famous passage, the Buddhist analogue to St. Paul's: 'Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God' (I Cor. x. 31).

By the real fact underlying any action is meant that, in the Buddhist theory, behind the action (going, seeing, etc.) there is no ego, no actor (goer, seer, etc.), that can be called a 'soul' (*Abbhantare attā nāma āloketā vā viloketā vā n' atthi*), but that there is a psychological explanation sufficient, of itself, without the soul-theory.

46. 'Consider the fowls of the air,' etc. (Matt. vi. 26).

No man can call me servant, and I wander—
So said the Exalted One—
At will, o'er all the earth, on what I find
I feel no need of wages, or of gain,
So let the rain pour now, if it likes, to-night.
(Dhaniya Sutta 8)

And see the context in my 'American Lectures', p. 168.

47. *Abhijjhaṃ loke pahāya*. Gogerly renders 'banishes desire from him,' leaving out *loke* altogether, and rendering *abhijjhā* in defiance both of the

derivation and of the traditional explanation of the word. Even Burnouf (who frequently uses 'desire' for words in the Pali meaning 'lusts' or 'excitement') has here 'cupidité'

48 So Buddhaghosa here (p. 211). But the Dhamma Saṅgaṇi 1156, 1157 explains it as torpor of mind and body.

49. *Āloka-saññī*, literally 'whose ideas are light' Neumann ('Reden des Gotamo,' I, 434, etc.) translates 'loving the light,' which may be the right connotation. Burnouf has 'being aware of his visual sensation' (de son regard), which is certainly wrong

50 *Iṇaṃ ādāya* Neumann has 'oppressed by debt,' but Buddhaghosa (p. 212) says 'taking goods on interest'; this is confirmed by Gāt. IV, 256, V, 436.

51. From the beginning of § 68 the text, though here split up into paragraphs for the convenience of the reader, is really one long sentence or paragraph of much eloquence and force in the Pali; and the peroration, leading on to the Jhānas, is a favourite passage recurring M. I, 71; Vin. I, 294; Mil. 84. The five similes are to be taken, in order, as referring to the Five Hindrances (Nīvaraṇā) given in § 68. The Dhamma Saṅgaṇi 1152 gives six hindrances, and M. I, 360–3 gives eight.

52 *Viveka*, 'separation'—physically of the body, 'seclusion'; intellectually, of the objects of thought, 'discrimination'; ethically, of the heart, 'being separate from the world' We have no word in English suggesting these three, all of which are implied. The stress is upon separation from the world, taking 'world' in the sense of all the hindrances to spiritual progress, and especially of the five chief Hindrances (Nīvaraṇā) just above set out. Buddhaghosa has nothing here, but compare Asl. 166

53. *Ekodibhāva* Compare Asl. 169, Senart in Mahāvastu I, 554, and the notes in J. P. T. S., 1884, p. 32 ff.

54 *Upekhako*, literally 'looking on,' that is, looking on rival mental states with equal mind. Imperturbable, impartial, tolerant, unsusceptible, stoical, composed, are all possible renderings, and all unsatisfactory. The ten kinds of Upekkhā, 'equanimity,' translated into English from Sinhalese by Spence Hardy (Manual, p. 505), can now be corrected from the Pali at Asl. 172.

55. This is a favourite description of the body. (See M. I, 500; II, 17; S. IV, 83; Gāt. I, 146, tc.) The words for erasion, abrasion, are cunningly chosen (ucchādana, parimaddana). They are also familiar technical terms of the Indian shampooer, and are so used above (p. 7, § 16 of the text). The double meaning must have been clearly present to the Indian hearer, and the words are, therefore, really untranslatable.

56. *Viññāna*. 'The five senses, sensations arising from objects, and all emotions and intellectual processes,' says Buddhaghosa (p. 221).

57. In spite of this and similar passages the adherents of the soul theory (having nothing else to fasten on) were apt to fasten on to the Buddhist Viññāna as a possible point of reconciliation with their own theory. Even an admirer of the Buddha (one Sāti, a member of the Order) went so far as to tell the Buddha himself that he must, as he admitted transmigration, have meant that the Viññāna did not really depend upon, was not really bound up with, the body, but that it formed the link in transmigration. In perhaps the most earnest and emphatic of all the Dialogues (M. I, 256 ff.), the Buddha meets and refutes at length this erroneous representation of his view. But it still survives. I know two living writers on Buddhism who (in blissful ignorance of the Dialogue in question) still fasten upon Buddha the opinion he so expressly refused to accept.

58. Buddhaghosa explains that, if the Bhikṣu have his ears unpierced, so will the image, and so on.

59 This old simile occurs already in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* IV 3, 3, 16.

60. The point is the similarity. Buddhaghosa explains that the Karaṇḍa is not a basket (as Burnouf renders it), but the skin which the snake sloughs off; and that the scabbard is like the sword, whatever the sword's shape. He adds that of course a man could not take a snake out of its slough with his hand. He is supposed in the simile to do so in imagination.

61 *Iddhi*, literally well-being, prosperity The four Iddhis of a king are personal beauty, length of life, strong health, and popularity (M. Sud. Sutta in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 259–61). The Iddhis of Gotama when at home, as a boy, were the possession of a beautiful garden, soft clothing, comfortable lodging, pleasant music, and good food (A. I, 145). Worldly Iddhi is distinguished from spiritual at A. I, 93. Buddhaghosa gives nine sorts of Iddhi, mostly intellectual, at Asl. 91, and compare 237. There are no examples in the Piṭakas of concrete instances of any of these except the last; but see S. IV, 289, 290; A. III, 340, 341, M. P. S. 43.

62 The point of the comparison, says Buddhaghosa (223), is that if he is in trouble and has lost his way he might be in doubt. But if calm and secure he can tell the difference.

63 *Sa-uttara* and *anuttara* Unless the interpretation given in the Dhamma Sangani 1292, 1293, 1596, 1597 ('occupied with rebirth in heaven, and occupied with Arahatship') reveals a change in the use of terms, the evil disposition, in this case only, is put first.

64 This is based on the Indian theory of the periodic destruction and renovation of the universe, each of which takes countless years to accomplish.

65 *Vaṇṇa*, 'colour'.

66. The three villages correspond to the three stages of being, the three Bhūmis,—the world of lust, the world of form, and the formless worlds (the Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa Lokas).

67. *Dibba-cakkhu.* See the note below on § 102 at the end of this Sutta.

68 This paragraph forms the subject of the discussion in the Kathā Vatthu III, 9 (p. 250). The mere knowledge of the general fact of the action of Karma is there distinguished from the Dibba-cakkhu, the Heavenly Eye; and the instance of Sāriputta is quoted, who had that knowledge, but not the Heavenly Eye. As he was an Arahat it follows that the possession of the Heavenly Eye was not a necessary consequence of Arahatship. Buddhaghosa adds (p. 224) that the sphere of vision of the Heavenly Eye did not extend to the Formless Worlds. On the Dhamma-cakkhu, 'the Eye for the Truth,' see below, p. 110, § 21 of the text.

69. *Vītisañcarante* is Buddhaghosa's reading. The Siamese has *Vithiṃ*. Compare M. I, 279.

70 *Āsavas*, Deadly Floods, another untranslatable term. Neumann has Illusion (Wahn); Burnouf has defilement (souillures). They are sometimes the three here mentioned (M. I, 23, 155; A. I, 167; S. IV, 256, etc.); but speculation, theorising (Diṭṭhi) is added as a fourth in the M. P. S. and elsewhere. Unfortunately, the world has not been yet found in its concrete, primary, sense; unless indeed Buddhaghosa's statement (at Asl. 48) that well-seasoned spirituous liquors were called *āsavā* be taken literally. It is therefore impossible to be sure what is the simile that underlies the use of the word in its secondary, ethical sense. Perhaps after all it is the idea of overwhelming intoxication, and not of flood or taint or ooze, that we ought to consider.

Subhūti in quoting the above passage from Buddhaghosa (in the Abhidhāna Padīpikā Sūci, p. 43) reads *pārivas* throughout for *pārivās*.

71. ***Kamāsavā*, with special reference to the taint of hankering after a future** life in the sensuous plane (Kāma Loka); that is, in the world.

72. *Bhavāsavā*, with special reference to the taint of hankering after a future life in the plane of form and the formless plane (the Rūpa and Arūpa Lokas) that is, in heaven.

73. *Avijjāsavā*, with special reference to ignorance of the Four Great Truths, just above summarised.

74. The simile recurs M. I, 279; A. I, 9. Compare for the words *sippisambuka* Gāt. V, 197; A. III, 395; Trenckner, 'Pali Miscellany,' p. 60.

75 Because, as Buddhaghosa points out, this is really Arahatship, Nirvāṇa; and it was to this, to Arahatship, that all the rest led up.

76. *Ariyānaṃ*. That is, either of previous Buddhas, or perhaps of the Arahats.

77. The Dhamma-cakkhu (Eye for the Truth) is a technical term for conversion, for entering on the Path that ends in Arahatship. It is higher than the Heavenly Eye (dibba-cakkhu, above, p. 82 of the text, § 95) which sees other people's previous births, and below the Eye of Wisdom (paññā-cakkhu) which is the wisdom of the Arahat (Itivuttaka, p. 52, § 61).

Ancient Grammatical Literature

The passage is quoted from S. N. Dasgupta's *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. iii, Cambridge 1922, pp. 515–6.

The special significance of the passage, as Dasgupta rightly insists, is that our ancient grammatical literature preserves some conclusive evidence of the actual writings of the Lokāyatas having once been in circulation in spite of the fact that no such writing has survived for us.

Ancient Grammatical Literature

'Fortunately we have still further conclusive evidence that the *Lokāyata-śāstra* with its commentary existed as early as the time of Kātyāyana, i.e. about 300 BC. There is a *Vārtika* rule associated with VII. 3. 45 "*varṇakā-tāntaye upasaṃkhyānam*," that the word *varṇaka* becomes *varṇakā* in the feminine to mean a blanket or a wrapper (*prāvaraṇa*), and Patañjali (about 150 BC), in interpreting this *vārtika-sūtra*, says that the object of restricting the formation of the word *varṇaka* only to the sense of a cotton or woollen wrapper is that in other senses the feminine form would be *varṇikā* or *vartikā* (e.g. meaning a commentary) as in the case of the *Bhāguri* commentary of the Lokāyata—*varṇikā bhāgurī lokāyatasya, vartikā bhāgurī lokāyatasya*. Thus it seems to be quite certain that there was a book called the *Lokāyata* on which there was at least one commentary earlier than 150 BC or even earlier than 300 BC, the probable date of Kātyāyana, the author of the *vārtika-sūtra*.'

Arthaśāstra

The following extract is from the Introductory Part of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (1. 2. 1–12).

The special importance of the passage consists in being the earliest available classification of the philosophical views of ancient India. What is more significant for us is to note

that in this classification Lokāyata is definitely mentioned as one of the three logic-based philosophies (*ānvīkṣikī*: translated by Kangle simply as 'philosophy', though Vātsyāyana in the introduction to his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* clearly interprets the word in the sense of logic). As for the word *Yoga*, mentioned by Kauṭilya as another such philosophy, Sanskritists as eminent as M. M. Kuppuswami Sastri and M. M. Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa convincingly argue that this was but an ancient term referring to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Arthaśāstra

[TEXT]

The First Chapter (adhikaraṇa)

Section 1: The enumeration of the branches of learning (*vidyā*) and the establishment of (the utility of) logic (*ānvīkṣikī*).

1. The branches of learning are: Logic, the three Vedas (*trayī*), agriculture, cattle-raising and trade (collectively called *vārtā*) and the technique of ruling (*daṇḍanīti*).

2. According to the followers of Manu (they are only three): the three Vedas, *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*.

3. For, logic is only a special branch of Vedic lore.

4. According to the followers of Bṛhaspati (they are only two): *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*.

5. For, Vedic lore is only a kind of cloak (*saṃvaraṇa*) for those who are wise in the ways of worldly life.

6. According to the followers of Uśanas, there is only one branch of learning, namely, *daṇḍanīti*.

7. For, (the success of) various efforts put according to all the branches of learning is rooted in it.

8. However, Kauṭilya says that the branches of learning are four and only four.

9. The (common) essential characteristic of all the branches of learning (*vidyātva*) consists in the fact that, with them as the means, one can learn the (nature of) *dharma* and *artha*.

10. Logic-based philosophy (*ānvīkṣikī*) (is represented by the following three): Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata.

11. (Logic), by critically examining with the means of proper arguments (*hetu*)—*dharma* and *adharma* which belong to Vedic lore, gain and loss which belong to *vārtā*, and good policy and bad policy which belong to *daṇḍanīti*; and moreover, the relative strength and weakness of all these—benefits the people, keeps the thinking steady both in calamities and prosperities, and also brings about expertness in knowledge, speech and actions.

12. Logic is ever accepted to be the lamp of all the branches of learning, the means for all kinds of activities and the basis of all virtues (*dharma*).

Epics and Purāṇas

Philosophical literature apart, there are a number of references to the Lokāyata/Cārvāka views in the epics and Purāṇa, presumably indicating its wide prevalence in ancient and early medieval periods. However, as J. Muir, in his article read in 1861 and published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xix, pp. 299 ff, has extensively quoted these references, the readers are referred to his article included in part ii of the present collection. (See No. 20).

Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's *Commentary*

The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama (also called Gotama or Akṣapāda) is the basic and earliest text of the Nyāya system. The work is divided into five adhyāya-s, each of which is further divided into two āhnika-s. The total number of the Sūtras is 528. It is very difficult to be conclusive about its date. Various dates have been proposed by various scholars: AD 200–500 (Jacobi); not older than fourth century BC (Bodas); middle of fourth century and second century BC. (Kuppuswami).

A vast literature has grown upon this early sūtra-work of Gautama and the Nyāya system may be said to have developed almost exclusively through the commentaries and sub-commentaries on it written in later times. Thus, to mention a few important ones, Vātsyāyana (about AD 300) wrote the

Bhāṣya on the Sūtras, Uddyotakara (about AD 635) wrote the Vārtika on the Bhāṣya, Vācaspati (AD 840) wrote the Tātparyaṭikā on the Vartika, and Udayana (AD 984) wrote the Parisuddhi on the Tātparyaṭikā.

We have given here in literal translation the Sūtras of Gautama and Vātsyāyāna's Bhāṣya bearing on mainly two topics, most commonly attributed to the Lokāyata/Cārvāka: (i) the denial of inference as a source of knowledge and (ii) the denial of a self distinct from the body. To the texts are also added the *Elucidation* (in summary) by Mm. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa.

Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's *Commentary*

Adhyāya II, Āhnika 1

A. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE

Bhāṣya

The critical examination of perception is over. Now inference is being critically examined.

Sūtra 37

[Objection] Inference is 'not valid' (*a-pramāṇa*), because [in the typical examples of inference] there is irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) due to embankment (*rodha*), damage (*upaghāta*) and similarity (*sādṛśya*) // ii. 1.37 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] The expression 'not valid' [in the *sūtra*] implies the incapacity of determining the object in any of the three times [i.e. past, present and future]. [Thus, in the typical examples of inference], the fullness of the river may as well be understood as due to embankment; even in such a case there may be the wrong inference that the deity above has showered. [Similarly] the movement of the ants with their eggs may as well be due to damage done to their habitation; even in such a case there may be the wrong inference that it is going to shower.

[Again] the peacock's cry may as well be imitated by a human being; even in such a case, because of the similarity of the sound, there may be a wrong inference.

Elucidation

It is objected that the inference of the past, present and future may be wrong, because of the irregularity of the probans. The typical example of the inference of something belonging to the past is the inference of past rain from the fullness of the river. But the fullness of the river is an irregular probans for the inference of rain, inasmuch as this fullness may as well be due to the obstruction caused by an embankment. The typical example of the inference of something belonging to the future is the inference of future rain from the movement of the ants with their eggs. But such a movement is an irregular probans, inasmuch as it may be due to the damage done to their habitation. The typical examples of the inference of something belonging to the present is the inference of the peacock from the peacock's cry. But such a sound is an irregular probans, inasmuch as it may be due to the similarity of the human voice imitating the peacock's cry.

The evidence of irregularity in these three examples causes doubt as to the possibility of valid probans in general. Therefore, inference is not valid; it cannot prove anything belonging to the past, future or present. In other words, this shows that inference as such is unreal, because the probans of any inference can similarly be shown to be irregular.

It may be objected that if inference itself is viewed as unreal, how can one claim that it has no validity? Is there any sense in saying that the flower blossoming in the sky has no fragrance? The answer is that what is denied here is the alleged validity of what is called inference by others. What is actually unreal may wrongly appear to be real. In the same way, though inference is actually unreal, it wrongly appears to be real to others.

Sūtra 38

[Answer] No [i.e. inference is not invalid], because [the

probans for the inference of past rain, future rain and present peacock, viz., the fullness of the river, the movement of the ants with their eggs and the sound of the peacock's cry respectively] are different from [the fullness of the river due to] the embankment in a part of the river, [the movement of the ants with their eggs due to] fear (*trāsa*) [caused by the damage done to their habitation] and [the sound having] similarity [with the peacock's cry when the human voice imitates it]. // ii. 1.38 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] This is not irregularity of inference, but the illusion (*abhimāna*) of inference in what is not an inference. How? Something not being specifically determined cannot be a real probans. A person observing [in the river] the rain-water as different from the water previously existing—the swiftness of the current and the floating of profuse foam, fruits, leaves and wood, etc —infers, from the fullness of the river, that the deity above has showered, and not from the mere swelling of the river. There is the legitimate inference 'It will rain', only when there is movement everywhere of the ants with their eggs, and not from stray cases of it. From the absence of the knowledge of the specific difference in the form 'This is not the cry of a peacock, but a sound merely imitating it'—there is the wrong inference [of the present peacock]. However, for one who can discriminate the real peacock's cry, from the sound merely imitating it, the specific sound of the peacock's cry, when apprehended, becomes the probans, [of a right inference], as it happens in the case of the serpents, etc., [i.e. the serpent can correctly differentiate the actual sound of a peacock from other sounds resembling it, and can thus rightly infer the presence of the peacock therefrom].

Therefore, the error is that of one who [wrongly] infers, and not of the inferential process itself. In other words, [the error is of one who] wants to infer from an unspecified observation a specific object which can be proved only by a specific ground.

Elucidation

After explaining the main points of Vātsyāyana above,

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa discusses many important issues relating to the nature and validity of inference.

Uddyotakara, already in his explanation of the previous *sūtra*, points to the futility of the objections raised against the validity of inference. The objector himself has to take recourse to an inference to prove the invalidity of inference, his own probans being the irregularity of the probantia of three types of inference. But this is flatly self-contradictory. The objector cannot deny inference and, at the same time, take recourse to an inference to prove this. Further, does the objector intend to prove the invalidity of inference in general, or only of certain specific cases of it? The former alternative is impossible, inasmuch as the objector has at least to assume his own inference to be valid. The latter alternative entails the 'fallacy of proving what is already proved' (*siddhasādhanadoṣa*), for it is already accepted by everybody that the specific cases of inference committing the fallacy of the irregular probans are invalid.

The Cārvākas do not admit any *pramāṇa* except perception. According to them, that which is not perceived cannot be admitted as existent: its non-apprehension proves its non-existence. There is no *pramāṇa* like inference, etc. Human activity (*lokavyavahāra*) is based on probability. From the perception of a specific smoke, people are led to believe in the (probable) existence of fire there and, when this fire is actually obtained there, people are wrongly led to believe in a *pramāṇa*. Udayana, in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* (iii. 6), refutes this position. He argues that probability is a form of doubt and, from the Cārvāka point of view, there is no explanation for such a doubt: when the fire is actually perceived, its existence is positively proved, and so long as the fire is not perceived, it is proved to be non-existent in the Cārvāka view, according to which the unperceived does not exist. Thus, the perception of a specific smoke cannot result in any doubt of the nature of probability concerning fire; the absence of the perception of fire proves it to be non-existent. Further, the Cārvāka assertion that whatever is not perceived is proved to be non-existent leads to sheer absurdities. One leaving one's home does not perceive his relations, and therefore should believe in the non-existence

of these relations and even of his home itself. There will be no point for such a man to return home.

The Cārvākas, however, propose to disprove the validity of inference also on various other grounds. Their main argument is that inference is impossible, because it is impossible to establish any *vyāpti* or invariable relation between the probans and the probandum. *Vyāpti* is said to be ascertained (positively) by the 'knowledge of co-existence' (*sahacāra-grahaṇa*) and (negatively) by the 'absence of the knowledge of any contrary instance of co-existence' (*vyabhicāra-agrahaṇa*). But it is impossible to ascertain the absence of any contrary instance of co-existence, because there is always the scope for doubt of the probans as existing without the probandum. How can one be absolutely sure that smoke exists in no case of the absence of fire?

In a more sophisticated form, the Cārvāka position is as follows: The Naiyāyikas claim that *vyāpti* is an 'unconditional relation' (*anaupādhika-sambandha*) or a 'natural relation' (*svābhāvika-sambandha*), i.e. a relation free from any 'adventitious condition' (*upādhi*). Thus, e.g., fire is inferred from smoke, because the relation between fire and smoke is a natural one and not a relation due to any adventitious condition. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa examines at length various definitions of *upādhi* or adventitious condition. Of these, the usually accepted definition is that an adventitious condition is one which invariably co-exists with the probandum but not with the probans. Thus in the wrong inference, 'This contains smoke because it contains fire'—the probans is fire, the probandum is smoke and the adventitious condition is 'the presence of wet fuel'. The 'presence of wet fuel' invariably co-exists with the probandum 'smoke' but not with the probans 'fire'. For example, in the red-hot iron-ball, fire exists without wet fuel.

With this idea of adventitious condition, we may proceed to understand the Cārvāka position more fully. Since, according to the defenders of inference themselves, a real probans must be free from any adventitious condition, without a positive proof that the probans is absolutely free from any adventitious

condition, no inference is possible. But it is impossible for the Naiyāyikas to prove that a probans is absolutely free from all possible adventitious condition. The mere non-perception of any adventitious condition cannot be, for a Naiyāyika, a positive proof of the non-existence of any such condition. Only from the Cārvāka point of view that which is not perceived is non-existent—a view which the Naiyāyikas want, above all, to refute. Nor can it be claimed that the absence of all adventitious conditions is proved by inference, because this absence is a precondition for inference itself.

Thus, in short, it is impossible to prove that in an inference, the probans is absolutely free from all possible adventitious conditions. The probans of an inference may be vitiated by the presence of an adventitious condition in some possible place or time beyond the range of actual perception. Therefore, because of the possibility of being vitiated by an adventitious condition, no inference is beyond doubt.

Udayana answers this argument by showing that the doubt concerning inference, based on the possible existence of an adventitious condition in some place or time beyond the range of actual perception, is inadmissible for the Cārvāka himself, according to whom nothing that is not actually perceived can be possible. Thus, since, this alleged doubt concerning inference is itself inadmissible, inference must be admitted as valid.

Says Udayana: *śaṃkā cet anumā asti eva, na cet śaṃkā tatastarām*. This means, 'If you admit that there is doubt, then inference has got to be admitted; if there is no doubt, then all the better (for inference)'.

But the Cārvākas may argue that even admitting the refutation of their above argument, how can the Naiyāyikas completely eliminate the possibility of the irregularity or deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of the probans-probandum relation? How can they positively prove the co-existence of the probans and the probandum in all cases? Observed cases of this co-existence, however numerous these may be, can never be equated to all cases, and it is well known that even the evidence of thousands

of cases is disproved by the evidence of a solitary contrary instance. Therefore, there always remains a doubt concerning the invariability of the probans-probandum relation.

To this Udayana answers: *tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ mataḥ*. This means, 'Reductio is to be regarded as the dispeller of doubt'. In other words, this doubt concerning the invariability of the probans-probandum relation is finally eliminated by a 'reductio'. Thus, in the inference of fire from smoke, the possible doubt is: Is smoke really invariably related to fire? This doubt is dispelled by the following reductio: 'If smoke were not invariably related to fire, then smoke would have never been due to fire.' But the fact is that smoke is due to fire.

The Cārvākas may argue that the reductio itself presupposes an invariable relation and as such, another *tarka* is necessary to dispel the doubt concerning the invariable relation presupposed by this *tarka* itself—and so on, *ad infinitum*. Thus, the doubt concerning the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum cannot really be dispelled by a *tarka*.

As against this, Udayan says: *vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśaṃkā*. This means, 'Doubt is permissible only so long as there is no contradiction.' In other words, one can continue to doubt only so long as this doubt does not contradict one's own practical activity. Thus a person cannot have any doubt concerning the invariable relation between smoke and fire inasmuch as, in his practical life, he unhesitatingly seeks fire for obtaining smoke. If he really has any doubt concerning the invariable relation between smoke and fire, why should he at all seek fire in order to obtain smoke? His own activity, therefore, is itself an indication of the absence of the doubt.

Thus, the full statement of Udayana, in the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* iii. 7, is—

śaṃkā cet anumā asti eva, na cet śaṃkā tatastarām / vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśaṃkā, tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ mataḥ //

Śrīharṣa, the great exponent of Advaita Vedānta, in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, proposes to refute elaborately the above arguments of Udayana. He sums up his refutation by

formulating a counter-*śloka* showing slight verbal variations with Udayana's *śloka*, but intended to rebut it. Before quoting this counter-*śloka*, we may sum up Śrīharṣa's main arguments against Udayana.

Udayana claims that contradiction (*vyāghāta*) with practical activity (*pravṛtti*) dispels doubt concerning the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum. But this is impossible. A contradiction implies the contradicted, i.e. there must be two alternatives, one of which contradicts the other. In the present context, the two alternatives are: (1) the doubt concerning the invariable relation, and (2) the practical activity. Therefore, to admit the contradiction means to admit (both these alternatives, i.e. also the) presence of the doubt. In other words, doubt is one of the supports (*āśraya*) of this contradiction. Wherever there is contradiction, there is doubt. Thus, far from dispelling the doubt, contradiction implies its presence. Śrīharṣa expresses this by saying: *vyāghātaḥ yadi, śaṃkā asti*. This means, 'If there is contradiction, there must be doubt'. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, Udayana goes to the extent of denying the contradiction, then, argues Śrīharṣa, it is all the better for doubt, because there remains nothing to contradict it. So, he adds: *na cet śaṃkā tatastarām*. This means, 'If not (i.e. if there is no contradiction), it is all the better for doubt.'

It cannot thus be said that contradiction is the dispeller of doubt, and as such, the doubt concerning the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum remains ever undispelled. If the invariable relation is never free from doubt, then *tarka* itself becomes doubtful; for *tarka* depends on an invariable relation. It is thus futile to imagine that *tarka* dispels doubt concerning the invariable relation. Argues Śrīharṣa: *vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśaṃkā tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ kutaḥ*. This means, 'How can contradiction dispel doubt, or how can reductio dispel doubt?'

Therefore, as Śrīharṣa claims, only a little variation in the wordings makes Udayana's verse go in favour of Śrīharṣa's own view:

vyāghātaḥ yadi śaṃkā asti, na cet śaṃkā tatastarām/
vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśáṃkā tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ kutaḥ //

As against this, Gaṅgeśa argues that Śrīharṣa is here distorting the real purport of Udayana's claim. The real point of Udayana is that a clash with practical activity removes the very possibility of doubt. Udayana does not claim that 'contradiction', in the sense in which Śrīharṣa takes it, is the cause of the removal of doubt. Gaṅgeśa further argues that even admitting Śrīharṣa's interpretation of 'contradiction', his conclusion does not follow. It is a fact that doubt is dispelled by the perception of specific characteristic. Thus, e.g. when we have the doubt: 'Is this a pillar or a person?'—the perception of the specific characteristics of a person in the object like arms, legs, etc., dispels the doubt and results in the definite knowledge: 'This is a person.' But how can this perception of specific characteristics remove the doubt? Only by contradicting the latter. Thus it is seen that the perception of specific characteristics, by contradicting the doubt, removes it. Assuming Śrīharṣa's contention that contradiction implies the presence of two factors, one of which is doubt—he cannot explain the fact of the removal of doubt by the perception of specific characteristics.

Śrīharṣa's other contention is that doubt concerning irregularity cannot be silenced by *tarka*. This *tarka* is dependent on a causal relation. However, though in the cases observed, the relation between the cause and the effect holds good, this is not bound to be so even in the unobserved cases. In other words, the causal relation cannot be a universal or invariable one. Thus, e.g. though in the cases observed, smoke is caused by fire, there is no ground to assume that in all cases smoke is related to fire in the same way.

To this, Raghunātha replies that when the relation between fire and smoke is observed in numerous cases, there actually results the ascertainment of a causal connection between fire as such and smoke as such.

After elaborately discussing all these, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes that the objections raised against inference by the Cārvākas

and others are not tenable. Even one, wanting to prove that inference is invalid, has to depend upon inference itself. It is futile to claim that inference as such is invalid merely by pointing to certain cases of inference committing the fallacy of irregularity (*vyabhicāra*). A case of genuine inference is free from any irregularity. Thus, in short, the objection that inference is invalid cannot be sustained.

B. REFUTATION OF BHŪTACAITANYA-VĀDA

Adhyāya III, Āhnika 2

Bhāṣya

In this context, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin (i.e. one who admits the consciousness of material elements) says:

Sūtra 35

(Objection) The probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (exertion and its absence). As such, (consciousness) cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc., //iii. 2. 35//.

Bhāṣya

(Objection) Desire and aversion have, for their probantia, respectively, exertion and its absence. Thus it follows that knowledge, as well as desire and aversion, all belong to what is characterised by exertion and its absence. Exertion and its absence are observed to exist in the bodies—made of earth, made of water, made of fire and made of air. As such, they must be characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge, and must also be the loci of consciousness.

Elucidation

The cause and its effect must be located in the same substratum. Thus, the effect—exertion or its absence—is located in the body and hence the cause—desire or aversion—must also be located in the body. In the same way, knowledge being the cause of desire or aversion must also be located in the body

itself. It is concluded, therefore, that consciousness belongs to material elements.

Sūtra 36

(Answer) (Consciousness does not belong to the body), because exertion or its absence is observed even in the case of an axe, etc. // iii. 2. 36 //

Bhāṣya

(Answer) Consciousness does not belong to the body. If it be argued that the body is characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge—because exertion and its absence are observed in it, it would as well be proved that consciousness belongs to instruments like the axe, etc., for exertion and its absence are observed also in them.

Again, if it be said that on the basis of exertion or its absence the relation (i.e. presence) of desire, etc., is proved in the body only; and exertion or its absence does not invariably point to (the presence of desire, etc.) in the case of instruments like the axe, etc., the statement 'the bodies—made of earth, made of water, made of fire and made of air—are characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge, because exertion and its absence are observed to exist in them' does not represent a valid ground. (In short, the presence or absence of mere physical action is not a valid ground for the inference of consciousness.)

(Objection) Let then (the implication of the previous *sūtra*, viz.) 'the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (exertion and its absence); and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc.,' be interpreted in a different way (as follows). Exertion (*ārambha*) in the case of material elements like earth, etc. (i.e. the atoms of earth, etc., which constitute the body) means a specific form of activity (*pravṛtti*) which is inferred through the probans—viz. the peculiar conjunction of the component parts (i.e. the atoms)—in the bodies of beings moving (*trasa*) as well as stationary (*sthāvara*). Absence of exertion is the absence of the specific

form of activity, as in the case of a piece of stone, etc., in which the above probans (viz. the peculiar conjunction of the atoms) is absent. Thus, exertion and its absence (as described above) are the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion. Such exertion and its absence being observed in the atoms of earth, etc., the connection (i.e. presence) of desire and aversion, too, is proved in them and (from the presence of desire and aversion) is proved the presence of knowledge in them. It is, therefore, established that consciousness belongs to material elements.

(Answer) The above (does not indicate) a valid ground, for (desire or aversion) is not apprehended in the jar, etc. To explain, from the peculiar conjunction of the earth-particles constituting the jar, etc., exertion in the form of a specific activity is inferred in them also, and (from the absence of a peculiar conjunction leading to the formation of a compact body), the absence of exertion—i.e. the absence of a specific activity—is inferred in the sand-particles. Still, it is never admitted that 'earth or sand is characterised by desire, aversion, internal effort and knowledge, because exertion and its absence are observed to exist in them.' Therefore, the ground mentioned by the expression *tal-liṅgatvād icchā-dveṣayoḥ* (i.e. *sūtra* 35 above) is not a valid one.

Elucidation

According to the alternative interpretation of the previous *sūtra*, attributed to the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, exertion means a specific form of activity in the atoms of earth, etc., which leads, through a peculiar conjunction of the atoms, to the formation of the body. The presence of exertion in the atoms establishes the presence of its cause—viz. desire—in them, and finally, the presence of desire establishes the existence of consciousness in them, for desire is never possible without consciousness. Thus, the atoms being characterised by consciousness, the material elements composed of them will also be so.

In answer, Vātsyāyana contends that the alleged probantia for the inference of exertion and its absence—viz. the peculiar

conjunction of parts and its absence—are present in the case of the atoms of a jar and sand also, for a jar is formed only when the atoms of earth are conjoined in a specific way and the atoms of sand do not form a compact substance due to their inability to combine in a specific way. Thus, exertion and its absence are proved in the atoms of a jar and sand, which, however, are not characterised by desire and aversion. In other words, it follows that exertion and its absence are not invariable marks for desire and aversion, and hence they do not establish the presence of desire and aversion in the body.

Sūtra 37

The special characteristics (of desire and aversion) are 'presence of a rule' (*niyama*) and 'absence of a rule' (*aniyama*). //iii. 2. 37//

Bhāṣya

The special—i.e. distinguishing—characteristics of desire and aversion are presence of a rule and absence of a rule. Exertion and its absence, which are due to the knower's desire and aversion, do not reside in their own (i.e. of desire and aversion) substratum. What, then, is (the substratum of exertion and its absence)? Their substratum is what is employed (*prayojya*) (as the means). (As for instance, in the act of cutting, the desire inheres in the self of the person and the exertion in the form of upward and downward movement inheres in the axe.) Thus, exertion and its absence exist only in the material elements (i.e. objects) which are employed, and not everywhere. Hence the absence of rule (regarding the occurrence of exertion or its absence and desire or aversion) is justified.

Presence of rule is possible in the view of one (viz. the Bhūtacaitanyavādin) according to which, the material elements being themselves conscious, exertion and its absence which are due to desire and aversion reside in their own (i.e. of desire and aversion) substratum (viz. the body).

It is observed, in the case of material elements in general, that the material elements are characterised by exertion (in the

form of downward movement) due to some other quality (viz. heaviness) and they are characterised by the absence of exertion (i.e. the absence of the said movement) when the quality (viz. heaviness) is made ineffective. In the same way, exertion and its absence, which are due to knowledge, desire and aversion, should also reside in their own substratum, viz. material elements in general. This is, however, not actually so. It is, therefore, proved that knowledge, desire, aversion and internal effort are located in the employer (i.e. the knower or the self); while exertion and its absence are located in what is employed (as the means).

There is no ground for multiplicity of knowers in the same body. In the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, would not there be many knowers in the same body, for the numerous material elements (i.e. the atoms in the body) are all characterised by the qualities of knowledge, desire, aversion and internal effort? There is no ground in favour of one who answers in the affirmative. The existence of different knowers in different bodies is (admitted) because of a specific rule regarding the location of the qualities of knowledge, etc., (i.e. the rule that each knower experiences only his own pleasure, pain, etc.). (If a single body is sought to be proved as a locus of many knowers or selves), such a specific rule regarding the location of the qualities of knowledge, etc.—which indicates the multiplicity of knowers—is to be admitted in the case of a single body also. (That is, it is to be admitted that each part of the same body has its own pleasure, pain, etc. This is, however, not possible, and hence it cannot be claimed that the same body has many knowers.)

Elucidation

In the Nyāya view, exertion and its absence have for their substratum the body, while desire and aversion are located in the self. This difference of substratum is expressed in the *sūtra* by the word *aniyama*.

In the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, however, exertion,

absence of exertion, desire and aversion are all located in the same substratum, namely, the body; for the Bhūtacaitanyavādin admits the consciousness of the body itself. This identity of substratum is expressed in the *sūtra* by the word *niyama*.

After explaining the nature of *aniyama*, Vātsyāyana argues that *niyama* of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin cannot be logically defended. The implication of Vātsyāyana is that the qualities of the material elements are observed to be present in all the cases of the element to which the quality belongs. Heaviness, a quality of earth, for instance, is present in all the cases of earth. If the qualities of knowledge, desire etc. are admitted to be the qualities of material elements, they should be present in all cases of the same. This is, however, contradicted by facts, for a jar made of earth is characterised by none of the qualities.

As against the above, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin may point out that there can be no rule that each and every substance made of material elements like earth, etc., is to be characterised by the quality of knowledge. It is observed, for instance, that molasses, rice and other such objects develop the power of intoxication only when they are transformed through fermentation into a new substance, and not if they are arbitrarily mixed up.

In the same way, a material body develops the quality of knowledge, only when the atoms of earth, etc., combine themselves, through a specific form of conjunction, into the body of a human being.

Foreseeing this objection, Vātsyāyana says that the above argument presupposes the presence of knowledge in the constituent atoms also, for the quality of an effect is derived from the qualities of its material cause. In that case, there would be a multiplicity of knowers in the same body, which is, however, not proved by any ground. Different knowers in the bodies of different persons are admitted to explain the fact that the pleasure or pain of one person is not experienced by someone else. This is quite possible on the admission that one body is related to one knower or self only.

Vācaspati Miśra says that if the presence of numerous knowers in the same body is admitted, the body would be unable to perform any function, for each knower would have his own desire which would not be in agreement with those of the others. An agreement may sometimes accidentally take place, still it cannot be accepted to be the general rule.

Refuting the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, Udayana says that if the body itself is admitted to be conscious or the knower, a person would not be able to recollect, in his youth or old age, an object perceived in his childhood, for, through continuous production and destruction of the different constituents, the body is constantly changing, and an object perceived by one cannot be recollected by someone else.

To this, it may be replied that in spite of the change of the body the group of impressions persists and is transmitted from one body to another, and thus recollection is possible. Udayana rejects the argument by pointing out that a transmission of impressions is not possible, for, in that case, the impressions of the mother may be said to be transmitted to the child in the womb so that the child even may recollect the objects perceived by its mother.

Still, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin may persist in saying that the impressions located in the material cause only are transmitted and the mother not being the material cause of her child, the above difficulty does not arise. However, such a position, too; involves difficulties. The material cause of the body is the different component parts or the limbs. When any one of the limbs is damaged, the impressions located in it also are destroyed. Thus, according to the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, there can be no recollection of an object perceived through one limb of the body when that limb is destroyed. This is, again, contradicted by facts, for an object known by one's eyes is recollected even when they are damaged and one has turned blind.

Finally, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin may maintain that consciousness as well as the impressions produced by cognitions belong

to the atoms that constitute the body. The atoms being eternal, recollection is possible even in later times. To this, Vardhamāna answers that the qualities of atoms are never perceived, for an atom not being characterised by 'intermediate magnitude' (*mahattva*) is imperceptible, and if knowledge be a quality of the atoms, it can never be internally perceived in such forms as 'I know', 'I have a cognition' and so on.

Bhāṣya

It is observed that the particular exertions of the material elements are due to the quality of something else, and this is a ground for inference in other cases also. To explain: it is observed that in the case of material objects like the axe, etc., which are used as instruments and the clay, etc. which are used as material causes, the particular exertions are due to the quality of something else. This (observed fact) is the ground for the inference of (exertions being due to the quality of something else) even in other cases of bodies, moving and stationary. (It is thus established that) the particular exertions of the material objects—inferred from the peculiar conjunctions of their component parts—are due to the quality of something else. (That is, from the instance of the axe, etc., it is inferred that the physical exertions of the body, too, are due to the urge of something else, which is nothing but the conscious self.)

This quality (of something else which is the cause of physical exertions in the body) is the impression, known as *dharma* and *adharma*, which coexists with 'internal effort' (*prayatna*) (i.e. exists in the self), is a cause for all actions and, just like internal effort, is required for the attainment of all human ends.

It is to be noted that (the doctrine of) the consciousness of the material elements is refuted also by the proofs for the existence of the self as well as the proofs for the eternality of the self. Besides, the *sūtra* (i.e. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.18), viz. 'knowledge is not a quality of the sense or the sense-object, because

knowledge (i.e. recollection) is produced even when they are destroyed' is also directed against the same (doctrine).

When (the Bhūtacaitanyavādin) claims, (as in *sūtra* 35 above), that the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (exertion and its absence), and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc., (he wrongly) considers exertion and its absence to be mere physical movement and its cessation. But, as has been stated, these, exertion and absence of exertion, are actually of a different kind (viz. a specific form of purposive action leading to the attainment or the avoidance of an object). Such exertion and its absence, however, are not observed in earth, etc. and, therefore, it is illogical to claim that the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (exertion and its absence), and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc.

Praśastapāda *with Nyāyakandalī*

Praśastapāda's (c fifth century AD.) *Padārtha-dharmasaṅgraha*, also known as *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, is about the most important and early exposition of the Vaiśeṣika view. Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-kandalī* (c. tenth century AD) is one of the best known commentaries on it.

We have given here the section of the text and commentary discussing the self as distinct from the body, sense-organ and mind, much of which is, evidently, intended to be the statement and its refutation of the standard understanding of the Lokāyata/Cārvāka position.

An English translation of the two was done by Mm. Gangānatha Jha and as reprinted from the *Pandit*, it was published from Allahabad in 1916. Though depending much on this translation, we have found it necessary to make substantial changes in it

Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya with Nyāya-kandalī

[ON PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL]

TEXT

Ātman, Self, is that to which belongs the universal self-ness (*ātmatva*). (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* viii. 1.2; iii 1.2).

Being too rarefied to be sensed, it is imperceptible. It is ascertained by means of the auditory sense, etc., which, in their turn, are inferred from the perception of sound, etc.—for such instruments as the axe and their like are always found to be operated by an agent.

In the case of the cognitions of sound, etc. too, we infer a 'cogniser'. It cannot belong to the body, or to the mind; because all these are unconscious. Consciousness cannot belong to the body because it is a product of matter, like the jar. Further, no consciousness is found in dead bodies.

Nor can consciousness belong to the sense-organs, because these are mere instruments, and also because even after the sense-organ is destroyed, when the object is no longer in contact with it, recollection may occur.

Nor can consciousness belong to the mind; because if the mind may be regarded as functioning independently of the other organs, we could have perception and recollection simultaneously. Also because the mind itself is a mere instrument. We are thus left with the only alternative that consciousness belongs to the self, which, in its turn, is known by this consciousness.

As from the motion of the chariot we infer the existence of an intelligent guiding agent as the charioteer, so also we infer an intelligent guiding agent for the body, from the activity and the restraint found in the body which have the capacity of acquiring the desirable and avoiding the undesirable respectively. (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iii. 1.19).

The intelligent agent is also inferred from the breathing, etc. How? 1) When we perceive an unusual movement of the air

contained in the body, (we infer the existence of a guiding agent), like a conductor of a bellow. 2) From the regular action of opening and shutting the eyes we infer the existence of an agent, like the string-puller of a wooden puppet. 3) From the fact of the wounds of the body being healed up, we infer the existence of the agent like the master of a house (repairing it). 4) From the action of the mind that effects a contact of the sense-organs with desirable objects, we infer the existence of the agent, like a boy in a corner of the house throwing a ball. 5) When with the eye we look at an object, and then remember its taste, a certain modification is found to occur in the organ of taste. From this, we infer the existence of a single guiding agent for the two operations, like a person looking through different windows. 6) Also, from the qualities of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, is inferred the existence of one to whom these qualities belong. These qualities cannot belong either to the body, or to the sense-organs. Why? Because: a) these are coextensive with the notion of the ego; b) these qualities exist only in certain parts of the object to which they belong; c) they are not coexistent with their substratum; and d) they are not perceptible by the external senses. 7) The existence of the self (as a distinct substance) is also proved by the fact of its being spoken of by the word 'I', which is distinct from the words 'earth', etc. (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iii. 2. 4–13)

The qualities of the self are: knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, impression, number, magnitude, separateness, conjunction and disjunction. The *sūtra*, dealing with the distinguishing marks of the self, clearly establishes the qualities, beginning with knowledge and ending in effort. The presence of virtue and vice is indicated by the mention of the fact that the qualities of one self are not the cause of the appearance of a quality in another. The existence of impression is indicated by the mention of it as being the cause for the production of remembrance. The presence of number is indicated by the mention of 'specific reference' (*vyavasthā*) and, on the same ground, 'separateness'. The greatest magnitude of the

self is mentioned in the *sūtra*, 'so is the self also'. The fact of pleasure, etc. being due to contact proves the existence of conjunction with the self; and disjunction as the destroyer of that conjunction. (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iii. 2.4; 20; 21; vi. 1.5; ix. 2.6 & vii. 1. 22)

Commentary (*Nyāya-kandalī*)

The author now proceeds to describe that for whom the knowledge of truth brings the highest good, and false knowledge leads to birth and rebirth, and for whose purpose there are all the things (in the world).

Ātmatvābhisambandhāt, etc.: *Ātmatva* is the name of a universal. The relation with this universal makes the substance known as *ātman*. It is the fact of being characterised by this universal that differentiates the self from all other things.

Objection: As a matter of fact, we find that the existence of a perceptible object is always accompanied by a cognition of its form. In the case of the self, there is no cognition of the form of the self. Hence, not finding its invariable concomitant, we cannot but reject the existence of the self. Under the circumstances, why should any attempt be made for ascertaining its distinguishing marks?

Answer: There is no reason for setting aside the notion of the existence of self, because the absence of its perceptibility by the sense is implied by its very nature. On the other hand, for its existence we have an inferential proof. The author proceeds to show this: *tasya*, etc. Rarefiedness consists in the incapability of being perceived by the senses; and this rarefied self is known by inference from the auditory and the other senses, whose existence, again, as belonging to the imperceptible self, is proved by another inference: 'The perception of sound, etc., is brought about by means of an instrument, because it is an action, like the action of cutting (which is not possible without an instrument in the shape of the axe)'. How these senses prove the existence of the self is next shown: in the case of such instruments as the axe and the like, we find that they are always

worked by an intelligent agent. That is to say, whatever instrument there is in the world, it is found to be worked by an intelligent agent, as we find in the case of the axe, which is worked by the carpenter; and the organs of audition, etc., are all instruments; as such, they must be worked by something else. That by which these are worked is the self. Though the auditory sense, which is of the nature of *ākāśa*, has no direct relation with the self, as *ākāśa* is all-pervading, yet it has the capability of being worked by the self, through the substratum of the internal sense (mind); just as the hand is in contact with the red-hot ball of iron through the pincer.

The fact of the auditory sense, etc., being but instruments, is proved by the fact of their illumining, or manifesting, or rendering perceptible, the definite objects, as does the lamp.

Though it is by the mind that we cognise the self as 'I' and 'mine', mixed up with the notions of the doer and the master, brought about by the limiting conditions of the body and the senses acquired by it by reason of its previous deeds, yet it is spoken of as 'imperceptible by the senses', on account of its being imperceptible by the external sense-organs.

Śabdādiṣu prasiddhyā, etc: Inasmuch as there is a cognition of sound and other things, we infer from that the existence of the cogniser. For instance: 'Cognition must inhere in something, because it is an action, like the action of the axe; and that wherein it inheres is the self.'

Objection: The cognition cognises the object by itself, and not as inhering in something else.

Answer: Is such cognition eternal, or does it change every moment? If it is eternal, then there is a mere difference of name (as what we call 'self' is nothing more than an eternal cogniser). If it be momentary, then there could be no remembrance of something perceived a long time before, for the cognition that remembers is something wholly different from that which had perceived on the previous occasion.

Objection: Inasmuch as there is a causal relationship between the previous cognition and the subsequent remembrance, the

former cognition would be remembered by the latter. The reason for the son not remembering that which was perceived by his father lies in the fact of there being no causal relationship between the cognition of the father and that of the son. Though there is such a relationship between the bodies of the two persons (father and son), yet inasmuch as the bodies are unconscious things, their relationship can have no bearing upon their cognitions.

Answer: This is not correct, because if there be no self, there would be no idea at all of any causal relationship, for at the time when the cause would be cognised, there would be no cognition of the effect, which has not yet come into existence at that time; while at the time when the effect would be perceived, the cause would disappear in the past, and hence there can be no cognition of it. According to one who denies the self, there would be no one perceiver of both, and, as such, there would be none to ascertain the causal relationship between these two things appearing one after the other

Objection: The previous cognition cognising itself also brings about the idea of its causal character, which is nothing apart from itself. The subsequent cognition cognising itself, also cognises its character as an effect, which is not distinct from its own nature. The character of the cause and that of the effect, apprehended by each of these cognitions, come to be cognised by a simple idea brought about by the single impression produced by the two cognitions conjointly.

Answer: These are simply absurd assumptions. How could the two cognitions, which would be confined to their respective objects, have any such idea as that 'I am the effect or the cause of that cognition', for certainly, they would be wholly ignorant of the conditions of each other. And that which they would not cognise could not be apprehended by them, as apprehension always follows in the wake of cognition.

Objection: We grant that cognition inheres in something else; and as the substratum of cognition we would have either the body, or the sense-organ, or the mind.

Answer: It does not belong to the body, the sense-organ or the mind. What does not belong to these is 'consciousness', *caitanya*, mentioned in the next sentence. That is to say, consciousness does not belong to the body, or to the sense-organ, or to the mind, because these are 'unconscious', i.e. they are not the material cause of cognition.

Objection: This argument involves a begging of the question, the premise being the same as the conclusion.

Answer: With a view to this objection, the author adds *na śarīrasya*, etc. That is to say, consciousness does not belong to the body, because like the jar, the body is a product of matter. As a matter of fact, we find that whatever is a product of matter is not conscious, as the jar; and the body is a product of matter. Therefore, it cannot be conscious.

He adds another argument: Because it is not found in the dead body. The putting forward of the fact of there being no consciousness in the dead body, is with a view to show that the property of consciousness is not coeval with its substratum. The argument thus comes to this: Consciousness is not a specific quality of the body, because it is not coeval with (does not exist as long as) its substratum like conjunction. From this, it follows that consciousness does not belong to the material constituents of the body. If these constituents were conscious, their product would also have been so, and there would be numerous cognisers (conscious beings) in one and the same body.

The conscious entity not being one, there could be no adjustment of the activities of the body, because in accordance with the motive or purpose of each of those numerous conscious beings (in the body, there can be no unanimity).

Consciousness does not belong to the sense-organs, because these are of the nature of instruments. That is to say, the sense-organs are unconscious, because they are instruments, like a stick (in the making of the jar).

He adds another argument: When they are destroyed, etc., that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that even when a sense-

organ has been destroyed, we have distinct remembrances of things previously perceived by its means; and certainly no remembrance would be possible if the cogniser (in the shape of the sense-organ) had been destroyed. Hence, consciousness cannot be a quality of these sense-organs.

Then again, we find that we have the remembrance of an object even when the object is not before us (and hence, not in contact with the sense-organs, which would not be possible if consciousness belonged to these organs). Nor could the remembrance be attributed to these organs, for these operate on objects only by going over to them (which would not be possible in the case of the absence of the object). Hence, remembrance cannot belong to the sense-organs. The absence of remembrance would also prove the absence of cognition in these, for remembrance cannot belong to any other thing, viz., that to which the previous cognition belongs.

It is for this same reason that consciousness cannot belong to the objects. If it were so, there could be no remembrance of the object after it had been destroyed.

For the following reason also, consciousness cannot belong to the object: we do not find the object to have any idea either of its position or of the pleasure, etc., brought about by it, and we do not find it ever moving at all with any degree of intelligence.

Then, again, if consciousness belonged to the sense-organ or to the object, then we could have no such notion as 'I saw the colour, perceived the taste, and am feeling the touch,' which unifies in itself the several cognitions of colour, etc.

Colour, etc., and eye, etc., are distinct from one another (i.e. colour is distinct from taste, and the eye from tongue, and so on).

Objection: Consciousness may be a quality of the mind, as it applies to all objects, and is eternal. As such, the unification of cognitions just spoken of would be quite possible in this case.

Answer: It cannot belong to the mind. If the mind be believed to cognise with the help of some organ of perception other than the eye, etc., then your theory differs from mine only in

name (you applying the name 'mind' to what we call 'self') as what this other organ would be is the mind, and the mind which you hold to be the substratum of consciousness would be what we call 'self'. If the mind does not need the help of any other organ save the eye, etc., in the case of an object with a colour, taste, etc., being before us, all these would be perceived simultaneously, as there would be a simultaneity of the causes of their perception. It is only when there is a need of some other organs that this organ of the mind, being atomic in its nature, cannot be in touch with all the ordinary sense-organs at one and the same time. Hence, there would be no possibility of any simultaneous cognitions of colour, taste, etc. If there were no such organ (in the shape of an eternal organ, mind), there would be simultaneous remembrances, as there would be no want of any necessary element. Whereas, if there be a need of such an organ, as there could be no simultaneous contact with this organ, the remembrances could only be gradual.

It has been held by some people that the mind, being a single, eternal entity, cannot bring about any remembrance, either simultaneous or successive (as in the latter case the remembrances would go on *ad infinitum*, and as such, it could not be regarded as having any instrumentality in the bringing about of remembrances). But this is not right, because as regards the simultaneous bringing about of remembrances, this is not possible. Then, as regards the successive bringing about of them, when one has been brought about, there can be nothing left to be brought about after that. But this does not mean that at this latter time, the mind does not exist, as we do admit of an existence other than that which consists in effective activity.

For the following reason also, consciousness cannot belong to the mind: the mind being itself of the nature of an instrument. That is to say, 'Mind is not conscious, because it is an instrument of consciousness.'

Objection: The fact of the mind being an instrument has not been accepted (by both parties), as it is held to be the doer or agent.

Answer: If the mind were the doer, then for the perception of pleasure, etc., we should find some other instrument, like the eye for the perception of colour, for no action can ever be produced without an instrument. If you agree to accept the existence of some such organ, there would be a difference in name only, as you would also admit the existence of a doer (calling it 'mind' while we call it 'self') and a distinct instrument (calling it something else while we call it 'mind').

Another reason why the mind cannot be regarded as conscious lies in the fact of its being a material substance, like a piece of stone.

Question: If consciousness does not belong to the body, or to the sense-organ, or to the mind, how does that prove its relation with the self?

Answer: *Pariśeṣāt*, etc. That is to say, consciousness being an effect, must be the effect of some cause in which it would inhere. It has been proved that it cannot inhere in the body, sense-organs or the mind. It will be shown later on that nothing else has the power to be the cause of consciousness. Hence the only thing that remains, to which consciousness could be attributed, is the self. Inasmuch as it is a product of the self, it is by means of consciousness that the self is cognised.

The author brings forward other arguments to prove the existence of the self: *śarīra-samavāyinībhyām*, etc. That is to say, from the activity and restraint found in the body, we infer the existence of an intelligent guide of the body, who makes the necessary effort. In order to preclude the activity of the creeper, etc., the author has added 'inhering in the body'. For the purpose of precluding the movement and its absence in the dead body in a current of water, he has added: 'capable of acquiring and avoiding the desirable and the undesirable respectively'. The 'desirable' is pleasure and the 'undesirable' is pain. The acquiring of pleasure and the avoiding of pain indicate such activity as is prompted by intelligence.

The author cites an instance: 'Just as we infer the charioteer as guide from the motion of the chariot.' That is to say, 1) the

activity capable of acquiring the desirable and avoiding the undesirable, through acceptance and rejection of the means leading to those experiences, must be regarded as due to a preceding effort, because it is a particular kind of activity, like the activity of the chariot and 2) the body is controlled by an intelligent agent, because it has a peculiar action, like the chariot.

Prāṇādibhiśca: The significance is that also from the actions of breathing, etc., we infer the existence of the intelligent controller. This refers to all such actions as inhaling, exhaling, closing and opening of eyes, living, mental activity, and the modifications undergone by the sense-organs; as also pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort,—all of these being indicative of the existence of the self.

With a view to show in what way these are indicative of the self, the author proceeds to show first how breathing up and down is indicative of it: *śarīraparigṛhītaḥ*. Air has the character of blowing horizontally; but in the case of the air, enclosed in the body, we find it moving up and down vertically, in a manner contrary to its ordinary nature. From this we infer the existence of a controller of the body, who makes the air move in that manner, as otherwise we could not account for such an action of the air, contrary to its natural mode of motion. The instance cited is that of the blower of the bellow.

The argument may be simply stated thus: The body is controlled by an intelligent agent, because it is the receptacle of such air as has its action modified by the desire of someone, just like the bellow. The qualification *śarīraparigṛhītaḥ* indicates the fact of being preceded by intelligent desire. Hence the argument is not invalidated by such instances as those of the *dvivāyuka* and the like. (*Dvivāyuka* is the name given to the phenomenon of the rising up of the whirlwind caused by the collision of two contrary winds.)

The closing and opening of the eyes indicate a controlling agency, of the same kind as the string-puller of the puppet. That is to say, the action bringing about the conjunction of the

upper lid with the lower is called *nimeṣa*; and that which brings about their separation is called *unmeṣa*; and from this action we infer a controlling intelligent agent for the body who would act like the string-puller of the puppet.

Inasmuch as the propelling up and down of the puppet could be brought about by the action of the wind also (as in the case of the wind-mill), in order to preclude this, the author has added *niyatena*, in a fixed manner, which implies dependence upon someone else's desire. The argument may be thus stated: The body is controlled by an intelligent agent, because it has, as its constituents, such parts as are moved up and down by desire, like the puppet.

The author next puts forward an argument that proves the existence of life: *dehasya*, etc.: *Vṛddhi* is growth; this and the healing up of wounds being due to some intelligent controller, we infer the existence of such an intelligent controller or mender for the body, who would be similar to the master repairing his house. That is to say, the growth of the body and the healing up of its wounds must be regarded as being brought about by an intelligent agent, because they have the character of growth and healing up of wounds, like the extending and repairing of the house. Nor would the growing of trees, etc., invalidate this argument, as the growth of these also is brought about by God.

Such things as the tree and their like have no souls, as in the case of these we do not find any connection with soul characterised by the various functionings of the intellect, etc.

The author now puts forward the inferential argument based upon mental activity: *abhimata*, etc. That is to say, the existence of the self in the body is indicated by the action of the mind that brings about its connection with the eyes and the other organs of perception, which apprehend objects desired to be perceived. The mover of the mind is inferred to be like the boy throwing one ball against another fixed in a corner of the room.

That is to say, the mind is moved by an intelligent agent,

because it is the substratum of an action bringing about the connection with a desired object, like the ball in the boy's hand. That which would be moved by non-intelligent agencies of the wind and the like would bring about connection with undesirable things also.

Nayanaviṣaya, etc.: As a matter of fact, we often find that after the perception of colour in the object of vision, there may be certain modifications in the organ of taste, following upon the remembrance of the taste of the object seen. From this, we infer that there is a single agent who cognises both colour and taste, by means of the two organs, resembling a person looking through two openings in the window. That is to say, when we see the colour of a nice fruit we like, we have a remembrance of its taste perceived on some previous occasion; this remembrance produces in us a desire to eat the fruit; this is followed by an effort towards obtaining it; and this effort, through the contact of the self and the mind, produces a modification in the organ of taste, in the form of making saliva flow from the roots of the teeth; this flow of saliva could not be due to any intelligence in the sense-organ itself; as each of the two organs concerned perceives only the colour and the taste respectively. Hence, the seeing of colour could not bring any remembrance of the taste. As a matter of fact, however, we do find this modification appearing in the organ of taste. Hence, there must be someone apart from the organs who cognises both, and who, on seeing the colour, remembers the taste. Nor could the body itself be taken as the cogniser of both, because the young body being universally recognised to be different from the old body, on account of the difference in size, anything perceived in boyhood could not be remembered in old age.

Not for the above reasons alone, but also because of the properties of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, which lead to the inference of something to which these properties belong, all these qualities are cognised as co-extensive with the notion of 'I', being always cognised as 'I am pleased', 'I am pained' and the like, where we find that it is the object 'I' which

is characterised by pleasure, etc. The notion of 'I' could not refer to the body, because it is not found to apply to the body of another person. Nor could it be said to apply to one's own body alone. Because one body, as a body, does not differ from another body. If the notion of 'I' is referred to the body, then just as another man's body being as perceptible as our own, the notion of fatness appearing equally with references to both—the other man's body would also be capable of being spoken of as 'I', specially as, in both, the shape is the same. If it be held that there is a difference between the two on account of the characters of things related to them, then the notion of 'I' would come to apply to these things, and not to the body. Then again, if the notion of 'I' referred to the body, it could not appear in our consciousness as something internal.

For the same reasons, the notion of 'I' could not refer to the sense-organs, as these organs are themselves beyond sense-perception; while the notion of 'I' is of the nature of sense-cognition, being independent of inferential marks as well as of verbal expression.

For the same reason, pleasure, etc., as well could not belong either to the body or to the sense-organs. Then again, it is a fact known by all that to him alone who is the experiencer or cogniser, belong remembrance, desire, acquiring of the means of pleasure, the feeling of pleasure, avoidance of pain, and so forth. It has already been proved that cognition and remembrance do not belong either to the body or to the sense-organs. Hence it follows that pleasure, etc., also cannot belong to them.

The author brings forward another reason: *pradeśavṛttitvāt*. That is to say, we actually see that the qualities of pleasure, etc., exist only over a part of their substratum: for instance, we have such ideas as 'I feel pleasure in my feet', 'I have a pain in my head'. From this, it follows that they cannot be the properties of the body or the sense-organs, as they differ essentially from the specific properties of these, which are found to pervade over the whole of their substrates. The argument may be thus

simplified in the form of a negative inference: pleasure, etc., are not the specific properties of the body or the sense-organs, because they exist only in parts of their substrates, while the specific properties of the body and the sense-organs have always been found to pervade the whole of their substrates, e.g., colour and the rest. Pleasure, etc., however, do not thus pervade the whole of their substrates, and hence they cannot be the properties of the body or the sense-organs. Nor could the case of sound be an exception invalidating the above premise, although sound is a property of *ākāśa* (the whole of which it does not pervade), yet it appears as the property of that portion of *ākāśa* which is enclosed within the cavity of the ear, the whole of which it certainly pervades.

For the following reason also, pleasure, etc., cannot be the properties of the body or the sense-organs: they do not last as long as their substrates. The case of colour may be cited as an instance to the contrary. In fact, this argument cannot apply to the case of the sense-organs, because the premise would be invalidated by the case of the organ of hearing, whose property, viz. sound, does not exist as long as the organ itself.

Another reason why pleasure, etc., cannot be properties of the body or of the sense-organs, is that they are not perceptible by any of the external senses. The qualities of the body and sense-organs are of two kinds: 1) some, like gravity and the like, are imperceptible; and 2) some, like colour, etc., are perceptible by the external sense-organs.

In the case of pleasure, etc., however, we find that they do not come within any of the two categories (being perceptible, but not by any of the external sense-organs). Hence these cannot be the properties of the body or the sense-organs.

It being thus proved that pleasure, etc., cannot belong to the body and the sense-organs, the self is the only substance left to which they could belong.

Objection: Pleasure and pain are modifications, and as such, cannot belong to the self, which is eternal (hence, unmodifiable).

Even if they could belong to it, that self (being modifiable) would become non-eternal, like the skin.

Answer: Not so; because the production and destruction (appearance and disappearance) of these cannot cause any disturbance to the nature of the self. In the case of all eternal things, we do not admit of any destruction or change of its form. As for the disappearance of one quality (pleasure) and the appearance of another (pain) in connection with it, there would be no incongruity.

Question: How do pleasure and pain relate to the eternal self?

Answer: They afford to it an experience with regard to themselves.

Question: What good could this experience do to one that is free from all addition or substraction (i.e. want and its supply)?

Answer: The good done consists in this, that it is on the strength of such experience that it becomes an enjoyer or experiencer of pleasure and pain.

Tathāhaṃśabdenāpi: That is to say, just as the self is inferred from pleasure, etc., so also is it inferred from the notion of 'I'. We find the word 'I' used in the Veda, as well as in ordinary parlance by learned persons. This word cannot be without something that it would denote. Its own form cannot form its denotation, as that would involve the incongruity of its operation bearing upon itself. As has been well declared: 'No word ever denotes itself.' Hence, that something which is denoted by the word 'I' would be the self.

Objection: The word 'I' may be regarded as denoting the earth, etc.

Answer: *pṛthivyādiśabdavyatirekāt*. That is to say, that which denotes one thing is always found to be co-extensive with other words denoting the same thing, as we find in the case of the words 'substance' (*dravya*), 'earth' (*pṛthivī*) and the like.

In the case of the word 'I', however, we find that it is not co-extensive with the other words denoting the earth, etc., as we never come across such expressions as *ahaṃ pṛthivī* ('I am earth'), *ahaṃ udakaṃ* ('I am water'), etc. Hence, the word 'I' cannot be taken as applying to the earth, etc.

Objection: The word 'I' is found to be applied to the body in such expressions as *sthūlo'ham*, 'I am fat.'

Answer: Not so; because we find it used in such expressions as *ahaṃ jānāmi* ('I know'), *ahaṃ smarāmi* ('I remember'). It has been shown that knowledge and remembrance do not belong to the body. Hence its use with regard to the body must be understood as secondary or figurative, based upon the fact of the body being a useful instrument for the self, as the master says of his useful servant: 'he is my very self'.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī

The *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is one of the most outstanding contributions in the field of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in particular and Indian philosophy in general. A Gauḍa-Brāhmaṇa of the Bharadvāja *gotra*, Jayanta was the son of Candra Paṇḍita. Probably his family's original home was Bengal, but his forefathers had gone to Kashmir and settled there. He is said to have written this immortal work while he was imprisoned for his refusal to part with, on the king's demand, the wealth of the temple of which he was the chief. He appears to have quoted Vācaspati Miśra and hence, must be posterior to him, and might have flourished between AD 850 and 910. As is evident from every line of his writing, Jayanta was a profound scholar in most of the systems of Indian philosophy. The *Nyāyamañjarī* is supposed to be a commentary on Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*, although it is rather of the nature of an independent work, and in any case, a unique exposition. Jayanta has discussed in great detail all the important problems of logic and philosophy, representing the opponent's positions most elaborately and criticising them from the Nyāya standpoint with great logical acumen. His style of writing, too, is unique—witty, forceful and sometimes sarcastic.

We have given here mainly his exposition with refutation of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata views on the validity of inference and the materialistic understanding of the self, besides adding a few stray references to the Cārvākas in different contexts.

Nyāyamañjarī

A. Dehātmavāda

A.I. The view of the Cārvākas who admit that the body is the self

(*śarīrātma-vādi-cārvāka-mata*)

TEXT All this 'discussion about one becoming non-attached' (*virakta-saṃkathā*) 'cannot produce the intended result' (*asañjāta-phalocita*). Why not, first of all, decide whether there is any (distinct) self or not?

NOTE After discussing the *pramāṇa*-s very thoroughly and elaborately in the first six *āhnika*-s of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta goes on to discuss the *prameya*-s, which comprise the next three *āhnika*-s. The twelve *prameya*-s are taken up in the same order in which they are mentioned in the list given by Gautama (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.9), where, again, the self comes first.

In a general introduction to his discussion of the *prameya*-s, Jayanta argues (following *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.2) that the right knowledge of the twelve special *prameya*-s leads, through a distinct causal sequence, to the ultimate good, namely, liberation, which is nothing but an absolute cessation of suffering. Thus, right knowledge of the *prameya*-s leads to the removal of false knowledge about the *prameya*-s; false knowledge being the cause of evil (*doṣa*), its removal leads to the removal of its effect, etc., . . . i.e., the self has to be admitted.

TEXT Thus, for example, the Laukāyatikas, who deny that there is any 'other world' (*paraloka*), think that there is no self other than the body itself as 'endowed with consciousness' (*caitanya-khacita*)

NOTE The most important consideration for the admission of a distinct self is that the body is non-sentient whereas the self must be something, which is sentient. As will be presently shown, according to the Laukāyatikas, the body itself can have consciousness and hence, there is no need for the admission of a distinct self. The concepts of rebirth, 'merit and demerit' (*dharmādharma*), etc., are not logically justifiable; the destruction of the body, or death, means the end of one's worldly existence for good. There is, thus, no need to assume that there is some eternal being, a distinct self, which may survive even after death and pass from births to births.

TEXT The (so-called distinct) self cannot be perceived, for it cannot be apprehended by the external sense-organs, like the jar, etc., or by the internal sense-organ, like pleasure etc. According to the Cārvākas, inference is not a *pramāṇa* at all; moreover, there is also no inferential mark which can prove the existence of the self.

NOTE The two most generally accepted *pramāṇa*-s are perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). The Cārvākas now claim that there is neither perception nor inference to prove a self as distinct from the body.

Perception may be either external (e.g. the perception of a jar) or internal (e.g. the perception of pleasure). The most important precondition for the external perception of a substance is the 'possession of colour' (*rūpavattva*): only a substance which has colour can be externally perceived. The self is, admittedly, a substance without colour; hence it cannot be perceived externally. An internal perception of the self may, sometimes, be possible; still, such a perception does not prove any self as distinct from the body, rather, it substantiates the view that the self is identical with the body.

Inference—even if it is admitted to be valid—is not possible in the case of the self. Inference is vitally dependent upon a probans (*liṅga*, *hetu*) having invariable concomitance with the probandum (*liṅgin*, *sādhya*). Thus, fire can be rightly inferred from smoke, because smoke is invariably related to fire—

wherever there is smoke there is fire, and wherever there is no fire there is no smoke. Further, the presence of invariable concomitance is not enough; it has got to be verified perceptually in some instance. But, so far as the so-called distinct self is concerned, no such invariable probans—concomitance of which with the self may be established beyond doubt—is available. Hence, the self remains unproved inferentially too.

TEXT (The properties of) 'knowledge and others' (*jñānādi*) would be produced in the forms of matter (*bhūta*) themselves, when these elements attain a high degree of potency (*śakti*) as a result of undergoing a 'special kind of transformation' (*pariṇāma-viśeṣa*). As, for example, things like *guḍa*, *piṣṭa* and others become characterised by 'intoxicating power' (*mada-śakti*), even though it had not been present in them earlier, when they undergo (a special kind of) transformation in the form of 'spirituous liquor' (*surā*). In the same way, the forms of matter, even though without consciousness in the state of simple earth, etc., would become characterised by consciousness, when they have a (special kind of) transformation in the form of a body. After the end of the specified period (i.e. after the life-span has come to an end), due to disease or some other cause, the same forms of matter lose the special (kind of transformation) and become things without any consciousness.

NOTE There being no *pramāṇa* to establish the existence of a distinct self, the body itself is to be admitted as the seat of consciousness—as the substratum for the qualities of knowledge (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and others. However, as against this, two objections may be raised. First, the body is only an assemblage of certain forms of matter. If the body can be characterised by consciousness, then other assemblages of forms of matter as well, such as the jar and others, should be characterised by the same. But the jar and others are never observed to be characterised by consciousness. Secondly, it is generally observed that the qualities in the effect come from the qualities in the cause. Thus, for example, the colour of a piece of cloth agrees with the colour of the yarns used. Accordingly, consciousness in the effect, namely, the body, must come from consciousness in the cause, namely, the forms of matter. But actually the forms of matter are all devoid of consciousness. How, then, can consciousness appear in the body?

The Cārvāka answer to these two objections is given here. First, the mixture of the forms of matter that gives rise to consciousness is not an arbitrary one; it is a specific form of mixture leading to a 'specific kind of transformation' (*pariṇāma-viśeṣa*). When the forms of matter form the body, the transformation takes place and consciousness appears in the body. But in things like the jar and others, the transformation does not take place, hence, consciousness does not appear in them. Secondly, it is not true that the quality in the effect necessarily comes from the quality in the cause. The various ingredients of a spiritous drink do not possess individually any intoxicating power; but when they are mixed in a particular proportion and undergo transformation, they become characterised by such power. The case of the body being conscious, in spite of its production out of unconscious material elements, may be similarly explained. So long as one lives, transformation is there and the body remains conscious. When death comes, the transformation is not there, and the body becomes unconscious.

TEXT Because of the non-absence (*anapāya*) of consciousness in them (i.e. since the presence of consciousness in the material elements can be logically justified), the material elements themselves (in the form of the body) would be quite capable, during the specific period (i.e. a life-time), to perform the various functions like recollecting (*smṛti*), recognising (*anusandhāna* = *pratyabhijñā*) and others. Thus, by what inference would a distinct self be proved?

NOTE A distinct self is inferred as the conscious agent who recollects and recognises. But since the body itself can be conscious, it can very well perform the acts of recollection and recognition too. Hence, there is no logical basis for the inference of a distinct self.

TEXT The 'scriptural statements' (*āgama*) have only such validity as is imposed upon them by one's mere wish (i.e. they have no real validity; they are considered to be valid, illogically, by some persons only). How can they rightly convey that there is a distinct self? (Such statements, even though they may speak of a distinct self, cannot be trusted, for they have no validity.)

(Even those who admit the validity of *āgama* cannot deny the fact that consciousness may appear even in the material elements), for there is, in the scripture, also such a statement as: 'Pure consciousness (*vijñāna-ghana*) appears out of all these material elements and then, disappears in the same; there is no consciousness after death.'

Therefore, there being no eternal self which can travel to the 'other world', one should desist from all these discussions about the 'other world' which involve only meaningless exertion.

A.II. ILLOGICALITY OF VIEWING THE BODY AS THE LOCUS OF DESIRE AND OTHERS

(śarīrasya icchādyāśrayatvānupapattiḥ)

TEXT (Objection) Why not admit that (the qualities of) desire and others may have for their substratum (*āśraya*) the body itself? Bṛhaspati has in fact asserted that consciousness is a property of nothing but the material elements. It has also been claimed that consciousness (*vijñāna*) is produced just like the 'intoxicating power' (*mada-śakti*).

NOTE According to Nyāya (*see Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.10 and Vātsyāyana's commentary thereon), the self as a distinct substance is inferred on the basis of the qualities (*guṇa*) of desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), motivation (*prayatna*), pleasure (*sukha*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and knowledge (*jñāna*). These are called the 'specific qualities' (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) of the self; they are not present in any other substance.

The self may be inferred on the basis of the quality of desire, for instance, in the following manner. One perceives an object and derives pleasure by attaining it. In some later time, again, one perceives an object of the same kind, recollects that it has earlier been a cause of pleasure and strives to attain it for the sake of similar pleasure. This indicates that 'one' who previously perceived the object must be the same as 'one' who later strives to attain it, for an object perceived by one cannot be recollected by another. Moreover, here one has also the re-cognition in the form—'I, who previously enjoyed pleasure by perceiving and attaining this kind of object, am the same who, coming across a similar object, is now desiring to attain it.' Briefly, there must be a permanent substance which would be the subject (*kartṛ*) or substratum of the previous perception, the later perception, the recollection and the desire for the object—all these taking place at various times. Besides, all qualities reside in substances. Desire, etc., too, are qualities and therefore, must reside in some substance. This substance can be nothing other than the self.

Jayanta first discusses and defends the above Nyāya position and then, takes up the task of criticising the opponents, for the Indian philosophers believe that one's own view is not established simply by giving the arguments for it; the rival theories too have to be logically refuted. Accordingly, after rejecting the Buddhist view which admits a distinct self, but considers it to be impermanent, merely a 'stream of momentary consciousness' (*kṣaṇika-vijñāna-santāna*), Jayanta takes up the Cārvāka view according to which the body itself may be considered the substratum for desire, etc. It has already been shown (see *supra*) that the body itself may be the seat of consciousness and hence, the other similar qualities also—the so-called specific qualities of the self—may reside in the body. There is no need for admitting a distinct self.

TEXT (Answer) To this, the reply is as follows. The body cannot be the substratum of the qualities of desire and others, because it becomes different in the different 'states of life'

(*avasthā*) such as childhood, youth, old age and others. Indeed, an object perceived by one, cannot be recollected by another, and when an object is recollected by one, a desire in respect of it cannot be produced in somebody else. Therefore, for the single series of effects, starting with the first cognition of an object and ending with the production of the desire, some single substratum has got to be admitted. The body, however, becomes different in the different states, such as childhood and others, and therefore, it cannot logically be the substratum (of the cognition, etc.), just like a different stream of consciousness (which is held to be the self by the Buddhists). Just as an object perceived by Devadatta is never recollected by Yajñadatta, so also, an object perceived by the childhood-body (*bāla-śarīra*) would not be recollected by the youth-body (*yuva-śarīra*).

NOTE It is an undeniable fact that the first perception, the subsequent recollection and the ultimate desire must all have a single subject (*kartṛ*) or substratum. In that case, however, the body cannot be considered the knower or conscious subject of all these, because (as it will be presently shown) in the different states of life there are present different bodies and not the same one. The body of childhood and the body of youth are, in fact, two different entities. On the assumption that the body is the knower, things experienced in childhood would not be recollected in youth, for what had perceived earlier is not present now and what recollects now had not perceived earlier. This anomaly can be explained only by assuming that the knower is the self, something distinct from the body, which remains unchanged.

IEXI (Objection) In reality, only the states (*avasthā*) are different, but the body itself, which continues to exist, is the same. And this is rightly ascertained by a valid cognition in the form of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). The re-cognition, in this case, cannot be explained to be otherwise, like the re-cognition in the case of the nail and others which have been cut off and grown once again, for the destruction (of the body) is not

observed. The negation of momentariness in the case of the pillar (*stambha*) and its like would also be made (by the Naiyāyika) with the help of nothing but re-cognition, and in the present case as well, (i.e. in the case of the body,) it may be so.

NOTE As against the claim that the body cannot be the knower, because, in different states there are different bodies, it is contended here that actually, only the states are different, but the body remains the same.

How is it to be concluded that the body remains the same? On the strength of a valid re-cognition. For example, one sees Devadatta at Mathurā; once again, afterwards, one comes across Devadatta at Vārānasī. One has, then, a special kind of perception, in the form: '*this* is *that* Devadatta (*so'yaṃ Devadattaḥ*). Such a form of knowledge is called re-cognition or *pratyabhijñā*. It proves the identity of an object—perceived in different times, in different places. In the case of the body, too, one can have a re-cognition identifying the body to be the same at childhood and at old age. There is thus no need to admit a distinct self.

In fact, even the Naiyāyikas have to accept the validity and importance of re-cognition, for they have to take the help of re-cognition to refute the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (that every object is constantly changing every moment) when they argue that all objects cannot be momentary, for a pillar is definitely proved to be durable and identical on the strength of a re-cognition, namely, *this* is *that* pillar.

It may be pointed out that a re-cognition does not necessarily establish the identity of an object; there are cases of re-cognition where only sameness of kind is established because the object, actually, differs. For example, a person shaves off his hair on his head and afterwards, hair grows there once again. One may, then, have a re-cognition in the form: '*this* is *that* hair'. Here, the hair is different, although similar in kind. However, the re-cognition in the case of the body is not of such a form. In the case of the hair, there is definite evidence against the establish-

ment of identity, for, in the intervening period, the head may be observed to be without any hair and hence, it has to be accepted that the old hair is gone and new hair has grown later. During one's whole life-span, however, one is not observed to be without the body; hence there is no evidence for the production of a new or different body.

In short, re-cognition establishes that the body remains the same at different states and hence there is no need to assume a self as distinct from the body.

IEXI (Answer) All this is illogical. The re-cognition in the case of the pillar and its like is really erroneous, the error being due to the non-awareness of the cause for difference. (In the case of the body also), the re-cognition is erroneous and the error is due to resemblance (*sādṛśya*), for (the re-cognition is produced) in spite of the observation of difference in complexion (*rūpa*), size (*parimāṇa*) and condition (*pariveśa*), etc. Indeed, in the body of the child, in the body of the youth and in the body of the old man, the size, etc., are never observed to be the same.

NOTE A pillar, although re-cognised to be the same at different times, cannot actually be so, for subtle changes due to the action of various natural forces such as the sun, wind, rain, etc., are constantly taking place there as well. But it is not possible to easily determine all these changes and their causes. Hence, the pillar is re-cognised to be the same—only erroneously. In the case of the body, however, the changes are palpable. Still, there may be a recognition, though erroneous, revealing the body to be the same. The cause for the error is similarity—the previous body and the later body, although actually different ones, happen to be closely similar to each other. In short, there must be different bodies in different states and hence, the body cannot be the knower.

Some of the most obvious conditions indicating the disappearance of the old body and the appearance of a new body are stated here. Some further grounds in justification of the difference of the body are given in the text below.

IEXI That there is a different body is ascertained, also, from the fact of the digestion (*pariṇāma*) of food taken. Otherwise, the food would not have been digested in the manner in which 'qualities produced due to contact with fire' (*pākaja*) appear. There would have been no nourishment from the consumption of curd, milk and such other things. However, the body is observed to be rich in blood when gold, etc., are consumed. (In the various states) sometimes, some of the 'component parts' (*avayava*) perish, and sometimes, newer components are immediately produced; how can the body (lit. the 'whole', *avayavin*) (being composed of such different component parts) be considered to be the same?

(As in the case of an unbaked jar put into fire), so in the case of the body also, food and drink, etc., (taken by one) are cooked by the 'fire in the stomach' (*udarya*) and become transformed in the form of 'vital fluid' (*rasa*), excrement (*mala*) and 'essential ingredient' (*dhātu*), and it is thus quite possible that almost every moment, production and destruction are going on. Therefore, there being no permanence, (i.e. there being constant changes), how can the body perform the acts of re-cognition, etc. (which presuppose the presence of a permanent entity)?

Therefore, the body cannot be one and the same all along, because differences of size, etc., are clearly observed in it. As such, the re-cognition in the case of the body is similar to the recognition in the case of the flame (of a lamp).

NOTE To substantiate further the view that the body cannot be the same all along, Jayanta argues with a well-known Vaiśeṣika theory, called *pīlu-pāka-vāda* which explains how the four qualities of earth-substances—colour, taste, smell and touch—change when they come in contact with fire; as, for example, a black, unbaked jar becomes red after it has been put into fire.

When an unbaked jar is put into fire, movements (*karman*) are produced, because of conjunctions with fire, in the atoms constituting the jar. The movements then give rise to disjunctions (*vibhāga*) among the atoms. The disjunctions, in their turn, destroy the conjunctions among the atoms. Since the

group of conjunctions among the atoms is one of the vital causes of the jar, the destruction of the conjunctions leads to the destruction of the jar as well—the effect. The jar is, thus, ultimately reduced to a group of isolated atoms. Then, the conjunctions of fire, aided by heat, destroy the black colour of each of the atoms and produce the red colour in each of them.

Next, once again, movements are produced in those atoms which now have a new colour; due to movements conjunctions are produced among the atoms, and gradually, a new jar with a new colour is produced. The destruction of the colour or its production cannot take place in the jar as a whole, for, in that case, since the jar remains compact, fire would not be able to penetrate and come in contact with all the constituent atoms inside and out. As a result, only the outer atoms would turn red and the inner ones would not, and then, the whole jar cannot become red, for the colour in the effect must come from the colour in the causes. Thus, since the whole jar is baked and turns red it is to be admitted that all its constituent atoms have come in contact with fire. But this can happen only if the jar disintegrates and the atoms are all isolated. Therefore, the destruction of the jar and consequently, its production too, are to be admitted.

It is to be noted, however, that all this happens with extreme rapidity, and hence it is not perceptible to the eye. As for the baked jar being recognised to be the same as the unbaked one, it is only due to their extreme similarity.

In short, it follows that when qualitative changes due to contact with fire take place in an earth-substance, the substance cannot remain the same; there can only be *a different but similar* substance.

The fact of food-digestion (*āhāra-pariṇāma*) caused by the fire in the stomach proves that changes due to the action of fire take place in the body as well, which is an earth-substance; and these go on almost continuously. Hence, the body cannot remain the same all along.

How, then, is the body recognised to be the same at different times?

The fact is that although re-cognition generally refers to the same object, there are some exceptional cases in which re-cognition is admitted to refer not to the same object, but to objects which are *different but similar*. For example, the flame of a lamp, as long as it burns, is recognised to be one and the same. But in reality, different flames come into being at different moments. It is an undeniable fact that if the causes are different, the effects, too, must be different. Thus, each flame produced in consecutive moments has different causes—a new drop of oil, a new particle of the wick, and so on. Besides, some of the flames are shorter, some are longer, some are more brilliant, some are less brilliant, and so on and so forth. Hence, re-cognition, in such a case, cannot refer to the same object; it refers to a similar object. In the case of the body, too, re-cognition is to be explained similarly. (Also see *supra*, text and note).

TEXT Moreover, the statement that actually the states are different, but the thing that continues to exist—namely, the body—is one and the same, is illogical, because it can be justified in neither of the possible alternatives 'that the states are different' and 'that the states are not different'.

If it is claimed that the states of the body are really nothing different from the body itself, then the states themselves cannot be mutually different (for the body is alleged to be the same and the states are all identical with the same body). If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the states are really different from the body, then it has to be shown (at least in some case) that they are apprehended as different entities; but, in fact, there is never any such apprehension.

Therefore, the body being a different entity (in each state) ... it would not be possible for it to perform the acts of recollection, re-cognition and suchlike, and hence, the body cannot be the substratum of the effects like desire, etc.

(There are also) the following grounds (in favour of the view that consciousness cannot belong to the body): The body cannot be characterised by knowledge, etc., because it is 'subject to transformation' (*pariṇāmin*), just like milk, etc; because it is characterised by colour, etc., just like the same, (i.e. milk, etc.); because it is 'of the nature of a collectivity of the many' (*aneka-samūha-svabhāva*), just like the tripod (*tridaṇḍa*), etc.; because it has a peculiar 'arrangement of parts' (*sanniveśa*), just like the external material objects.

NOTE It has already been shown that the substance which would be the substratum of knowledge, etc., must be something permanent, and not something subject to constant change. But the body goes on changing. Hence, it cannot be characterised by knowledge, etc.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, three substances—earth, water and fire—are characterised by the qualities of colour, etc. But they are all observed to be without the qualities of knowledge, etc. The body, too, is an earth-substance. Hence, it cannot be characterised by knowledge, etc.

The living body may be said to be a collectivity of the many, for, besides its basic element of earth, the presence of water, fire, air and *ākāśa* may be inferred from the presence of the various fluids, the act of digestion (with the aid of stomach-fire), the act of breathing and the presence of openings (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii 1.27–30). Thus, since it is of the nature of a collectivity of different elements, it cannot be characterised by knowledge, etc.

The external material substances, such as the jar, etc., are all observed to be without knowledge, etc. The body, too, is an external material substance. Hence, it also must be so.

IEXI The body is devoid of consciousness, because it is a body, just like a dead body.

Consciousness is not a property of the body, because it is 'not a quality which exists as long as its substratum exists' (*a-yāvad-dravya-bhāvin*). It cannot be argued that there is irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) in the instances of itching (*kaṇḍu*), etc., because the production and the cessation of itching, it is observed, are due to some specific cause; whereas in the present case there is no such cause. Or, there would be no irregularity if a 'qualifying expression' (*viśeṣaṇa*) is added, namely, 'being a specific quality'. If consciousness is regarded to be a specific quality of the body, then there arises an undesirable consequence: just like colour, etc., consciousness too would be lasting, and would not be destroyed (as long as the body would be in existence).

NOTE The unaltered shape, etc., indicate that the body remains when a man dies. But a dead body is never observed to have consciousness or knowledge. Hence, the body cannot be the substratum of consciousness. The occasional appearance of consciousness in the body does not necessarily indicate that it is a quality of the body. Water, for example, may sometimes appear to be characterised by hotness (*uṣṇa-sparśa*); but this is explained to be due to its connection with fire, which is hot by nature. Similarly, the appearance of consciousness in the living body is to be explained as *due to its connection with something else which is really conscious*.

Later writers note and answer a possible objection to the above. Knowledge is said to be a quality of the self. But the self, too, is not always characterised by knowledge; for, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the liberated self is devoid of all specific qualities such as knowledge, etc. Then, instead of admitting a new substance, why not admit that the body is the seat of consciousness? As to the absence of consciousness in the dead body, this may be explained to be due to the absence of 'vital breath' (*prāṇa*) there.

In answer, it is pointed out that the admission of consciousness in the body fails to explain the facts of recollection, etc. (as it has already been shown by Jayanta himself,) and hence, there is no alternative to the admission of a new substance. The presence of knowledge in the liberated self is not admitted only because it cannot be logically established.

The accepted qualities of the body, colour, etc., remain

present in the body so long as the body exists. They are destroyed only when their substratum, the body, is destroyed. The body, therefore, is never observed to be without the qualities of colour, etc. On the basis of this, a rule may be stated: *whatever is a quality of the body remains present in the body as long as the body exists*. The quality of knowledge, however, is not of such nature; it may be destroyed even if its substratum may continue to exist. Therefore, it cannot belong to the body.

As against the above, it may obviously be pointed out that the said rule is not invariable and decisive, because there are, indeed, properties of the body which, admittedly, do not remain present in the body even though the body may continue to be there, e.g. itching. What is the harm, then, in admitting knowledge to be a quality of the body?

In answer, it is pointed out that, for the itching of the body, the body is not the sole cause; there are other specific causes, too. When these causes are there, along with the body, the itching is there; when they are not there, it is not there, in spite of the presence of the body. But, according to the Cārvākas, for the production of knowledge or consciousness, the body itself would be the sole cause (see *supra*, under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.37). Hence, itching, etc., cannot be similar to knowledge, and the body should be characterised by knowledge as long as it exists.

The same objection may be answered in a different way. According to one principle of classification, qualities may be of two kinds: 'general qualities' (*sāmānya-guṇa*) which belong to many substances (e.g. conjunction, magnitude, etc.) and 'specific qualities' (*viśeṣa-guṇa*), each of which belongs to one substance alone (e.g. smell inhering in earth alone, hot touch inhering in fire alone, etc.). Knowledge, if it be a quality of the body, would have to be considered a specific quality, for it would not, then, belong to any other substance.

However, it is observed that the specific qualities of the body—colour, etc.—are invariably present in the body as it is there, and we can have a general rule: 'whatever is a specific

quality of the body is present in the body all along'. Knowledge is not of such a nature and hence, it cannot be a quality of the body.

TEXT As to the contention that (consciousness is produced) just like the intoxicating power, (our reply is) that the production of intoxicating power there is admitted because it is actually observed to be there; but knowledge is not observed to be there (and hence, there is no question of explaining the production of knowledge in a similar manner).

NOTE The presence of intoxicating power in a spiritous drink can be explained by admitting that such a power has actually been produced in it. In this case, there is also no violation of the rule that the qualities of the effect come from the qualities of the (material) causes, for the ingredients of a spiritous drink (e.g. molasses, rice, etc.) possess in themselves the said power. However, it has already been shown that knowledge cannot belong to the body. Nor can the quality of knowledge be admitted to be present in the components of the body (see *supra*, under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.37). Hence, the appearance of knowledge in the body cannot be explained to be due to the production of knowledge in the body; it has to be explained otherwise.

A.III. REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT CONSCIOUSNESS BELONGS TO THE FORMS OF MATTER

(*bhūta-caitanya-vāda-nirāsaḥ*)

TEXT (The position of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin) But then, it is generally (*prāyeṇa*) observed that knowledge, too, concomitantly follows the presence (*anvaya*) and the absence (*vyatireka*) of these (i.e. the forms of matter).

When the forms of matter are nourished by the consumption (*upayoga*) of food, drink, etc., there is produced a 'higher degree of consciousness' (*paṭvī cetanā*); and in the absence of it (viz. such nourishment), there follows the absence of that (viz. a higher degree of consciousness). (For instance,) a higher degree of

intelligence is produced in the body of a boy that has been enriched (*saṃskṛta*) by the consumption of Brāhmī butter, etc.

(Moreover), it is observed that, in the rainy season, over a very long time, the minute components of curd themselves (which are unconscious) are transformed, due to moisture (*sveda*), etc., into moving worms, such as the *pūtanā*, etc. (which are conscious).

Hence, the attributions (*vyavahāra*) of excellent consciousness and inferior consciousness can also be explained to be due to the presence and the absence, respectively, of the excellence of forms of matter.

Thus, it appears that the doctrine that consciousness belongs to the forms of matter is really quite logical.

NOTE Some further arguments showing that knowledge or consciousness can belong to the material body are noted here.

First, there are 'agreement in presence' (*anvaya*) and 'agreement in absence' (*vyatireka*) between the body and knowledge. If there is a body, knowledge is produced, and if there is no body, knowledge is not produced. Hence, just as hot touch having agreements in presence and absence with fire is admitted to be a quality of fire, so also, knowledge can be admitted to be a quality of the body.

Secondly, consider, for example, the case of the pot and the potsherds. If the potsherds (*kapāla-kapālikā*) are smaller, the pot (*ghaṭa*) would also be smaller; and if the potsherds are bigger, the pot would also be bigger. But the potsherds are the cause, and the jar the effect. Similarly, it is observed that excellence of body is followed by excellence of knowledge; a body nourished by food, drink, etc., has a better consciousness, whereas a body not so nourished has an inferior consciousness. Hence, the body must be the cause and substratum of knowledge.

Thirdly, due to the effect of heat, moisture, etc., forms of matter themsleves may be transformed into living beings, e.g. the components of curd are transformed into worms.

TEXT (Jayanta's answer) However, all this is not proper. The body will be presently defined as the substratum of 'physical

action' (*ceṣṭā*), senses (*indriya*) and 'pleasure and suffering' (*artha*). Now, because of the nourishment (*anugraha*) of the body, the senses also become nourished; as a result, their capability is enhanced and consequently, they become more skilful in receiving their respective objects. There is, indeed, nothing called consciousness other than the reception of objects. This explains also the case of the consumption of Brāhmī butter.

Moreover, the self (as distinct from the body) is ubiquitous and as such, it is present everywhere. At a certain time, at a certain place, it may take up some components of material elements as the locus for its experience of pleasure and pain; thus, just as it may take up semen and blood, etc. (and have the human body, etc., as the locus of experience) so also, it may take up the changed (*vikṛta*) components of curd (and have the body of the worm as the locus of experience). Indeed, in this way, the process of the creation of living beings in their varied forms—there being so many forms of living beings, such as the ones produced from moisture and many others—goes on, depending on the fruition (*paripāka*) of the various forms of merits and demerits (of the living beings). All this is rather simple (and needs little further elaboration).

Hence, it is established that in no way can consciousness belong to the forms of matter.

NOTE The argument based on agreement between the body and knowledge is negated by the instance of the dead body, and this has already been discussed (see *supra*).

The argument based on the fact that excellence of body is followed by excellence of consciousness also does not stand, for though the two are related, it is not established thereby that consciousness must be a quality of the body. What, actually, is consciousness? Consciousnes is nothing but the 'reception of objects' (*viṣaya-grahaṇa*) by their appropriate senses. Excellence of consciousness means nothing but a better reception of the objects by the senses, and this may well happen when the body is nourished by food and drink. The body is the very seat of the senses (*Nyāya-sutra* i.1.11), and the nourishment of the body

means the nourishment of the senses as well. Thus, the senses become more powerful and fit to receive their objects. This is why a nourished body appears to have a better consciousness than what appears to be present in an unnourished body.

Moreover, although the self is an entity distinct from the body, it has to be specifically connected with a particular body to experience the results of its actions—the sensations of pleasure and pain. When, for this purpose, the self gets specifically connected with the mixture of semen and blood, its locus for experience would be the human body, and then the human body may appear to be conscious. Similarly, it may also get specifically connected with some transformed particle of curd. In that case, its locus for experience would be the worm (really a transformed particle of curd), which may, then, appear to be conscious. However, the nature of the particular body with which a self is to be connected for experience is determined by the *adṛṣṭa* of that particular self (cf. *Nyāya-sutra* iii.2.60–72). This is also why there are to be found so many kinds of living beings with so many forms of bodies (cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, pṛthivī-nirūpaṇa*).

B. On Inference

B.1. Against the Validity of Inference

Text 1

Now, if it be a fact that inference really has validity, in that case, a discussion as regards its definition may be worthwhile; the fact, on the contrary, is that its validity cannot be logically justified.

For instance, some have argued in the following manner (against the validity of inference). Since *pramāṇa* must be non-secondary (*agauṇa*) (and inference is secondary), it is very difficult to have an ascertainment regarding an object through inference.[1]

(How is inference secondary?) That the probans has the characteristics of 'being a property of the subject' (*pakṣa-dharma*), etc., is to be shown, perforce, by a 'secondary mode of expression' (*gauṇī vṛtti*).

To explain, if the (inferable) character (*dharma*) alone (e.g., fire) is considered the probandum, the probans (e.g., smoke) cannot be a property of the subject (e.g., the mountain), because smoke is a property of fire.

Again, if the 'thing characterised' (*dharmin*) alone is considered the probandum, the probans cannot have concomitance, for there is, indeed, no such agreement in presence as, 'wherever there is smoke there is a mountain'.

If both of them (i.e. the character and the thing characterised) are considered the probandum, neither of the two (vital characteristics of a valid probans, viz. location in the subject and concomitance) would be possible. It is not possible that smoke would be a property of both fire and a mountain. Nor is there any such agreement in presence as 'wherever there is smoke there are a mountain and fire.'

Even if it be said that the probandum is the thing possessing the character, none of the two (said vital characteristics) would be logically possible. For, it is not possible to know smoke, at first, as a property of a mountain or as possessing fire; and moreover, there is neither any such agreement in presence as, 'wherever there is smoke there is a mountain as possessing fire'.

Therefore, to justify the 'verbal expressions' (*vyavahāra*) conveying that (the probans) is a property of the subject, and that (the probans) has agreement in presence, the term *pakṣa* (subject), which ordinarily has as its established meaning the 'thing as possessing the character' (*dharma-viśiṣṭa-dharmin*)—is to be taken (to mean), through the secondary mode, a part of that (established meaning); namely, the thing only (for justifying the probans as a property of the subject). Again, at the time of showing the agreement in presence, the same term is to be explained, in the same manner (i.e. secondarily), in the sense of a part of that (established meaning, namely, the character only).

Thus it follows that (in the case of inference) the definition has to be understood in too secondary a sense. It cannot be taken in the primary sense, as is possible, for instance, in the case of (the definition of perception, namely,) 'knowledge which is produced from sense-object contact', etc.[2]

Therefore, inference cannot be a source of valid knowledge.[3]

Further, (there are other arguments that also go against the validity of inference).

No concomitance (*anugama*) being possible in the case of the particular (*viśeṣa*) and there being the charge of 'proving the proved' (*siddhasādhana*) in the case of the general (*sāmānya*), the subject cannot be justified as a locus of the probandum. How can, therefore, one talk about inference (as a source of valid knowledge)?[4]

There is a relation (between the probans and the probandum) in the form of their (mutual) association (*sāhacarya*), and trust may be put on that (That is, the one is inferred from the other on the basis of this relation or association) But such an idea would be mere foolishness, because deviation (*vyabhicāra*) is possible even if their association has been observed in hundreds of cases.[5]

Various things each have their own peculiar nature due to the difference of space, time and circumstance (*daśā*). Therefore, it is not possible that there would be present universal agreement (between two things which may vary according to the difference of space, etc.). It has, thus, been said that since the various things differ in their powers (*śakti*) due to the change of circumstances, time, space and the like, it is hardly possible to determine the things (in their true nature) by inference.[6]

Even if it is assumed that universal agreement is possible, it would not be possible to ascertain this agreement without acquiring knowledge about all the innumerable things that pervade the three worlds. (And this is truly impossible.) So long as each and every individual smoke and individual fire (present in the world) have not been perceived, one may very well have a doubt: is it not possible that this thing (viz. smoke) may also be due to something that is not fire?[7]

For persons like you (who claim that) they can know the whole world by perception, what purpose would be served by inference, since they have divine eyes (capable of seeing everything)?

Nor can it be claimed that the ascertainment of universal agreement would be possible through generalities (*sāmānya*); for, in reality, nothing called a generality exists.[8]

It can neither be accepted that concomitance is ascertained by repeated observation; because, even though the association has been observed in thousands of cases, deviation may be determined (by coming across, later, a single instance in which the two do not coexist).[9] The nature of a thing may be determined, time and again, (in a particular way)—'it is of that nature;' but, again, it may be found to be otherwise due to the change of space, time, and so on.[10]

By repeated observation, this much only may be ascertained, that smoke is associated with fire; but it can never be established by repeated observation that smoke is never present in a place where there is no fire.

It is not that by observing (a probans) simply as accompanied by (the probandum), one may be certain that it is capable of yielding true inferential cognition. For, there must be invariability (*niyatatva*) also, which depends upon an agreement between the absence of one (viz. the probandum) and the absence of other (viz. the probans). (That is, *anvaya* is not enough; there must be *vyatireka* also).[11]

This invariability can be considered an indispensable factor for the production of inference only if it is ascertained (*gṛhīta*),[12] and its ascertainment is not possible without an ascertainment of the absence of smoke somewhere else (i.e. where there is no fire).

If it be claimed that invariability is ascertained through observation and non-observation?

Well, it would be unjustified; for, in that case, it would have to be perceived that smoke is never present where there is

no fire. But how innumerous would be the spots which are characterised by the absence of fire, for they would consist of the whole world except the few spots in which fire may be present! And in all these spots, the absence of smoke cannot be ascertained by any one unless one is a *yogin*.

Thus, since there is a no invariability; or since, even though such invariability may be there, it is impossible to ascertain it; one should best give up the impossible hope of establishing inference as a source of valid knowledge.

Moreover, it is easily possible to find, in all cases, that one's inference is contradicted[13] either by a probans 'which nullifies one's own thesis' (*iṣṭa-vighātakṛt*),[14] or by a probans 'which is an invariable opposite' (*viruddhāvyabhicarin*).[15]

That is why the learned, finding that inferences have no validity, have urged the following, with a view to destroy the undue faith in inference: (for instance,) when a blind person hurries on in an uneven path, mainly depending upon inferences by the touch of the hand, etc., he stumbles down, not infrequently, on the ground.[16]

Further,[17] an object may be determined (to be of a particular nature) with an inference, carefully formulated, by persons who are quite adept in the act of inference; still, the same may be described to be of a quite different nature by others who are more learned.[18]

B.II. IN DEFENCE OF THE VALIDITY OF INFERENCE

TEXT

As against the above, we would like to state the following.

By the above, do you argue against the fact (*svarūpa*) of inference itself; or, do you argue against the various definitions (*lakṣaṇa*) of inference which have been offered by the various logicians?[19]

(The first alternative is untenable.) It is by no means possible to disprove the fact of inference itself, because it is well-established (by the practice of) people in general. Even ordinary people like a woman, a child, a cowherd, or a ploughman

determine, beyond doubt, the presence of one object from the presence of another object which has an invariable relation with the former. If the validity of inference is denied, (perception would be the only source of valid knowledge). But the everyday life of people in general cannot be carried on with the help of perception alone, and hence, the world would have been as motionless as a figure drawn in a picture. Even in the case of objects which are being perceived, common people apply the probans—'it is of the same nature' (as previously produced pleasure or pain) in respect of them, and thus determine them (by inference) to be either a cause of pleasure or a cause of pain, and accordingly, take them up or avoid them.[20]

If it be said that all the above (i.e. practical activity based upon inference) shows, simply, the foolishness of one who acts without proper judgement?[21] Indeed, we only endeavour to argue against the definition of inference, because it is not possible to state specifically a correct definition of inference.

However, such a contention is also illogical. For, the established rule is that a particular object indicates the presence of only another particular object, and not that one seeing simply an object ascertains the presence of, simply, another object. Just like a gradual stretching of the feet,[22] (one gradually comes to understand that) it is the very nature of that particular thing (to be always accompanied by the other particular thing) That is why it is observed that the presence of one object is known from the presence of another object which has invariable concomitance with the former.

Therefore, we conclude that when due to the perception of one object, there results an awareness regarding the presence of another object, there must exist some kind of relation between the two. However, those who really know about this relation do not favour the idea that it consists in identity (*tādātmya*) and causation (*tadutpatti*).[23] This relation—so far as we are able to comprehend—is nothing but co-existence (*sāhacarya*), and then, it comes to: One is necessarily present when the other is present, and when the other is absent, one also is absent. This

is what is variously called inseparability (*avinābhāva*), invariability (*niyama*) and co-existence (*sahacarita*).

Now, one may, indeed, ask: to what exactly is this invariability (of occurrence) due?

Our answer to this would be as follows: this question remains unanswered, even if one adheres to some other view such as that (the said relation) consists in identity, etc. What is there to explain the fact that smoke is produced only from fire and not from water?[24] If it be answered that it is just so (i.e. their very nature), let the same answer be given in the case of co-existence as well.[25] A reductio can prove only that much of a fact as lies within its scope; it does not have the power to prove a thing as different from what it really is.[26] The proper point to be decided by argument (i.e. reductio), as it has already been pointed out, is that, unless there is invariability (*niyama*), the perception of one thing cannot lead to the awareness of another thing; and hence it has to be assumed. After this (i.e. the establishment of invariability), the question—"to what is due this invariability" would not arise. (It has already been shown that) identity and causation (alleged to be responsible for establishing invariability) do not stand logically. Therefore, it is concluded that (by agreements in presence and absence) invariability is justified.

It would not be proper to say that inferential cognition is only a form of 'intuitional knowledge' (*pratibhā*), for it has already been pointed out that (in inference) an awareness regarding a thing is produced from the perception of some other thing which is invariably concomitant.[27]

If it be assumed that concomitance becomes a condition for the production of (inferential) cognition, even though it remains unascertained, it would have to be admitted that even the inhabitants of the coconut-tree island (*nārikela-dvīpa*) would have been able to infer fire from the presence of smoke. But the fact is not so. Hence (it is not enough that concomitance may be there); it is also necessary that the concomitance should be ascertained.[28]

It has also been argued that (even if concomitance may be there), it is not possible to ascertain the same. (In this regard, however, various answers have been given.)

There are some who maintain that concomitance is ascertained by 'mental perception' (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*). First one ascertains, by perception and non-apprehension respectively, that smoke is accompanied by fire, and that smoke is absent from where fire is absent; on the basis of this, one determines mentally that smoke is invariably concomitant with fire.[29] Is there anybody who does not admit that the mind is capable of comprehending all things, even things which are not near at hand? There is no need for knowing directly each and every case of individual smoke and individual fire, confined within various holes all over the three worlds, for concomitance is ascertained (generally) through the universals of fireness and the like.[30]

There are others who maintain that concomitance is ascertained by a special kind of perception, called) the argumentative (*yauktika*), which is very similar to Yogic perception. It may be alright that the agreement in presence between the pervaded and the pervader is ascertained through universals like smokeness and fireness. But the absence of smoke from where there is no fire (i.e. the agreement in absence), is also to be ascertained.[31] The spots where there is no fire, again, are very much scattered; and there is, indeed, no universal in them which may be called non-fieriness (*anagnitva*).[32] Therefore, concomitance would not be ascertained without a perception revealing (smoke's invariable) presence in, and absence from, spots with fire and without fire respectively—such spots, however, being scattered all over the three worlds. The concomitance, again, cannot lead to valid knowledge, unless it is ascertained. But the fact is that there is produced valid (inferential) knowledge (due to the ascertainment of concomitance). Hence, it is only logical (to admit that) there must be some perception which determines, perforce, in a single moment, the concomitance, and which—though not ascertained to be so (at that moment),

is assumed to be so (later on)—has, for its object, the innumerable individuals (of smoke and fire). And this kind of perception is called the argumentative (*yauktika*).

There are others who, therefore, fearing that such a special kind of perception would have to be admitted, maintain that let such a probans be accepted as 'yielding valid inferential cognition' (*gamaka*), in respect of which agreement in presence has been determined, with the aid of repeated observation, through universals, but in respect of which agreement in absence does not stand in need of being determined.

For example, it has been said:[33] 'In my view, probantia which co-exist (with the probandum) are capable of yielding valid inferential knowledge, when they are not ever observed (as unaccompanied by the probandum)'. The implication is as follows: Because of repeated observation (of the co-existence), there is produced an awareness in the form, 'this thing is invariably concomitant with that thing,' which is evidenced by (the practice of) all living beings.[34] And by this much only, a probans' capability of yielding valid inferential knowledge is proved generally (*autsargika*). The Mīmāṃsakas argue as follows. An awareness contradicting it (i.e. a probans' capability being established by agreement in presence only), would be the perception of the probans in a spot without the probandum. But (it may be pointed out) that there is, in fact, no such awareness, for, up to this day, smoke has never been found to be present without fire. It is not proper to be apprehensive of a contradictory awareness, even though it is not produced actually. So it has been said by them: If no awareness regarding an error (*doṣa*) is produced, a doubt (regarding the validity of a cognition) would be unfounded.[35]

But the above view does not seem acceptable. For, it has already been pointed out[36] that without an ascertainment of the agreement in absence, concomitance cannot be logically determined. The invariability (*niyama*)—since it is responsible for indicating the presence of the probandum—stands in need of being itself ascertained; and by invariability is meant not

only that the one is present wherever the other is present, but also that wherever the other is not present, the one is also not present. But repeated observation (said to be the cause of the ascertainment of concomitance) can determine only the agreement in presence; namely, wherever there is the one, there is the other. Thus, the invariability would only be determined by half, for, the other half, namely, wherever the other is absent the one, too, is absent, would remain unascertained.

Others, again, (admit) that there is, indeed, no universal in the form of non-fieriness (*anagnitva*), and also, without assuming the necessity of Yogic perception, maintain that agreements in presence and absence may well be ascertained by mental perception.[37] At the moment smoke, as characterised by smokeness, and fire, as characterised by fireness, are perceived to be co-existing, the absences of the two are also likewise ascertained to be co-existing, because smoke, as characterised by the universal of smokeness, is never perceived to be present with non-fire, such as water, etc. . . . Although in the case of (agreement in) absence, there is no universal in the form of non-fieriness, etc., even then, uniformity as regards presence being established through the universal of fireness, located in the counterpositive (*pratiṣedhya*), uniformity as regards their absence, too, is established.[38] For the ascertainment of concomitance, the knowledge of all the individuals (of probans and probandum) is not a necessary condition.[39]

The concomitance of two absences is ascertained in the same way as the concomitance between two positive things in general is ascertained. The concomitance of two positive things is called *anvaya*, while the same of two absences is known as *vyatireka*.[40] When one absence is offered as the probans and another absence is offered as the probandum, the *anvaya* would be between themselves (i.e. the two absences), while the *vyatireka* would be between two positive things (i.e. the two absences of the absences). In this way, just like the *anvaya* of two absences, the *vyatireka* of two positive things may also very well be ascertained by perception. The only difference comes to this: if

the relation of being the pervaded and the pervader exists between two positive things, one has just to reverse the order in order to understand the same between their absences.[41]

When the 'relation of the indicator and the indicated' (*gamya-gamaka-bhāva*) exists between two absences, the concomitance may be understood between two positive things (i.e. the two absences of the absences) only by reversing the order. Thus, the awareness of uniform presence between two absences in general being justified as following from the uniform presence of the counter-positives, Yogic perception would not be relevant for the ascertainment of either *anvaya* or *vyatireka*. Actually, one first ascertains the co-existence of two positive things and also the co-existence of their absences; and afterwards, the awareness of invariability is produced through the instrumentality of the mind.

Therefore, the opponent should desist from undue insistence upon (the view that invariability or concomitance cannot be established). It is thus established that just as there is invariability, so, also, there is a means for its ascertainment.

Even after invariability has been ascertained, the awareness of the probandum (as present in the subject) is not produced so long as the probans, e.g. smoke, is not perceived in the particular spot (i.e. the subject), and hence, there is the necessity of a further perception of the probans, called the second perception in relation to (the prior perception of the probans) at the time of ascertaining the concomitance. And this is what is conveyed by the term *pakṣa-dharmatā*.

Even when a probans' residence in the subject and agreements in presence and absence have been ascertained, a probans does not lead to inferential knowledge in case it is contradicted by perception and verbal testimony, or in case it is challenged by a counter-probans. For this reason, two other characteristics of a valid probans have been stated, namely, non-contradiction and non-opposition.[42]

Thus, just as the fact of inference itself has to be admitted because of general experience establishing it, so also is the case

with the definition of inference. If, however, the opponent contends that all these definitions formulated by the various logicians do not convey any sense, then let him cite one himself which may be free from all defects. It is not proper to deny the thing defined (which is an established fact) simply out of grudge against its (definition offered by others).

It has been said (by the opponent) that inference cannot lead to the valid knowledge of an object, because a (true) *pramāṇa* is non-secondary (whereas inference is secondary). This argument, however, is not intelligible to us. Even in the case of inference, we do not find any secondariness so far as the *pramāṇa* is concerned. Even if it be a fact that certain terms, such as *pakṣa-dharma* and others, are used in a secondary sense by persons who seek to explain (the nature of inference), how is it possible that thereby the *pramāṇa* is made secondary? If the definition of inference be stated using different terms, there would, in fact, be no such fault of secondariness or the like.[43]

As to the contention 'there being no concomitance in the case of the particular, and there being the charge of proving the proved in the case of the general', etc., we say that it is unjustified; for its has been shown that the probandum stands for what is expressed by the suffix *matup*.[44]

Again, as to the contention 'there being difference due to the difference of circumstances, space, time and others', etc., we say that it is also not much to be afraid of; for, if concomitance be correctly ascertained, there would be no scope for contradiction (*viplava*). In such a case, the fault lies only with the person who infers (since he infers wrongly), and not with inference itself.[45]

The opponent has also urged the following: '(Inference is not valid), because everywhere it is possible to find an opposite inference and contradiction—sometimes an invariable opposite, and sometimes one nullifying one's own thesis, being easily available,' etc. But all this is simply nonsense, because if a probans truly capable of indicating the probandum is offered, there remains no scope for counteracting factors like these.[46]

We shall later show that an inference which has a further inference (contradicting its thesis) is not truly capable of indicating the probandum; being only the cause for a doubt, it becomes a pseudo-probans.[47]

(In a true inference), there is scope for neither a probans which is an invariable opposite nor a probans nullifying one's own thesis; if the probans is a well-established one, these kinds of difficulties would never arise. When one knows an object through such a faultless inference, one never does resemble a blind person who proceeds after inferring the nature of the path by touching it with hands (and stumbles). An object which is carefully inferred (to be of a particular nature) by persons adept in the act of inference cannot be shown to be of a different nature, even by hundreds of contrary arguments.[48]

Now, those who (think themselves to be) more learned, say that (in fact) there are two kinds of inference; 'some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself' (*utpanna-pratīti*), and 'some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on somebody else's advice)' (*utpādya-pratīti*). [The former kind is valid, but the latter kind is not.] The inferences of God and the like are ones in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired [on others' advice]. Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they may not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after-world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of the probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians.[49]

However, those who contend in the above manner succeed only in making a show of their extreme aversion against orthodoxy, or utter foolishness, but not in establishing the invalidity of inference. Indeed, invalidity is not proved merely because the means for the ascertainment of the concomitance

is different. The concomitance may be ascertained [as the case may be] by verbal testimony, by inference, by advancing a reductio or by perception; but that does not make any difference (in the actual nature of the inference).[50]

Therefore, you should admit inference as an instrument of valid knowledge, the efficacy of which is not at all disproved by the said charges advanced by you. However, if you do not admit this, as has already been pointed out, all living beings would cease to have any kind of activity and hence would become just like stones (*upala*).[51]

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS (USED IN THE NOTES)

ATV	*Ātma-tattva-viveka* of Udayana
KKK	*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* of Śrīharṣa
MM	*Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa
NB	*Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti
NBHU	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña
NM	*Nyāya-mañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa
NS	*Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama
NVTT	*Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* of Vācaspati
NVTTP	*Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā-pariśuddhi* OF UDAYANA
NK	*Nyāya-kandalī* of Śrīdhara
PPBH	*Praśasta-pāda-bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda
PV	*Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti
SDS	*Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* of Mādhavācārya
SV	*Śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila
SVR	*Syādvāda-ratnākara* of Vādideva Sūri
TCM	*Tattva-cintā-mani* of Gaṅgeśa
TP	*Tattva-pradīpikā* of Citsukhamuni
TS	*Tattva-saṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita
VP	*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari
VS	*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda
YS	*Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali

1 From the treatment of invalidity of inference from the Cārvāka viewpoint as found in NBHU (p. 210) and SVR (p. 265), it appears that the present objection was formulated in a *sūtra*-like form (viz. *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ*) by Purandara, a Cārvāka,

celebrated for holding the view that inferences concerning ordinary objects have validity, but inferences concerning the so-called extra-ordinary imperceptible objects have no validity. See *infra*, fn 3, fn 49. There is no mention of such an objection in later scholastic works like the KKK or TP.

2. Two illustrations for the point have been given by NBHU (p. 240). First, consider the inference: This Brahmin boy is capable of burning (*dāhasamartha*), because he is of a fiery nature. Here, the probans 'fieriness' is present in the subject, a Brahmin boy, not in a literal sense but only in a figurative sense. Secondly, consider the inference: Sound is non-eternal, because it is audible; as, for instance, is pleasure (*sukha*). Here, pleasure has been cited as a corroborative instance for the concomitance, 'whatever is audible is non-eternal'. But such a concomitance can be corroborated by pleasure only in a figurative sense, for pleasure can be said to be audible, not literally, but figuratively, when, for example, one experiences pleasure because of hearing sweet words.

   Both these inferences are invalid.

3. The validity of inference is being rejected on the charge of secondariness (*gauṇatva*). The explanation of secondariness, given here by Jayanta, agrees with that of NBHU (p. 210) or SVR (p. 261). Yet, two other different explanations of secondariness may be gathered from these two works.

   First (NBHU, p. 211), in an inference, there are mainly three terms, *pakṣa* (subject), *sādhya* (probandum) and *hetu* (probans). A *sādhya* is a thing the presence of which is sought to be established; a *pakṣa* is the locus in which the presence of the *sādhya* is sought to be established; and a *hetu* is the mark on the basis of which the presence of the *sādhya* is sought to be established. In short, all these terms have reference to the 'act of establishing' (*sādhi-kriyā*). But then, a question may be asked: when one goes on to infer, is or is not the act of establishing already accomplished? If it is, the inferential process would be useless, and the so-called *sādhya* would only be *siddha* (established).

   If it is not, how would one apply these inferential terms to some particular things? In fact, what happens is that one takes, obviously in a secondary sense, the future act (i.e. that which is yet to occur) as the past act (i.e. that which has already occurred), and applies the inferential terms accordingly. In other words, inference involves secondariness and cannot be a *pramāṇa*.

   The second explanation comes, most probably, from Purandara (SVR, p. 266). One of the means for the ascertainment of concomitance is an observation of agreement in presence and an observation of agreement in absence. In the case of an inference involves secondariness and cannot be a *pramāṇa*.

   The second explanation comes, most probably, from Purandara (SVR, p. 266). One of the means for the ascertainment of concomitance is an observation of agreement in presence and an observation of agreement in absence. In the case of an inference involving ordinary objects, both are possible, and it would be a case of valid inference. But in the case of an inference involving imperceptible objects—the existence of which is advocated only by some particular school—the latter is possible, but the former is never possible. That is, the latter kind of inference has only a partial similarity with a genuine inference—it is an inference in a secondary sense; hence it has no validity. See *infra*, fn. 49.

4. The idea is as follows. It is alleged, for instance, that one infers, in the mountain, fire from smoke. But what is really sought to be established by it? Does it prove that smoke in general is accompanied by fire in general? In that case, there is no need for an inference, for the fact is proved already, by perception, in the instances of the kitchen (*mahānasa*) and the like. Or, does it prove that some particular smoke is accompanied by some particular fire? In that case, an inference would not be possible; because concomitance between mountain-smoke and mountain-fire, for instance, has not been established. For a somewhat different interpretation, see SVR, p. 262.

5. The most common example is the relation between earth-substance-hood (*pārthivatva*) and iron-scratchability (*loha-lekhyatva*). It may be observed, in hundreds of cases, that an earth-substance is scratched by iron; but there is no invariability, because dimaond, though an earth-substance, cannot be scratched by iron.

6. This is VP i.32, also quoted in TS (verse 1459) and SVR, p. 262. Thus, for instance, Devadatta is observed to have a strong physique, capable of lifting heavy loads. But from this it would not be correct to infer, on some later occasion, that he would be able to carry a certain heavy load. For in the meantime, because of some internal disease, he may lose his strength, even if his outward appearance may remain unchanged. This is an illustration of *avasthā-bheda*. Secondly, the water of the Himalayan region is very cold to the touch, but the water of a hot spring in some other place (e.g. in Rājagṛha) is warm to the touch.

   Thus in the case of the water in a certain place, it would be wrong to infer either that the water is cold, or that the water is warm. This is an illustration of *deśa-bheda*. Thirdly, the water of the same well feels different in different seasons. In summer and in the autumn, for instance, the touch and the taste of the water both differ. Thus, the nature of the water in the well cannot be correctly determined by an inference. This is an illustration of *kāla-bheda*. (See Vṛṣabhadeva's *Paddhati* on VP, i.32)

7. As Vṛṣabhadeva (on VP, i.32) illustrates, a frog (*śāluka*) may be born of

a frog, and also from cowdung (*gomaya*). Similarly, smoke may be produced by fire or, by something else.

8. It may be pointed out further that even if it is accepted that there is, in reality, something called a generality, there will be absurdities. Thus if the concomitance be established through generalities, it would mean that the presence of one generality leads to the presence of another generality. But such a knowledge has little practical value, and would not explain a person's peculiar activity after having an inferential knowledge (such as the collection of fire, etc.); for fireness has never been observed to have any usefulness for burning a thing or cooking.

Moreover, if one is led to activity on the basis of the knowledge of a generality, one would not proceed in one particular direction alone. A generality does not have any fixed spot or direction, because it inheres in so many individuals who are scattered in all directions. To this, it may be objected that a generality is not possible as detached from an individual. Thus, when one ascertains the presence of a generality, one also ascertains a particular individual as its locus, and since one's activity relates to that particular locus or individual, one proceeds to a particular direction only. But such an objection would be of no avail. It cannot be claimed that the generality is not possible without that particular locus or individual alone, for it resides as well in so many other individuals. For a locus of the generality any individual would suffice, and as such, one's proceeding towards a particular direction alone would remain unexplained.

9. Cf. TCM., section on *vyāpti-grahopāya*. Text and English translation with explanatory notes by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 3, pp. 167–208.

10. See *supra* fn. 6.

11. Agreement in presence alone does not prove invariability; there must also be agreement in absence. Otherwise, the relation even between smoke and an ass, for instance, would be concomitance; for it may so happen that in certain cases of smoke there may also be present, by chance, an ass.

12. Sometimes, a thing may be a cause simply by its presence (*svarūpa-sat kāraṇa*). For example, fire is the cause of burning; whoever puts his hand into the fire, knowingly or unknowingly, gets burnt. But sometimes, the presence of a thing is not enough; to be a cause, it must be known to be so (*jñāta-sat kāraṇa*). For example, smoke yields the knowledge of fire in the mountain only after being known to be present there. Concomitance as a cause of inference belongs to the second category.

13. Inference is not valid, because every inference, it can be shown, suffers from contradiction (*virodha*), generally (*sāmānyataḥ*) or specifically (*viśeṣataḥ*).

As an instance of the former, which is capable of invalidating any inference, the following inference may be cited: 'The subject (*dharmin*) cannot be a locus (*ādhāra*) of the intended inferable property (*abhimata-sādhyadharma*), because it only represents a part of what is denoted by the term probandum (*sādhya*), just like the inferable property itself.' The probandum of an inference is a 'thing (i.e. the subject, or *dharmin*) as characterised by a property' (*dharma-viśiṣṭa-dharmin*). Thus, taking the probandum as a whole, we may say that what is denoted by the term probandum has two constituent parts; namely, the *dharmin* (i.e. the subject only) and the *dharma* (i.e. the inferable property only). Now, it is a fact that the latter, the *dharma* itself, cannot be a locus of the inferable property—that is, of its own self; because the substratum-superstratum relation (*ādhārādheya-bhāva-sambandha*) is possible only between two separate entities. Hence the conclusion that follows is that a part of what is denoted by the term probandum cannot be a locus of the inferable property. The subject is such a part; hence it cannot also be a locus of the same.

Another instance of the same kind would be: This subject cannot be a locus of the intended inferable property, because it is one of the two things representing the *pakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* (*pakṣa-vipakṣayor anyataratvāt*), just like the *vipakṣa*, which is defined to be an indisputable locus of the absence of the inferable property. But the *vipakṣa* represents one of the two things. The *pakṣa*, too, represents one of the two things; and hence it also cannot be a locus of the inferable property.

Such counter-inferences are possible in each and every case of inference.

As an instance of the latter, where one particular inference is invalidated by some inconsistency, the following may be noted. A Naiyāyika offers, for instance, an inference for his own view, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is something produced, just like a jar.' As against this, it may be pointed out that the probans 'being something produced' (*kṛtakatva*) would also prove that sound cannot be a quality of *ākāśa* (for barring one or two qualities, all its qualities are eternal and not produced); hence, a Naiyāyika would have to deny one of his accepted conclusions. In different cases of inferences, such inconsistencies may be pointed out in different ways. For further details, see *Pañjikā* on TS, (verses 1456f) and NBHU., pp. 211f.

14. Inference is not valid, because it often proves a wrong conclusion and goes against one's own view. The illustration can be given from Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* (iii. 101). To prove the existence of the self (*puruṣa*), the Sāṃkhyas offer the following inference (SK, verse 17): 'The visual organ and the like are for the use of someone else, because they are composite substances, just like the various implements (*aṅga*), such as a bed, a chair, and so on.' The thesis intended to be proved is 'usefulness for a non-composite being' (i.e. *puruṣa*) (*asaṃhatapārārthya*). But the inference actually proves 'usefulness for a composite being' (*saṃhata-pārārthya*), because the instances like the bed, etc., establish usefulness for only ordinary persons who are composite beings.

Iṣṭa-vighātakṛt has been mentioned by Diṅnāga as a variety of the pseudo-probans called the contradictory (*viruddha*). But Dharmakīrti

refuses to recognize it as a separate variety (*op cit*.)

15 Inference is not valid, because it can be shown that for every inference, there is an equally strong counter-inference proving just the opposite. For instance, one may argue that sound is non-eternal, because it is something produced, just like a jar. But it can be counteracted by the argument that sound is eternal, because it is audible, just like sound-ness (*śabdatva*) [According to Nyāya, a universal is eternal and is perceived by the same sense which perceives its locus. Thus, sound-ness would be eternal and also audible.]

Viruddhāvyabhicārin has been accepted as a fallacy of inference by Diṅnāga, though Dharmakīrti rejects it (NB, iii. 126). Cf. the Nyāya fallacy of *prakaraṇasama* (NS, i. 2. 7) and PPBH, pp. 192ff.

16. VP, i. 42

17. VP, i. 34. The reasoning of one may be upset by another. "The argument of the Naiyāyika to prove that substance is different from quality is taken as an example. His argument, briefly, is: Substance is different from quality, because the latter can qualify the former. Against this, others point out that the argument is weak, because both what is different and what is not different from another can qualify it in some cases, and cannot qualify it in other cases. A king and a kingdom are different from each other, and we can say: the king's kingdom (*rājño rāṣṭram*). Here, 'king' qualifies 'kingdom'. But on this analogy, we cannot say: the hermit's kingdom; even though the hermit and the kingdom are also different from each other. Similarly, we can say 'the smell of sandal', but we cannot say 'the smell of something which has colour', even though in both cases, there is a difference between the two things. To come to cases where there is no difference, we can say: *āmrāṇaṃ vanam*=a grove of mango-trees. Here, mango-trees qualify grove, although the grove is not different from the trees". K. A. S. Iyer, note on *op cit*.

18. Some further objections against the validity of inference have been noted (and answered) in SVR, pp. 266–67: (a) The knowledge given by inference is dim and not vivid (*aspaṣṭa-svarūpatvāt*); (b) inference has to depend on other things for the determination of its object (*svārtha-niścaye parāpekṣatvāt*); (c) inference is always preceded by perception (*pratyakṣa-pūrvakatvāt*); (d) inference is not directly produced by the object (*arthād anupajāyamānatvāt*); and (e) inference does not have something real as its object (*avastu-viṣayatvāt*). See also S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, III. p. 537.

19 See also SVR, pp. 268f.

20. Without inference, everyday life would be impossible. Consider, for example, the activity of a person searching water to quench his thirst. In many previous cases, when he had been thirsty, he had obtained a particular kind of water and found it useful. From this, he acquires the knowledge that a particular kind of water is always useful for quenching thirst. In the present occasion, on perceiving water at some spot, he recalls this invariable relation between a particular kind of water and its usefulness, and infers: 'this water is useful for me, because it is of the same particular nature as previously quenched my thirst.' Next, he proceeds to collect the water. Hundreds of similar instances may be cited.

21 According to the Cārvākas, practical activity in the so-called cases of inference is based upon mere probability.

22 *Pāda-prasārikā*. Considered to be a popular maxim (*laukika-nyāya*). See Jacob, *A Second Handful of Popular Maxims, addenda* (p. 61).

23. Cf. PV, iii. 31. What is the means for the ascertainment of concomitance? "The Buddhist answers that the concomitance is known to be universal and invariable if the relation between the probans and the probandum can be shown to be either one of causality or essential identity, and not from mere observation of co-accompaniment of two factors. If the concomitance be based upon causality or essential identity, the relation cannot be conceived to be invariable, as an effect cannot be conceived to be independent of a cause, and hence the effect is the proof of the cause; and as regards two things, whose nature is fundamentally identical, there can be no separation between the two, as that would be tantamount to forfeiture of their own essential character, which is inconceivable." Satkari Mookerji, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, p. 372. For further details of the Buddhist view, see ch. XXIV of the same.

An inference in which the concomitance is based upon causality is the inference of fire from smoke, smoke being an effect of fire (cf. SDS, p. 16). An inference in which the concomitance is based upon identity (*svabhāva* or *tādātmya*) is the inference of 'being a tree' (*vṛkṣatva*) from 'being a *śiṃśapā*' (*śiṃśapātva*), for a *śiṃśapā* is a kind of tree and hence is not fundamentally different.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has already refuted, in some detail, this Buddhist doctrine (NM, pp. 104f). As to concomitance based on causality, he says that the Naiyāyikas too admit cases of inference where the probans and the probandum may have, between them, a causal relation. In fact, Gautama (NS, i. 1. 5, *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* inferences) and Kaṇāda (VS, ix. 2. 1. see also *Upaskāra* thereon) both speak of such inferences. It the point is determined because of the constant association (*sāhacarya*) of the probans and the probandum, and not because of the causal relation. In fact, numerous instances of inference may be cited in which the probans and the probandum have neither a causal relation, nor identity. 'Thus, for instance, the forthcoming appearance of stars is inferred from sunset; the rise of tidal waves from the rise of the moon; impending rainfall is inferred from the movement of ants carrying off their larvae; the existence of shade on the other side of light on the surface, and such like. But the concomitance, in these cases, cannot be traced to causality.'

Besides, as Vācaspati Miśra points out (NVTT, p. 161), if one infers the probandum from the probans, ascertaining concomitance through causality, the fact that one proceeds unhesitatingly to collect the thing inferred (i.e. the probandum) cannot be explained. For, causality implies that the effect is posterior and the cause is prior; the two are

invariably non-simultaneous. Thus, a person inferring fire (=cause) from smoke (=effect) would ascertain that fire *had been* there, but he cannot be certain that fire *is* there. Therefore, how can he proceed to collect fire then?

The Buddhist position is untenable, also because there may be, on the one hand, an ascertainment of cause-effect relation between fire and ash, although there may not be an ascertainment of concomitance; and on the other, an ascertainment of concomitance between smoke and fire, although there may not be an ascertainment of cause-effect relation. (cf. NVTTP, p. 333)

Identity, also, cannot be the means for the establishment of concomitance. In fact, if such a claim is put forward, inference, in those cases, would have little relevance. It is admitted by all that there can be no inference unless the probans is first cognized. Now, to the Buddhist who believes in the identity of the probans and probandum, a question may be put: Is, or is not, the probandum, too, cognized, when the probans is initially cognized? If the probandum is not cognized, it must be something totally different from the probans; just like a cow and a horse, for instance. If, however, the probandum is also cognized, it would have to be admitted that, just like the probans, the presence of the probandum as well is already determined. In that case, why should one go on to infer?

Moreover, one who happens to ascertain the general property of *vṛkṣatva*, but not the specific property of *śiṃśapātva*, may be justifiably prompted to take the help of inference. But why should one go on to infer *vṛkṣatva* from *śiṃśapātva*, for ascertaining the latter amounts, in fact, to ascertaining the former as well? It is really an extraordinary claim that a person perceives *śiṃśapātva*, but *vṛkṣatva* remains imperceptible to him. Thus, there remains no scope for an inference.

Moreover, if there really be an identity between *śiṃśapātva* and *vṛkṣatva*, then, just like the inference of *vṛkṣatva* from *śiṃśapātva*, it would have been possible to infer, also, *śiṃśapātva* from *vṛkṣatva*. But that is not a fact, for, in a *khadira*, there is *vṛkṣatva*, but not *śiṃśapātva*, and the probans would be irregular.

24. Vācaspati Miśra has argued (NVTT, pp. 159ff) in great detail that concomitance or invariability cannot be based upon causation, for in the Buddhist view, it can never be concluded with certainty, for instance, that smoke is always produced from fire and never from anything else. It is claimed that there is concomitance between smoke and fire, because smoke has 'production from fire' (*tad-utpatti*; *tat*=fire). But what exactly is meant by this 'production from fire'? Does it mean simply that the presence of smoke is followed by the presence of fire? But it may be true of an ass also, and one would be led to the absurd position that smoke has concomitance with an ass as well.

As against this, it may be pointed out that the implication here is that the presence of smoke is *invariably* followed by the presence of fire. The presence of smoke may sometimes be accidentally followed by the

presence of an ass; but still, it is not an invariable antecedent of fire. For, even in the presence of an ass, smoke is not produced when fire is not present, and even in the absence of an ass, smoke is produced when fire accompanied by wet fuel is present.

But all this, Vācaspati contends, would be of no avail. Although it may be observed, in some cases, that the presence and the absence of smoke are related to the presence and the absence of fire, the question still remains—in the spots other than the observed ones, due to what can be explained the presence of smoke? It is possible that one may observe, in a number of instances, that there is an ass and there is smoke; and again, that there is no ass, and there is no smoke. Still, everybody admits that it would be wrong to conclude that smoke is an effect produced by an ass; for the same kind of smoke is observed to be produced when there is no ass but there is fire. In the same way, even after it has been observed in a number of instances that where there is fire there is smoke, and where there is no fire there is no smoke, it is possible to assume that smoke may be produced, in some other spots, even in the absence of fire, but in the presence of something else, say, a demon (*piśāca*) [which may be the real cause of fire]. In the instances in which smoke is found to be followed by fire, the presence of fire may be explained to be due to some extraneous circumstances and not because it is the cause of smoke; just like the accidental presence of an ass in some instances of smoke.

Invariability presupposes the removal of such a doubt, and again, the removal of such a doubt presupposes the establishment of invariability. In short, there arises the fallacy of mutual dependence.

25. Thus, for Vācaspati (NVTT, p. 165), Udayana (ATV, p. 403) and the author of MM (p. 26), concomitance is only a natural relation (*svābhāvika-sambandha*).

26. The idea seems to be that there is a limit to the power and application of a reductio; it cannot disprove an established fact. It cannot be argued, for instance, by a reductio, that if fire (*tejas*) be a substance (*dravya*), it cannot have hot touch (*uṣṇa-sparśa*), just like the other substances, namely, earth, water etc.

27. Intuitional knowledge is independent of the perception of a mark, whereas inference is essentially dependent upon the perception of an invariable mark. Intuitional knowledge is thus defined to be a form of valid knowledge produced by the mind alone, independent of any other factor (YS, iii. 33. *Bhojavṛtti*); for instance, when a girl speaks about her brother who is away in a distant country, 'My brother will come back tomorrow.' [And he actually arrives]. See also PPBH on *ārṣa-jñāna*, pp. 627–28 and NM, pt. i, p. 21.

28. See note 12, above.

29. Vācaspati Miśra appears to object to such a contention. He argues that the mind alone (which is the internal sense or *antaḥ-karaṇa*), independent of any external sense-organ, cannot produce a direct awareness about an

external object. If such a position is accepted, there would be no person who may be called blind or deaf, because it may be claimed that even a person without the visual or the auditory sense-organ may have a direct awareness of colour or sound through the instrumentality of the mind alone. It is not that a perception becomes a mental one simply because it is produced by the operation of the mind. In that case, knowledge would only be mental and never otherwise, for the mind has a role to play in the production of all kinds of knowledge. It may be pointed out that though the various kinds of knowledge have the mind as a common cause, still they are different from one another, because of the fact that, in each case, there is some special cause to assist the mind. Thus, in the ascertainment of concomitance, the mind may be the cause, as assisted by 'repeated observation' (*bhūyodarśana*). But this would lead to another absurdity, namely, the admission of a new kind of *pramāṇa*. For, the ascertainment of concomitance would, then, be a special kind of knowledge distinct from all other kinds, having a special cause of its own; and hence it must have a special instrument (*karaṇa=pramāṇa*) of its own.

Vācaspati's own view is that the cause of the ascertainment of concomitance is the sense-organ having, as its accessory, the group of impressions (*saṃskāra*) produced by the various individual perceptions of the co-existence of the probans and the probandum. Sucarita Miśra (SV, verse 12) also seems to hold a similar view. For its refutation by the Prābhākara, see TCM, section on *vyāpti-grahopāya*. Text and English translation with explanatory notes by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 3, pp. 169ff.

NBHU first argues against the view that concomitance is ascertained by the mind, but later on replies to the objections noted earlier and accepts the view.

30. See, for instance, TCM, section on *vyāpti-grahopāya*. M. K. Gangopadhyay, *ibid.* 177.
31. See note 11, above.
32. However, here also, the difficulty may be solved with the help of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*. The term *sāmānya* in the case of such apprehensional connection is not necessarily to be taken in the technical sense of a universal (*jāti*); it may be taken in the ordinary sense of a common property as well, which, in the present case, would be 'absence of fire' (*agnyabhāva*). See *Muktāvalī*, on verse 64.
33. SV i. 1. 5, *anumāna*, 134–37.
34. Gadādhara (TCM, beginning of section on *vyāpti-grahopāya*) characterizes such a view as *jaran-naiyāyika-siddhānta*. According to Uddyotakara, concomitance is ascertained by perception, but he is silent about the number of cases to be observed. Of the Mīmāmsakas, Kumārila (SV, chapter on inference, verse 12) holds a similar view. Gaṅgeśa maintains that no hard and fast rule about the number of cases to be observed can be laid down. For an ascertainment of concomitance, two factors are responsible: (i) a knowledge about the co-existence of the probans with the probandum, and (ii) absence of any knowledge that the probans is present without the probandum. Thus, a person who knows that smoke is an effect of fire can ascertain that smoke is invariably accompanied by fire, even on the first case of observation. But another person, unaware of such a cause-effect relation, has to observe many instances of co-existence to determine concomitance. See TCM, *ibid*, pp. 168f and 203f and also NVTTP, p. 337.
35. SV (i. 2. 60), *codanā-sūtra*, verse 60.
36. *supra*, fn 11.
37. *supra*, fn 29.
38. *supra*, fn 32.
39. NBHU (pp. 218, 219) thus argues that for the perception of a property which is resident in many individuals, it is not necessary to perceive all those individuals; the perception of a few individuals being sufficient. As, for instance, the fact is proved by the perception of cowness (*gotva-jāti*). Similarly concomitance, being a property of many smokes, can be ascertained by the perception of only some smokes. Secondly, the concomitance may be determined as relating to the unperceived, past and future individuals also, by an inference on the basis of the observed cases of individuals: the other individuals of smoke also are pervaded by fire, because they have the property of smokeness, just like the individual smokes already observed. Thus, concomitance would be proved in respect of all smokes.
40. Cf. NS., i. 1. 34–35.
41. For example, in the inference of fire from smoke, the *anvaya* will be: 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire'; here, smoke is the pervaded, and fire is the pervader. The *vyatireka* will be: 'wherever there is absence of fire, there is absence of smoke'; here, absence of fire is the pervaded, and absence of smoke is the pervader.
42. According to the Naiyāyikas, the essential characteristics of a valid probans are five: (i) presence in the subject (*pakṣa-sattva*), (ii) presence in an indisputable locus of the probandum (*sapakṣa-sattva*), (iii) absence in an indisputable locus of the absence of probandum (*vipakṣāsattva*), (iv) not having an equally strong counter-probans proving the opposite (*asat-pratipakṣatva*), and (v) not having the absence of the probandum already established in the subject by some stronger *pramāṇa* (*abādhitatva*).

The lack of any one of these five characteristics makes a probans fallacious. Thus, the lack of the first leads to the fallacy of the unproved (*asiddha*), of the second to the fallacy of the contradicted (*viruddha*), of the third to the fallacy of the irregular (*anaikāntika*), of the fourth to the fallacy of the counter-acted (*sat-pratipakṣa*), and of the fifth to the fallacy of the sublated (*bādhita*).

The examples are respectively: (i) Sound is a quality, because it is visible. (But 'visibility' does not belong to sound.); (ii) Sound is eternal, because it is a product. ('Being a product' is not true of any eternal thing.); (iii) The mountain has smoke, because it has fire. (Fire is present even

where smoke is absent, as in the red-hot iron ball); (iv) Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, just like a jar. (There is also a counter-probans: sound is eternal, because it is audible, just like the universal of sound-ness.); (v) Fire is not hot because it is a substance, just like water. (Fire is already proved to be hot by tactual perception).

The Buddhists accept only the first three, and strongly argue against the admission of the last two. For a summary of the Buddhist objections, see M. K. Gangopadhyay, *Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, Supplementary note 3. Jayanta's arguments for the Nyāya position are given earlier (NM, pt. i, pp. 101f.). The views of Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda seem to agree with that of the Buddhist. However, Śrīdhara (NK, pp. 482–85), after refuting an alternative view that the fallacies of the counter-acted and the sublated are to be included in the fallacy of the irregular, explains that the probantia lacking in the last two characteristics are to be covered by defective formulations known as *pakṣābhāsa*. See also Uddyotakara and Vācaspati on NS, i. 2.4 and *Upaskāra* on VS, iii, 1.17

43. Cf. SVR (p. 265) quoting the view of Udbhaṭa in the *Tattva-vṛtti*. NBHU (pp. 213–15) replies in some detail to the charge of 'secondariness' against inference. The opponent's argument, in brief, is that terms like *pakṣa-dharma* and others are used in the context of inference in a secondary sense and hence, inference has no validity. But a use in a secondary sense is not possible unless there is also a use in a primary sense; a word cannot have a use in a secondary sense alone. For instance, a Brahmin boy, because of his courage and brilliance, may be called 'fire' (*agnir māṇavakaḥ*), the word 'fire' being used in a secondary sense. But the word is also used in the primary sense of something that burns in so many instances. Thus, it would have to be presupposed that the terms like *pakṣa-dharma* and others have, also, a use in a primary sense; and in such a case, the validity of inference would have to be admitted even by the opponent.

Moreover, even if the said terms are used in a secondary sense, there is no harm so far as inference's capability of yielding valid knowledge is concerned. For example, a person desiring to weave a piece of cloth goes to the market and buys a bundle of yarns. When somebody asks him 'What are you carrying?', he replies, 'These are yarns for a cloth.' However, the piece of cloth will be produced much later and hence, the expression 'yarns for a cloth' is to be taken in a secondary sense, as distinguished from its use in a primary sense when it is used in respect of yarns fitted in a weaving machine actually producing a piece of cloth. Though the cause of the piece of cloth is 'secondary' in one case, and 'primary' in the other, there is no difference in the nature of the piece of cloth produced from either. Similarly, let inference be secondary; still, its effect, the knowledge, would not be secondary or invalid.

44. *supra*, fn. 4. Jayanta's implication is as follows. Generally, in an inferential formulation, the term indicative of the probandum is a word formed by the addition of the suffix *matup*. For instance, the inference of fire from smoke is expressed as *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*.

The suffix *matup* generally expresses a relation (*sambandha*) of the thing expressed by the word to which *matup* has been added. The subject as such, and the inferable property as such, may already be proved elsewhere. But the relation between the subject and the inferable property is not a proved fact, and the function of inference is to establish this relation. Thus, in the instance cited, the inference proves the relation of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between the mountain and fire. See also NBHU, p. 216.

45. *supra*, fn. 6. For example, one may wrongly identify rising steam as smoke, infer the presence of fire, and may not get fire at the particular spot. But it proves only the ignorance of the person concerned, and not the invalidity of inference. Concomitance is properly established only after the possibility of deviation due to the change of time, place and the like has been duly taken into consideration. See Kamalaśīla on TS, verses 1474–76.

46. See NB, (pp. 104, 111), TS, verses 1472–73 and NBHU, p. 213.

47. See Jayanta's discussion on the fallacies *prakaraṇa-sama* and *kālātīta* (NM, pt. ii, pp. 158 and 167). Also *Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, pp. 220f.

48. Cf. TS, verse 1476.

49. *supra*, fn. 3. The idea is: there are certain inferences which are so obvious and well-known that their validity cannot be challenged. But there are also inferences—put forward dogmatically by the followers of particular systems—which are unintelligible, and not verifiable. The validity of such inferences is not beyond question. Cf. Purandara's view noted by Kamalaśīla on TS, verse 1481.

50. The basic principles are the same in all cases of inference; the nature of the object inferred does not matter. Hence, the admission of validity in one case amounts to the admission of validity in other cases as well. Cf. TS, verses 1481ff.

51. SVR, (p. 268, attributing to Dharmakīrti) and SDS, (p. 19 attributing to the Buddhists) quote a verse noting some further arguments for the admission of the validity of inference (*pramāṇāntara-sāmānya-sthiter anadhiyo gateḥ/pramāṇāntara-sadbhāvaḥ pratiṣedhāc ca kasyacit/*).

First, if inference is not admitted, it would not be possible to distinguish between a valid cognition and an invalid cognition. When one sees, for instance, water at a distance, one determines the validity or the invalidity of the cognition by an inference. Earlier, in some other spot, one had seen water, had gone there, and had actually found water there. Finally, one had decided that the cognition must have been valid.

Or, conversely, in the same instance, one had gone there, but had not actually found water there; finally, one had decided that the cognition must have been false. In the case of the newly acquired cognition of water, one thus infers either that this cognition is valid, because it is of the same kind [as the one acquired earlier]: or, 'this cognition is invalid, because it is of the same kind [as the one acquired earlier]'.

Secondly, a person utters sentences to convey his implications to others. But how does he determine that his words have been correctly

understood or not by the hearer? It cannot be determined by percetion, and if the fact remains undetermined, he should become silent at once. But the fact is that he continues his dialogue. In other words, from the reactions and replies of the hearer, the speaker infers whether he has been understood or not, and continues accordingly. Hence, the validity of inferences cannot be denied.

Thirdly, inference is necessary also for the cognition of absence (*abhāva*). As, for instance, one infers the absence of a jar on the ground: there is an absence of a jar on the ground, because though perceptible, it is not cognised there. (See NB pp. 47ff).

NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ
C. STRAY REFERENCES

(a) (In the lists enumerating the *vidyāsthāna*-s, two words denoting logic have been mentioned, namely, *tarka* and *nyāya-vistara*. Jayanta contends that both of them refer to the Nyāya system of Gautama and not to any other. Thus, as against a possible claim of the Cārvākas he remarks:) 'The wretched (*varāka*) Cārvākas are only to be thrown away (i.e. refuted) and therefore, where is the scope for enumerating their very insignificant (*kṣudra*) logic (*tarka*) in this list (of *vidyāsthāna*-s)?'

(b) (The Nyāya system recognizes four kinds of *pramāṇa*-s, namely, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. But there are systems which do not accept such a classification. So Jayanta remarks:) 'Thus, for example, the Cārvākas say that there is only one kind of *pramāṇa*, which is perception (*pratyakṣa*). . . . Later on, when we will establish the validity of inference, we will refute (the arguments of) the followers of Bṛhaspati (*bārhaspatya*) (claiming that inference is not a *pramāṇa*).

(c) (Different systems accept different kinds of *pramāṇa*-s. The Naiyāyikas say they are four, the Prābhākaras five, the Bhāṭṭas six and yet others eight. In such a context, Jayanta remarks:) 'The Cārvākas, the well-learned ones (*suśikṣita*), say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of *pramāṇa*-s'.

(According to the commentator Cakradhara, *suśikṣita-cārvāka* refers to Udbhaṭa and others. Udbhaṭa was said to be a Sabhāpati of King Jayāpīda of Kashmir).

(d) The Cārvāka, the cunning one (*dhūrta*) begins with the promise: 'now, therefore, we will explain *tattva* (reality, true nature of things),' but afterwards, explains *tattva* to be nothing but the impossibility of making a specific rule regarding the number and definition of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. To establish that it is impossible to make a specific rule regarding the number of *pramāṇa*, they have cited the following forms of valid knowledge which cannot (be said to) be produced by (the accepted) *pramāṇa*-s like perception, etc.: One standing in darkness, or with the eyes closed, has an awareness in the form 'the fingers of the hand are closed', or 'the fingers of the hand are open.' But such an awareness cannot be produced by the tactual sense, for the tactual sense, as located in the hand, cannot produce a valid cognition in that hand itself. Moreover, at night, the flame of a lamp, seen from a distance, produces an awareness of the glow as reaching up to the end of the quarters. Again, (for one standing) in a spot lying in the direct path of the blowing wind, a cluster of lotuses shaken by the wind produces an awareness of fragrance even at a distance.

But then the ascetic, though he is adept in inventing such (peculiar) instances of awareness, does not really know the nature of either perception or inference. The awareness that the fingers in the hand are open is due to perception; the sense (tactual), being pervasive, is not incapable in respect of such (an awareness). Persons who drink cold water up to the navel feel its touch to be colder well inside. Just as the awareness of conjunction is produced by it (the tactual sense), so also the awareness of its absence, too, is produced by it. The sense is capable of receiving specific forms of action and, for that reason, the closedness of the fingers can be known by it. The knowledge of the fragrance of the lotus (at a distance) and the knowledge of the glow of a lamp at a distance are produced by inferential marks (*liṅga*), and they proceed from the ascertainment of

invariable concomitance. Thus, where is there any form of knowledge which would be dependent upon some other novel form of *pramāṇa*? Therefore, the Nāstikas, not having enough intelligence to determine the power of the *pramāṇa*-s, have been clamouring in vain that in the case of *pramāṇa*-s, there is no specific rule as to the number.

According to us, however, in the case of *pramāṇa*-s, there is definitely a specific rule as to the number, and we shall discuss later on the *prameya*-s which have their specific nature etc. By declaring before the assembly of the learned that *tattva* is nothing but the impossibility of determining (the true nature of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*), they have only revealed their dullheadedness.

(e) (According to Nyāya, the existence of God is proved by an inference: The earth, etc., must have a conscious agent, because they are effects, like the jar, etc. The probans of the inference is effecthood, or *kāryatva*, of the earth, etc.)

In this connection, Jayanta observes:

Well, it has already been said that effecthood (of the earth, etc.), is unproved. (So how can it be the ground for proving the existence of God?) Who would argue in such a manner—a Cārvāka, a Śākya (Buddhist), or a Mīmāṃsaka? A Cārvāka is, in fact, one who admits the effecthood of even the Vedic compositions in spite of the fact that they are distinct in nature from other compositions; as such, how can he deny the effecthood of formations like the earth, etc.?

(f) (As against the Nyāya view of God it may be argued, why not explain the production of the earth, etc., by only perceptible causes? What is the use of admitting an imperceptible cause, an agent in the form of God? In answer, it is pointed out that there is no harm in this, for those who admit *paraloka* also admit an imperceptible cause in the form of *adṛṣṭa* or merit-demerit. Then, Jayanta remarks:)

The reply to (the objections against the admission of God raised by) the Bārhaspatyas would simply be the establishment of *paraloka*. (When *paraloka* is established, their objections are automatically rejected.)

(g) (Is sound, *śabda*, produced or manifested? The views of the different systems in this regard are to be critically discussed. For example, the Vaiśeṣika and others argue that sound is non-eternal and is produced. Jayanta remarks:)

But, in such kinds of assemblies (discussing philosophical questions), who would indeed care to remember the (name of the) wretched Cārvākas?

(h) (If all precepts based upon the Veda are considered valid), well, then, even the precepts (*āgama*) of the Lokāyata and others would have to be considered valid, for it is found that (their precepts too) are based on Vedic statements, e.g., 'the one of pure knowledge (*vijñānaghana*), appearing out of these forms of matter, gets dissolved again only into them; there is no awareness (*saṃjñā*) after death' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 4.5.13). And thus, if the Lokāyata doctrine is also held to be valid, then let us hope for the best for the precepts of all the other systems.

The reply to this is as follows. In the Lokāyata view, no precept is indeed (positively) prescribed. It is only the assertions of a Vaitaṇḍika (representing, merely, the destructive criticism of others). It is not really a body of precepts.

But then, there it has been (positively) prescribed: 'live in pleasure as long as you live.' No. The fact being naturally established, a prescription in this regard becomes useless. (It is not a prescription at all.)

As to the instructions '*dharma* is not to be practised', 'faith is not to be put upon instructions regarding it', etc., (it is to be noted that) they are not really proper instructions, for the Lokāyata doctrine is based only upon such statements as represent the viewpoint of the opponent (*pūrvapakṣa-vacana*). Thus, there are subsequent *Brāhmaṇa* statements replying (to the previous ones): 'Well, I am not preaching ignorance. This self is indeed, indestructible. It only has a connection with the senses, etc.). (The self is not born; it can only have connection with newer senses, etc.)' (cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 4.5.14).

Thus, due to its being based upon statements representing only the viewpoint of the opponent, the doctrine of the Lokāyata is also not an independent one; and because it is contradicted by later statements, it is not to be taken into account.

Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali*

Udayana (c tenth century AD) is a highly respected name in the history of Indian philosophy As a representative of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika he has commented on the major works of the systems, besides writing a few independent works of which the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is one, which has as its main theme various proofs for the existence of God Given here is an extract from it containing a brief exposition and refutation of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata view identifying the self with the body.

Nyāyakusumāñjali (1.15)

(ON DEHĀTMAVĀDA)

(The following may be advanced by the opponent): Well, all this would have been so, if there would actually have existed an enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) who is eternal and omnipresent. But where is there such a being, the forms of matter themselves being conscious? (The conscious one) is nothing but the forms of matter transformed into the shape of a body, for it is observed to be so through agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Everywhere, the (unseen *karma-vāsanā* = *adṛṣṭa*) and the reminiscent impression (*jñāna-vāsanā*) would follow as restricted to each particular combination of matter, so that a specific rule as regards enjoyment and recollection can be justified.

In answer, it is said (*verse 15*): What is apprehended by one is not recollected by another. The same combination of matter is not there, because there is constant change (*apakrama*). Nor can there be a transfer (*saṃkrama*) of impressions, and neither is there any other alternative, accepting the permanence of things.

It cannot be said that consciousness inheres in the collectivity (*samudāya*) of the forms of matter as a whole (i.e., in the body as a whole), because it becomes a different one day after day (being subject to change), and there would arise the absurdity

of there being no recollection of things apprehended on each previous day

Nor can consciousness inhere in each individual (limb of the body), for in that case, it would not be possible to recollect what had been apprehended by them in the event of the limbs—hand, foot etc.—being severed (from the body).

Neither can it be argued that, like the lingering fragrance of musk (transferred to) a piece of cloth due to constant contact, the impressions of one also may be transmitted to another; for then there would arise the absurdity of recollection by the embryonic child (*garbhastha-bhrūṇa*) of what has been experienced by the mother. The objection cannot be avoided even by maintaining that (for such transfer the precondition would be) a relation of being the material and the effect (*upādānopādeya-bhāva*); for, if the view of the permanence of things is accepted, it (i.e. such a relation) would not be possible in the case of atoms. (It is not possible) also because, in relation to a broken whole (*khaṇḍāvayavin*), the parts severed from them cannot be the material causes; and also because the whole, produced previously, has been destroyed.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

Because of the circumstance that, of the great Buddhist *ācārya*-s of India, Śāntarakṣita spent the maturest part of his life in Tibet where he was most highly esteemed, and moreover because practically nothing about his life and activity survives for us in Indian sources, we have basically to depend upon the Tibetan historians of Buddhism for our knowledge of him. According to the foremost Tibetan historians, he acted, before leaving for Tibet, as the *upādhyāya* of Nālandā during the eighth century AD when Gopāla and Dharmapāla ruled over eastern India He persuaded the Tibetan king Khri-sron-lde-dtsan to construct in AD 787 the bSam-yas monastery in the model of Odantapurī, the first genuine centre of Buddhist studies. It was here that the

earliest Tibetan scholars of Indian Buddhism were trained and initiated in the activity of translating Indian texts into Tibetan. He died in Tibet, 'having been kicked by a horse', in the first decade of the ninth century AD. The foremost disciple and commentator of Śāntarakṣita was Kamalaśīla, who also followed the master to Tibet where, according to Tibetan historians, he was killed by some Chinese rivals expounding Buddhist doctrine in their own way and, in a grand debate organised by the king, got defeated by Kamalaśīla.

Although in the large Tibetan collection called the Tanjur (bsTan-'gyur), a large number of works is attributed to him, the most important philosophical work of Śāntarakṣita is undoubtedly the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, which fortunately for us survives also in its original Sanskrit. It is commented upon in detail by Kamalaśīla, the commentary being known as the *Pañjikā*. The work is intended to defend the later Yogācāra view for the purpose of which it goes into detailed refutation of practically all the other Indian philosophical views, and is thus a veritable encyclopaedia for us of Indian philosophy current in his time.

We have given here, mainly in Ganganatha Jha's English rendering (with revisions where felt necessary), the section explaining and refuting the Lokāyata view as well as the section on Svabhāva-vāda, which we are inclined to understand as a prominent feature of ancient Indian materialism. Jha's translation originally appeared in GOS, Baroda, 1937.

Śantarakṣita's *Tattva-saṃgraha with the Commentary (Pañjikā) of* Kamalśīla

A. LOKĀYATA

Commentary

(In the introductory text, verse 4): Truth has been spoken of as 'without beginning, without end'. The author proceeds to set forth arguments in support of this view, starting with the criticism that has been urged against it

Text (1857):

If there is no entity that has continuity of existence, then there can be no other world, because there is nothing that could belong to the other world.

Commentary

'No entity'—like the soul, etc. The 'soul' has already been rejected; hence it cannot be 'continuous', simply because it does not exist at all. As for cognition and other entities, they are all momentary, and it has been proved in the (previous) chapter on 'The Three Points of Time' that there can be no continuity of these.

'The body, etc., might appertain to the other world.' The answer to that is as follows:

Texts (1858–9)

The body, cognition, the sense-organs and the rest being destroyed every moment, they cannot pertain to the other world. There is nothing else that is admitted (by you, Buddhists). Hence, consciousness must be regarded as produced from, or manifested by, certain material substances, just like acids, liquors and such things.

Commentary

The term 'and the rest' includes feeling (*vedanā*), naming (*saṃjñā*) and mental impressions (*saṃskāra*).

'There is nothing else that is admitted'—as the 'Soul'.

Thus, this turns out to be the assertion of the view of the Lokāyata (Materialist). His aphorisms read as follows: 'There being nothing that can belong to the other world, there can be no other world; there are four material substances—earth, water, fire and air; and from these proceeds consciousness'.

Some commentators on these aphorisms offer the explanation that consciousness is produced out of material substances; others explain that it is manifested by them. Hence the author

has mentioned both these views—'produced or manifested'.

Śukta is acid. *Surā* is intoxicating liquor. 'And such things' are meant to include things having the effect of making people unconscious, and so forth.

An objection is raised—'As a matter of fact, consciousness (or cognition) is always produced on the basis of such causes as the eye and other sense-organs and objects, in the shape of colour (forms); this fact is well known. How, then, is it said that cognition proceeds from those material substances?'

The (Materialist's) answer is as follows:

Text (1860)

The names 'body', 'sense-organ', and so on are applied to particular combinations of earth and other material substances; there is no reality other than these.

Commentary

Says the *Lokāyata-sūtra*—'It is to the combination of these that the names "object" and "sense-organ" are applied; the sense-organ, etc., have no existence apart from the great material substances (*mahābhūta*); the notions of these appear only in regard to the combinations of these; and "combination" has no existence apart from the combining elements; these four material substances are well-known by direct perception. Apart from these, there is no other reality equally well-known by direct perception; and apart from perception, there is no other means of cognition which could prove the existence of the "other world" and such things'.

Texts (1861–62)

There can be no relation of cause and effect between the two minds (consciousnesses) under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies, just like the consciousness of the cow and the consciousness of the horse. Cognitions (consciousness) cannot be the effects of the cognition (consciousness) in question, because they are consciousness, like consciousness connected with another 'series'.

Commentary

Further, if the mind that existed in the past body were the cause of the mind (consciousness) in the body now born—and the mind in the dying body were the cause of the mind in the future body,—then, inasmuch as there would be no cessation in the continuity of the mind, the existence of the "other world" might be postulated. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no relation of cause and effect between the said two minds in dispute, because they reside in different bodies—just like the cognition of the cow and the cognition of the horse.

'Or, the produced cognitions may be made the 'Subject'—in regard to which there is denial of the idea of their being produced by the last cognition in the past (dead) body—the 'Probans' being the same as before, 'because they are cognitions'—the 'cognitions appearing in other series' supply the corroborative instance.

'The argument may be formulated as follows: the (present) cognition cannot be produced by the last cognition in the past body, because it is cognition,—like the cognition appearing in another series; the cognitions appearing in the body in question are all cognitions; hence, there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; inasmuch as 'being cognition' is concomitant with the contrary of 'being produced by the cognition in the last body in question.'

The idea of the 'previous birth' has thus been denied by the Materialist; he proceeds to deny the 'future birth':

Text (1863)

The dying consciousness of the man beset with affections cannot bring about the contiguity of another mind (or consciousness), because it is dying consciousness—just like the dying consciousness of the person free from the 'afflictions' (passions and impurities).

Commentary

'The dying consciousness cannot bring about another consciousness, because it is dying consciousness, like the dying consciousness of the *Arhat*, (the person free from the afflictions of passions, etc.).'

Question: How, then, does consciousness (mind) come about?

Answer:

Text (1864)

From this, it follows that the right view is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself which is equipped with the five life-breaths—Prāṇa, Apāna and the rest—as has been declared by Kambalāśvatara.

Commentary

The *Sūtra* is—'It is from the body itself, etc.'—which has been pronounced by Kamabalāśvatara.

An objection is raised—even before the body has been completely formed, and while it still exists only in the form of the foetus, etc., consciousness is already there, though in latent condition; and this consciousness is known as being produced by the consciousness in the *past* body; then how can it be asserted that it proceeds from the body itself alone? The answer to this is as follows:

Texts (1865–8)

To assert that consciousness resides in the foetus, etc., is sheer audacity; nothing can be cognized at that stage, as the sense-organs are not there; and consciousness can have no form other than the cognition of things; it is for this same reason that there is no consciousness in the state of swoon. Nor can consciousness exist there in the form of a latent potency, because no potencies can exist without a substratum; and as there is no soul that could be that substratum of consciousness, the body is the only substratum possible for it. So that, at the end, when the body has ceased to exist, wherein could the consciousness subsist?

Commentary

'The sense-organ and the object are the cause of the birth of consciousness; because consciousness consists only in the apprehension of things; at the foetus-state of the body, neither the sense-organs nor the objects are there; how then could there appear the effect of these in the form of consciousness? Thus it is proved that on account of the absence of the cause, there can be no consciousness, even in a swoon. Such is the outcome of the whole.

'It cannot be correct to assert that at that stage, consciousness is there in the state of latent potency. Because at that stage, there is no substratum for such a potency, either in the shape of the "soul" postulated by the Naiyāyika, or in that of the "chain of cognitions" (postulated by the Buddhist); and potency cannot be there without a substratum.

Hence it follows that on the ground of sheer capacity, the body alone can be the substratum of consciousness, for the simple reason that there is nothing else that could be the required substratum—either in the shape of the "chain of cognitions", or the "soul". Consequently at the end, when the body dies, the substratum in the shape of the body having ceased to exist, how could consciousness exist without a substratum?

'Thus it is proved that there can be no future birth.'

Texts (1869–71)

When the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the body that is subsequently born? How, too, could the consciousness, residing in different bodies, be related to the same 'chain of cognitions'—being like the consciousness of the elephant, the horse, and other animals? For these reasons, as the substratum of consciousness, you have either to seek a beginningless and endless transmigrat-

ing personality, or accept pure Materialism (*nāstikatā*).

Commentary

'It might be argued that consciousness would be subsisting in that intermediate body which would be produced immediately after death'. But that cannot be correct, because no such intermediate body has ever been seen to appear immediately after death; and there can be no certainty regarding the existence of what has never been seen, as such a thing is always regarded as non-existent.

Nor can it be correct for the consciousness of one "chain" to subsist in another body; as in that case, the character of being related to the same "chain" would be lost; just as in the case of the consciousness of different animals, elephant, horse and so forth.

The argument may be formulated thus: consciousness appearing in different bodies cannot belong to the same "chain"—like the cognition of the elephant and that of the horse, the consciousness subsisting in the dead body and that subsisting in the succeeding intermediate body subsist in different bodies; hence there would be the possibility of the apprehension of what is contrary to the wider conception; but as a matter of fact there is no such apprehension; hence, the contrary must be true. That is, what are related to the same "chain" cannot subsist in different bodies, e.g. the consciousness of the elephant does not subsist in the body of the horse; the consciousness of every person is related to the same chain; hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; because "being related to the same chain" is invariably concomitant with "subsisting in the same body", which is contrary to "subsisting in different bodies".'

The words—'for these reasons, etc.'—recapitulate the Materialist's view.

Ādi—is birth, beginning; *nidhana* is destruction, end; that which has neither beginning nor end is 'beginningless and endless'.

'Or, accept pure Materialism'—this indicates the *Lokāyata-sūtra*—'There is no one related to the other world; hence there can be no other world'.

The following texts answer the above arguments (of the Materialist):

Texts (1872–7)

As regards the 'other world', there is no such 'other world', apart from the 'chain of causes and effects, in the form of cognition and the rest'. What is spoken of as 'the other world' or 'this world', is only, by way of a certain limit, placed upon the said 'chain', which is beginningless and endless. We regard it to be thus, in the same way as people addicted to the pleasures of the perceptible only assume the 'other world' to consist in some other part of the country. If what you are denying is the 'other world' different from those just mentioned, then the attempt to prove that denial is futile, as there is no dispute (between us) regarding the non-existence of such an 'other world'.

Objection—'The *chain* being a non-entity, it cannot have different states; how, then, can the "other world" consisting of these be anything real?'

Answer—There is nothing in this; what are denoted by the term 'chain' are the members of the chain, spoken of collectively by that term for the sake of brevity; just like such terms as 'forest' and the like.

Commentary

What is the 'other world' which you are denying? Is it something different from the chain of causes and effects, consisting of cognition and the other four constituents (*skandha*)? Or is it this same chain?

The former cannot be right, as no such 'other world' has been admitted. In fact, there is nothing apart from the chain of causes and effects, in the shape of cognition and the rest, which could be accepted. What is actually regarded as the 'other

world', or 'this world', or the 'previous world'—is only by way of a certain limit, in the form of a hundred years or so, placed upon the said chain of cognition, etc., which is without beginning and without end. This is exactly as you (Materialists), who are addicted to merely perceptible pleasures, apply the name 'other world' to some other part of this same visible world; as is declared in such assertions as: 'Man is only so much as is perceptible to the senses'; and again: 'The other world consists in another place, another time or another state'.

If, on the other hand, the 'other world' that is denied is something different from the said chain of causes and effects in the shape of cognition, etc., then as such, a conclusion is already admitted (by both parties); any proving of it would be futile, as no such 'other world' is postulated by us.

An objection is raised—'The chain being a non-entity, any state that is attributed to it must also be a non-entity; under the circumstances, the "other world", based upon such limitations, could not be real.'

Answer—This does not affect our position. What the term 'chain' denotes are the members of the chain, which are entities; these being spoken of for the sake of brevity, and expressed collectively and simultaneously, by the one name 'chain'; in the same way as the Dhava and other trees (which are real) are spoken of collectively as 'forest' (though the forest as such, apart from the trees, is not a real entity).

Question: 'If it is so, then how was it that the chain was spoken of as a non-entity (under text 1807), where the chain or series has been declared to be "illusory" (unreal)?'

Answer:

Texts (1878–85)

Because it is conceived as 'one' (composite), and is featureless and incapable of being indicated either as the *same*, or as *different* (from the component members of the chain), the chain has been regarded as a 'non-entity', just like the 'line of sky-lotuses'. As it is, why cannot the chain be accepted as being

without beginning and without end? If (it had a beginning and) the first member of the 'chain' consisted of the first cognition, this could be held to be either: (1) 'without cause', or (2) as produced by an eternal cause, or (3) as eternal by itself, or (4) as produced from any substance, or (5) as produced by any other cognition.

1 The first cognition would appear at the very inception of the foetus, and it could not come about without cause, because otherwise, its existence, which is only occasional, would be quite the reverse (everlasting).
2. Nor could it be brought about by such eternal causes as Mind, Time, Space, God, Soul and so forth, because on that very account, it should be eternal.
3. On account of the absence of the said 'eternal existence', it would be sheer audacity to assert that the cognition is one and eternal, as difference is clearly perceived among the cognitions of colour, sound and other things
(4–5) Nor could it be produced from, or manifested by, the material substances—earth, fire, water and air; as in that case, all cognitions would be simultaneous; as the other party regard these substances as of permanent form; and the idea of a permanent thing requiring the help of auxiliaries has been already rejected.

Commentary

That 'chain' which has been postulated as one has been found to be incapable of being indicated as the *same* as, or *different* from, the members of the chain, and on that ground, it has been regarded as a 'non-entity', just like the 'series of sky-lotuses'; and we do not base our notion of the 'other world' upon the states of any such one 'chain'. If it is this 'chain of cognitions, etc.' called the 'other world', which you are denying, then it cannot be right to deny this 'other world' on the basis of the denial of the very form or existence of the said 'chain', because what is actually percevied cannot be denied. All the

denial that could be made of it would be with regard to its qualities of *beginninglessness* and *endlessness*. But why cannot these—endlessness and beginninglessness—be accepted?

If beginninglessness is denied, and the first cognition at birth is held to be the first cognition (the beginning), then this initial cognition would be either: (1) without cause, (2) produced by an eternal cause, like an eternal cognition, or God, and so forth, (3) it would itself be eternal, (4) it would be produced from any substance, (5) produced by a cognition appearing in another 'chain'. These are the five possible alternatives.

If each cognition in the 'chain' were the effect of another previous cognition in the same chain, then alone could the chain be beginningless, not otherwise. That is why the author has set forth these alternatives that are possible (under the idea of the chain not being beginningless, and then to show the untenability of every one of these alternatives):

(1) The first alternative cannot be accepted, as under that view the cognition would have permanent existence. Things are occasional only when they are dependent upon other things, and what is without cause is not dependent upon anything—why, then, should it cease to exist?

(2) Nor is the second alternative tenable, as for that same reason, it would be eternal. Effects become non-existent only by reason of the absence of their cause; when the cause is present in its perfect form, you have to explain why the effect should not come about.

(3) Nor can the third alternative be accepted. "Why?" 'Because of the absence'—of permanent existence. The same absence is further emphasized by the words—'It would be sheer audacity, etc.'. This points out the fact of the opponent's proposition being contrary to perceived facts.

(4) The sentence 'Nor could, etc.,' rejects the fourth alternative *Kṣoṇī* is earth. This alternative is open to the same objections as the second one—that it proceeds from the eternal God, etc.; because the four major elemental substances are held by the other party to be eternal. It will not be right to urge that—

"the production of the cognition from an eternal cause would be possible as it would be dependent upon auxiliary causes," because it has been thoroughly established that an eternal cause cannot depend upon an auxiliary, as it can render no help to it.

(The refutation of the fifth alternative follows under text 1893.)

Text (1886)

If the other party asserts that "these elemental substances are momentary (not eternal)", then, in that case, why cannot their own doctrine be regarded as rejected by this?

Commentary

If the four major elemental substances (*bhūta-catuṣṭaya*) are described by the other party as momentary—with a view to escape from the objections urged above—then also, there are objections against him. This is what is meant.

(These objections against the view that cognition proceeds from the elemental substances, earth, etc., are now set forth in detail.)

For instance, there is nothing to prove that between cognition and the body (made of the material substances), there subsists the relation of cause and effect, on the basis of which the usage of the other party could be justified. This argument may be thus formulated: When there is no evidence in support of a certain thing having a particular character, no sane man should treat that thing as having that character: for instance, one should not treat fire as cold. There is no evidence in support of the presence of a causal relation between the body and cognition, hence there is no awareness of the wider term (*vyāpaka-anupalabhi*). Nor can the reason (*hetu*) be held to be 'inadmissible'. As the causal relation is always based on perception and non-apprehension, it can be ascertained through specific positive or negative concomitance, not by mere perception or non-perception. When the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a particular cause is going to be ascertained through

positive concomitance, what is to be found out is if the thing in question is one which is perceptible and which, not being seen before, is seen when the other thing (the cause) is seen; otherwise, if it were not discovered that the thing is perceptible and was not seen before, then it might be thought that the thing (effect) might have been there even before the cause appeared, or it might have gone to some other place. So that there would be nothing in the idea of the tree and such other things, which were existing before the cause in question, being the cause of the effect concerned. This possibility becomes averted by noting that the effect is one that could be perceived and yet is not perceived; as this condition is not fulfilled in the case of false causality.

In this way, the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause becomes ascertained through positive concomitance. In the ascertainment of the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause through negative concomitance, it has to be found out what that thing is during the absence of which the effect in question does not appear, even though other efficient causes are there; otherwise, if all that were ascertained were that it does not appear when the other is absent, it would be doubtful if that particular cause were really efficient enough to bring about that effect; as other causes efficient for that purpose are also absent, so that it might be conceivable that—"these latter causes are the real causes of the effect; and it is the absence of these to which the absence is due; and as for its absence during the absence of this other thing as well (which is intended to be the cause)—that may be a mere accident; just as in the case of the absence of the date-palm, which grows in a place where the *Mātṛvivāha* (plant) generally grows, during the absence of this latter. Hence the qualification, 'other efficient causes being present', has to be added. It is in this way that it is fully ascertained that the thing in question *only* can be the cause of the effect concerned, its absence being duly followed (by the absence of the effect). There is no such following of the absence of anything which renders no help in the bringing about of the effect. If it did, it would lead to an

absurdity. Thus it is only through positive and negative concomitances that the relation of cause and effect can be ascertained, and not in any other way.

There is no such positive or negative concomitance between the body and cognition. For instance, there can be no certainty regarding the positive concomitance between one's own body and cognition, because in the foetus, before the appearance of cognition, the body alone is not perceived; nor is it perceived apart from the cognition. As regards the body of another person as well, the cognition is *not* one that could be perceptible; hence there is no perception of any order of sequence. Hence there can be no certain idea of positive concomitance.

Nor can there be any certainty regarding negative concomitance. It is possible to know that when one's own body is absent, one's own cognition is also absent—because the man himself is absent; but it can by no means be ascertained that in the absence of another man's body, his cognition is also absent. Because that man's cognition not being perceptible, even in the absence of his body, there may be doubts regarding the absence of his cognition. It is for this reason that, even in the case of trees, though the body is not there, it is not certain that the cognition is not there; as in this case also there will be the suspicion that its presence is not amenable to perception. It cannot be correct to be certain of *absence* on the basis of the absence of vibration, etc., as it is not necessary that causes *must* always produce their effects. It would be always a matter of doubt whether the absence of cognition in the tree is due to the absence of the body, or to the absence of its cause in the shape of the absence of desire, which would be the cause of its having a particular body.

Thus, the reason adduced by us is not 'inadmissible'.

Nor is it 'contradictory', as it is present in all cases where the probandum is known to be present.

Nor, again, can it be 'inconclusive', as that would lead to incongruities; and it would also mark the objector as being devoid of intelligence.

Question: 'What is there to prove that the contrary of the

proposition "The body cannot be the cause of cognition" is not true?'

Answer: This has no force, as the proof is there; for instance, that 'the body cannot be the cause of purely mental cognition' is going to be proved under text 1930: 'Mental consciousness is independent, self-sufficient, etc.' Specially as it is this mental consciousness itself which serves as the dominant cause in bringing about the contact of other bodies, which shows that it is not dependent upon the present body; and thus it is that the existence of the 'other world' becomes established.

Then again, the body may be the cause of mental consciousness. But would it be so in the form of the single composite whole, or in diverse forms—in the form of an aggregate of atoms? Would it be the cause along with the sense-organs? Or without the sense-organs? Would it be the material (constituent) cause? Or the contributory cause? These are the alternatives possible.

Now the body, as a single composite whole, cannot be the cause of cognition, as the very idea of the 'composite whole' has already been rejected. And also because such an idea would militate against the notion that the cause consists of the four major elemental substances, as a single thing could not have four forms; for, if it did, there would be an end of all notions of 'plurality'.

Nor can the body in the form of the aggregate of atoms be accepted (as the cause of cognition). Will the cause consist of the atoms severally, or collectively? It cannot be *severally*, as in that case, the cognition would arise from each one of the atoms, just as the sprout arises from every one of the seeds. Nor could it be *collectively*, as in that case, the defect in any one of the limbs—like the nose—would lead to the contingency of no cognition being produced at all; just as the defect in even one of the various ingredients of the cause of the sprout—in the shape of the soil, for instance—makes it impossible for the sprout to appear. In fact, whenever an effect is dependent upon a concatenation of cause-conditions, it does not come about

when even one of those conditions is absent; if it did, it would not be dependent upon them. It might be held that 'all the atoms are the cause of cognition, according as they happen to be in proximity'. But in that case, there should be some difference between the effect as produced by a perfect cause and that produced by a defective cause, as the two causes would be different; otherwise the distinction in the cause would be pointless. As a matter of fact, when a cause that has been perfect in all its parts happens, subsequently, to be defective in certain parts, there is not found any difference in the mental cognition at all. This is due to the fact that the impressions of past auditory and other cognitions continue to be intact. It is only in the case of animals, like the elephant, that there are changes in mental consciousness, not in the case of human beings. Animals, in the infantile stage of the body, are dull, while those that have acquired a full-grown body are cleverer; the improvement and deterioration of the cause, in this case, are found to bring about improvement and deterioration in the effect. Hence when, between two things, changes in one do not lead to changes in the other, one cannot be the effect of the other; otherwise there would be absurdity; and the changes in the effect would be without cause.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, viz. that the body along with the sense-organs is the cause of mental consciousness. For here also, would the mental consciousness proceed from each of the sense-organs severally? Or from all of them collectively? It could not proceed from each severally, because it is found that even after the disappearance of the sense-organs one by one, the mental consciousness remains intact. For instance, even when the motor-organs have become disabled by paralysis and other diseases, the mental consciousness remains intact and in a perfect state of existence. And when between two things, the changes in one do not bring about changes in the other, one cannot be the effect of the other; otherwise there would be incongruities. Further, according to the view under consideration, mental consciousness would

have to be regarded as: (a) apprehending only particular things, (b) as being free from conceptual content (indeterminate), and (c) as being dependent upon the presence of the object—just like the visual and other sense-cognitions; because it would have the same cause as these latter; and also because there would be the possibility of several conceptions appearing at the same time.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, that 'mental consciousness proceed from all the sense-organs collectively'; as in that case, there could be no mental consciousness when even one of the sense-organs would be absent (disabled); just like the absence of the sprout on the absence of even one of its contributory causes.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted that 'mental consciousness proceeds from the body without the sense-organs.' As under that view, it would be possible for the said consciousness to proceed from the hand and other such parts of the body, even when severed from the body. If it were held that a qualified body is the cause, then it would come to this, that the cause consists of the body *along with* the sense-organs, as no qualified body can be shown other than the body with the sense-organs.

Nor, again, can the view be accepted that 'the body is the material (constituent) cause of mental consciousness.'

Because that particular cause is accepted as the 'material cause' of a certain effect which is found to fulfil the two conditions, *viz.* (1) that it helps, by its presence, the entire nature of the effect embracing all its peculiar features, and (2) that the effect undergoes no change, except upon changes in the said cause, as is found in the case where the clay is held to be the 'material cause' of the jar, as it passes successively through all the modifications proceeding from the clod of clay to the finished product called 'jar'. It is for this reason that when one desires to modify a certain thing, he modifies it by modifying its material cause—not in any other way. When a material cause precedes without having its potency impeded in any

way, no one can impede the appearance of the subsequent effect going to be produced. For instance, in the case of the jar, no modification can be made in the effect to be produced without having brought about a 'moment' in the clay incapable of further efficiency. In fact in the bringing about of all modifications, the process is the same—that of producing a 'moment' (entity) incapable of producing another 'moment'. If it were not so, nothing could be directly contrary to anything. If such direct modification were possible, then as the cause, so could the effect also be modified directly by itself—not through the bringing about of a like modification in its material cause. It is true that in the case of the lamp, there is a modification brought about in its outspreading light by putting up an intervening screen without modifying the light at all; but in this case, the lamp is not the direct material cause of the light; each light-moment is the cause of the light-moment that follows it, so that what happens is that the screen brings about a modification in the shape of a 'moment' devoid of further causal efficiency, and thereby practically destroys the light at that point. In a case where a thing is modified without modifying an entity, it is not a case of material cause: when, for instance, the cow is modified without modifying the Gavaya. In the case in question, however, it is found that without modifying the body, the mental consciousness is subjected, by wrong-doing, to modifications, such as evil intentions and the like. So that here, there would be apprehension of something contrary to the wider premise (that there can be no modification in the effect without modifications in the cause—if the body were regarded as the material cause of mental consciousness).

Objection: 'When there is modification in the body, in the shape of it being well-nourished and strong—which is brought about by good food—there *is* actually perceived a modification in the mental consciousness, in the shape of love, etc.'

Answer: What does it matter if such modification is seen? This alone does not make our reason inadmissible. For example, all that is meant by us is that, when between two things, the

modification of one is possible without modification of the other; then the one cannot be the material cause of the other. It is quite possible that under certain circumstances, without any modification in the body, there is modification in the mental consciousness by wrong-doing. Consequently, why should our reason be 'inadmissible'? But on the basis of occasional stray instances of modification (of the mental consciousness due to modification in the body), it cannot be right to regard the one as the material cause of the other. As, in this way, the *object* also might become the material cause (of cognition). For instance, when one sees such alarming things as the blood of a tiger, etc., there appears a modification in the mind of a cowardly person in the shape of swooning and so forth; yet this does not make the said mental consciousness a material effect of that blood. Again, when the mind is beset with vacillations due to love or grief and such causes, there come about certain modifications in the body; and on the basis of this, the body might come to be regarded as having the mind for its material cause. The fact is that when the modification of one thing always follows the modification of another, then alone can the one be rightly regarded as the material cause of the other. Modifications of the mind such as love, hate, etc., do not *always* follow from the strength and vigour of the body, as it is not found to follow in the case of the vigorous man who has attained wisdom. Conversely, even a man or an animal with a weak body and poor development, who happens to have no opportunities for sexual and other indulgences, has his mind beset with much love and hate, etc. And when one thing comes about in the absence of another thing, one cannot be rightly regarded as the cause of the other. If it were so regarded, there would be incongruities. Love and hate, etc., do not proceed directly from the body; the absence of opportunities for sexual and other indulgences being the necessary intervening conditions. For instance, when the body is quite vigorous, there is a pleasure felt in the contemplation of pleasurable sensations; in such cases, the man who has a body and a soul and has his mind

beset with the notion of impermanence attaching to pleasures and their means—sometimes feels that what obstructs his pleasure does him good as well as harm; and thence follows the idea of the two alternatives of loving (the benefactor) and hating (the obstructor); thence follow (respectively) good-will and ill-will; from all this proceed the notions of pleasure and other things. All this is well-known through positive and negative concomitances. In fact, it is only when the mind is happy and at peace that love is found to appear; and it is often found not to appear when the body is over-fed. From all this it follows that over-feeding, etc., of the body cannot be the cause of mental consciousness.

From all this it also follows that, on account of its affording no direct help, the body cannot be the contributory cause of mental consciousness; because in the case of the sprout, it has been found that the contributory causes are only those that have a direct bearing upon it—e.g. the soil, moisture, etc. If it were not so, there would be incongruities. Love and other feelings, therefore, must be regarded as proceeding from the awakening of an antecedent homogeneous root-cause. As for over-feeding of the body, youth and so forth, these are found to give rise to love, etc., by enlivening the impressions of the past, in men who have had no practice of meditation and are hence without the requisite wisdom.

Even granting that sometimes the body has a direct bearing upon mental consciousness, when this latter proceeds from its own material cause—even so, it does not follow that it ceases upon the cessation of the body. For instance, even on the cessation of fire, the jar does not cease to exist, because it has proceeded from its own material causes; so this does not affect our view adversely. Nor is the reason 'inconclusive'; for if it were, then there would be incongruities. Nor, again, is the reason 'contradictory', as it is present in all cases where the probandum is known to be present.

Thus it is proved that the body cannot be the material cause of mental consciousness; nor can it be the contributory cause;

from all of which it follows that mental consciousness proceeds from preceding cognitions, occurring one after the other in the same 'chain'

The following argument might be urged: 'When any two things are found to be invariably concomitant with one another, they must be regarded as material cause and effect, as in the case of the lamp and the light. There *is* such invariable concomitance between the body and the mental consciousness; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.'

The reason adduced here is 'inadmissible' for one or the other party. Because in certain cases, where the mind-essence is devoid of material form, mental consciousness is present even though there is no body. Nor does the argument put forward actually prove what is intended to be proved, as on the same grounds, mental consciousness might be regarded as the material cause of the body.

The reason adduced is also 'inconclusive' as the said concomitance is possible even when the cause is different—as between fire and fluidity of (melted) copper. For instance, it is only with fire as the contributory cause, that copper produces fluidity, not otherwise. Similarly, in the case in question, the foetus, which is the material cause of the body, produces the next body, which is the contributory cause of mental consciousness; so that the concomitance between the body and the mental consciousness is not due to the one being the material cause of the other. To this extent, the reason adduced is 'inconclusive', 'doubtful'.

The following might be urged: 'Even though the mental consciousness appearing subsequently proceeds from each preceding consciousness (cognition), yet that which appears for the *first* time must have proceeded from the body; hence it cannot be regarded as *beginningless*.'

This is not correct. There is no proof in support of such an assumption, as has been explained already. It cannot be said that 'there is no proof to the contrary either', because there certainly is proof to the contrary. For instance, if the mental

cognition (mental consciousness) were produced at the outset out of the body and then, subsequently, came to be produced out of each preceding homogeneous cognition, then forever afterwards, it would be produced out of preceding homogeneous cognitions, and never out of heterogeneous cognitions produced through the eye and other organs. Once the smoke has been produced by fire, it is never, later on, produced from anything not homogeneous to itself. As a matter of fact, mental cognition is not always found to be produced by mental cognitions only; it is found to be produced by any cognition that happens to go immediately before it. When one thing has been found to appear immediately after another thing, the former cannot be held to proceed from anything other than the latter; as in that case, it would have to be regarded as being without cause. As regards mental cognition, it is found to appear immediately after the visual and other cognitions. Hence it becomes established that it can follow from any cognition without restriction.

Further, if it is only at the earlier stage that the body is the material cause of the mental cognition—and not at the later stages—then why should it not proceed entirely independently of the body? It is not right that it should depend upon the body, which does not help it in any way. It might be urged, 'In your case also, where one cognition is preceded and brought about by another cognition, why should not the cognition be brought about by itself alone?'—There can be no force in this, as it does so proceed, as in the case where the mind-element is without material embodiment. When a cognition wants another cognition, it is dependent upon that; this is only natural, and should not be objected to. If it is held that 'at the later stages also, the body does help the mental cognition'—then there would be the incongruity of several chains of cognition proceeding at once, as the body, which is the material cause of the other cognition, would be present there in its efficient form and would be productive of the same. Because, whichever cognition is produced from the body sets going its own 'chain

of cognitions', different from the other chains. In this way, therefore, for a single person there would be issuing forth, at every moment, innumerable 'chains of cognition'. But such is never found to be the case.

It might be argued: "when the body helps cognition at the *later* stages, it does not help as its material cause; it is only as a contributory cause that it helps the mental cognition that has been produced out of itself as the material cause, in bringing about each of its succeeding effects; so that the body helps as a contributory cause, and the cognition does not function entirely independently of the body at any state."

This, also, cannot be true. When one thing is known to be productive of another thing in a certain way, it cannot produce it in any other way; as there is no difference in the conditions. For instance, light, having served as productive of visual cognition as its basis, does not produce it in another way. As has been thus declared—'Apart from *apprehensibility*, there is no other characteristic of the apprehensible thing; colour, and other things, cannot otherwise be helpful to cognition'. If this were not so, there could be no certainty regarding the difference and non-difference of the *effect* from the character brought about by its cause, as it would not be following in the wake of the help rendered by it; this would mean that the effect is without a cause.

Then again, at the first stage—apart from the body being directly productive of the cognition—you have not noticed in it any other character of the material cause. What you have apprehended is merely the fact of its being a directly contributory cause. And as this is present at the later stages as well, why should it not be the material cause at those stages too? Otherwise, as at the later stages, so at the first stage, too, it may not be the material cause at all, as the conditions are the same.

It will not be right to argue: 'At the later stages as well, it is the body itself, which, along with the preceding cognition, would be the material cause of each succeeding cognition'. Because the possibility of its being such a material cause has

already been rejected in detail; and also because in that case, the first initial cognition too would have to be regarded as preceded and produced by another cognition.

It is for these reasons that, even under the view that material substances are impermanent, the following objection urged by the teacher remains applicable: 'If cognition, once produced from the body, becomes restricted to its own kind, through something else, then why should there be cessation of the efficient body?'

From all this it follows that mental cognition (mental consciousness) is *without beginning*. Or it may be understood that all cognition, without exception, is without beginning

Because if the cognition had a beginning—then, when the cognition would appear first of all, would it be *sensuous* cognition or *mental* cognition? It could not be sensuous cognition; because, in the case of men asleep or in a swoon or with mind elsewhere, even though the sense-organs are there, the sensuous cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the mental functions Hence it is understood that the sense-organs alone cannot be the cause of sensuous cognition. They can be so only through the help of a particular functioning of the mind; and it should be so understood because the causal relation between things is always determined by positive and negative concomitance.—Similarly, when one thing has been ascertained to be produced, at first, from a certain other thing, as such appearance would be without a cause, as for example, if smoke were held to proceed from non-fire. When the sensuous cognition has come about first of all, it does so only through a favourable mental operation. Hence it becomes established that the sense-organ alone can never be its cause; otherwise it would be without a cause. This is an argument that annuls the said view.

Nor can the first cognition be a mental cognition. As a matter of fact, it never appears independently by itself in reference to anything not apprehended by the senses; if it did, there would be no deaf or blind persons. Even if it did appear so, it should

be explained if it were conceptual 'determinate', or non-conceptual 'indeterminate'. It could not be conceptual. Whenever conceptual thought operates, it operates as associated with verbal expression, expressive of the concept; because it is always found to appear in the form of an internal (unexpressed) verbal presentation. This expressive verbal form of conceptual thought could proceed either (a) from the comprehension of convention, (b) from the fact of word in the expressive form being a property of cognition itself, like the form of consciousness, or (c) from the comprehension of the meaning of the word. These are the only alternatives possible.

(a) It cannot be true that it proceeds from the comprehension of convention; because the convention has not yet been comprehended.

(b) Nor can the second alternative be accepted; because the essence—form—of the word is twofold: 'specific individuality' and 'universal'. Of these, the 'specific individuality' of the word is always apprehended in an inexpressive form; hence, on that basis, the cognition could (not) be conceptual (determinate). Nor is it a property of the cognition itself, as it always appears as something external, like the colour blue and other objects. If, then, it were the property of cognition itself, then the colour blue and other things might also be the property of cognition itself; as there would be nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In that case the entire universe would be mere cognition, and not a modification of material substances.

Objection: "According to the view that cognition has forms, the colour blue and other things are of the very essence of the cognition, and it is these that appear as external; what, then, is meant by the assertion that 'because they appear in the external form, they cannot be properties of cognition'?"

Answer: True; but the very fact of cognition appearing in a form tainted by the external object leads us to conclude that it forms the essence—not of the cognition, but of the external object; as therein lies its own essence. In the cognition, it appears only on account of certain circumstances and is purely adventitious.

From all this it follows that the word in the form of 'specific individuality' cannot be expressive; nor can it be the property of the cognition itself.

As regards the word in the form of the 'universal'—though that is expressive, yet it cannot be a property of the cognition itself; because it is tacked on, not to the cognition itself, but to that which is comprehended on the hearing of the specific individuality of the word appertaining to the external thing. The 'universal' of one thing cannot be tacked on to another thing; if it were, then there would be incongruities in the cognition, as in that case, the universal 'cow' could be tacked on to the 'horse'. And until the thing, in the shape of the specific individuality, has been apprehended, it is not possible to tack on to it that property which is expressive; for the simple reason that properties are always dependent upon the objects to which they belong, and as such, cannot be apprehended by themselves. And the thing in the form of 'specific individuality' cannot be apprehended by conceptual thought; as this latter always envisages the 'universal'. Hence it becomes established that all conceptual thoughts have their source in the awakening of the tendencies created by the beginningless apprehension of 'specific individualities'.

(c) Nor, lastly, could the fact of the conceptual thought having the form of the expressive word be due to the comprehension of what is expressed by the word. Because words do not subsist in the object; nor are they of the nature of objects; for if they were so, they could be understood by the unlearned, too; and it would, in that case, be impossible to apply words to things according to one's own choice.

Further, though all objects are similar insofar as they are impermanent, yet conceptual thought cannot envisage them all at one and the same time, as each conceptual thought appears only in respect of certain well-defined objects with special forms, as differentiated from other forms. Hence, the cause that is pointed out should be through a conceptual thought that appertains to a single form. Such a cause cannot be indicated to be any other except repeated practice; as is found in the case

of the conceptual thoughts appertaining to dead bodies (?). Thus then, as the conceptual thought proceeds through previous repeated practice, it becomes proved that conceptual cognition is without beginning.

Nor can it be correct to accept the alternative that 'the first mental cognition (or mental consciousness) is non-conceptual'. Because under that view, there would never be any conceptual cognition at all. It might be argued: 'In the manner explained before, it could appear later on the basis of conception'. But that cannot be; so long as man rests upon non-conceptual cognition, he cannot set up any convention. Because no convention can be set up until the universal word or the universal thing figures in the cognition. What does figure in the cognition, however, is the specific individuality, and no convention can be made either in relation to it or upon its basis; because it is meant for the purposes of usage; while the specific individuality that is seen at the time of the convention can never be present at the time of usage. Consequently, it has to be admitted that there is conceptual thought before the convention is made relating to the specific individuality. And this is not possible without repeated experience; so that there also, it becomes established that the cognition in question is without beginning.

Then again, if it is not admitted that 'the first cognition at birth is due to the continuity of the impressions left by the repeated experiences of previous lives'—then how would you account for the idea in the new-born babe—even among animals—of a certain thing being a source of pleasure, and another a source of pain? It is by virtue of such ideas that it seeks the mother's breasts which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find them, or having found them, suddenly stops crying and proceeds to feed itself. Certainly during its present life, the baby has never experienced the fact of the breasts being the means of allaying its pangs of hunger. Nor has it had any experience of the fact that falling from a precipice is a source of hurt and pain; and yet even the

new-born young of the monkey feels instinctively afraid of death and suffering caused by falling from a height and, on account of that fear, clings more strongly to its mother's arms and also avoids the place where there is a precipice. Until people have had some *actual experience* of things bringing pleasure or pain, they never invariably seek to obtain one and avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity. The example of iron being drawn to the magnet cannot be properly cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without cause; if it were without cause, then it would always be there. If, then, it has a cause, it is the magnet that is pointed out to be the cause, on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of the child in securing and avoiding certain things. No such cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experience. Hence it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to obtain and avoid certain things is due to repeated past experience; and that on this account, the cognition must be without beginning.

It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicate other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the Materialists) under texts 1930 and 1940 below. Hence we desist from further details.

Further, if the Cārvākas admit the momentary character of things, then their own doctrine—that material substances are everlasting—becomes invalid.

Texts (1887–88)

(The Materialist might say): 'Let the doctrine be upset; we accept the view that all things are decidedly momentary, because it is a reasonable view supported by all kinds of reason.'—If your love for reason is so great that you have no regard for your own doctrine, then you should accept, also, the more reasonable view that 'primary elemental substances do not exist at all.

Commentary

If you accept the momentary character of things because it is in accordance with reason, then you should also accept the doctrine that 'ideas alone exist', which is still more reasonable, because reasonableness, which is your criterion for acceptance, is present in this case as well.

Question: 'How so?'

Answer:

Text (1889)

The primary elemental substances cannot exist in the form of *composite wholes*, nor in the form of *atoms*; because there can be no conjunction of atoms, as is going to be explained.

Commentary

Teṣām—of the primary elemental substances.

To be explained in the next chapter, on the examination of the 'external world'.

Question: 'If the said elements do not exist, then how is it that they figure in cognitions?'

Answer:

Text (1890)

Not having any real external form, they figure in cognitions only through the fruition of dispositions; just as during dreams; they do not appear anywhere else.

Commentary

'Anywhere else'—i.e. apart from cognition.

Question: 'How, then, is it that people and the scriptures speak of the earth and other elemental substances?'

Answer:

Text (1891)

All these four primary elemental substances are assumed on

the basis of what appears in cognition, just like dreams and illusions. And they have no real existence.

Commentary

Question: 'If the elemental substances do not exist, then what is the basis of the cognition (of these)?'

Answer:

Text (1892)

It is not possible that something different from the cognition should figure in it; it is only a previous cognition envisaging the substances that could produce another such cognition.

Commentary

Tadanyasya—something different from the cognition, in the shape of the four elemental substances.

It has thus been proved that the first cognition after birth cannot proceed from any material substance. The author now proceeds to demolish the view that it is produced only by another cognition (occurring in a different chain; the fifth alternative put forward under *text* 1880).

Texts (1893–6)

If the cognition in some other 'chain' is held to be the cause (of the first cognition)—then (the question is): is that the 'material cause' of it, or the 'contributory cause'? If it is meant to be the material cause, then the learning and culture of the parents should continue in the child's 'chain of cognitions.' That such is the nature of the material cause and its effect has been ascertained, through positive and negative concomitance, in connection with one's own 'chain'. If, on the other hand, the cognition of the other 'chain' is assumed to be the 'contributory cause' of the first cognition on the basis of its own material cause—then there would be nothing wrong in it.

Commentary

Would this 'cognition' occurring in 'another chain'—i.e. the 'chain of cognitions' of the parents—be the material cause or the contributory cause (of the first cognition under consideration)? It cannot be the material cause; as, in that case, it would be possible for the peculiar learning and culture of the parents to continue in the son, just as the parents' cognition continues in their own subsequent cognitions. It has been found, in the case of all material causes and their products, that the embellishments of the preceding 'moment' continue in the succeeding 'moments'; this having been ascertained by positive and negative concomitance to be the case in one's own 'chain'.

The following opinion might be suggested: 'When one lamp is lighted from another lamp, the second lamp is not equipped with the size and other embellishments of the first one. It is produced merely as a lamp, without any embellishments. It acquires its own embellishments from other sources, in the shape of its own wick and oil, etc. The same may be the case with the cognition in question as well.'

That cannot be so; because the embellishment of the lamp sets up a 'chain' in its own substratum too, as it is itself evanescent. That is the reason why, on the exhaustion of the 'fuel' (in the shape of the oil and wick), the lamp ceases to exist. The embellishment of learning and culture, however, is not evanescent, as it continues for a long time. Hence it is not possible for mere cognition without embellishments to be produced, in the manner of the lamp.

Further, in the case of the lamp and other things, the presence or absence of peculiarities is determined on the basis of their being aggregates of larger and lesser numbers of atoms. Of the single thing, as a mere entity, there cannot be either presence or absence of peculiarities. In the case in question, however, the single entity—the cognition in the mother—would have the peculiarities of cultural and other embellishments, whereas while appearing in the son, would be without these peculiarities. Who can impart such a teaching?

Then again, the *reductio ad absurdum* that has been urged is in regard to the view that one cognition is the material cause of the other; but one lamp is not the material cause of the other lamp, because it belongs to an entirely different 'chain'. Hence what has been urged is nothing at all.

Further, in the case of beings who have no mother—e.g. sweat-born insects—how could the first cognition be due to a cognition in another series? We desist from further argumentation on this subject.

If, on the other hand, it is held that the cognition of the other chain is a contributory cause of the first cognition, then the argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and hence is superfluous.

The following text formulates the argument in support of the beginninglessness (of cognition):

Text (1897)

Thus then the first cognition must be regarded as arising out of its own material cause, because it is cognition and so forth, like the cognition of the present moment.

Commentary

The argument may be formulated as follows: that entity which partakes of the nature of the four constituents (*skandha*-s)—cognition, feeling, name-conception, and mental faculty—must be regarded as proceeding from its own material cause; because it is cognition, feeling, etc., just like the same four constituents during youth and old age, the first cognition is of the nature of cognition: hence this is a reason based upon the nature of the thing.

In the term 'first cognition', the mention of cognition is only by way of illustration; what is asserted should be understood to be true of feeling and the other constituents also.

The following text puts forward an argument against the contrary of the above conclusion:

Text (1898)

As other causes have been rejected, if the cognition were entirely without cause—then, it could not have any particular character at all.

Commentary

All other causes, in the form of eternal things—mind, time, space, God and so forth—have been rejected before; and the view that the cognition arises out of itself is not accepted. The only alternative left is that it should be without cause; but in that case, it could not have any such particular (distinguishing) character as being, cognition and the like. Because a character or property that is purely accidental cannot serve as a determinant, and hence there could be no determination on the basis of that.

Thus the causelessness of cognition would be open to rejection by the incongruity of there being no possibility of the appearance of such distinguishing characters as that of being, cognition and the like. There would be the further objection that if it were causeless, it would not be possible for the cognition to appear only occasionally.

Having thus established the fact of there being 'previous' birth, the author proceeds to establish 'future' birth as well:

Text (1899)

The cognition at the moment of death is capable of bringing about its product, because it is beset with affections, not having shaken off all attachment—like the previuos cognition.

Commentary

The cognition or consciousness that is beset with affections is capable of producing its effect in the shape of another cognition, because it is beset with affections, like the consciousness during the previous state; and the consciousness at the moment of death is beset with affections; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.

This reason cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'; because as a matter of fact, the consciousness that is dissociated from the idea of 'void', which is opposed to all experience, is always beset with affections; because it is dissociated from its opposite, just like the consciousness during intercourse.

Nor is the reason 'inconclusive' (doubtful), because the appearance of another cognition is always due to this much only. Hence, the reason against the contrary of the conclusion would consist in the impossibility of there being a fully efficient cause.

The same point is further elucidated:

Text (1900)

In the form in which the cognition produced a definite cognition in the past—why can it not, in the same unalloyed form, be productive of it in the future as well?

Commentary

'In the same form'—i.e. bearing the same form or character.

In the following text, the opponent urges the objection against both the above arguments, that 'the corroborative instances cited are devoid of the probandum':

Text (1901)

According to the other view, the idea is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself; how, then, can the two corroborative instances be admitted to be equipped with the probandum?

Commentary

The probandum that is desired to be proved, is that *the cognition proceeds from its own material cause and produces its own product*. According to the other party, however, cognition is always produced from the body itself; so that for him, there can be no instance which fulfils the conditions of the probandum. Why, then, has the Buddhist put forward the two instances of 'the present cognition' and 'the previous cognition'?

(The answer to this is as follows):

Texts (1902–5)

The view that the body is the cause (of cognition) has already been discarded on grounds of its involving the possibility of all cognitions appearing simultaneously, on account of there being no other (contributory) causes. As a matter of fact, it is found that cognition in the form of remembrance, affection and so forth (which are cognitions) actually proceeds from pleasurable experiences and pleasant reminiscences of the same (which are also cognitions); and this cannot be denied. Then again, it is also seen that deterioration and improvement in one's later cognitions are brought about by deterioration and improvement in the practice of the learning and arts. It is also seen that when the functioning of the mind is defective, there is no apprehension of other things. On account of all these facts, the idea of cognition proceeding from cognition cannot be objected to.

Commentary

There is no force in the above objection. It has already been shown that the body cannot be the cause of cognition, on the ground that that would involve the simultaneity of cognitions; because there is no other contributory cause which would be needed; and if the body is eternal, it cannot require anything else. If, on the other hand, it is not eternal, then the previous and the present, both objections, would be applicable. As a matter of fact, what is proved by proper means of cognition cannot be set aside by mere assertion, as otherwise there would be incongruities, so that nothing could be the cause of anything at all. This is what has been described in the words 'mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable'.

Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, from this pleasurable cognition, a feeling of love and attachment: 'How beautiful she is! So youthful and slim-waisted, with a lovely face!' and so forth. When one goes on contemplating it there appears, in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate,

the passion of love. Similarly when someone causes one an injury, one goes on thinking of it: 'He has caused me this injury—he has done it in the past—he is going to do it again,' and so forth. Thereupon, there appears hatred. How can all this be denied, especially by one who takes his stand upon sense-perception (as the only right means of cognition)?

Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in the previous practice of learning and arts, it is found that there is corresponding deterioration and improvement in the subsequent cognitions. And it is found that, when the mind is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the mind is defective, there is no perception of other things.

From all this it is clear that the idea that cognition is the cause of cognition is in accordance with reason, and should not be objected to; also because it has actually been proved that cognition is the cause of cognitions.

Text (1906)

The reason—'because they subsist in different bodies'—cannot be admissible. Because how can there be any subsistence of the cognition, which is incorporeal and hence not liable to fall down, in the bodies?

Commentary

Under text 1861, it has been argued (by the Materialist) that—'there cannot be any relation of cause and effect between the two cognitions under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies.' This reason put forward is not admissible. If the 'subsistence' meant is that of the nature of 'container and contained', then such subsistence in the bodies is entirely impossible for cognition, which is not liable to fall, because even though the causal relation may be there, the cognition, which is incorporeal, could never be liable to fall; and for what is not liable to fall, no container is needed, as it could serve no useful purpose.

Question: 'What, then, would the container (or receptacle)

do in the case of water and such things?'

Answer:

Text (1907)

In the case of water and other things, the receptacle (container) would be there to prevent their falling down. In the case of cognitions, however, which are devoid of movement (and hence of falling), what would be the use of receptacles (or containers)?

Commentary

In the case of earth, etc., which is corporeal, things are produced on the spot where the material cause exists, and never in a place where that cause does not exist. Hence, that which serves as a preventive of its moving away from that place is regarded as the receptacle (substratum, container). No such thing is possible in the case of what is incorporeal.

Text (1908)

If then, the 'subsistence' (of the cognitions in the bodies) is assumed to be of the nature of 'identification' (sameness)—that, too, cannot be right. Because for you, cognition cannot be of the nature of the body.

Commentary

If what is meant by 'subsistence' is, 'being of the same nature'—that cannot be admitted either. For you, who insist upon external things only, it cannot be correct to assert that 'cognition is of the nature of the body'; though it is all right for me, who posits the cognition only and for whom the body also is of the nature of the *ālayavijñāna* (a series or chain of cognitions).

Question: "Why can it not be right (to assert that cognition is of the nature of the body)?

Answer:

Texts (1909–10)

If the cognition is of the same nature as the body—then why is the consciousness (cognition) of love, hatred, etc., not perceived by others as clearly as the body is? In fact, cognition is cognised by the cogniser himself alone; while the body is cognised by himself as well as others. Things that are so cognised are always distinct, e.g. colic pain and the dramatic actor.

Commentary

When the body of a man is perceived by another man, it should be possible for the latter to perceive the emotions of love, hatred, etc., as well of the former; as the two are not different. Nor can the premise be falsified on the basis of occult powers (whereby the feelings of others are perceived), because at the time concerned, no such powers are noticeable. Nor can consciousness be regarded as incognisable; as in that case, it could not be cognised by the cogniser himself.

Further, whenever between two things, one is cognised by one while the other is cognised by both—they are different from one another; for instance, colic pain and the dramatic actor. Of the two cognitions in the two bodies in question, while one is cognised by one, the other is cognised by both; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.

Svenaiva—by the cogniser himself.

Says the opponent: 'If this is so, then nothing can prevent the doctrine of pure idealism (that there is cognition or consciousness alone) also being rejected on these same grounds'.

The answer to that is as follows:

Texts (1911–12)

This reason is not admissible against the doctrine that 'cognition (consciousness) alone exists', as (under that view) what is cognised (by the cognition) is the appearance of itself—as in the case of the man with defective vision. Further, cognition is always found to be destroyed immediately after appearance.

If, then, the body with the cognition is of the same nature as the cognition—why is it not regarded as momentary?

Commentary

'This reason is not admissible'—i.e. the reason, if so applied, becomes subject to the objection of being 'inadmissible'. For instance, the fact of 'being cognised by both' cannot be admitted by the Idealist. For him, what is cognised by the cognition is always its own appearance, as in the case of the man with defective vision seeing two moons.

Then again, when a particular object is cognised, the cognition is clearly found to disappear immediately after its appearance. Hence, if the body were held to be of the same nature as the cognition, it should have to be regarded as momentary (like the cognition).

Thus, then, it has been proved that the 'subsistence' of cognitions in the body cannot be admitted to be of the nature of 'identity' (or 'sameness'). If the 'subsistence' of the cognition in the body be held to consist in its being produced from it, then the question is: Is it 'produced from it' in the sense that the mental cognition has the body for its receptacle (or substratum) in the way that visual perception is produced by the eye, which serves as its receptacle? Or, is it 'produced from it' in the sense that it is inseparable from it' as smoke is inseparable from fire?

Both these forms of 'subsistence' are inadmissible. Because mental cognition does not rest in the body, like sense-cognition, as it does not always follow the changes in the body. Nor is it invariably concomitant with—inseparable from—it; because, in the case of 'formless negations', it is held that there are cognitions without the body.

Yet, even admitting the above, for the sake of argument, the author proceeds to show that it is 'inconclusive' (doubtful).

Texts (1913–15)

If the said 'subsistence' is held to be due either to the cognition being produced in the body as its substratum, or to its

inseparability from the body—the reason put forward is wrong (inconclusive, doubtful). The body undergoing destruction every moment, the previous consciousness brings about an unbroken continuity of consciousness in such succeeding bodies. If, by reason of their occurring in the same chain, the two bodies are held to be not different from one another, then in the other case also there could be no difference, on the same ground of occurrence in the same chain.

Commentary

As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the contiguity of other consciousnesses and the presence of the consciousness in the body. For instance, the consciousness at the moment preceding death brings about contiguity with the consciousness in the living body coming into existence at the next moment, even though this latter consciousness appears in a body other than that of the former; because the body has only a momentary existence. Hence, the reason put forward by the other party is 'inconclusive'.

If, on grounds of their occurring in the same chain, the two bodies are regarded as one and the same, and on that ground, the fact of the consciousness appearing in the 'same' body is assumed—then the same might be said in the other case as well—of the bodies appearing during the stage intervening between the two physical bodies. Because the body appearing in the other regions (at which the intervening bodies appear) is only one other state of the chain of the same body consisting of the five 'receptacles' (*āyatana*-s)—just like the states of childhood and old age.

In the second argument (of the opponent) as well, the probans or reason adduced is, 'because it is cognition (or consciousness)'; and no evidence has been adduced to prove that the said reason is not present where the contrary of the probandum is known to be present; so that the reason is clearly 'inconclusive', doubtful. This fact was quite clear; hence the author did not mention it.

The third argument adduced by the other party is that—"the dying consciousness of the man beset with affections can bring about another consciousness, because it is dying consciousness; like the consciousness of the man free from affections". This is now taken up:

Text (1916)

Why has it been held that the consciousness of the person free from the impurities of the affections is non-contiguous? If this view is held in accordance with the doctrine of others—that cannot be right; because the authority (and validity) of these doctrines is not accepted (by the Materialist).

Commentary

'Non-contiguous': i.e. that which has no contiguity with another consciousness.

What is meant to be shown by this is that the corroborative instance cited is 'not admitted' by either one or the other of the two parties concerned. For instance, how does the Materialist know that in the case of the Arhats, the dying consciousness does not bring about the contiguity of another consciousness?

It may be that in the Buddhist's philosophy, the following assertion is found: 'My life is at an end; I have led the life of the student; I have done my duty; I know of no more birth.' It is in accordance with this faith of the Buddhist that the Materialist has based his assertion that 'there is no contiguity of the dying consciousness'.

This, however, cannot be correct. As a matter of fact, the Materialist does not admit the authority or validity of the doctrines of other people. How, then, could he come to have a conviction on the basis of what he does not accept as valid? Specially, in this same way, he may come to the decision that the 'other world' exists.

If it is from any other valid source of knowledge that the Materialist derives the said conviction—then why has that same source not been cited as proof? What is the use of putting

up a reason which does not lead to the desired conclusion, and which only indicates sheer stupidity? Certainly, that other proof cannot be unfit for proving the other conclusion (of the Materialist), for which reason it has not been adduced.

Even though the statement may be made on the basis of the Buddhist doctrine, there are some Buddhists who cannot admit the corroborative instance (of the Arhats) to be endowed with the probandum (not bringing about further consciousness). This is what is shown in the following.

Texts (1917–18)

As regards this matter, there are some wise persons who describe the Jinas (Buddhas) as 'beings' whose Nirvāṇa is not 'absolute and final', and the two paths as aiming at that same Path. For these people, the instance cited cannot be admitted to be endowed with the probandum; even though it has been cited (by the Materialist) on the basis of the doctrine of the other disputant.

Commentary

'This matter': the doctrine of the Buddhists.

'Some wise persons': the Mahāyanist-Mādhyamikas.

These people have declared that the Nirvāṇa of the Buddhas consists of the absence of absolute finality, on the ground that both 'birth-cycle' and 'cessation of conscious existence' are neither final nor absolute for them, as is clear from such statements as—'There is only one Path, that of the Mahāyāna'.

Having pointed out the defect in the corroborative instance, the author proceeds to show that the probans is also open to the charge of being 'inconclusive'.

Text (1919)

Inasmuch as no argument has been adduced as negativing the contrary, there is an uncertainty regarding the negative concomitance (of the probans with the probandum); so that, there being a suspicion regarding the presence (of the probans)

in the contrary of the probandum, the probans remains 'inconclusive'.

Commentary

'Inasmuch as, etc.': this is the reason for the uncertainty regarding the negative concomitance (i e. there is no certainty as to the probans being absent whenever the probandum is absent).

'There being a suspicion, etc.': This is the reason for 'inconclusiveness'.

Vijātīyasadbhāva is presence in the contrary. "Whose presence?"—of the probans.

The compound *Śaṅkyamāna*, etc.': is to be expounded as 'whose presence in the contrary is suspected'.

Nor could the contingency of the idea (of death-cognition producing another cognition) being taken to imply the absence of death, be taken as serving the purpose of the argument negativing the contrary. Because in reality, there is no 'death' of anything in the shape of the 'soul' and other things; what really happens is that a dissimilar chain is set up, which brings about the cessation of the condition which gave the name to the particular body; and it is this that is spoken of as 'death' in common parlance and also in scientific treatises.

It has been argued above (under text 1865) that—'it is sheer audacity to assert that there is consciousness in the foetus, etc.' The answer to this is as follows:

Texts (1920–22)

There is no audacity in asserting that 'there is consciousness in the foetus': even though the sense-organs have not appeared in it, why can cognition not be there? In fact, the assertion that does involve audacity is that 'all cognition proceeds from sense-organs and objects'; because the contrary is found to be the case during dreams. In reality, cognition is also apprehended in a form which is distinct from that of the object, as is found in

the case of a swoon. From this, it is clear that consciousness can exist in the foetus.

Commentary

If all cognition were apprehended only through the sense-organs and objects—then our assertion would have been an audacious one. As a matter of fact, however, in dreams and other states, there appears mental consciousness envisaging the colour blue and objects, which is apprehended even when there is no sense-organ nor any object that has colour, etc. Nor can it be said that at that time, the substratum of the consciousness consists of the sense-organ in the body, because what figures in the consciousness is the colour *blue* (which is not present in the body); and *every bodily cognition apprehends only tangible objects*. Hence, it is not correct to say that 'all cognition is in the form of the apprehension of things'. There is, therefore, nothing incongruous in asserting the presence of cognition in the state of swoon and similar conditions.

The following might be urged: 'There is nothing incongruous in the idea of consciousness existing there in the form of a latent potency; but the idea that it is actually there in its potent form is certainly incongruous.'

The answer to this is as follows:

Texts (1923–27)

Consciousness is not present in the foetus merely in the form of a potency; the view held is that consciousnesses are present there in their actual form. From where do you derive the idea that there is no consciousness during sleep, swoon and other such conditions? If it is argued that "the idea is obtained from the absence of consciousness", then the question is: now has this absence been cognised? In case your idea proceeds thus—"we do not cognise any consciousness at the time"—then that itself proves the presence of consciousness at the time. It might be argued that: 'If consciousness is present during

the said states, then why is there no remembrance of it on awakening, etc.? This fact (of non-remembrance) is not effective (in refuting our view); the absence of remembrance is due to the absence of vividness and other conditions (in the consciousness)—as in the case of the consciousness of the newborn infant.

Commentary

There would certainly be an incongruity if there were some means of knowing with certainty that there is no consciousness at all during the states of sleep, swoon and the like.

'There is this means of knowledge available in the fact that there is no consciousness or cognition of the consciousness itself.'

That cannot be right; how has this absence of the consciousness itself been cognised? As *ex hypothesi*, there can be *no definite cognition of the absence of cognition*.

If also your definite cognition proceeds in the form that 'in sleep, swoon and other states, I am not cognisant of any consciousness'—then this definite cognition itself proves the existence of cognition (or consciousness).

It might be argued that: 'if there were consciousness during sleep and other conditions, then why should there not be remembrance of it on awakening, etc.? The 'etcetera' is meant to include the state when the swoon and the intoxication have passed off.'

But this non-remembrance is not effective in proving that what has been cognised did not exist there. It would be so, if the mere cognition of a thing meant that there must be remembrance of it. As a matter of fact, however, in many cases, even when there is cognition, there is no remembrance, on account of the absence of vividness, repetition and interest in the cognition; just as is found in the case of the new-born infant, where even though there is cognition, there is no remembrance of such.

Question: 'What proof or authority have you to assert that consciousness is present, where there is doubt regarding the appearance of remembrance?'

This is the objection urged by the opponent in the following:

Text (1928)

'If it is so, then how do you postulate the presence of this (consciousness) in these (states)?'

Commentary

'*Of this*': of the consciousness.
'*In these*': in the states of sleep, etc.
Our reason is as follows, as has already been explained.

Texts (1928–30)

We conclude the following from reasons already explained before. If the presence of consciousness is not admitted during the states of sleep, swoon and the like, then there should be death. While, if another consciousness is produced, then there would be no death at all. Thus, mental (subjective) consciousness must be regarded as independent, as it is not dependent upon the eye, etc., and is present on the strength of its own cause, just as during dreams, etc.

Commentary

The reason, as already explained before, is as follows: On awakening, the first consciousness that the man has must be regarded as arising from its own cause, because it is consciousness—like the reminiscent cognition following after experience. The probans adduced here is not 'inconclusive', because on the previous occasion it has been shown, by the rejection of the possibility of other causes, that the necessary invariable concomitance is there.

Then again, if there were no consciousness during sleep, etc., then there would be death.

If on the other hand, it is held that 'after the body has become entirely deprived of all consciousness, another consciousness is produced (on awakening)'—then, such an appearance of consciousness would mean that there can be no death at all;

because, as in the case of the man awakening from sleep, so in the case of the dead man also, there would be a reappearance of consciousness. Specially as it is only mental (subjective) consciousness that has the capacity to link up with the next birth, as has been thus declared—'linking up, dispassion and the rest are admissible only when the subjective consciousness is there.'

From all this it follows that mental consciousness rests entirely on the previous consciousness; this is the idea expressed in the words: 'mental consciousness must be regarded as independent.' The reason for this 'independence' consists in the fact of its not requiring anything else. In all cases, this mental consciousness proceeds entirely from its own cause, because it does not stand in need of any causes other than its own, in the shape of the eye, ear, etc.' as is found to be the case during sleep.

The following text disposes of the charge of 'inadmissibility' against the reason just stated.

Text (1931)

For instance, conceptual cognitions are not dependent upon sense-organs and objects, because they come about even in the absence of the functioning of the latter, as in the case of the 'sky-lotus' and such things.

Commentary

Tadavyāpāra, etc.—Even when there is no functioning of the sense-organ and the object. When one thing comes about without the functioning of the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. If it were, it would lead to absurdity.

The following might be urged: 'The conceptual cognition of the sky-lotus and such things may be independent of the sense-organ and the object, because it comes about even in the absence of these latter. How could the conceptual cognition, however, which appears when the eye is fixed upon the blue colour before one, be independent of the sense-organ and object, which could save the probans from being 'inadmissible'

in regard to a part of the 'subject'?'

The answer to this is as follows:

Texts (1932–33)

Even in the presence of the sense-organ and the object, the conceptual cognition that appears in relation to the past, etc., should be regarded as on the same footing as the conception that envisages a non-entity. It has already been explained in detail that the form of an entity cannot figure in conceptual cognitions, because they involve verbal expressions.

Commentary

tayoḥ—of the sense-organ and the object.

asadarthoparāgeṇa—is 'that which envisages what does not exist'—i.e. the conception of things like the sky-lotus. On the same footing as this would be conception relating to the past (if cognitions were dependent upon the actual presence of the object cognised).

'How so?'

All conceptual cognitions appear as associated with verbal expressions, and hence they envisage verbal expressions as well; and that which envisages the verbal expression cannot envisage an entity, because verbal expressions do not bear upon the form of things, as words are not fixed by convention in relation to the actual form of things. All this has been explained in detail under the chapter on 'Word and its Denotation' (Chapter XVI).

The reason is present in everything where the probandum is known to be present; hence it cannot be regarded as 'contradictory'. Nor is it 'inconclusive', because if the cognition were not produced from its own cause, it would have to be regarded as without cause.

It might be argued that—'as the cognition would subsist in the body, it could not be regarded as without cause.'

The answer to that is as follows:

Text (1934)

In the states of paralysis, etc., even though there is change in the body, there is no change in the mental consciousness. Hence this latter cannot be regarded as subsisting in the body.

Commentary

When the body is struck with diseases like paralysis, there is modification in it; but that does not create any change in the mental consciousness. Hence, this subjective consciousness cannot be regarded as subsisting in the body. When one thing does not become directly modified upon the modification of another thing, it cannot be regarded as subsisting in the latter: e.g., the horse, which is not modified by the modification of the cow (does not subsist in the cow). On the modification of the body, mental consciousness does not always and directly become modified, as in the state of paralysis, etc.; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide).

The following text proceeds to show that the character of subsisting in something is invariably concomitant with the character of becoming directly modified on the modification of the latter thing:

Texts (1935–6)

In cases of affections of the eye, whenever there is the slightest defect in the eye, the cognition based upon the eye appears in a defective form. Thus even when the body has perished, the mental consciousness, which does not subsist in it, continues to exist through the force of its own cause. There can be no incongruity in this.

Commentary

As the wider character is absent, it is proved that the mental consciousness does not subsist in the body.

'*Thus*'—therefore—even on the cessation of the body, the

mental consciousness shall not cease. There is no incongruity in this. When one thing does not subsist in another, it does not necessarily cease upon the cessation of the latter: e.g., the cessation of the cow does not lead to the cessation of the Gavaya. The body is not the substratum of subjective consciousness; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.

It has been argued above (under text 1869) that—'when the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the body that is born subsequently?'

The answer to that is as follows:

Texts (1937–8)

When there is no incongruity in mental consciousness by itself, we are not eager to prove the existence of another body. But, even though unseen, such a body cannot be denied, because the non-perception may only be due to uncertainty in the man with defective eyesight—as in the case of scanty smoke that does not vividly enough indicate the presence of a fire.

Commentary

What is meant is as follows: what is intended to be proved is the existence of the 'other world'. And how can it be proved? It can be proved if it is shown that consciousness is without beginning and without end, as it is only an aspect of consciousness that figures in the idea of the 'other world'. This idea cannot subsist in the body, which is a material object with a shape; as the 'other world' is held to be there even when the body is not there. If the 'chain of cognitions' is proved to be without beginning and without end, then the existence of our 'other world' is also proved. Hence we do not put forth any effort towards establishing the existence of the other body, as this would be useless.

Simply because the other body is not seen, it cannot be denied; as this not-seeing may be due to the absence of necessary

attention, as happens in the case of the man with defective eyesight—even though the body may well be there; as it happens when there is a scanty line of smoke; so that mere non-perception does not prove non-existence. In fact, a subsequent body is described as actually perceived by persons of pure birth and super-normal vision.

For these same reasons, there can be no denial of the 'migratory body' (*liṅgaśarīra*) postulated by the Sāṅkhya.

In the case of the previously-born body too, it is possible that there may be non-perception due to the remoteness of place—due either to its being produced at a remote place, or to the difference in its character, as in the case of ghosts and goblins. Even when bodies are not remote, people with normal vision can never cognise with certainty that such and such a being has been born as a bird; just as there is no recognition in cases where the body is changed by means of the use of medicines with unthinkable potency.

Question: 'How is it, then, that cognitions appearing in different substrata are spoken of as belonging to the same chain?'

Answer:

Texts (1939–41)

Even though the two cognitions subsist in two different bodies, yet by reason of the later cognition appearing in the same particular character as the preceding one, the later cognition is connected with the same 'chain' with which the previous cognition was connected. Further, even in the case of new-born infants, there is activity towards sucking the breast, as also displeasure at being balked; all of which is inferred from such acts as crying, sucking the breast and so forth. All this is of the nature of conceptual cognition, and conceptual cognition is associated with names (verbal expression).

Commentary

By reason of the later cognition, etc.—That is, the cognitions

of the present life appear with the same peculiarities as the cognitions of the previous life. This has been thus declared: 'Through repeated practice, good and evil deeds appear in the nature of men; and the same appear in future lives, without any instruction—like a dream.'

The Materialist has argued as follows: 'The body in this world and the body in the 'other world' being entirely different, the chain of cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and the same, so that the first cognition that appears in the foetus cannot belong to the same chain as the cognition under dispute—because they belong to different bodies—like the cognitions of the buffalo, the boar and other animals.'

This is also refuted by what has been said above.

Then again, for the following reason as well, the existence of the 'other world' should be admitted: every conceptual cognition is preceded by the repeated cognition of words, because it is conceptual—like the conceptual thoughts occurring in youth and old age. The conceptual cognition involved in the desire for sucking the breast and so forth appearing in newborn infants is conceptual. Hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.

The reason cannot be said to be one which has an unadmitted substratum; because the existence of the probandum in the shape of the desire for sucking the breast, etc., is proved by such effects in new-born infants as crying and actual breast-sucking. Such crying and breast-sucking cannot be possible in one who has no conception of liking and disliking.

Nor is the reason 'inadmissible by itself'. This is shown by the words, '*all this is of the nature of conceptual, etc.*' '*All this*'—i.e. the desire for breast-sucking, etc.—is of the nature of conceptual thought, because it is apprehended as something sought-after.

That the reason is not 'inconclusive' is shown by the words: '*is associated with names*'. *Saḥ* stands for conceptual cognition. Inasmuch as conceptual cognition is associated with verbal expression, it is said to be 'associated with names'. This

'association with names' of the conceptual cognition is not possible without repeated convention; as has been explained by us already in detail.

The following might be urged: 'There may be association with names due to repeated practice; but that does not prove what is wanted; in fact, it only proves the contrary, i.e. the fact of being preceded (and produced) by repeated practice during the present life.'

The answer to this is as follows:

Text (1942)

In the case in question there can be no 'name-form' to which one has been habituated, during the present birth. As in the case of these persons, if there has been no previous birth, there should be an entire absence of the said desire, etc.

Commentary

What is meant is as follows: The practice, or habitual use during the present life in this world, is negatived by all evidence in the case of new-born infants. The reason adduced in support of a conclusion that is so annulled cannot be said to be 'contradictory', because the probans has been said to be 'contradictory' only when the probandum is one that is not already annulled.

Name-form, i.e. the form of the name, or its expressiveness; even though this really functions in the mind, it is imposed upon (attributed to) the verbal forms.

These persons—i.e. new-born infants.

Absence of, etc—i.e. absence of the said desire for breast-sucking and so forth.

The following text sums up the purport of the above arguments:

Text (1943)

For these reasons, the said desire, etc., must be regarded as proceeding from the impressions left by the habitual use of the name; and as these are of the nature of conceptual cognition, the said desire should also be admitted to be conceptual.

Commentary

tat—stands for *tasmāt*, 'for these reasons'

The following text describes the upshot of the above arguments:

Text (1944)

Because the conceptual cognition of the said persons is born of the fruition of the impressions left by the repeated cognition of the name during that same birth—therefore 'another birth' becomes established.

Commentary

Name—verbal expression. '*Cognition*'—apprehension, knowledge; *abhyāsa*, repeated appearance.

The compound *yannāma*, etc., is to be expounded as 'that birth during which there has been repeated cognition of the name', this compound being in accordance with a particular rule (of Pāṇini's)—*Saptamī etc.* The impressions are left by this repeated cognition—these impressions have this 'fruition', development, or attainment of their full character, by producing their effects; and it is from this 'fruition' that the said conceptual cognition is born. *Of the said persons*—i.e. of new-born infants.

The following text sets forth the opponent's *reductio ad absurdum* argument against the above view:

Text (1945)

'If the said conceptual cognition of new-born infants proceeds from the repeated cognition of names, how is it that they do not have the memory or the clear speech of eloquent speakers?'

Commentary

'If the conceptual cognition proceeds from the repeated cognition of the convention during previous lives, then the newborn child should have remembrance of the past convention, because the continuity of a habit could not be possible without remembrance. Also, the child should have clear speech like eloquent speakers, and in that case, there would be no

need for the setting up of any conventions during the present life. Yet, none of these things happen. Hence it follows that, as there is no remembrance and there is no clear speech, the idea that the conceptual cognition is preceded and produced by repeated cognition is incompatible with facts.'

By means of this *reductio ad absurdum* which rejects the very nature of the subject (*pakṣa*), the opponent shows that the final conclusion (of the Buddhist) is defective.

In the following text, the author points out that the reason put forward in this *reductio ad absurdum* is 'inconclusive' (doubtful).

Text (1946)

That speech does not exist is due to the fact that the development (of the impressions) becomes hampered by powerful impediments, just as in the state of a highly-complicated fever.

Commentary

As a matter of fact, repeated cognition is not invariably concomitant with remembrance, etc., by virtue of which concomitance it should always produce the said remembrance, or should cease on the cessation of the same. Because it is quite possible that there may be continuance of the previous habit, and yet there may be no remembrance.

The mention of the 'high complicated fever' is only by way of illustration

Powerful impediments—due to existence in the mother's womb.

The development becomes hampered—that is, the full development of the impressions becomes hampered; i.e. it does not proceed in exact accordance with the peculiarities of the particular place, time and character of things as previously cognised.

This answers the following argument of the Materialist: 'Remembrance of previous birth cannot be admitted; because there is remembrance of all men coming from the same village.' The fact of the matter is that even those coming from the same village do not have the same remembrance; as among them,

there are some who are dull-witted and who lose their memory.

Tāsām—stands for words, speech.

The following text shows that the reason adduced in the *reductio ad absurdum* is 'inadmissible' regarding its substratum.

Text (1947)

In the case of those high-souled men, where there is not the slightest impediment, clear speech is actually heard and they do have clear remembrance of them as well.

Commentary

High-souled men—men of exceptionally pure life.

The following texts set forth another argument in proof of the idea of the 'other world':

Texts (1948–53)

As a matter of fact, all these feelings of love, hatred and the rest become strong through habit and repetition, as has been ascertained by positive and negative concomitance. These feelings, appearing for the first time (in the child), are entirely devoid of any habit and repetition during the present life. What, then, is the cause of their appearance, if there is no other life? Their appearance cannot be due to the presence of their (external) excitants; because even when these excitants are present, the feelings in question do not appear, if there is disgust; and when this disgust ceases, they are found to be strong even in connection with past and future things, when the counter-feelings appear in intensified form. The feelings of love, hatred and the rest are found to proceed in regard to women and other things, when the man attributes to them goodness, devotedness, constancy and so forth; even though these qualities may not actually be there. For these reasons, these feelings appearing in this life must be regarded as appearing without the excitants being actually present, through the force of the habitual appearance of similar feelings in the past—because they are feelings of love, etc.—like these same feelings appearing subsequently.

Commentary

The argument may be thus formulated: the strength of the feelings of love, hatred, jealousy, haughtiness and pride, etc.—as also, wisdom, compassion, sympathy and so forth—is due to habitual practice; just as during the present life, it is found in men possessed of varying degrees of these feelings, during the present life, there is in the body, etc., of a man, a degree of strength of the feelings, which is not due to any such practice during the present life; so this is a reason based upon the relation of cause and effect. As all such relations of cause and effect are determined by positive and negative concomitance, the reason cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'. This is what is meant by the words—*Ascertained by positive, etc.*

It cannot be urged that: 'The reason is 'contradictory', as cited in proof of the fact of the feelings due to habitual repetition during other lives.' What is meant is that these feelings, as appearing for the first time during the present life, have not been habitually repeated during this life. This may not be a reason directly proving the fact of these feelings being due to habitual practice during previous lives; but what is stated as the reason being admitted to be a fact, it could not be without some cause: if it were without cause, it would be there at all times. Hence if another life were not there, what could be the cause of the strength of the said feelings of love, hatred, etc.? Hence the conclusion is that habitual repetition during past lives is the cause of the said strength of the feelings. Thus, the 'other world' becomes established.

The external objective excitant cannot be the cause of the feelings in question, because in many cases, even when these excitants are there, the feelings of love, etc., do not appear at all—if there happens to be present a feeling of disgust against the evil character of the things.

The term *pratisaṅkhyāna*, 'disgust', stands for that counter-feeling against love, etc., which is based upon the idea of evil. Sometimes even when the excitant is not there, the said feelings of love, etc., actually appear. Hence the presence of the feelings

cannot be due to the presence of the excitants.

Then again, even with regard to past and future things, the feelings are found to be strong in the man in whom the feeling of disgust has ceased and feelings due to the absence of pleasure have become intensified through strong desire. And, when there is no change in the presence or absence of a certain thing on the presence or absence of another thing, the one cannot be the cause of the other. Otherwise, there would be incongruities.

For the following reason as well, feelings of love, etc., cannot be due to the presence of the excitants: because if the feelings appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would proceed from the excitants in exactly the same manner as the cognition of blue and other things (which always proceeds in accordance with these things); the feelings, however, do not proceed in this way. On the contrary, the said feelings appear with regard to the woman and other things, in men who attribute, to the woman, the form of their own lasting pleasure, etc., which has not been experienced at all; and yet, the objects (woman, etc.) may not actually be possessed of the said form of goodness, etc.—and when a thing is devoid of a certain form, it cannot be the excitant or basis of the cognition of that form; otherwise it would lead to absurdity.

tat—i.e. for these reasons, the feelings of love, etc., as pertaining to imposed things, must be regarded as devoid of an objective basis (or excitant). From this, it follows that the said feelings of love, etc., when they appear for the first time during one's present life, proceed from the repeated experience of similar feelings in the past.

Question: "If objects are not the excitants of the feelings, then how is it that feelings of love, etc., appear only when the objects are present?"

Answer:

Texts (1954–6)

When the objects are present, there appear pleasure, etc.; from this pleasure, etc., proceed the 'afflictions' of love, hate

and the rest, being the outcome of the fruition of impressions left by similar past feelings in men who are devoid of wisdom and are subject to evil propensities—in accordance with the potency of things. Directly, the objects are not the cause of the feelings; if they were, a single affliction would be the cause of them all with regard to the object, like the cognition of things.

Commentary

The process is as follows: when the object is present, there appears pleasure born of the sense-organ concerned; from this pleasure proceed the 'afflictions' of love, etc., in men devoid of wisdom (and dispassion) and subject to evil propensities and tendencies, out of the fruition of impressions left by previously experienced feelings of love, etc.; so that the objects are not the direct cause of the feelings.

The following might be urged: 'You are only expounding your own doctrine; you state no reasons.'

The answer to this is: *a single affliction, etc. Single*—i.e. of a single kind. *Tatra*—in regard to the object. *Tasya*—of the object. *Like the cognition of things*; i.e. like the cognition apprehending the form of blue and other things. As a matter of fact, however, a single 'affliction' is not what actually appears; for instance, with regard to the single object in the shape of the body of the woman, while in one man the feeling aroused is that of love, in another it is hate, while in yet another, mere jealousy; so that there are several kinds of 'afflictions' (feelings) that appear.

The following might be urged: 'The feelings of love, etc., that appear during the present life cannot be the effect of repeated experience in the past; they arise either from the seeing of the actual act done by others, or from the advice of other persons.'

This is answered by the following:

Text (1957)

The appearance of the feelings cannot be due either to the perception of the doings of others, or to hearing of things from other persons; because such is not always found to be the case.

Commentary

vṛtti stands for doings.

The following text shows how this is not always found to be the case:

Text (1958)

Boars, bucks and other animals—who have never seen or heard of such acts—become perturbed at the touch of females of their own kind.

Commentary

Acts—intercourse and the like.

Sabhāgagati, etc.—females of the same kind, i.e. the sow and the doe.

When there is contact—proximity—of these, there is 'perturbation'—disturbance—i.e. desire for intercourse.

Text (1959)

Such qualities as wisdom, gentleness, compassion and the like—which are not habitually practised in the world—do not proceed by themselves, like pride, etc.

Commentary

It must be admitted that feelings of love, etc., appear by themselves, as the effects of habitual experience in the past; because such qualities as wisdom, gentleness and others, which are not habitually practised in the world, are not found to appear by themselves like pride, etc. This is an instance of dissimilarity. Otherwise, like pride, etc., wisdom and the rest would also appear by themselves.

Some people have held the following view: 'Love proceeds from *phlegm* (in the physical constitution of the body), hatred from *bile*, and delusion from *wind*.'

The answer to that is as follows:

Texts (1960–61)

The origination of the feelings cannot be due to phelgm and the rest. Because as in the previous case, the entire falsity of this idea is perceived in experience. For these reasons, it is established that time-repeated practice which is the cause of feelings appearing for the first time, must be from the 'other birth'; and the doctrine of the *nāstika* is killed.

Commentary

Balāsa is phlegm

As in the previous case—in the case of objects, as shown under text 1950 above.

Then again, as a matter of fact, there is no increase and decrease in the feelings of love, etc., upon increase and decrease of phlegm. And when change in one thing does not bring about a change in the other, the former cannot be the cause of the latter. Similarly, fierce hatred, and not fierce love, has been seen to appear in one with a preponderance of phlegm; while one with a preponderance of bile is found to have fierce love, not fierce hatred. This sort of comingling is often met with; and when one thing appears without the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. Further, the man with love is often found to be in the same condition as the man with hatred. From these non-concomitances it follows that the feelings of love, etc., are not the effects of phlegm, etc.

tasmāt—Thus; this sums up the chapter.

yadabhyāsa, etc.—The compound is to be expounded as: 'Repeated experience during which occurs the cause of the feelings in question'.

The following texts set forth the objections of the other party:

Texts (1962–3)

'(a) If what is meant to be proved is the fact that feelings are produced by repeated experience during the present life—then such an idea is annulled by well-perceived facts, and is also

contrary to what is desired (by the Buddhist). (b) If what is meant to be proved is the fact of their being produced by the repeated experience of other lives, then the corroborative instance is devoid of the probandum. (c) If what is meant to be proved is the mere unqualified fact of the feelings being produced by 'repeated experience'—the reason put forward is 'contradictory', because it proves contrary to the fact of the feelings being due to the repeated experience of another life.'

Commentary

The sense of the objection is as follows:

'With reference to the feelings of love, etc., appearing for the first time, what is it that is desired to be proved? (1) Is it that they proceed from repeated experience during the present life? Or, (2) that they proceed from repeated experience during other lives? Or, (3) that they proceed only from mere 'repeated experience', without any qualifications? As if this is proved, then by implication it is also proved that they are due to experiences of the 'other world'. These are the only alternative views possible.

'(1) If it is the first—then there is *bādhana* of it—incompatibility with facts of perception; because, in fact, the feelings of love, etc., in question are never found to appear from experience during the present life; and there is *bādhana*—denial—also of what is desired by the upholder of the 'other world'."

'(2) Under the second view, the corroborative instance cited becomes devoid of the probandum; because for the Materialist, there can be no instance where the feelings proceed from experiences of past lives.

'(3) Under the third view, the reason becomes "contradictory"; as, like the corroborative instance, it proves only the negation of the desired idea of the feelings being due to experiences during other lives.'

The above objection is answered by the following:

Text (1964)

What is meant to be proved is the general fact. Nor would

the reason be 'contradictory'; there is no incompatibility between these and the reason, because of which it could negative it.

Commentary

It is the third of the above alternative views that is meant by us. *Nor is the reason 'contradictory'*. 'Why?'

Because there is no incompatibility between 'being produced from past experience' and 'love and other feelings' by virtue of which incompatibility, the idea of 'being due to past experience' could be set aside.

Further, such notions as 'this world' and 'the other world' are based on differences in the state or condition of things—and the differences of childhood, youth and so forth.

In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes established. Hence this should not be emphasized—as it amounts to the viewpoint of other disputants (*Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka*, etc.).

B. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD BY *SVABHĀVA*

Commentary

The opening verses of the text have spoken of 'other entities', which include the doctrine of those philosophers who hold that the origination of the world is due to its 'own nature' (*svabhāva*). This is the doctrine that is now taken up for refutation, even out of its proper sequence, because there is little to be said regarding it.

Text (110)

The propounders of the doctrine of *svabhāva* describe the origination of things as being independent of all causes. They do not declare even the thing itself to be its own cause.

Commentary

Although the doctrine of *svabhāva* has nowhere been directly promulgated in so many words, yet it is implied by

the doctrine that the things are produced by themselves (as detailed in texts 106 *et seq*.). Those who assert that things are born out of themselves have been silenced by the works (in text 107)—'The operation of thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms.' Now, the upholders of the doctrine of *svabhāva* are going to be silenced.

These philosophers assert as follows: 'The origination of things does not proceed either from themselves or from any other thing; in fact, it is independent of all causes, i.e. it does not depend on the action of any cause at all.'

Question: 'What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe the origination of things to themselves?'

Answer: *They do not*, etc. 'They', i.e. the upholders of *svabhāva; the thing itself*, i.e. its own nature (prior to origination); '*even*'—this implies that they do not accept the form of any other thing to be the 'cause'; the difference thus is that while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its 'cause', these other people do not accept even that as the 'cause'.

These people put forward the following reason in support of their view: 'When a thing which fulfils the conditions of perceptibility has an existence that is not perceived, it should be regarded, by intelligent persons, as *non-existent*, as are the "hare's horns". Any cause of things is something whose existence is not perceived; hence it follows that there can be no cognition of the "nature of the thing" (the cause).'

In the following text, it is shown that the reason put forward is not 'unproven' (hence, inadmissible):

Text (111)

Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its filaments, etc.? By whom, too, have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created?

Commentary

Rājīva is lotus; the '*filaments, etc.*' of the lotus. Such is the analysis of the compound. *Et cetera* is meant to include the stalk,

the petals, the pericarp and other parts; also the sharpness of thorns and the like. *Diversity*—such diversities as those of shape, colour, hardness and the like. *Who makes*?—The sense is that no one makes it, since we do not find any such 'cause' as God and the like.

The following might be urged: 'Even if it be regarded as proven that external things are without "cause", because no such cause is perceived—how can it be taken as proven with regard to internal things?'

The answer to this is provided by the following text:

Text (112)

Just as sharpness and other properties of the thorn and other things must be regarded as without cause, on the ground of their appearing at certain times only, so also must pain and other (internal) things be regarded as without cause.

Commentary

Even though the fact of pain and other internal things being *without cause* is not proved by perception, yet it is clearly proved by inference. For instance, what appears only at certain times is definitely known to be *without cause*, e.g. the sharpness of the thorn and such things. Pain and such internal things appear only at certain times; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things. Nor is it right to hold that, when a certain thing is present or absent at the time when another thing is present or absent, the latter should be regarded as the cause of the former, as this is not found always to be true. For instance, visual perception is present when there is touch (in the object perceived), and is absent when there is no touch; and yet, touch is not the 'cause' of visual perception. Hence, the said definition of the causal relation cannot be true. From all this it follows that 'the origination of all things is independent of all causes'.

The author answers the above arguments of the upholder of *svabhāva* with the following texts:

Texts (113–14)

As regards the lotus and its filaments, etc., it is definitely ascertained through perception and non-apprehension that they have their 'cause' in the seed, clay, water, and the rest, under certain peculiar conditions—with which they are positively and negatively concomitant. Such being the case, what other 'cause' can there be of those of which you are asking?

Commentary

By this text, the author shows that the reason adduced by the other party is 'unproven' and 'inadmissible', and the conclusion put forward is contrary to perceived facts.

It has been asserted (under text 111) that 'of such things as the lotus, its filaments and the like, no cause is perceived'. This is 'not admitted'; as through perception and non-apprehension, such 'cause' is definitely cognised to consist in the seed, clay, water and such things, with which the said things are positively and negatively concomitant. To explain: when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present, and it becomes modified by the modifications of this latter—then this latter thing is said to be the 'cause' of the former thing. Such a 'cause of the lotus and its filaments, etc.,' is found in the shape of the seed, etc., which, *under certain peculiar conditions*, such as their becoming swollen due to moisture and so forth, serves as their 'cause', with which they are positively and negatively concomitant. The lotus, etc., come into existence only when the seed, etc., are present, and they do not come into existence when these latter are absent; that these are the 'cause' of the lotus, etc., is definitely ascertained through perception and non-apprehension. Thus, the reason put forward by the other party is 'inadmissible', untrue.

Then again, it has been urged that 'the definition of "causal relation" is not true (fallible)'. This reason, also, is 'unproven', not admissible; as in the instance cited, as touch is also a cause of colour, it is admitted to be the cause of visual cognition as well. To explain—the term 'touch' (in this connection) stands

for the material substance; and it is only by associating with these substances that colour subsists; hence, with regard to visual cognition, touch does serve as a 'cause'; the only difference being that while one (colour) is a *direct* cause, the other (*touch*) is only an *indirect* one.

Further, mere negation (absence) is not regarded by us as determining the causal relation. 'What then?' It is a particular kind of absence that is so regarded; for instance, when it is found that even though other efficient agents are present, yet in the absence of some one agent, the thing in question is not produced—then this latter agent is regarded as the 'cause' of that thing; and not when there is simple negation in the form that 'it is not produced while the other is absent'. Otherwise (if such mere negation were to determine the causal relation) date-growing in the country proper for *Mātṛvivāha* would not be produced if the *Mātṛvivāha* had not been there (as *ex hypothesi*, by mere negation, the *Mātṛvivāha* would be the 'cause' of the growth of the date).

The negative premise in the qualified form that we have shown is not 'fallible' (untrue) with regard to touch. For, if it could be shown that even in the presence of colour and other conditions (of visibility), there is no visual cognition on account of the absence of touch alone, then there might be 'fallibility' in our premise. Nothing like this, however, can be shown. Hence, there can be no 'fallibility' in the definition of the 'causal relation' (as stated by us).

It is not only such things as the seed and the rest that are definitely known as the 'cause' of things; even particular points of place and time are definitely known as such 'causes'. This is what the author indicates in the following text:

Texts (115–16)

Particular points of place and time are also related (as causes) to things. 'How so?' If the said points were not the cause of things, these would be produced everywhere and at all times.

As a matter of fact, however, things are found to be produced

specifically at a certain place, at a certain time, and in certain receptacles; being dependent upon these and independent of all others.

Commentary

If the lotus, etc., did not have them—i.e. the particular points of place and time—for their 'cause'—then such phenomena as their production *only* in a particular place, such as water and similar things, and not in other places, such as stone—and only at particular points of time like the summer, and not at other points of time like the winter—would not be possible. In fact, the lotus and other things would, then, come into existence at all places and at all times, as they would be independent of the peculiarities of place and time. It is clearly recognised, therefore, that they are dependent upon these latter, from the fact that they avoid certain places and times and appear only at special places and times.

Question: 'The things in question (by their insentience) cannot have any wish; how, then, can they have any *need* for (dependence upon) the causal conditions?'

The answer is given in the following text:

Text (117)

What is meant by their being 'dependent' is that they come into existence in that manner, so that it is the character of 'effect' that is spoken of as 'dependence'. That things come into existence in that manner is a perceptible fact; hence, the said causes become duly established.

Commentary

What is meant by the things being so 'dependent' is that they come into existence at particular places and times, and not at others; it does not mean that they have any 'wish' or 'desire'.

Objection: 'If such is their dependence on the particular points of time and place—even so, how does it follow that they are effects of these?'

Answer: It is the character of 'effect' that is spoken of as 'dependence'. The character of the effect is not anything else except the dependence involved in the fact that they come into existence in that particular manner.

Question: 'How is it known that they come into existence in that particular manner?'

Answer: It is a perceptible fact.

Text (118)

Thus the doctrine of *svabhāva* is discarded by perception, specially as the exact nature of the 'cause' of things is duly ascertained through perception and non-apprehension.

Commentary

Tat—Therefore, thus; or the whole expression *tatsvābhāvika-vādaḥ* may be taken as a compound, meaning 'the doctrine of *svabhāva* with regard to the lotus and other things'; is discarded by perception. Perception alone is mentioned here, as the 'non-apprehension' of a certain thing also consists only in the 'apprehension' of something else, and as such, is of the nature of 'perception'

It has been sought (under text 112, above) to prove: 'Pleasure and such internal things can have no cause, because they appear only occasionally'. This reasoning, however, is 'contradictory', inasmuch as it proves only the contrary of what is desired to be proved; because what has no cause and is not dependent upon anything else cannot be 'occasional', appearing only at certain times and places. What is meant is that the corroborative instance cited is devoid of the character desired to be proved.

Thus it has been shown that the conclusion (of the other party) is contrary to facts of perception and that their reason is 'unproven, inadmissible'; now, the author takes for granted (for the sake of argument) the 'admissibility' of the reason, and then proceeds to show its 'inconclusiveness', in the following text:

Text (119)

It may be that there are no proofs of the existence of the 'cause' of things; but the mere *absence of proof* cannot prove the non-existence of anything.

Commentary

If mere 'non-apprehension' is put forward as the reason for the non-existence of the cause, then it is 'inconclusive'; because mere absence of proof, i.e. mere absence of a valid means of knowing, cannot serve as a reason for establishing the non-existence of the thing concerned.

Question: "Why can it not be a proof?"

The answer is provided in the following text:

Text (120)

Inasmuch as 'proof' is not pervasive of the 'existence of the thing'; nor is it its 'cause'; (a) because there is difference; (b) because there is non-concomitance; and (c) because it proceeds from that (mere absence of proof cannot prove the non-existence of a thing).

Commentary

When one character is pervasive of (more extensive than) another, then alone does the absence of the former imply the absence of the latter; similarly, the absence of the cause implies the absence of the effect; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the less extensive is invariably concomitant with the more extensive one, because of the two being of the same essence; and the effect is invariably concomitant with the cause, being produced by this latter.

In the case of 'proof' and 'non-existence of a thing' there can be no co-essentiality, as the two actually appear to be distinct; nor can proof be the 'cause' of the thing, as there is no concomitance between them, the thing existing even when the proof is not there. For instance, there is nothing incongruous in admitt-

ing the existence of things which are far removed in space and time and character, hence not within reach of any proof—and, when a thing can exist even during the absence of another thing, the latter cannot be regarded as the cause of the former; for, if it were, it would lead to an absurdity. In fact, if the other party were to regard this as a 'cause', he would renounce his own position.

Also, because it proceeds from that: Proof cannot be the 'cause' of the existence of things. That is, the proof arises out of the thing itself, which forms its objective; and the cognisable thing does not arise out of the proof.

It might be argued: 'Even though not invariably concomitant, the proof (being absent) may yet preclude the existence of the thing.' The answer to this is provided by the following text:

Text (121)

When a thing is neither one nor the other, its absence does not conclusively preclude the other thing; because there is no connection.

Commentary

Neither the one nor the other; i.e. neither the cause, nor pervasive—the absence of what is not invariably concomitant cannot rightly be taken as, necessarily, precluding the other thing; for if it did, it would lead to an absurdity: the absence of the horse might, in that case, imply the absence of the cow as well.

Text (122)

'Non-perception' by all persons is doubtful. 'Non-perception' by any one person himself is inconclusive, as it is found that grass and other things growing in the caves of the Vindhya mountains do exist, even though they are not perceived.

Commentary

Further, when 'non-apprehension' is put forward as the reason (for non-existence), is it put forward in the form of the absence of perception by all men? Or of the absence of perception

of any one person himself? It cannot be the former; because ordinary men with limited powers of perception can never be sure of anything not perceived by all men; hence this must always be doubtful. People of limited vision have no means of knowing that no man has the perception of an unseen cause for such things as the marks on the wings of the peacock. As for any single man's own non-perception, that can never be conclusive. Why? Because even though such things as the grass, the coral, the pebbles and such like growing in mountain-caves are not perceived, they do exist; that is, there is nothing incongruous in regarding them as existent. Thus the reasons adduced being doubtful, non-existence cannot be regarded as proved beyond doubt

Texts (123–4)

If no reason is adduced to prove the fact of things having no cause, then, inasmuch as nothing can be proved without reason, your theory is not proved. If, on the other hand, you do adduce a reason proving it, then also, your theory is not proved; as the *proving* itself would be produced by the proof adduced (which would, therefore, be the cause of the proving).

Commentary

Further, you have to be asked the following question: in support of your conclusion that 'things have no cause'—do you adopt any reason, or not? If you do not adopt it, then your view is not proved, as there can be no proving anything without adequate proof. If, on the other hand, you do adopt a reason—even then, your view cannot be proved (such is the construction of the words of the text). 'Why so?'—*Because the 'proving' itself would be produced by the proof adduced*. This is what has thus been declared by the revered *ācārya* Sūri: 'One who declares that there is no cause would demolish his own conclusion if he adduces any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were slow to adduce reasons, what could be gained by mere assertion?'

The following might be urged: 'The reason that I adduce is

indicative, not *productive*; why, then, should my conclusion not be proved?'

The answer to this is provided by the following text:

Text (125)

As regards the *indicative*, be it in the form of the probans, or in the form of words expressive of that (probans), it is said to be 'indicative' of the probandum (desired conclusion) only when it becomes the 'cause' of the *proving* (of the said conclusion).

Commentary

The indicative probans—i.e. the probans fulfilling the three conditions, as conceived by the reasoner for his own benefit; *or in the form of words*—when the same probans is asserted for the benefit of someone else. *Expressive of that*—i.e. of the probans. *Cause of the proving*—i.e. of the bringing about of the definite cognition of the object to be cognised. If it were otherwise, and the probans or reason did not serve as the 'cause' of the said *proving*, then how could it be regarded as an 'indicative'? In fact, in this way, everything would be 'indicative' of everything else.

Question: 'If this is so, then how do the teachers make the distinction between the *indicative* and the *productive*?'

The answer given in the following text is that the 'indicative' is so called because it *makes the thing known*, and what is called 'productive' is that which *actually brings into existence* the thing concerned.

Text (126)

Thus, it is really the 'productive' cause which is spoken of as 'indicative'; because it does not actually produce (bring into existence) what is desired to be accomplished, it is not called 'productive'.

Commentary

It is called 'indicative'—and not 'productive'—because it does not actually produce what is desired to be accomplished;

while that which actually produces what is desired to be accomplished—such as the sprout and the like—is called 'productive'. Hence there is nothing wrong in the distinction that has been made.

This answers all the objections that may be urged against the declaration of *ācārya* Sūri. For instance, the following is an objection that may be raised: 'Even when asserting with reason that there is no cause, why should one demolish his own conclusion? As what he asserts is an indicative reason, while what he denies is the productive cause.' The answer to this is as follows: the indicative reason is also a productive cause, because it produces the cognition of the thing. This urges against the other party the fact of his assertions being self-contradictory. In fact, there can be no reason that could prove the absence of all cause, because such a proposition would clearly be one that is contrary to, and set aside by, sense-perception and the rest.

With the following text, the author sums up his position and thereby also shows that the conclusion of the other party is contrary to, and set aside by, inference:

Text (127)

From all this, it follows that other things also have their 'causes', as their production is restricted—just as your cognition of the probandum appears when the probans is there.

Commentary

Things like the lotus and its filaments—which are 'other' than the things spoken of by the other party in his reasoning. *As their production is restricted*—i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there. The argument may be formulated as follows: those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain other things are there must be regarded as *with cause*—as, for instance, your own cognition of the probandum (desired to be proved) which appears only when the probans (reason) is there the same is the case with the lotus and other things (hence, these must be regarded as 'with cause')—this being a reason based on the nature of things.

Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*

COMMENTARY ON THE *Brahma-sūtra*

Śaṅkara (*c.* AD 788–820) is the most renowned exponent of the Advaita school of Vedānta philosophy, his *magnum opus* being the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, which he calls the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*. In this commentary he refers thrice to the Lokāyata view. One of these references (on ii. 2.2) seems to have the peculiar intention of showing how the Sāṅkhya philosophy, in defence of itself, was likely to quote the authority of the Lokāyatikas. We have given here these three references in the standard English translation of G. Thibaut (*SBE*, vols. xxiv and xxxviii).

Śaṅkara's *commentary on the Brahmasūtra*:

ON DEHĀTMAVĀDA

i. 1.1

But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people, and the Lokāyatikas, are of the opinion that the mere body, endowed with the quality of intelligence, is the Self; others, that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting; others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all-knowing, all-powerful Lord. Others, finally (i.e. the Vedāntins), maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the product of Nescience).

Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and scriptural texts misunderstood.

ii. 2.2

The existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body. Hence, activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this, we—the Vedāntins—make the following reply. We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar materials, are, indeed, not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, etc., does not exist), but at the same time, result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present, and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is, therefore, incontrovertible. But—an objection will be raised—your Self, even if joined to a body, is incapable of exercising moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that, the nature of which is pure intelligence. A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion, may, nevertheless, move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the

other organs of sense. So the Lord also, who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful, may, although himself unmoving, move the universe. If it finally be objected that (on the Vedānta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power, as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman, no motion can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Māyā, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience. Hence, motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

iii. 3.53–54

Sūtra 53. Some (maintain the non-existence) of a (separate) Self, on account of the existence (of the Self) where a body is (only).

Bhāṣya. At present, we will prove the existence of a Self different from the body in order to establish, thereby, the qualification (of the Self) for bondage and release. For, if there were no Self different from the body, there would be no room for injunctions that have the other world for their result; nor could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self. But, an objection is raised, already in the first *pāda* which stands at the head of this Śāstra (i.e. the first *pāda* of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*), there has been declared the existence of a Self which is different from the body and hence capable of enjoying the fruits taught by the Śāstra. True, this has been declared there by the author of the *bhāṣya*, but there is in that place no Sūtra about the existence of the Self. Here, on the other hand, the Sūtrakāra himself establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed of a preliminary objection. And from hence, the teacher Śabara Svāmin has taken the matter for his discussion of the point in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge. For the same reason, the reverend Upavarṣa remarks in the first *tantra*—where an opportunity offers itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self—'We will discuss this in the Sārīraka,'

and allows the matter to rest there. Here, where we are engaged in an inquiry into the pious meditations which are a matter of injunction, a discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced in order to show that the whole Śāstra depends thereon.

Moreover, in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, we have shown that passages may be exempted from the influence of the leading subject-matter, and that for that reason, the fire-altars built of mind and so on subserve the purpose of man (not of the sacrifice). In consequence thereof, there naturally arises the question: who is that man whose purposes the different fire-altars subserve; and in reply to it, the existence of a Self which is separate from the body is affirmed. The first Sūtra embodies an objection against that doctrine; according to the principle that a final refutation of objections stated in the beginning effects a stronger conviction of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is aimed at.

Here now, some materialists (Lokāyatika), who see the Self in the body only, are of the opinion that a Self separate from the body does not exist; assume that consciousness (*caitanya*), although not observed in earth and the other external elements—either single or combined—may yet appear in them when transformed into the shape of a body, so that consciousness springs from them; and thus maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no Self separate from the body and capable of going to the heavenly world or obtaining release, through which consciousness is in the body; but the body alone is what is conscious, is the Self. For this assertion, they allege the reason stated in the Sūtra, 'On account of its existence where a body is.' For wherever something exists, if some other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a mere quality of the latter; light and heat, e.g., we determine to be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness, remembrance and so on—which,

by the upholders of an independent Self, are considered qualities of that Self—are observed only within bodies, and not outside bodies, and as an abode of those qualities, different from the body, cannot be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body only. The Self, therefore, is not different from the body. To this conclusion the next Sūtra replies.

Sūtra 54. There is separation (of the Self from the body) because its existence does not depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), but there is not (non-separation); as in the case of perceptive consciousness.

Bhāṣya. The assertion that the Self is not separate from the body cannot be maintained. The Self, rather, must be something separate from the body, 'because the existence (of the Self) does not depend on the existence of that (i.e. the body).' For if, from the circumstance that they are where the body is, you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities of the body, you must also conclude, from the fact that they are not where the body is, that they are not qualities of the body, because thereby they show themselves to be different in character from the qualities of the body. Now the (real) qualities of the body, such as form and so on, may be viewed as existing as long as the body exists; life, movement, etc., on the other hand, do not exist even when the body exists, viz. in the state of death. The qualities of the body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by others; not so the qualities of the Self, such as consciousness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can indeed ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain their non-existence when the body does not exist; for it is possible that even after this body has died, the qualities of the Self should continue to exist by passing over into another body. The opposite opinion is thus precluded, also for the reason of its being a mere hypothesis. We further must question our opponent as to the nature of that consciousness which he assumes to spring from the elements; for the materialists do not admit the existence of anything but the four elements.

Should he say that consciousness is the perception of the elements and what springs from the elements, we remark that in that case, the elements and their products are objects of consciousness, and that hence, the latter cannot be a quality of them as it is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire is hot indeed, but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well-trained as he may be, cannot mount his own shoulders. As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of the elements and their products, render them objects of itself. For form and other (undoubted) qualities do not make their own colour or the colour of something else their objects; the elements and their products, on the other hand, whether external or belonging to the Self (the organism), are rendered objects by consciousness. Hence, in the same way as we admit the existence of that perceptive consciousness which has the material elements and their products for its objects, we also must admit the separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And, as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness is permanent, follows from the uniformity of its character (and we therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is permanent also; as also follows) from the fact that the Self, although connected with a different state, recognises itself as the conscious agent—a recognition expressed in judgments such as 'I saw this'—and from the fact of remembrance and so on being possible.

The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of the body because it is where a body is, is already refuted by the reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive consciousness takes place where there are certain auxiliaries such as lamps and the like, and does not take place where those are absent, without its following therefrom that perception is an attribute of the lamp or the like. Analogously, the fact that perception takes place where there is a body, and does not take place where there is none, does not imply that it is an attribute of the body; for, like lamps and so on, the body may be used (by the

Self) as a mere auxiliary. Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as an auxiliary of perception; for, in the state of dream, we have manifold perceptions while the body lies motionless. The view of the Self being something separate from the body is therefore free from all objections.

Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī*

Vācaspati Miśra (*c.* ninth century AD) is the author of very important expositions of the various systems of Indian philosophy like Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Advaita Vedānta, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. He is thus, for us, the most versatile exponent of what is often called the 'orthodox systems', though leaving the stamp of his individuality on each of the expositions—a circumstance due to which he is popularly known as *sarvatantra-svatantra*. We have given here an extract from his commentary on Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, called *Bhāmatī*, in which he deals with the Lokāyata view of *dehātmavāda*.

Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī*

(3.3.53)

The objection (*ākṣepa*) is described: 'Here there are some who consider the body alone as the self'.

Although consciousness is not observed in earth, water, fire and air, either taken collectively (*samasta*) or separately (*vyasta*), it may still be present in them when they are transformed into the shape of a body. It is not that *kiṇva*, etc., since they are not found to be intoxicating taken either collectively or separately, would not produce intoxication when they are transformed into a spiritous drink.

In the awareness, namely, 'I' (*aham*), what is revealed is only

the body as being of the nature of a fair-complexioned thing, and not as something distinct from it; as it is in the case of the awareness, 'there is curd in the bowl.' For this reason is well-justified the co-application (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the terms *aham* and *sthūla*, etc. (to the same object), as in the expression 'I, a fat one, am going'. Indeed, terms that can be co-applied to curd (*dadhi*), namely, sweet (*madhura*) etc., are never observed to be referring equally to the bowl as well (so that one may say), the bowl is something white and sweet (though one may easily say that curd is something white and sweet).

The existence of an entity in the form of the self which is not perceptible cannot be ascertained even on the basis of inference, etc. Indeed, there is no *pramāṇa* other than perception. As it has been said: 'Since the various things differ in their powers (*śakti*) due to the change of circumstances like space, time, etc., it is hardly possible to determine the things (in their true nature) by inference.' When such is the plight of a mark the invariability (*nāntarīyakabhāva*) of which is possible to be established on the strength of observation (*upalabdhi*), then what, indeed, can be said in respect of verbal testimony, in the case of which deviation (*vyabhicāra*) is actually observed; of postulation, which has for its object things totally beyond perception; and of comparison, against which may be posed the alternatives of 'total similarity' and 'partial similarity'. In the event of total similarity there would be identity, and in the event of partial similarity there would be undesirable consequences, since in that case everything would be compared to everything else.

Effort (*ceṣṭā*) is activity (*vyāpāra*) with a view to obtaining the beneficial and avoiding the harmful. It is observed to take place as dependent upon the body and hence, must be a property of the body. In the same way, breath (*prāṇa*) also, which consists of inhaling and exhaling, is a property of the body. Desire, volitional effort (*prayatna*) etc., though they are internal (*āntara*) properties, are to be admitted as located in the inner parts of the body itself, because no substratum for them other than the body is ever observed, and they are produced only when the

body is there. Otherwise there would arise the absurdities of denying what is observed and of admitting what is not observed. There being no proof of the existence of a self over and above the body, and their (i.e. of desire, etc.) occurrence being possible in the body itself, the body itself can be considered the self, as characterised by desire, etc.

After such a contention has been made, the reply is to be given as follows. One making the claim that there is no *pramāṇa* other than perception, becomes liable to question. Wherefrom had you ascertained the invalidity of inference, etc.? Perception can grasp the mark, etc. only as such, and would not be capable of determining their invalidity (also). It would not be proper that, just like the knowledge of smoke, the knowledge of their invalidity, too, should be produced from the sense-object contact; rather, it is to be produced from a possible doubt concerning deviation (*vyabhicāra*) due to the difference of space, time, condition and nature. But (the consideration of) so much cannot be the function of perception. As it has been said: 'Perception, indeed, is not capable of discharging so many functions, for it is produced on the strength of an object which is in contact, and also because it cannot critically judge.' Therefore in this regard, one would have to admit, even though unwillingly, an additional form of *pramāṇa*.

Moreover, people who have the power of critical judgement explain things only to such persons who are not convinced and as are under doubt; they leave alone such persons who are already convinced. But such conditions of the persons concerned cannot be perceptually known to you. These conditions, indeed, cannot be perceptually known, just like a fair complexion etc. Rather, they are only to be inferred from such marks as their words, activities etc. (But in your view) the mark is not a *pramāṇa* from which these conditions can be established. It is indeed no mark of critial judgement for one who, without becoming aware of the actual conditions of the persons concerned, becomes desirous of explaining things to any person at random, and consequently, whose words do not command respect.

Moreover, even beasts, with a view to obtaining the beneficial and avoiding the harmful, move towards a field green with soft, fresh grass and leave one full of dried grass and thorns. The Nāstika, not knowing what would lead to his own good or what would lead him into harm, is more beastly than a beast. In this matter (of determining a thing as desirable and undesirable), which is the basis of an effort for obtainment (*pravṛtti*) or an effort for avoidance (*nivṛtti*), and can only be known by inference, perception is not capable of doing anything.

Nor should the Nāstika utter words to convey anything to others; for the objects referred to by words are not perceived. Thus, let there be no other birth for the Nāstika; but in this very birth would he be thrown into the great hell, in the form of muteness and absence of all efforts either for obtainment or for avoidance. Learned ones have discussed all of these in great detail. (So we are not going into them any further.)

Although postulation has, for its object, what is totally beyond perception, it arises from facts (*artha*) which cannot be explained otherwise. In the context of the definition of *pramāṇa*, comparison has been explained to be based on the presence of similarity in many respects (*bhūyaḥ-sāmānya-yoga*).

Well, let there be other forms of *pramāṇa* in this regard. Still, it can be ascertained through agreement in presence and agreement in absence that even a perceptual cognition, an awareness involving the 'I', has, for its underlying object, something distinct from the body. It has already been pointed out that, as in the case of one assuming the form of a tiger through powers of *yoga* (*yoga-vyāghra*), in the state of dream as well, although there is the notion that a different body has been assumed, the basis of the awareness involving the 'I' is re-cognised to be the same.

The syntactical connection of (the words) in the *sūtra* would be as follows: the self is not non-distinct, but quite distinct from the body. Why? Because it (the self) is not invariably present in the presence of that (the body). If consciousness etc. are to be the qualities of the body, they must be specific qualities

(*viśeṣaguṇa*), and not general qualities (*sāmānya-guṇa*) like number (*saṃkhyā*), magnitude (*parimāṇa*), conjunction (*saṃyoga*) etc. Thus, it is observed that those which are the specific qualities of the forms of matter remain present (in their substratum) as long as the forms of matter are present. It is not possible that there is a form of matter, but it is without colour Therefore, because of being dissimilar to colour etc. which are the specific qualities of the forms of matter, consciousness cannot be a quality of the body. By this, also is refuted the contention that desire etc. are the specific qualities of the body.

Similarly, breath, effort etc., as well, though they are the properties of the body alone, are not born of the body alone, for then their presence would have been possible in the state of death (i.e. in a corpse) as well. Therefore, that (the body), being governed by which these can be produced as properties of the body, is the self, as distinct from the body.

Besides, if *adṛṣṭa* is admitted to be a cause, its location in the body cannot be logically justified, and hence the self has to be admitted.

Another point of dissimilarity is indicated: 'the properties of the body again', etc. The properties of the body, such as colour, etc., are observed to be perceptible to one's own self as well as to others. But desire, etc., are perceptible only to one's own self (and not to others), and thus they become dissimilar to the properties of the body. On this ground too, they should be the properties of something distinct from the body

Moreover, even if consciousness is also admitted to be a specific quality of matter, it should continue to be present as long as matter is present. It cannot be said that there would be deviation (*vyabhicāra*) in the instance of power of intoxication, for capability (*sāmarthya*) is a kind of general property.

Again, in each of the component particles of a spiritous drink, the power of intoxication is present in a very small degree. In the same way (if it is assumed that there is consciousness) in the body, consciousness should be present, though in a very small degree, in each of the component parts of the

body. Thus, in a single body there would be present a number of conscious agents. However, it is not possible to unify the different intentions of each of so many conscious agents, and that is why a number of birds caught in a single net, each eager to move in an opposite direction, are not able, although they have the capacity, to cross a distance even as much as the length of a hand. In the same way, the body would also not have the inclination to do anything.

Moreover, it is not possible to ascertain, only on the basis of agreement in presence, a relation of property and property-possessor (between two things) (*dharma-dharmi-bhāva*). It is not that all properties should belong to *ākāśa*, simply because it has agreement in presence with all of them; (but such a relation is determined) on the basis of both agreement in presence and agreement in absence. However in the present case, the agreement in absence is doubtful. Thus, the agreement in presence alone cannot establish (what is sought to be established by the opponent). The author points to all this by saying: 'Besides, when (the body) is there' etc.

Desiring to point out a further fallacy, the author asks: 'Of what nature, again' etc.

The Nāstika says: 'The very awareness' etc. The implication is that just as colour, etc., are only different kinds of transformations of matter, and not anything distinct from the four forms of matter, so also, consciousness is a particular transformation of matter, and not anything distinct from the forms of matter; so that there might have been any contradiction with the thesis (*pratijñā*) that there are only four forms of realities, namely, earth, water, fire and air. Thus, the following conclusion is arrived at: the whole world is the transformation of the four forms of matter only; there is no other form of reality, the transformation of which would be colour, etc., or any other form of transformation.

(The contention that consciousness is a) property of the body has been refuted by grounds already discussed. Still, because of a desire for pointing out a further ground, the author says:

'But, then' etc. The properties of matter, the colour, etc., being inanimate (*jaḍa*), are observed to be of the nature of object (*viṣaya*) only, and never of the nature of knowledge (*viṣayin* = lit., that which possesses object) itself. It cannot be said that there are some objects of knowledge which may also be of the nature of knowledge itself, for one's own action in respect of one's own self would be contradicted. It cannot be argued that the same contingency would arise in the case of knowledge itself as well, for, though inanimate, it is admitted to be self-manifested (*svayam-prakāśa*) by nature . . . .

The author explains the part of the *sūtra*, namely, 'just like knowledge': 'just as its', etc. From the very proof establishing knowledge itself is also ascertained its difference with the body; for its difference with the properties of matter which are inanimate is ascertained by the distinctive feature that it is only of the nature of self-manifested awareness.

Well, then, because of essential difference, let knowledge be something distinct from the forms of matter. Still, there is an absence of proof with regard to the self. Hence (i.e. apprehending such an objection), the author says: the self, according to us, is actually of the nature of knowledge itself.

Mādhavācārya's *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*

An Advaita Vedāntist of the fourteenth century AD, Mādhavācārya is best known for his compendium of Indian philosophy called the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*. Although a minister of the Vijayanagara empire, he eventually became the chief abbot of the Śṛṅgerī Maṭha, one of the four most famous centres of Advaita Vedānta generally viewed to have been established by Śaṅkara himself.

The compendium discusses sixteen philosophical views, of which the Cārvāka forms the first chapter, and gives the impression of a systematic treatment of the view as a whole. This exposition of the Cārvāka view undoubtedly enjoys the highest popularity among modern scholars.

Mādhava's work, as translated into English by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, was originally published at intervals in the *Pandit* between 1874 and 1878 and appeared in book-form in 1904. We have used here the chapter of Cārvāka as translated by E. B. Cowell, with his notes.

Mādhavācārya's *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*

TEXT

THE PROLOGUE

1. I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in *him* only has this all a maker.

2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Viṣṇu, who knows all the Āgamas, the son of Śārṅgapāṇi, who has gone to the further shore of the seas of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning of the term soul.

3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mādhava, mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the fortunate Sāyaṇa.

4. Having thoroughly searched the Śāstras of former teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sāyaṇa-Mādhava[1] the lord has expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not delight in a garland strung of various flowers?

THE CĀRVĀKA SYSTEM

[We have said in our preliminary invocation, 'salutation to Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,]' but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Cārvāka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school,

the follower of the doctrine of Bṛhaspati? The efforts of Cārvāka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain—

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it ever again return?

The mass of men, in accordance with the Śāstras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Cārvāka. Hence another name for that school is Lokāyata—a name well accordant with the thing signified.[2]

In this school the four elements, earth, etc., are the original principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients;[3] and when these are destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Śruti for this (*Bṛhad Āraṇy. Up.* ii. 4,12), 'Springing forth from these elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are destroyed—after death no intelligence remains.'[4] Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, etc.

The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is not therefore for us, through

a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire, because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents. If anyone were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet—

The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,
Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain—such is the reasoning of fools;
The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because these are covered with husk and dust?[5]

If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the *agnihotra* and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great expenditure of money and bodily fatigue; your objection cannot be accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the *agnihotra*, etc, are only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[6] then again, the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually destructive, as the authority of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is overthrown by those who maintain that of the *karma-kāṇḍa*, while those who maintain the authority of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* reject that of the *karma-kāṇḍa*; and lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying—

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes—
Bṛhaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.

Hence it follows that there is no other Hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, etc.; the

only Supreme is the earthly monarch, whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such phrases as 'I am thin,' 'I am black', etc., are at once intelligible, as the attributes of thinness, etc., and self-consciousness will reside in the same subject (the body); like the use of the phrase 'my body' is metaphorical, 'the head of Rāhu' (Rāhu being really *all head*).

All this has been thus summed up—

> In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire and air; and from these four elements alone is intelligence produced—just like the intoxicating power from *kiṇva*, etc., mixed together; since in 'I am fat', 'I am lean', these attributes[7] abide in the same subject,
>
> And since fatness, etc., reside only in the body,[8] it alone is the soul, and no other,
>
> And such phrases as 'my body' are only significant metaphorically.

'Be it so', says the opponent; 'your wish would be gained if inference, etc., had no force of proof; but then they have this force, else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on hearing another say, "there are fruits on the bank of the river", do those who desire fruit proceed, at once, to the shore?'

All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.

Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the *sign* or middle term as the cause of knowledge, which middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major.[9] Now, this invariable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed;[10] and this connection does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its *existence*, as the eye, etc., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being *known*. What, then, is the means of this connection's being known?

We will first show that it is not *perception*. Now perception is held to be of two kinds, external and internal (i.e. as produced

by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind). The former is not the required means; for, although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there never can be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition,[11] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case, becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case[12] (as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire).

Nor is *internal perception* the means, since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by one of the logicians, 'The eye, etc., have their objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others.'

Nor can *inference* be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an *ad infinitum* retrogression.

Nor can *testimony* be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply, in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Kaṇāda, that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends, itself, on the recognition of a *sign* in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man;[13] and, moreover, there is no more reason for our believing another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected, than for our receiving the *ipse dixit* of Manu, etc. (which, of course, we Cārvākas reject).

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection

between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing (as fire) on seeing another thing (as smoke); hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for oneself[14] would have to end in mere idle words.

Then again, *comparison*,[15] etc., must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection (i.e. the universal proposition), because their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, *viz.*, the relation of a name to something so named.

Again, this same absence of a condition,[16] which has been given as the definition of an invariable connection (i.e. a universal proposition), can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here, too, have recourse to inference, etc., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, 'it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension[17] with the major term, though not constantly accompanying the middle.' These three distinguishing clauses, 'not constantly accompanying the middle term,' 'constantly accompanying the major term,' and 'being constantly accompanied by it' (i.e. reciprocal), are needed in the full definition to stop, respectively, three such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of sound, as 'being produced,' 'the nature of a jar', and 'not causing audition';[18] wherefore the definition holds—and again, it is established by the *śloka* of the great Doctor beginning *samāsama*.[19]

But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible; i.e. a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and

major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents, as with adamantine glue, the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence, by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition, it becomes impossible to establish inference, etc.[20]

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, etc., to the knowledge of fire, etc., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception, or by its being an error; and that in some cases, this step is justified by the result, is accidental, just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, etc.

From this, it follows that fate, etc.,[21] do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you do not thus allow *adṛṣṭa*, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said—

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing and cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born.

And all this has been also said by Bṛhaspati—

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world.
Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect.
The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,
Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.
If a beast slain in the Jyotiṣṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,
Why then does not the sacrificer, forthwith, offer his

own father?[22]

If the Śrāddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,

Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.

If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Śrāddha here,

Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?

While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt;

When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?

If he who departs from the body goes to another world, How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred?

Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here

All these ceremonies for the dead—there is no other fruit anywhere.

The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.

All the well-known formulae of the pandits, *jarpharī, turpharī* etc.[23]

And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśvamedha;

These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,[24]

While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons

Hence, in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge to the doctrine of Cārvāka. Such is the pleasant consummation.

E.B.C.

NOTES

1. Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the *Vaṃśa-Brāhmaṇa*, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mādhava and Sāyaṇa. Sāyaṇa is a pure Dravidian name given to a child who is born after all the elder children have died. Mādhava elsewhere calls Sāyaṇa his 'younger brother', as an allegorical description of his body, himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sāyaṇa-Mādhavaḥ here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the same person. The body seems meant by the Sāyaṇa of the third *śloka*. Māyaṇa was the father of Mādhava, and the true reading may be *śrīman-māyaṇa*.
2. 'Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and other commentators name the Lokāyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Cārvāka' (Colebrooke), Lokāyata may be etymologically analysed as 'prevalent in the world' (*loka* and *āyata*). Laukāyatika occurs in Pāṇini's *ukthagaṇa*.
3. *Kiṇva* is explained as 'drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, etc.' Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara: 'The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not found in those substances severally.'
4. Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence once the knowledge of the Supreme is attained. Cf. Śabara's Comm. *Jaimini Sūt.*, i. i. 5.
5. I take *kaṇa* as, here, equal to the Bengali *kuṛ*. Cf. Atharva-V., xi. 3. 5. *Aśvāḥ kaṇā gāvas taṇḍulā māṣakās tuṣāḥ*
6. See *Nyāya Sūtras*, ii. 57.
7. I.e. personality and fatness, etc.
8. I read *dehe* for *dehaḥ*.
9. Literally, 'must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*)'.
10. For the *sandigdha* and *niścita upādhi*, see *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, p. 125. The former is accepted by only one party.
11. Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (as of smoke by fire).
12. The attributes of the class are not always found in every member—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.
13. See *Sāhitya Darpana* (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and *Siddhānta-M*, P. 80.

14. The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument.
15. '*Upamāna*, or the knowledge of a similarity, is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named.' Ballantyne's *Tarka Saṅgraha*.
16. The *upādhi* is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too-general middle term; as in the inference, 'the mountain has smoke because it has fire,' if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will no longer be too general. In the case of a true *vyāpti*, there is, of course, no *upādhi*.
17. (Pr Anal., ii 25). We have here our A with distributed predicate.
18. If we omitted the first clause, and only made the *upādhi* 'that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it,' then in the Naiyāyika argument 'sound is non-eternal because it has the nature of sound,' 'being produced' would serve as a Mīmāṃsaka *upādhi* to establish the *vyabhicāra* fallacy, as it is reciprocal with 'non-eternal'; but the omitted clause excludes it, as an *upādhi* must be consistent with *either* party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyāyika maintains that 'being produced' *always* accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we defined the *upādhi* as 'not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major,' we might have, as an *upādhi* 'the nature of a jar,' as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar), while at the same time, wherever the class of jar is found, there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the *upādhi* as 'not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanying the major,' we might have, as a Mīmāṃsaka *upādhi*, 'the not causing audition,' i.e. the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.
19. This refers to an obscure *śloka* of Udayanācārya, 'where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (i.e. universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (e.g. to prove the existence of smoke), there, that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal of the first.' Thus 'the mountain has smoke because it has fire' (here, fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke, though smoke is by fire), or 'because it has fire from wet fuel' (smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term *is* thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as, 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke'; here, though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add here, once and for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many another difficulty in the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, to my old friend and teacher, Pandit Mahesa Chandra Nyayaratna of the Calcutta Sanskrit College.
20. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P Hyp ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist system *infra*, we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species.
21. *Adṛṣṭa*, i.e., the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births.
22. This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p. 209.
23. *Ṛgveda*, x.106. For the Aśvamedha rites, see Wilson's *Ṛgveda* Preface, Vol. ii. p. xiii.
24. Or this may mean, 'and all the various other things to be handled in the rites.'

Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya and commentaries on it:* Maṇibhadra's *Laghuvṛtti and* Guṇaratna's *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*

A prolific writer subscribing to the Jaina creed, Haribhadra (*c.* eighth century AD) wrote a popular compendium on the six systems of Indian philosophy called the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*. Although the six systems discussed by him do not include the Lokāyata, he adds a special section on it, in consideration of the fact that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika—discussed by him originally as separate views—constitute, according to some, a single system. From their point of view, the sixth is the Lokāyata. Two of his renowned commentators are Guṇaratna (*c.* 15th century AD) and Maṇibhadra, who was much earlier. Given here is Haribhadra's version of the Lokāyata, along with the commentaries of

both, adding to this Guṇaratna's elaborate and separate discussion of the *dehātmavāda* of the Cārvākas.

Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya with* Manibhadra's *Commentary*

A. & B. DOCTRINE OF THE LOKĀYATAS

(*Verse 80*): The Lokāyatas give their views as follows. There is neither god (*deva*) nor liberation. Merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) also do not exist. Nor is there any fruit of virtue and vice.

Commentary

The Lokāyatas, the Nāstikas, speak of, set forth, their views, thus, in the following manner. How? So it is said that there is no omniscient being, etc., and also, there is no liberation or final release. There are some more things which do not exist. What are they? Merit and demerit (*dharmādharmau*). We have a *dvandva* compound here, *dharmaś ca adharmaś ca*. That is, virtue and vice also do not exist. The fruits of virtue and vice, of merit and demerit, such as heaven, hell, etc., are not there, do not exist. That also follows by implication: if virtue and vice themselves are non-existent, wherefrom would come about their fruits?

To show how they state (their views) in their own work (*śāstra*), ridiculing the opponent, the author says: 'Here is their view.' The words 'here is' are in the sense of introduction. 'Their view' means 'the view of the Nāstikas', since such a view has been proposed for discussion.

How is that? The answer is given:

(*Verse 81*): This world (*loka*) consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) is but similar to (the statement) 'Oh! Dear! Look at the footprints of the wolf!'

Commentary

This world is this much only, consists of this much only, as much as is within only the scope of the senses. The senses are of five kinds—tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory. 'Those which are within their scope' means 'those which can be their objects'. Only those things which are manifested by the five senses really exist, and nothing else. Since the word 'world' (*loka*) has been used here, we should understand, by it, the various groups of things found in this world.

However, others have spoken of heaven, hell, etc., which can be achieved by virtue and vice. They are also unproved on the same ground that they can never be perceived. If even unperceived objects really exist, then let horns growing on a hare's head, a son born of a barren woman, etc., really exist.

Thus, through the tactual sense are known things which are soft, hard, cold, warm, oily and dry, etc. Through the gustatory sense are known the tastes of pungent, astringent, sour and sweet, and things to be licked, to be sucked, to be drunk and the like. Through the olfactory sense one gets acquainted with the ever-flowing sweet scent of such fragrant substances as musk, sandalwood, camphor, aloe wood, etc. Through the visual sense are apprehended so many groups of things, immovable and movable, such as the earth, mountain, city, rampart, jar, cloth, pillar, lotus, etc., as well as man, animal, ferocious beast, etc. Through the auditory sense one listens to sweet music, proceeding (from the lips of) a widely-known wandering singer, playful and swaying, marked by proper time-beat, measure, and melodious modulation of voice.

Thus, only things which can be known by these five kinds of perception would be things really established by *pramāṇa*. The other *pramāṇa*-s, there being no evidence for their existence, are to be rejected like flowers blooming in the sky.

There are, indeed, people who accept the reality of even that which is not touched, not tasted, not smelt, not seen and not heard; they have their hearts drawn by the lust for pleasures

like heaven, liberation, etc., and fritter away their own lives in great suffering by performing the severest forms of penances, etc. All these are really acts of great courage on their part.

Moreover, if even unperceived things are accepted as existing, then the world would remain unexplained. A poor man, simply contemplating 'I have heaps of gold', would, with the greatest ease, overcome all his miseries. A servant too, elevating himself to the position of the master in his own heart, should be able to get rid of his state of servitude. Nobody should ever get any pain undesirable to himself. As a result, there would be no persons related as the served and the servant, nor anybody who can be said to be rich or poor. Thus there would follow the undesirable consequence that the normal order of things in the world would be destroyed. Therefore, it is well-established that only objects perceived by the senses are real.

For those chatter-boxes who accept the validity of inference, verbal testimony etc., and seek to establish pleasure and pain in the forms of heaven and hell, etc., to be achieved through the agencies of virtue and vice, and never cease in their efforts, an illustration is cited: 'Oh! Blessed one! Look at the footprints of the wolf!' Thus, for example, a certain person, after drawing, with the movement of his own fingers, the shape of a wolf's footprints on the layer of dust made even by a very gently blowing breeze, said to his wife, who had become eager to see the footprints of a wolf, 'Oh! Blessed one! Look at the footprints of the wolf!'

What is the implication? Just as her shrewd husband fulfilled her desire for seeing the footprint of a wolf—she, being an artless lady, was unaware of the real fact—by deceiving her only with the marks made by his fingers, so also these people—knaves in the garb of the pious, and bent upon only cheating others—and ordinary people, by somehow convincing them of the infallibility of certain inferences and verbal testimonies, into the dilemma of what is to be eaten and what is not, who is fit for copulation and who is unfit, what is desirable and what is to be avoided, etc., by enticing them away with the hope of enjoying pleasures to be attained after reaching heaven, etc.

and produce blind faith in pious acts

(*Verse 82*): Oh! The one who has become all the more beautiful! Drink and eat. Oh! The one with a charming body! That which is past does not belong to you. Oh! The timid one! The past never comes back. This body is only a collectivity.

Commentary

'Oh! The one who has become all the more beautiful!' The expression is evocative for a lady in whom beauty—the presence of (charming) face, eyes, etc.—has occurred. Drink—any fixed rule regarding what is to be drunk and what is not to be drunk being done away with, take liquor, etc. (according to your free will). (You should) not only drink, but also eat, without paying any heed as to what is eatable and what is not, take meat, etc. (according to your choice). Or, 'drink' means 'drink' the lips etc. (of the beloved)' (i.e. engage in the act of kissing), and 'eat' means enjoy the objects of pleasure. And all this is the advice coming from an impassioned man. That is, crown your youth with success.

But then, due to the acquisition of virtue, it would be easy to acquire beauty (of the limbs) even in a different birth. Apprehending such a rejoinder from the opponent, it is said, 'Oh! The one with a charming body!' 'Oh! The one with remarkable limbs!' That which is past, youth, etc., which have gone away, would not come to you once again, but you will only be worn out with old age, and this is the implication. Although the vocative expressions, 'Oh! The one who has become all the more beautiful!' and 'Oh! The one with a charming body!' have the same meanings, there is no fault of repetition because of the excessiveness of care and affection.

But, then, if one indulges in continuous eating and drinking according to one's free will, one would be subject to an intolerable series of pains in the other world. If, however, one accumulates merit, it would be quite easy for one to obtain youth, etc., even in a different birth. Refuting such a contention of the opponent, it has been said, 'Oh! The timid one! The past

never comes back.' Oh! The timid one! Oh! The one who just upon the words of the opponent, has become fearful of the suffering to be experienced in hell, etc.! The past, pleasures, youth, etc., which you have already enjoyed in this birth, would not come back, would not appear again, in the other world. Thus, disregarding the pleasures of this world, performing painful acts such as the practice of penance, etc., with the desire for enjoying pleasures in the other world, is simply useless.

But then, what if it be said that because of the presence of a cause-effect relation, pleasure and pain, etc., which have specific causes, are necessarily to be experienced even in the other world, through this body? So it is said: 'This body is only a collectivity.' This body, this physical frame, is only a collectivity. Collectivity means assembling together a conjunction of the four forms of matter which will presently be stated. (The body is) that much only. The word 'only' (*eva*) is in the sense of specification (*avadhāraṇa*). The body is only the related state of the four forms of matter, and not anything dependent upon pleasure and pain, etc., to be experienced through the fruition of pious and non-pious actions performed in the previous birth, etc. The conjunctions are liable to destruction within a short time, like those of a flock of birds seated upon the rows of tree-tops. In short, the implication of the verse is that paying no heed to the other world, drink and eat according to your free will.

Regarding consciousness, it is said—

(*Verse 83*): Moreover, earth, water, fire and air are the four forms of matter. According to them, these four are the basis (*bhūmi*) of consciousness, and the only valid form of knowledge is the one produced by the senses.

Commentary

'Moreover' is in the sense of introduction. *Pṛthvī* or earth, *jala* or water, *tejas* or fire and *vāyu* or air—these are the four forms of matter (and there is no other form). According to

them, i.e. the Cārvākas, these are the basis of consciousness, i.e. the causes for the production of consciousness. The implication is that all these four forms of matter collectively produce consciousness along with the body (*piṇḍa*).

Again, valid knowledge, knowledge which is non-erroneous, is ascertained to be only the one produced by the senses. That is, perception is the only source of valid knowledge.

But then, how can the production of consciousness be ascertained in the body, which is produced by the combination of the four forms of matter (which are all unconscious)? Apprehending such an objection, it is said—

(*Verse 84*): When there is a collectivity (*saṃhati*) of the forms of matter, the earth, etc., there is production of the body and others. Just as the power of intoxication (is produced) from the ingredients of a spiritous drink, so also is determined (in the body) the presence of the self's essential mark (*ātmatā*, i.e. consciousness).

Commentary

Earth, etc., all the forms of matter that are there, namely, earth, water, fire and air; when collected together, mutually combined, conjoined with one another; there is the production of the body and others. By 'others' is (to be understood) various things like the mountain, etc., which are also to be known as produced from the conjunction of the four.

An illustration is given. Just as, i.e. in the same manner, from the ingredients of a spiritous drink, i.e. from molasses, *dhātakī* fruit, etc., which are the components of liquor, is produced the power of intoxication, i.e. the capacity for making one drunk; so also, i.e. in a similar way, due to the combination of the four forms of matter, in the body itself is determined the presence of the self's essential mark, i.e. consciousness is produced (in the body itself).

Such being really the case, the following concluding remarks are made by way of giving (proper) advice—

(*Verse 85*): Therefore, the Cārvākas have contended that, on

the part of the ordinary people, the activity for the obtainment of the unseen, leaving aside the seen, is only extreme foolishness.

Commentary

The word 'therefore' is added for the purpose of drawing attention to what has already been said. Thus, 'therefore' means 'for the reasons previously discussed.' 'By leaving aside the seen': the seen means pleasures which can be directly enjoyed, depending upon what are fit or unfit for drinking, what are fit or unfit to be eaten, and who are fit or unfit to have copulation with.

By leaving aside such pleasures (foolish persons engage themselves) in respect of the unseen, i.e. pleasures to be enjoyed in the other world, which are to be obtained by painful acts like the practice of penance, etc.; activities, exertions, made for their obtainment . . . as are observed on the part of the ordinary people, are extreme foolishness, a kind of delusion. This is what the Cārvākas, the Laukāyatikas, have propagated, i.e. they believe in (the truth of) such (a position). The foolish people, their judgement vitiated by statements made by deceitful persons, leave aside the pleasures of the ordinary world and uselessly (hanker after) heaven, and pay no heed to the pleasures of this world, even though they are within easy reach, by practising penance, muttering spells, performing meditations and offering oblations, because of a thirst for liberation.

(*Verse 86*): According to their view, the pleasure that is produced in (the heart of) a person due to the obtainment of the desired and the avoidance (of the undesired) is useless; it is nothing better than the (empty) sky.

Commentary

The obtainment, the acquisition, of some object which is sought to be obtained, which is desired; and the avoidance the absence, of some object which is not desired; the pleasure that

is produced, brought about, by these two, in (the heart of) a person, some individual, is admitted, considered, by them, the Cārvākas, as useless, not serving any purpose, simply empty. The implication is that in no way can there exist pleasure and pain, etc., to be acquired by virtue and vice accumulated in various births. Such pleasure is nothing better than the empty sky. Just as the sky is only emptiness, so also, this form of pleasure is nothing but non-existence itself.

Concluding the discussion, it is said—

(*Verse 87*): Thus, the doctrine of the Lokāyata is also presented here in brief. The implication of the conclusions (*abhidheya*) is to be critically discussed by the intelligent.

Commentary

Thus, in the above manner, the doctrine of the Lokāyata is also presented here in brief. The word 'also' (*api*) is in the sense of addition (*samuccaya*). That is, not only have the doctrines of others been presented here in brief, but also that of the Lokāyatas (has been added).

Well, a treatise (*saṅgraha*) on the doctrines held by all the systems is found to be a record of so many conflicting views proposed by each of the systems, and people (studying it) would simply become confused as regards what is actually to be done. Hence, advice regarding what is to be done is given by 'the implication' etc. The implication of the conclusions is to be critically discussed by those possessed of intelligence, i.e. by the learned. The conclusions are what are sought to be conveyed, what are sought to be established as the essential expedients for liberation, the accepted viewpoints of the particular system; their implications, their real significances, are to be examined by the intelligent, i.e. persons who possess a clear, impartial, critical faculty, and not by those who are possessed by perverse motives. As it has been said: 'A person with too much inclination (towards a particular view) would like to find arguments (whatsoever) for whichever view his

mind is fixed upon. But truly, one's conviction should rest only upon that for which there is (valid) argument, from one who is free from impartiality.'

Although the different systems have unanimity as regards their ultimate aim, they have different kinds of instructions to be imparted and hence, there being scope for confusion, people would become perplexed; and since they would touch upon all, it would be difficult for them to be the expedients for heaven and liberation. Therefore the real implications are to be critically determined. As it has been critically considered by the older ones (*cirantana*): 'The doctrine (*dharma*) of Sugata is to be listened to; but that of the Arhat is to be followed, that of the Veda to be practised, and the highest Śiva to be meditated upon.' Thus, the implication of the final verse is that, critically judging all this, the essential truth which is the most beneficial is to be arrived at by the wise.

Gunaratna's *Commentary on Haribhadra*

B. THE LOKĀYATA DOCTRINE

First, the characteristics (*svarūpa*) of the Nāstikas are being stated. The Nāstikas are a kind of people, including Brahmins and ending with the low-born, who carry human skulls, smear their bodies with ashes and practise *yoga*.

They do not admit the self, virtue (*puṇya*), vice (*pāpa*) and the like. They speak of the world as consisting of only four forms of matter. Some sections of the Cārvākas, considering *ākāśa* as the fifth form of matter, declare that the world consists of five forms of matter.

In their view, consciousness is produced from these forms of matter, like the power of intoxication. Living beings are like water-bubbles. The self is nothing but the body as characterized by consciousness. They take spiritous drinks and meat and also copulate with those unfit to be sexually approached (*agamyā*) like the mother, etc. Every year, on a particular day, they assemble and copulate randomly with women. They do not consider *dharma* to be anything different from *kāma*. Their names are Cārvāka, Lokāyata, etc. (The word *cārvāka* is derived from the root *carv* listed as) the roots *gal* and *carv* mean 'to eat'; they are called Cārvākas, because they chew up (*carvanti*), eat up (*bhakṣayanti*), i.e. do not consider as realities a host of entities such as virtue, vice, etc., which are imperceptible. The word is irregularly formed (*nipātana*) by a rule of the Uṇādi section of Siddhahaima (grammar) beginning with *mayāka-śyāmāka*, etc. The word *loka* means ordinary people who act without discretion, and since the Cārvākas act like them, they are also called Lokāyatas and Laukāyatikas. As they subscribe to the views propounded by Bṛhaspati, they are also known as Bārhaspatyas.

Their doctrine itself is stated as follows:

(*Verse 80*): The Lokāyatas say: There is neither self nor final bliss (*nirvṛti*). Merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) also do not exist. Nor is there any fruit of virtue (*puṇya*) and vice (*pāpa*).

The explanation is as follows, according to the Lokāyatas and the Nāstikas.

How? It is said, a self which is (supposed to be) conscious and capable of travelling to the other world does not exist, because in this very world, when a living being dies, consciousness too—which is produced from the five forms of 'great matter' (*mahābhūta*)—is destroyed, and there is no possibility of a travel to the other world. If one reads *devaḥ* in place of *jīvaḥ*, the meaning would be: there is no god who is omniscient, etc. So, also, there is no final bliss, i.e. liberation (*mokṣa*). Moreover, the so-called two, merit and demerit, do not exist, and virtue and vice too are absolutely non-existent. Futher, there is absolutely no fruit of virtue and vice, such as heaven, hell, etc. The implication is that if merit and demerit are them-

selves non-existent, wherefrom, indeed, can their fruits be produced?

In order to show how they have tauntingly stated (their view) in their own Śāstra, the author says:

Here is their view.

(*Verse 81*) This world (*loka*) consists only of as much as is within the scope of the sense (*indriya-gocara*). Oh! Dear! only those who lack sufficient experience (*a-bahu-śruta*) make such a (foolish) statement as, 'Look at the footprints of the wolf.'

The expression 'here is' is by way of introduction. 'Their view' means the view of the Nāstikas, for the discussion has started with them. The implication of the expression *indriya-gocara* is as follows. The senses are five—tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory; that which is within their scope (*gocara*), i.e. can be known by them (is *indriya-gocara*). Only such things exist in reality as can be known by the five senses, and nothing else. By the word 'world' are to be understood the various things which are found in this world.

Thus the self, virtue and vice, their fruits in the form of heaven and hell, etc., which are admitted by the opponents do not really exist, for they are imperceptible. If it is admitted that even imperceptible things may exist, then even a horn growing on a hare and a son born of a barren woman should exist. In fact, nothing can ever be known by these five kinds of perception except things which are soft or hard, substances which are bitter, pungent or astringent, things which have fragrance or bad smell, a great number of movable and immovable things like the earth, mountains, regions, trees, columns, lotuses, etc., and also human beings, animals, wild beasts, etc., and further, the various kinds of sounds coming from the flute, *vīṇā*, etc.

In spite of the fact that no entity capable of travelling to the other world, distinct from consciousness produced by matter, and conceived to be the real cause of consciousness, is ever apprehended by perception, (the opponents foolishly) claim—as if drawing a charming picture on the sky—that there are

things like merit and demerit which are the causes of living beings' pleasure and pain, heaven and hell which are abodes for the enjoyment of fruits of the most intense forms of merit and demerit, and liberation which results from the destruction of virtue and vice. To whom would all these not be simply ludicrous?

There are, indeed, people who firmly believe in the existence of the self, etc., although such things can never be touched, tasted, smelt, seen or heard; their judgement is baffled by their yearning for pleasures like heaven, liberation, etc.; they fritter away their human life with sufferings like enduring the extreme heat of the sun, etc., while engaged in the practice of penances of the most difficult kind after shaving off the head and the face. It is only futile activity on their part due to their being under the influence of a great delusion. Thus it has been said: 'Penances are only various forms of torments, and abstinence is only depriving oneself of the pleasures of life. The rituals of Agnihotra, etc., appear only to be child's play. Live happily as long as you live—enjoying worldly pleasures. How can the body, burnt to ashes, return once again?'

Therefore, it is well established that only that which is within the scope of the senses is really existent.

However, there are some who think that inference has validity in respect of things which are imperceptible, and with its help they seek to establish the realities of self, virtue, vice, etc., and never cease in their efforts in this regard. To convince them (of the Cārvāka view), an illustration is being given: Oh! Dear! Look at the footprints of the wolf!

Here is a traditional story. Once there was a man, his mind deeply inculcated with ideas advocated by the Cārvāka doctrine. But his own wife had her mind deeply rooted in Āstika doctrine. Very diligently, every day, he tried to convince her with arguments set forth in his own system. But as she was not convinced, (he hit upon a plan) and thought to himself, 'she will be convinced by this process.' So thinking, in the later part of the night, he went out of the city along with her, and said to her:

'Oh! Dear! In this city there live some people who maintain that inference has validity in respect of imperceptible things, and they are held as men of great wisdom by ordinary people. But just mark their dexterity in the matter of critical judgement.' Then, starting from the city-gate up to the junction of the four roads, on the main thoroughfare where the mass of dust has been made even by the breeze blowing gently, he made footprints of the wolf on the mass of dust, on both sides of his own body, by pressing upon the three fingers joined together of both his hands. Then in the morning, finding those footprints, a large crowd gathered on the main thoroughfare. The men of great wisdom who also arrived there said to the people: 'As the footprints of the wolf cannot be explained otherwise (it is to be concluded that) at night, some wolf must have come here from the forest.'

So the man, finding them speaking in such terms, said to his wife: 'Oh! Dear! My beloved one! Look at, consider, the case of these footprints of the wolf.' But what is there to be considered? The answer is given: 'That these people who lack sufficient experience speak of and discuss the footprints of the wolf'. According to popular belief they may be men of great wisdom, but since they are speaking without ascertaining the actual position, they are actually men without sufficient experience. If the reading accepted is 'those who are men of great experience speak like', etc. then the implication is to be explained as, 'they are men of great wisdom only according to popular belief (and not in reality)'.

Now, these persons who do not know well the actual fact regarding the footprints of the wolf, speaking, though many in number, like a single person, may create confusion in the minds of ignorant persons; but still, their words would never be acceptable to those who are well-aware of the truth. So also, there are many preachers (*vādin*) who are really cunning fellows disguised as pious ones and who have the sole aim only of cheating others.

They speak in a similar way about the existence of the self,

etc. by producing conviction with the help of some sort of inference, verbal testimony etc. They may indeed produce confusion in the minds of many persons foolish enough to be pious by throwing them into dilemmas regarding the eatable and non-eatable, persons fit or unfit to copulate with, things to be desired and things to be avoided, etc., alluring them with hosts of pleasures to be obtained by the attainment of heaven, etc. But all their words are despised by the noble. Thus the lady finally accepted the validity of all the words of her husband.

To show what her husband advised her to do after that, the author says:

(*Verse 82*): Oh! the one with beautiful eyes! Drink and eat (as you like). Oh! the one with a charming body! That which is past does not belong to you. Oh! the timid one! The past never comes back. This body is nothing but a collectivity.

The explanation is as follows. Oh! the one with beautiful eyes! Oh! the one with charming eyes! Drink, there being no restriction as to what is to be drunk and what is not to be drunk; drink spirits, etc. (according to your liking). You should not only drink, but also eat, without considering what is to be eaten and what is not to be eaten; take meat, etc. (according to your liking). The acts of drinking and eating are mentioned by way of illustration. Hence, the following advice also is to be understood therefrom: disregarding restriction as to persons fit or unfit to copulate with, enjoy the pleasures (as much as you like) and thereby bring fulfilment to your own youth. Oh! the one with the most excellent limbs! the age of youth, once it is past, once it has gone away, 'will never be yours again', the expression is to be supplied elliptically.

But then, if one drinks, eats and enjoys pleasures according to one's own choice, one would surely be afflicted by a host of sufferings in the other world. On the other hand (if one does not do so), it would be easy to accumulate virtue; and as a result, in the other world, one would enjoy pleasures, have happiness, and be blessed with youth. To refute such an objection that may be raised by the opponent, it has been said: No,

etc. Oh! the timid one—one perturbed by the apprehension of sufferings to be experienced in hell, etc. The past, i.e. moments of pleasure, youth, etc.; which have been spent in this world, are never offered once again in the other world.

That is, it is useless to abandon the pleasures of this world by performing painful acts like the practice of penance, etc., with a desire for obtaining pleasures in the other world.

Well, a living being is under constraint of its actions, good and bad. As a result, it lives at present, inhabiting the present body (and experiences pleasure and pain through it, according to the nature of its action). Similarly, in the other world as well (after assuming another body), it should experience pleasure, pain, etc., the results of its own actions (through that body). Apprehending such an objection, it has been said (that the body is) only a collectivity. 'Collectivity' means the conjunction of the four forms of matter (and the body is) that much alone. The word 'alone' (*mātra*) is in the sense of exclusion (*avadhāraṇa*). On the basis of ellipsis, it is to be understood that just this perceptible body, the physical frame, exists; and in the body, there exists no self which is distinct from the mere conjunction of the four forms of matter, capable of travelling to the other world and the experiencer of fruits of actions good and bad. This conjunction of the four forms of matter is observed, like the flash of lightning, to be destroyed in a very short time. Therefore, without paying any heed to the idea of the other world, drink and eat according to your wish.

Next are stated the objects of valid knowledge (*prameya*; the forms of realities) and the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Moreover—

(*Verse 83*): Matter is of four forms—earth, water, fire and air. Earth is the substratum of all these. That (knowledge) alone is valid (*hi*) which is produced by the senses.

The explanation is as follows. 'Moreover' is used in the sense of addition. Earth, water, fire and air are the four forms of matter. Earth, again, is the substratum of all these forms of matter.

If the reading of the text is accepted to be *caitanya-bhūmir eteṣām*, the implication would be as follows. (To the question) 'characterized by what does this group of four become the seat of consciousness, the substratum for the origin of consciousness?' (it is answered that) the four forms of matter collected together produce the single (property of) consciousness. And such a view is upheld by the Cārvākas.

If, again, the reading of the text is accepted to be different, namely, *pramāṇa-bhūmir eteṣām*, the implication would be as follows. The four forms of matter are the only things accessible to *pramāṇa*, i.e. capable of being established by *pramāṇa*; i.e., they are the only realities, according to Cārvākas.

The only form of valid knowledge is sense-perception and nothing else; knowledge derived through inference, etc., has no validity. The word 'indeed' (*hi*) has been used here to indicate a speciality. The speciality, again, is that the Cārvākas admit the validity of inferences which tend to facilitate the daily activities of ordinary people, such as the inference (of fire) from smoke, etc., but they never admit the validity of extra-ordinary inferences which seek to establish heaven, merit and demerit, etc.

But then, how can the production of consciousness in the body, which is a product of the four forms of matter, be explained? Apprehending such an objection, it is said:

(*Verse 84*): Due to the combination (*saṃhati*) of the forms of matter such as the earth, etc., as also due to transformation in the shape of a body, consciousness is produced in the body, just as the power of intoxication is produced from the ingredients of a spiritous drink.

The explanation is as follows. The existing forms of matter, namely, earth, water, fire and air; their combination, i.e. their assemblage (*samavāya*), i.e. finally, their mutual conjunction (*saṃyoga*); and with such combination as the cause (they produce consciousness). In the same way, on account of the transformation, they change into the shape of a body (consciousness is produced in the body), and this is how the sentence is to be

construed. Just as from the ingredients of a spiritous drink, molasses, *dhātakī*, etc., is produced the power of intoxication, the capability of making a man drunk; so also is produced *cit*, consciousness, in the *ātman*, the body. Here by the word *ātman*, which has a variety of meanings, is to be understood only the body and not the self. The idea is as follows. There is transformation in the shape of a body from the combination of the four forms of matter, and therefrom exists consciousness in the body.

Alternately, there is a different reading of the verse (according to which the meaning is): 'When there is a combination of the forms of matter such as the earth, etc., there comes about the origin of the body, etc. Just as the power of intoxication is produced from the ingredients of a spiritous drink, so also is the case with consciousness, (*ātmatā*, lit. the specific property of the self).' That is, if there is a combination of the forms of matter, then the origin of the body, etc , would be possible. By 'etc ' is meant that the earth, mountains and other similar things are also produced from a combination of the forms of matter. Just as from the ingredients of a spiritous drink is produced the power of intoxication, so also, due to the combination of the forms of matter, there is, i.e. there is determined to be present in the body, the specific property of the self; namely, consciousness. As Vācaspati has said: The realities (*tattva*) are earth, water, fire and air. The names 'body', 'object' and 'sense' are given to their combinations. Consciousness is produced from them (i.e. the forms of matter).

To describe what they further put forward after thus giving their view (on the forms of realities), it is said:

(*Verse 85*): Therefore the Cārvākas have contended that all activity on the part of ordinary people for the attainment of the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*), leaving aside the seen (*dṛṣṭa*), is only extreme foolishness.

The explanation is as follows. 'Therefore' means, for the very reason that consciousness is produced from the forms of matter. 'Leaving aside the seen': 'seen' means pleasure which can be perceptually known, that belongs to this world, is of an ordinary nature and is produced from an object of enjoyment. After leaving aside all this, activity—i.e. effort for obtainment—on the part of ordinary people in respect of the unseen, namely, pleasure, etc., to be enjoyed in the other world and to be achieved by painful acts like the practice of penance, etc., is nothing but extreme foolishness or crass ignorance. This is the view the Cārvākas have propounded—they are convinced of it. The main point of their contention is: people have their critical judgement baffled by the verbosity of knaves. Leaving aside worldly pleasures which are within their easy reach, they strive (with a desire for obtaining pleasures like heaven and liberation) by practising penance, muttering spells, sitting in meditation, offering oblations, etc. The only cause for such acts is their ignorance.

Next, to state what the Cārvākas say addressing those who, with their hearts overflowing with the sentiment of quietitude (*śānta-rasa*), speak about the incomparable bliss of quietitude (*śama-sukha*), the author says:

(*Verse 86*): According to them, the pleasure produced in (the heart of) a person by activity for obtaining the desirable (*sādhya*) and for avoiding (the undesirable) is useless. Indeed (*hi*), *dharma* is not superior to *kāma*.

The explanation is as follows. The word *sādhya* means meditation (*dhyāna*), which is of two kinds, desirable and undesirable. The two desirable ones are the virtuous (*dharmya*) and the pure (*śukla*). The two undesirable ones are the painful (*ārta*) and the cruel (*raudra*).

Or, the word *sādhya* means the two kinds of action performed. Desirable actions are those leading to virtue; namely, practice of penance, abstinence, etc. Undesirable actions are those leading to vice; namely, striving for objects of enjoyment, pleasure, etc. Thus, according to Cārvākas' view, the pleasure, the mental happiness, which arises and is produced in a person, in an ordinary man, on account of activity for obtaining and for avoiding—i.e. engaging oneself in, and disengaging oneself from—respectively the two (the desirable and the undesirable), is

useless and serves no purpose, i.e. is quite fruitless and unreal. Indeed, this is because *dharma* is not superior to *kāma*, the constant enjoyment of pleasures derived from objects of the senses. The idea is that *kāma* is the highest form of *dharma* and the highest form of bliss is produced by it.

Or, to show what the Cārvākas say to those who maintain that, in this world as well, due to the influence of *dharma*, one succeeds in performing desirable actions and in avoiding undesirable ones, it has been said: 'Activity for obtaining the desirable and for avoiding (the undesirable) etc.' (It is claimed that) there is success, fruitful completion, of the intended, the action sought to be performed, by means of the practice of penance, muttering spells, offering oblations, etc. Also, by the same means of practising penance, muttering spells, etc., it is possible to remove, to nullify, to make as good as non-existent, all obstacles to the attainment of the intended. On account of these two, success in respect of the intended and removal of the obstacles (to its achievement) pleasure is produced in the heart of a person. But (the Cārvākas point out) such pleasure is useless. Since the word *artha* is also applicable in the sense of 'cause', the meaning may be that (such pleasure) is really without any cause, without any proper ground; indeed, because in their view, *dharma* is not superior to *kāma*, and the implication here is as before.

Concluding the discussion, it is said:

(*Verse 87*): Thus, the doctrine of the Lokāyata is also hereby presented in brief. The tenets, and their implications, are to be critically examined by the intelligent.

The explanation is as follows. 'Thus', i.e. in the above manner. Since the word 'also' is in the sense of addition, (the meaning is that), here, not only have the doctrines of other schools been stated in brief, but also the doctrine of the Lokāyata, as just discussed.

Well, if here the doctrines of all—the Buddhists and others—are only stated in brief, how would one ascertain, in detail, the ultimate truths in them?

Apprehending such an objection, it has been said: 'the tenets', etc. The tenets, or the views sought to be conveyed by all the systems of philosophy, and their implications, the ultimate truths in their manifold signification—one should oneself discuss all these and critically examine them from different viewpoints, considering their pros and cons.

Or, since in the list of roots there is a root *locṛd*, in the sense 'to see' (from which the word *paryālocya* of the text may be derived), the idea is that (for truths propounded in the other systems) intelligent people, people with a keen intellect, should look into the particular authoritative works of particular schools; for the present work in the style of the Sūtra is meant for the convenience of people who have a liking for brief discussion.

Or, on hearing about the mutual conflicts in the tenets accepted by all the systems of philosophy, people become confused about what is to be done. To advise them as to what is to be done, it is said: 'the tenets', etc. The tenets are the conclusions sought to be established by all the systems of philosophy. Their implications, the ultimate purports, established by discerning the true and the untrue, are to be critically discussed, to be reviewed carefully; not to be accepted simply as they are stated, without any critical consideration. By whom? By the intelligent—by people who have a fine, discriminating intellect, free from partiality, following the right path; by them alone and not by those guided by perverse motives.

Thus it has been said: 'A person who is too enthusiastic (about some particular view) would like to find arguments in favour of that view alone upon which his mind is fixed. But truly, one's conviction should rest only in that in favour of which there is argument from one free of partiality.'

The idea here is as follows. On hearing about the mutual conflicts in the views of all systems of philosophy, confused people become interested either in all the systems of philosophy, or completely partial to their own system of philosophy alone. Thus it becomes difficult for them to progress to heaven and liberation. Therefore, by assuming the role of an impartial

judge (*madhyastha*), one should discern the actual position by discriminating between what is true and what is untrue. After such critical deliberation the beneficial path is to be adopted, and efforts are to be made in that direction by those who have a keen intellect.

C. GUṆARATNA ON BHŪTA-CAITANYA-VĀDA

The Cārvākas discuss (the nature of the self) in the following manner.

The forms of matter which become the causes for consciousness are only found when they are transformed in the shape of a body. But there is nothing called the self which is distinct from them, transmigrates to another birth, and possesses the characteristics said to belong to it (by you), because there is no proof of its existence.

Thus (it may be asked), what kind of proof is truly possible for the existence of a self distinct from the forms of matter—perception, or inference?

It cannot be perception, because perception can have for its object only colour, etc., as connected to their own specific senses, and as such, it cannot pertain to the self which is quite different in nature from them.

However, it cannot be said that a self distinct from the forms of matter is revealed as the agent (*kartṛ*) of the act of knowing (when one acquires) an awareness involving the 'I', namely, 'I know a jar', for it can easily be justified as having the body itself for its object, as in the cases of awareness like 'I am fat', 'I am thin', etc. Such forms of awareness can, in no way, have the self as the underlying object, because properties like fatness, etc., cannot belong to the self. So also, in the awareness 'I know a jar', no self other than the body—as assumed by you (the opponent)—is ever revealed as the underlying object, even in a dream. If one assumes the existence even of what is never revealed by knowledge, there would be unnecessarily

manifold assumptions (*kalpanā-gaurava*) and also an absence of the fixed order of things.

It also cannot be said that an awareness involving the 'I' cannot logically pertain to the body, which is non-sentient, like the jar, etc., because it becomes sentient when consciousness is produced in it.

Nor can it be said that the cause of such consciousness is the self, for, as such a thing is never perceived, it would be illogical to claim that it is the cause of consciousness, there arising such a possibility even in the case of a flower blooming in the sky, etc. Therefore, it being well-established, the body itself would logically be the cause of consciousness.

(The body is the cause of consciousness) also because consciousness has agreements in presence and in absence with the body. The inferential formulation here would be: when one thing has agreements in presence and in absence with another thing, the former becomes the effect of the latter, e.g. the jar (is the effect of) a lump of clay. Consciousness also has agreements in presence and in absence with the body; hence, the body is the cause of consciousness. Everywhere, the cause-effect relation is determined by agreements in presence and in absence. The two are possible in the present case, too—when the body is there, consciousness is found to be there; and when the body is not there, consciousness is not found to be there.

Further, it cannot be said that the fact of such agreements in presence and in absence is not proved, as consciousness is not found to be there in a corpse, for in the state of death, there is the absence of the body itself due to the absence of air and fire; and by 'body' is meant nothing but a specific kind of conjunction of the forms of matter. Indeed, it is not logical that consciousness would be produced even when the mere shape of the body (and not a real body) is present, for in that case there arises the possibility of consciousness being produced even in a horse painted in a picture.

It is thus established that consciousness is an effect of the

body. As the production of an awareness involving the 'I' is logically possible in respect of the body itself as characterised by consciousness, it cannot be said that the self is a thing known by perception (viz. the said form of awareness). As such, it must be non-existent. The inferential formulation here would be: the self is non-existent, because it is absolutely unperceived; that which is absolutely unperceived is non-existent, e.g. a flower blooming in the sky; that which is existent is perceived (at least somewhere), e.g. a jar. Atoms are, no doubt, imperceptible, but they acquire perceptibility when they are transformed into effects, such as the jar, etc. But likewise, the self never acquires perceptibility. That is why the qualifying term 'absolutely' has been added there and as such, there is no irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) by the instance of atoms.

Similarly, neither is inference capable of proving the existence of the self as distinct from the forms of matter, because it is not a source of valid knowledge. Or even if it be a source of valid knowledge, the probans would suffer from the fallacy of the mistimed (*kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*), being advanced after putting forward an inferential subject (*pakṣa*) which is contradicted by perception. An inferential subject in the form of the self as distinct from the body is indeed contradicted by perception.

Moreover, inference is to be preceded by a recollection of the concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Thus, a person earlier ascertains, by perception, the invariable concomitance, based on agreements in presence and in absence between the probans and the probandum; such as, smoke and fire in the kitchen, etc., and afterwards, seeing a column of smoke reaching up to the sky somewhere else, in a forest or in the valley of a mountain, etc., recollects the concomitance ascertained earlier. Then (he goes on to infer fire), 'I have found that wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the instances of the kitchen, etc. Smoke is seen here. Therefore, fire must also be present here'. In this way, on the basis of the perception of the probans and the recollection of the concomitance, a person ascertains the presence of fire in a place.

However, in a similar manner, no concomitance of the self, the probandum, can be established by perception, with any probans; so that a person recollecting the concomitance between the two, as well as perceiving the probans once again, may have an inferential knowledge of the self. If, again, the concomitance between the self and the probans is established by perception, then a perception of the self too would have to be admitted, and as such an inference would be useless, as the existence of the self would be established by that very perception.

It also cannot be said that the self is established by an inference based on general observation (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*), like the movement of the sun—the sun has movement because it is found to occupy different places, like Devadatta. For indeed, in the case of Devadatta, the one cited as the corroborative instance, the fact that the occupation of different places is, in general, the result of movement is ascertained by perception itself; and hence, it is quite logical that a person infers movement in the same manner in respect of the sun as well. But in the case of the self, no instance is found in which may be perceived a probans having invariable concomitance with the presence of the self. Hence, the self cannot be established even by an inference based on general observation.

Nor can the self be ascertained by verbal testimony (*āgama*). The validity of verbal testimony is due to its being conveyed by a trustworthy person (*āpta*) whose words are never falsified (*avisaṃvādi*). However, nowhere can we find any such trustworthy person, whose words are never falsified—a person who has even known the self by perception. If we do not actually find (any such person), why should we deceive ourselves? Moreover, all verbal testimonies are found to be contradicted by one another. Therefore, the validity of verbal testimony is licked by the flames of the forest-fire of doubt; namely, 'which one is valid and which one is invalid?' Thus the self cannot be established by the source of valid knowledge known as verbal testimony.

Similarly, the self cannot be proved by the source of valid

knowledge known as comparison (*upamāna*). In the case of comparison, similarity produces a cognition in respect of an object not connected with the sense, as in, 'the *gavaya* is like the cow', etc. But not even in the three worlds is there any object similar to the self by comparison with which we can ascertain the existence of the self. If it be objected that there are, in fact, things similar to the self, such as *kāla*, *ākāśa*, *diś*, etc., it would be futile, for their existence is also equally under dispute and they, also, are tied up at the roots (i.e. belong to the same category of the non-existent).

So also, the self cannot be proved by presumption (*arthāpatti*) either. There is not a single thing, seen or heard, the existence of which is not explicable without the assumption of the self, so that on its strength we may establish the self.

Therefore, as it is found that (the self is) beyond the scope of any source of valid knowledge which can prove a thing to be actually existent, it is only logical to conclude that the self is an object of the source of valid knowledge called non-apprehension (*abhāva*), which alone can establish the non-existence of a thing.

The above is now being refuted.

As to the statement 'there are only found forms of matter transformed into the shape of a body, and not any self distinct from them, because there is no proof for its existence', etc., (we say) it is a statement made without critical consideration; for there is proof for its existence, which is perception itself. Thus in the case of every living being, there is observed to be produced an awareness in the form 'I experience pleasure', which is self-cognized and refers to the thing known, the knower and the knowledge itself, clearly distinguishing each from the others. Such awareness is not false, for there is no contradiction. Nor is it a form of doubt, as it does not involve two alternatives. Nor is it logical that such an awareness should be without an underlying object, for then there would arise the absurdity of the awareness of colour, etc., also being without any underlying object.

Nor can it have the body as the underlying object, because it is produced exclusively by the function of the internal senses, independent of the external senses. The body cannot be the object revealed by such an awareness involving the 'I', because it is an object for the external sense. Hence, some entity distinct from the body, which is the underlying object of such an awareness and a substratum of knowledge, has to be admitted, for logically, such an entity alone can be considered a knower. And since such an entity is nothing but the self, it is etablished that the self is known by perception in the form of self-cognition.

Further, as to the statement that an awareness involving the 'I' can logically pertain to the body itself, as it can become sentient when consciousness is produced in it, etc. (we say) this is just useless talk. For even after the production of consciousness, an awareness involving the 'I' can logically pertain only to what is itself sentient, and not to what is itself non-sentient. Thus, for example, it is observed that even with the assistance of light from more than a thousand lamps, a jar is never capable of revealing things, but only a lamp is. Similarly, even with the production of consciousness, the body, which is itself non-sentient, cannot be the knower; and logically, the self alone can be considered the knower, and hence an awareness involving the 'I' can be produced in respect of the self and nothing else.

As to the forms of awareness 'I am fat', 'I am thin', etc., which are actually observed to be produced, the fact is that they are produced in respect of the body simply because it is the most useful implement for the self; and such forms of awareness are only secondary, like one's awareness in respect of one's most useful servant: 'this is none but myself'.

Further, as to the statement you have made, posing like a great debater that the body itself is the cause of consciousness (we say), this is only the raving of a lunatic. For consciousness does not have agreements in presence and in absence with the body. In the case of a person drunk, one who has fainted, and one who is under deep sleep, in spite of the presence of an

intact body, no such consciousness is found to exist. It is also observed that even some men with an emaciated body may have superior consciousness, whereas some men with a plump body may have inferior consciousness. Thus it follows that consciousness has no agreements in presence and in absence with the body and hence, it is not an effect of the body.

Moreover, we do not find any proof for the alleged fact that consciousness is the effect of matter. To explain, it cannot be perception, because it cannot act in respect of imperceptible things. That consciousness, produced or not produced, is an effect of the forms of matter can never come under the scope of perception; for perception, by nature, receives only such things as are fit to be received by it and are connected (with the sense). (But all this is not possible in the case of consciousness), because not being corporeal (*mūrta*), it is not fit to be received by it.

It would also not be possible to know by perception—'I am an effect of the forms of matter'—that the characteristic of being an effect of matter pertains to the self; because the cause-effect relation is known only through agreements in presence and in absence. You (the Cārvākas) do not admit to the existence of any entity distinct from both matter and consciousness which would be the knower of agreements in presence and in absence between the two; for then one would be forced to admit the self.

Nor can it be proved by inference that consciousness is the effect of matter, for its (validity) is not admitted (by the Cārvākas). As you have said: perception alone is a source of valid knowledge, and nothing else. Besides, even if (the validity of inference) is admitted, it would not be possible to establish the intended conclusion by it.

(Objection by the Cārvākas): Consciousness is produced from the forms of matter as transformed into the shape of a body, because only when the body is there, does consciousness exist. From inferences such as 'like the power of intoxication from the ingredients of a spiritous drink', etc., it is quite ably proved that consciousness is an effect of matter.

(Answer by the Jainas:) The above is not acceptable, for the probans would be irregular so far as the rule that only when it (i.e. transformation = the body) is there, does consciousness exist is concerned; because in the state of death, although it (= the body) is there, there is no consciousness.

(Cārvāka objection:) Well, the fact is that consciousness is produced by the collectivity (*samudāya*) of the four—earth, water, fire and air. In a dead body there is no air, and due to its absence, consciousness is not present there. There is thus no irregularity in our argument by the instance of a dead body.

(Jaina answer:) We answer as follows. If the body is something porous (*suṣira*), there is every possibility that air is present there. Moreover, if it were a fact that there is no consciousness due to the absence of air, then consciousness would have been found there after air has been supplied through the pelvis, etc. But consciousness is not found to be there even when air has been supplied there in the said manner.

If it be said that in a dead body, there is no consciousness because of the absence of air in the specific forms of *prāṇa* (air inhaled) and *apāna* (air exhaled), it would not be justified, because air in the specific forms of *prāṇa* and *apāna* is not a cause of consciousness since it does not have agreements in presence and in absence. Thus in the states of death, etc., it is possible that there are long inhalations and exhalations in profusion, and yet there is an extreme loss of consciousness. Again, in the case of a Yogin who has his eyes closed in meditation, has controlled all activities through mind, speech and body, resembles a great ocean unruffled by waves, and has also stopped the flow of *prāṇa* and *apāna*, there is observed an excess of consciousness reaching the highest point of excellence.

If it be claimed that in the state of death, there is no consciousness due to the absence of fire; then (we ask), how is it that consciousness is not found even when fire is added to it?

Moreover, if in the state of death, the absence of consciousness is admitted to be due to the absence of air and fire, then how is to be explained the presence of consciousness in worms,

etc., born in a dead body after some interval? Therefore, all these are only empty words.

Further, consciousness cannot have as the cause only the forms of matter. In that case, consciousness being of the nature of an effect produced only by the forms of matter, and they also being of the nature of causes productive of consciousness, there would be production of clear consciousness always and everywhere, even in a jar, etc., as it is in the case of the human being. Thus, there would remain no distinction between a jar and a human being. (Everything would be alive.)

Well, there is no scope for the absurdities pointed out above; because what we mean to say is that consciousness is found to be produced from forms of matter only when they have been transformed into the shape of a body and have taken up inhalation and exhalation.

No, such a claim would not be proper, for according to your view, the very transformation into the shape of a body cannot logically be justified. In this regard, there can be three alternatives: (i) the transformation into the shape of a body is only due to the forms of matter like the earth, etc. (ii) it is due to some different entity and (iii) it is without any cause

Of these, the first alternative cannot be admitted, because the presence of the earth, etc , being possible everywhere, there arises the possibility that transformation into the shape of a body may also be present everywhere. If it be said that the possibility of consciousness being everywhere does not arise because of the non-availability of the cooperating cause (in some cases), namely, the presence of a requisite proportion (*sāmya*) etc., such a claim would not be proper, because the requisite proportion, etc., also cannot be due to some different entity, as in that case there arises the absurdity of admitting an additional reality; it must be due only to the presence of the earth, etc., and their presence being equally possible everywhere, how can the cooperating cause not be available (in some cases)?

The second alternative—namely, it is due to some different entity—would also be improper, because if such a position is accepted, it would be possible to establish the self.

If it is without any cause, however, there would result an absurdity—it would *always* be present, for it has been said: 'a thing without any cause must either be eternally existent or eternally non-existent, since it does not depend on anything else.'

Therefore in your view, the transformation into the shape of a body cannot be justified. In the absence of such a transformation, the chance of the forms of matter taking up inhalation and exhalation becomes extremely remote. Consciousness cannot be an effect of matter, and therefore it has to be admitted that consciousness is the quality of nothing but the self.

Moreover, since the quality is perceptible, the quality-possessor (*guṇin*) as well, namely the self, must be perceptible. The inferential formulation is: the self is perceptible, because its qualities—specific forms of cognition like recollection, desire to know, desire for action, desire for movement, doubt, etc.—are perceived by self-cognition. It is observed that a thing, the qualities of which are perceptible, is also itself perceptible, e.g. a jar. The self is a thing the qualities of which are perceptible, and hence it is perceptible.

As against the above, the opponent may say that the probans (in the above inference) is irregular, for the quality of *ākāśa*, sound (*śabda*), is perceived, but *ākāśa* is never so. However, we say that this is illogical, because sound is not a quality of *ākāśa*. Sound is, in fact, a quality of matter as it is perceived by an external sense, like colour, etc.

In this context, the following has also been urged: Well, let the quality-possessor also be perceptible, because of its identity with the quality, when the qualities are perceptible. But qualities like knowledge, etc , are found only in the body. Therefore it is only proper that the body should be the quality-possessor for them, as in the case of colour, etc., the jar is so. The inferential

formulation is as follows: knowledge, etc., are qualities of the body only, because they are found only in the body, like fair complexion, leanness, fatness, etc.

Our reply is as follows. It is a mis-statement of thesis (*pakṣā-bhāsa*), the one contradicted by a counter-inference. The counter-inference here is: knowledge, etc., cannot be the qualities of the body either because it is corporeal (*mūrta*), or because it is visible, like a jar. Therefore it is established that the quality-possessor, the self, is also perceptible, because of the perceptibility of the qualities.

Moreover, for one who seeks to deny the perceptible self, known through an awareness involving the 'I', it would be a mis-statement of thesis, the one contradicted by perception, as in the case of 'sound is inaudible', etc.

It would also be a mis-statement of thesis, the one contradicted by inference, as in the case of 'sound is eternal', etc., for, as it will be shown, there exist inferences proving the existence of the self.

Also, for one negating the self which is well-known to people in general, starting from the boy, cowherd, woman, etc., there would also be a contradiction with accepted general practice (*loka-virodha*) as in the case of (one saying) 'there is no sun, the illuminator of things', etc.

Moreover, for one claiming 'I am not "I" (i.e. I negate the self),' there also is self-contradiction in terms.

Therefore finally, it follows that the ground (advanced by the Cārvākas) 'because of being absolutely imperceptible' is unproved, as by the arguments explained above, the self is proved to be perceived by self-cognition.

The self is also ascertained by inferences, which are as follows: The living body is governed by one possessing (conscious) effort, because it is a locus of wilful action, like a chariot.

The auditory sense, etc., which are the instruments for acquiring cognitions, must be led to action by a (conscious) agent, because they are instruments, like the axe, etc.

The body must have a maker (*vidhātṛ*), because it has an origin

and a fixed shape of its own, like a jar. That which is without a maker does not have an origin and a fixed shape of its own, e.g. the ever-changing cloud. That which is the maker of its own body is the self. The Meru mountains, etc., also have fixed shapes of their own, but they do not have any maker. Thus the ground would have become irregular by their instances and hence, to eliminate their cases, it is to be noted, the qualifying expression 'having an origin' has been added.

So also the senses must have a (conscious) agent governing them, because they are instrumental causes, as, for example, the stick, wheel, etc., have the potter.

Again, the body must have an enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), because it is an object of enjoyment (*bhogya*), like a meal. That which is the enjoyer is the self.

But, then, all these grounds (cited for the existence of the self) are contradictory (*viruddha*) ones, for they establish the opposite of what is intended to be proved. Thus it is observed that the makers of the jar, etc.—the potter and others—all have definite shapes, and are subject to death (lit. non-eternal) by nature. Therefore (by the grounds mentioned), a self of such nature alone may be established. But the self is intended to be proved as having quite an opposite nature. Thus all these grounds, since they establish the opposite of what is intended to be proved, are only contradictory.

No, such an objection would not be proper. For the self, while in worldly existence (*saṃsāra*), being encircled by eight kinds of *karma*-matter (*karma-pudgala*) (fine particles of matter that bind the self to worldly existence), has a (material) body and as such, it is somewhat characterized by a definite shape. Therefore, there is no objection.

So also, the knowledge of colour, etc., must reside somewhere, because it is a quality, like colour, etc. So also, knowledge, pleasure, etc., must have some material cause, because they are effects, like the jar, etc. It cannot be said that it would be a case of proving the proved, as the body itself is intended to be their substratum and the material cause, for the claim that

the body is their substratum and the material cause has already been refuted.

So also, the term *a-jīva* (not-self) must have an opposite, because it is the negation of a chaste (*śuddha*) word having a grammatical derivation (*vyutpatti*). When there is observed the negation of a chaste word having grammatical derivation, there exists an opposite, e.g. the term *a-ghaṭa* (not-jar) has, for its opposite, *ghaṭa* (jar). In the term *a-ghaṭa*, there is a negation of a chaste word having grammatical derivation, and therefore, an opposite in the form of *ghaṭa* must be there. Where there is no opposite, there is no negation of a chaste word having grammatical derivation, as in the case of the terms *a-kharaviṣāṇa* and *a-ḍittha*. In the term *a-kharaviṣāṇa*, there is the negation of an unchaste compounded term, namely, *khara-viṣāṇa* (horn growing on an ass). There is no opposite here, because although there is grammatical derivation, there is no chaste word. In the term *a-ḍittha*, there is no grammatical derivation although there is a chaste word, and hence there is really no entity in the form of *ḍittha* as the opposite, as (in the case of *a-jīva*) there is *jīva*.

After establishing in one's own body the presence of the self as perceived by self-cognition, (the presence of the self) in another person's body can also be established by inference based on general observation. Thus (the inferential formulation would be), the self is present in another person's body as well, because action for acquiring (*pravṛtti*) and action for avoiding (*nivṛtti*) in respect of things desirable and undesirable respectively are observed. In another person's body are also observed actions for acquiring the desirable and for avoiding the undesirable. Therefore it must have a self, for in the absence of the self, there is also the absence of these two forms of action, as in a jar. It is to be noted that this also refutes the statement, 'the self cannot be established even by inference based on general observation', etc.

Moreover, the clamour for negating the self—'there is no self'—necessarily indicates the existence of the self; because it

is a form of negation. For example, the statement 'there is no jar here' necessarily indicates the presence of the jar elsewhere. The inferential formulation would be: when a thing is negated somewhere, it must exist elsewhere, e.g. the jar, etc. The self, too, is negated by you as you say 'there is no self'. Therefore, it must exist. That which is absolutely non-existent is never found to be negated, e.g. a sixth form of matter over and above the five ones.

But then, even the negation of such things that are absolutely non-existent—horns growing on the head of an ass, etc.—is observed and as such, the above ground becomes irregular. No, it would not be so. Whenever a thing is negated somewhere, what is actually negated in the intended place is either of the four—conjunction (*saṃyoga*), inherence (*samavāya*), commonness (*sāmānya*) and a specific characteristic (*viśeṣa*)—in respect of the thing existing in some other place only. It is not that its *absolute* non-existence is indicated. For example, in the statements 'Devadatta is not in the house', etc., only the conjunction between the house and Devadatta, etc., which all exist, is negated; their existence is not absolutely denied. Again, in the statements 'there is no horn growing on the head of an ass', etc., only the inherence between the ass and horns, etc., which all are existing things, is denied. Similarly, in the statements 'there is no moon', etc., only the commonness of the existing moon with any other moon is denied, as the reality of any other moon is not proved, and it is not that the absolute non-existence of the moon is indicated. Also, in the statements 'there are no pearls of the size of a jar', etc., only a specific property, namely, the size of a jar, is denied in respect of the pearls, and their non-existence is not indicated. In the same way, when it is said that there is no self, what can be denied is only the conjunction of the self somewhere with something—of a self which is existent; for example, 'there is no self in this body', etc. But it is not possible to absolutely deny the self's existence.

In the present context, someone says: If it is a fact that what-

ever is negated is existent, then let me also have mastery over the three worlds; since it is being negated by people like yourselves. So also, there should be a fifth category of negation over and above the four categories of negation (mentioned by you above), the conjunction, etc., because it is negated by none but yourselves.

This is illogical, for only a specific property, mastery over the three worlds, is negated with respect to you, like the pearl having the size of a jar; and not your mastery in all respects, as you also have mastery over your own disciple, etc. Similarly, in the case of negation as well, its being characterized by the number five, which is not possible, is denied, and negation is not absolutely denied, for negation as characterized by the number four is possible.

But then, all this is merely incoherent talk. My mastery over the three worlds which is being negated is really non-existent. In the case of negation too, its being characterized by the number five, which is being denied, is really non-existent. So also, the denials of conjunction, inherence, commonness and a specific property in respect of the house and Devadatta, the ass and horn, etc., are really the negations of the non-existent. Therefore, why should your generalization that whatever is negated must be existent not fall through?

Our reply is as follows. The conjunction of Devadatta and the house, etc., which is denied, may be non-existent; but it exists in relation to other things. It is only with the house that Devadatta has no conjunction, but he has conjunction with other things like the garden, etc. Similarly, the house, also, has no conjunction with Devadatta; but it has conjunction with the cot, etc. Similarly, the horn has no inherence with the ass, but it has inherence with the cow, etc. Also, commonness is not present in the moon, since there is no second moon; but it is there in the jar, etc. Again, the size of a jar is not present in the pearls, but it is present elsewhere. Mastery over the three worlds is not present only in relation to you, but also in relation to the Tīrthakaras, etc. Being characterized by the number

five, also, is not present in respect of the modes of negation, but it is there in the case of the most excellent heavenly body (*anuttara-vimāna*) etc. Only with the intention of conveying such implications do we say that what is negated is existent in general. It is not that we claim that what is negated in relation to a particular thing is present in relation to that very thing, so that there may be irregularity. Thus, in the case of the self as well, there may be a negation of the existent self only somewhere, but not everywhere.

So also, there must be a self distinct from the body; because even after the sense has ceased to function, there may be the recollection of an object apprehended by it, as in the case of Devadatta who recollects an object apprehended through five windows. Thus it is established that the self can be known by inference.

If it is established that the self can be known by inference, then it is also established that the self can be known by verbal testimony (*āgama*), comparison (*upamāna*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*), since these are included in inference.

Moreover, the statement you have made earlier that (there is no self) because of the impossibility of the five sources of valid knowledge in respect to it, is only similar to the ravings of one intoxicated by spiritous drinks. For although the five sources of valid knowledge are not possible in respect to the magnitude of the Himālaya, the lotus, etc., and (also in respect of the existence of) the demon, etc., they do exist. Therefore, the rule that if the five sources of valid knowledge be impossible in respect to a thing then that thing is non-existent, becomes irregular.

Thus it is established that the self is known by sources of valid knowledge, like perception, etc.

D. GUṆARAINA ON KĀLAVĀDA ETC.

One of the alternatives is: the self exists by itself (*svataḥ*), is eternal, and is dependent upon time (*kālataḥ*).

The implication of this alternative is as follows. According to the contention of the Kālavādins, there indeed exists the self by its own nature; it is also eternal and dependent upon time. By Kālavādins are to be understood those who think that the whole of this world is produced by time. They argue in the following manner. Without (the action of) time, flowers would never come forth and fruits also would never appear on the trees Campaka, Aśoka and Sahakāra, etc.; (there can neither be) the onset of the winter permeated by particles of frost or the movement of stars, conception (by women) and the onset of the rainy season, etc., brought forth by the different seasons (and divisions of time). Also, it would not have been possible to experience the particular stages of life, such as childhood, boyhood, youth, old age when wrinkles and grey hair appear, and so on. For all these are observed to be invariably dependent upon a fixed division of time; otherwise, everything would have happened without any fixed order. But this is not actually observed; nor is it desirable. Moreover, in ordinary life as well, even the cooking of *mudga* is not found to be possible without (the action of) time, but only in course of time. Otherwise it would have been accomplished even at the very first moment when the necessary conditions—the cooking pot, fuel, etc.—have all been assembled together. But it is not actually so. Therefore, whatever is produced is produced by time.

As it has been said: 'Without (the action of) time, there can be no conception by women, no boyhood and no youth. For whatever is produced in this world, time is surely the cause. Moreover, without (the action of) time even the cooking of *mudga* (a kind of beans) is not found to be possible. Even when the cooking pot, etc., have been brought in, it is accomplished only in course of time. Without (the action of) time, all conception, etc., would have happened without any fixed order, for it would have come about from the presence only of those causes which are admitted by the opponent.'

'(Also), time cooks the forms of matter; time destroys living beings; when the world sleeps, time remains awake; time is, indeed, insurmountable.'

Here (in the view quoted above), 'from the presence only of those causes which are admitted by the opponent' means 'just from the presence of causes like the union of a man and a woman, etc., which are accepted by the opponent' (as causes of conception).

So also, time cooks the forms of matter, the earth, etc., i.e. it brings them to maturity, brings about transformation in them.

So also, time destroys living beings, i.e. dissociates living beings, the inhabitants of the world, from their previous modes of existence; and time associates them with different modes of existence.

So also, when the world sleeps, time remains awake. The idea is that only time protects the sleeping world from dangers. Therefore clearly, it is impossible to surmount time, to overcome its influence.

In the said manner, the second alternative, too, is to be stated, which would be as follows: the self exists, is by itself, is eternal and is due to God (*īśvara*). The Īśvaravādins think that the whole world is created by God. God is the one in possession of the group of four, omniscience, freedom from all desires (*vairāgya*), virtue (*dharma*) and the highest accomplishments (*aiśvarya*), all innate to him; he is the one who moves living beings to heaven and liberation. As it has been said: 'The lord of the world has the four, all innate to him, unobstructed (*apratigha*) knowledge, freedom from all desires, the highest accomplishments and virtue. A living being is ignorant, incapable of mastery over its own pleasure and pain. It goes either to heaven or to hell, as governed by God.'

The third alternative is the one advanced by the Ātmavādins. The Ātmavādins are those who conclude that all this is self (*puruṣa*), etc.

The fourth alternative is the one held by the Niyativādins.

They contend in the following manner. There is a distinct thing called the fixed order of things (*niyati*), due to the influence of which all things get produced exactly with a specific nature, and not otherwise. Thus, when one thing is produced from another thing, it is observed that the latter is produced exactly, and with a specific nature, only from the former. Otherwise there would be no fixed cause-effect relation, and also no fixed rule as to the specific nature of each thing; for there would be no regulating factor (*niyāmaka*). Thus, is there any person adept in the application of *pramāṇa*-s, capable of negating such a fixed order of things which is clearly evident from the specific nature of each effect? (Denying it) let no one land in the absurdity of coming into conflict with the application of *pramāṇa* in other cases as well. (That is, if one does not accept such a well-proved position, one would have to deny other well-proved conclusions too).

Thus it has been said: 'All effects are produced exactly, with a specific nature of their own, and from this (it is to be concluded that) they are so produced by the fixed order of things, for permeated through them is its essence. When one thing is produced from another thing, then the latter is (observed to be) produced invariably from the former, because of a fixed order (*nyāya*); and who is capable of preventing it?'

The fifth alternative is the one held by the Svabhāvavādins. The Svabhāvavādins argue as follows. Here, it is the 'essential nature' (*svabhāva*) of a thing that it undergoes transformation by itself (*svataḥ*). All entities are born due to the influence of *svabhāva*. Thus for example, from clay, a jar is produced and not cloth, and from yarn, a cloth is produced and not the jar, etc. But this production according to a fixed rule cannot be explained to take place without it being characterized by such specific *svabhāva*. Therefore, it is to be concluded that all this is due to *svabhāva*. Thus it has been said: 'Who produces sharpness in thorns? (Who creates) different dispositions in animals and birds? All this has proceeded from *svabhāva*. There is no scope for action according to one's will. What is the use of

effort?' 'Of the many thorns of a jujube tree, one is sharp, another is straight, yet another is crooked. But its fruit is round. Say, who has made all this.'

Moreover, let alone the talk of other forms of effects, even the cooking of *mudga* would not be possible without *svabhāva*. For example, even when all the necessary things, the cooking pot, fuel, time, etc., have been assembled, the cooking of Kaṅkatuka *mudga* is not observed to take place. Therefore (on the principle that) when the one is present in the presence of the other, the one follows the agreements in presence and in absence of the other, and the one is produced by the other, even the cooking of *mudga* is to be accepted to be due to *svabhāva*. Therefore it is to be concluded that all these things are due to *svabhāva*.

According to the view of the Yadṛcchāvādins, the word *yadṛcchā* means the obtainment of objects without any prior deliberation (*abhisandhi*) (i.e. accidentally). But, then, who are these Yadṛcchāvādins? The answer is as follows. The Yadṛcchāvādins are those who, in this world, do not admit to any fixed cause-effect relation in respect to objects, but (maintain such a relation to be due to) *yadṛcchā* (accident).

They contend in the following manner. There is no fixed cause-effect relation among things, because it is not ascertained to be there by any *pramāṇa*. Thus for example, a frog may be born of a frog, and again, it may also be born of cowdung. Fire may be produced from fire and again, it may be produced from kindling wood (*araṇi*). Smoke may be produced from smoke and again, it may also be produced from putting fuel into the fire. The plantain tree may grow from the bulb and also from the seed. The banyan tree, etc., may be produced from the seed and also from the part of a branch. Wheat-plants may be produced from seeds of wheat and also from seeds of cane (*vaṃśa*). Therefore there is nowhere any *fixed* cause-effect relation. It is to be concluded that wherever any thing is produced, it is only due to *yadṛcchā*. People with critical judgement do not tire themselves in vain by imaginging otherwise,

when they actually find the order of things to be different. As it has been said: 'All these varied multitudes of pleasure and suffering experienced by people come about only accidentally, just as the striking of the *tāla* fruit by the crow is not an action preceded by intention (i.e., is accidental). Pride is, therefore, futile.' Indeed, all these, birth, old age and death, are only similar to the case of the crow and the *tāla* fruit.

Prabhācandra's *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa and Nyāya-kumuda-candra*

Among the galaxy of the later logicians subscribing to the Jaina creed, Prabhācandra (*c.* ninth-tenth century AD) was an outstanding representative of the Digambara sect. Two of his major philosophical works are the *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* (a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*) and the *Nyāya-kumuda-candra* (a commentary on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastraya*, a work consisting of three small treatises). In both these works, Prabhācandra, defending his own Jaina position, criticizes his rival views, inclusive of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. We have given here extracts from the two texts discussing the two prominent features generally attributed to the Lokāyatas, namely, *dehātma-vāda* and *pratyakṣaika-pramāṇa-vāda*.

Prabhācandra's *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*

A. BHŪTA-CAITANYA-VĀDA

(The Cārvākas say to the Jainas:) Well, let consciousness (*vijñāna*) be without form (*nirākāra*). But it cannot be self-cognized (*sva-saṃvidita*), for it is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of matter (*bhūta*), like a mirror.

But this is not proper, because the ground is unproved. If consciousness were a transformation of matter it would have been possible to perceive it by external senses, like a mirror.

There is no such absurdity, because consciousness is the transformation of a special kind of subtle (*sūkṣma*) matter.

This is also unjustified. How would this special kind of subtle matter be the cause of the production of consciousness—being in nature identical (*sajātīya*) to, or different (*vijātīya*) from, consciousness?

In the first alternative, there would be the fallacy of proving the proved (*siddha-sādhyatā*) (in the Jaina view). For the opponents (i.e. the Jainas) quite admit that there is a special kind of subtle being, also known by the name *ātman* (self), which is the material cause for the production of consciousness; it is by nature differentiated from (*vyāvṛtta*) unconscious substances; it is without the qualities of colour and such like; it is never an object of the external senses; it is known by perception in the form of self-cognition; and it is also inferred as being related to the other world (*paraloka*).

On the other hand (i.e. in the second alternative), if the subtle matter be different in nature from consciousness, it would not be a material cause for the production of consciousness. On the admission that even a totally dissimilar thing may be the material cause of another thing, it would be possible even for fire to become a material cause of water, and as a result (the doctrine of) the four realities (*tattva*) would be contradicted.

The same fallacy would occur even if it is admitted that it would become the material cause of consciousness, being similar in nature by (the possession of properties like) existence (*sattva*), etc.

In fact, the self being proved on valid grounds (*pramāṇa*), it alone can logically be held to be the material cause of consciousness.

Besides, if one entity possesses some distinctive characteristic which is different from the one present in another entity, then the former must be completely different (*tattvāntara*) from the latter; for example, air and other substances are different from

fire. And consciousness possesses some distinctive characteristics which are not shared by the earth and other forms of matter.

It cannot be said that the ground (namely, the possession of some distinctive characteristic) is unproved, for consciousness has the distinctive characteristic of being of the nature of knowledge (*jñāna*), belief (*darśana*) and active awareness (*upayoga*). On the other hand, earth, water, fire and air do not share such a characteristic, their specific natural characteristics being the capacity to hold (*dhāraṇa*), fluidity (*drava*), hotness (*uṣṇatva*) and constant movement (*īraṇa*).

Indeed, the forms of matter do not have the characteristic of being of the nature of knowledge, belief and active awareness, because they are perceived by many knowers such as ourselves. But that which has such a characteristic is not perceived by many knowers such as ourselves; for example, consciousness. The forms of matter are, however, so (i.e. perceived by many) and hence, they must be so (i.e. without such a characteristic).

But then, no distinct entity, other than the one which has the special characteristic of being of the nature of knowledge, etc. (i.e. consciousness) which may be said to possess it, is ever established on valid grounds. Hence (the ground put forward by you, namely,) the possession of a distinctive characteristic becomes incapable of proving (a distinct self). Thus, such an entity cannot be apprehended by perception, because it is not determined to be of the nature of a thing possessing colour, etc. Nor can it be apprehended by inference, for its validity is not established. Besides, there also is no inference capable of proving its existence.

All this is improper. For the self is apprehended by perception itself, as all living beings have direct awareness revealing the self, and awareness involving the 'I' (*aham-pratyaya*) in a non-secondary sense (*anupacarita*) in the forms: I am happy (*sukhī aham*), I am unhappy (*duḥkhī aham*), I have desire (*icchāvān aham*) and so on. Such awareness is not false, because it is not contradicted later. Nor does it have the body as its underlying

object (*ālambana*), for such awareness is produced by the function (*vyāpāra*) of the internal sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*), independently of the external senses (*bahiḥkaraṇa*). The body is not revealed by such (exclusively internal) awareness, because it is an object of the external senses, and also because it is not an object of awareness involving the 'I' in a non-secondary sense.

An awareness in the form 'I am fat' (*sthūlaḥ aham*) or 'I am lean' (*kṛśaḥ aham*) or the like, identifying the 'I' with the body, is not in a non-secondary sense; for in that case there would arise the absurdity of accepting non-secondariness even in the case of the awareness 'this is none but myself' (*aham eva ayam*) when one refers to one's servant (identifying the 'I' with the servant) who is extremely useful to oneself.

(It may be objected that in identifying the 'I' and the servant) there is an impediment (*bādhaka*), namely, a difference in the mental reflection (*pratibhāsa*). But then, the same is also possible in the other case (i.e. in identifying the 'I' and the body). In the mental reflection of the awareness involving the 'I' on the part of a person who has his physical form (*vigraha*) covered by the veil of a dense mass of darkness, not even the body, as characterized by the properties of fatness and the like, appears.

A secondary use is not possible without a ground (*nimitta*). Hence, as in the case of the servant, here also (i.e in the case of the identification of 'I' and body) the ground is assumed to be usefulness (*upakārakatva*) to the self.

Like the distinct awareness 'this is my servant' (*madīyo bhṛtyaḥ*), the distinct awareness 'this is my body' (*madīyaṃ śarīram*) is to be taken in the primary sense (*mukhya*).

As to the objection (that the self cannot be perceived or admitted, we reply that) it is unjustified, because its nature is revealed by awareness in the form 'I' (*aham*). There is nothing objectionable in the fact that some entity is not perceived through the property of another property. Otherwise there arises the absurdity of the non-perception of all entities.

But then, what if it be argued that the self cannot be perceived because it is the agent (*kartṛ*), and it is not possible for it to be

the object (*karman*) at the same time? No, that would not be proper, because (such duality of character) is justified by the presence of different specific marks (*lakṣaṇa*). Thus the specific mark of an agent is independence (*svātantrya*) (and it is present in the self), and at the same time it is also perceived to be pervaded (*vyāpya*) by the act of knowing (which is the specific mark of an object) and hence, there is no contradiction in its being considered an object as well. In fact, the specific determination of (the nature of) a thing depends upon the specific mark (present in it).

Similarly, the self is also known by inference. Instruments (*karaṇa*) like the auditory and other senses must be moved to action (*prayojya*) by some agent, because they are instruments, like an axe. It cannot be said that the very fact that the auditory and other senses are instruments is unproved. For it is established by the following inference: the knowledge of colour, taste, smell, touch and sound must be due to instruments, because it is a form of action (*kriyā*), like the act of cutting. Moreover, the self is also known by the following inference: the knowledge of sound, etc., must reside somewhere, because it is a quality (*guṇa*), like colour, etc.

We shall give arguments for the validity of inference later.

(The opponent may say:) Knowledge is actually a quality of the body, the sense, the mind (*manas*), or the object of knowledge (*viṣaya*), and it does not reside in any substratum other than any one of these so that it would be possible to establish the self as a distinct entity.

But this would be mere wishful thinking (on his part), for knowledge cannot be proved to be a quality of any of them. Thus (it may be inferred that) the body is not the substratum (*āśraya*) of the quality of consciousness, because it is a transformation of matter, like the jar, etc. Or, consciousness is not a specific quality of the body, because it can disappear even when the body exists. But those that are the specific qualities of the body do not disappear as long as the body is there, for example, colour, etc. But consciousness disappears even when the body

is there. Hence, it is not a specific quality of the body.

Similarly, the senses do not possess the quality of consciousness, because they are instruments; or because they are transformations of matter, like the axe, etc.

Moreover, if consciousness were a quality of the sense there would have been no knowledge in the event of the sense being destroyed, because a quality cannot be known when the very substratum of the quality has been destroyed. But it is not so (in the case of consciousness). Hence, it cannot be a quality of the sense. It can thus be put in the form of an inferential argument (*prayoga*): consciousness in the form of recollection (*smaraṇa*) etc., is not a quality of the sense, because it may be produced even when the sense has been destroyed. If one thing is produced in spite of the destruction of another thing, then, the former cannot be a quality of the latter; for example, the colour of the jar cannot be a quality of the cloth as it can be produced in spite of the destruction of the cloth.

Moreover, if consciousness is a quality of the senses, some further instruments for them would have to be assumed, for no action can take place without an instrument. If each of them possesses the quality of consciousness, then there arises the absurdity of (admitting) many selves in one and the same body. In that case, just as an object perceived by Devadatta is not re-cognized (*pratisandhāna*) by Yajñadatta, so also, an object perceived by one sense would not be re-cognized by another sense. But re-cognition is actually observed to occur. Hence, consciousness would not be a quality of the sense. If, however, it is said that such an objection cannot be raised, for it is admitted that only one sense would be the controller (*adhiṣṭhāyaka*) of all the instruments, then it would only be a difference in terminology (*saṃjñā*), for nothing but the self would be so expressed, though by a different term.

The mind, too, cannot be characterized by the quality of consciousness, for it is an instrument, like the axe, etc. Besides, if the mind is admitted to be the agent (*kartṛ*) and consequently, the conscious one, it would have to be dependent upon some

other instrument for (acts like) the apprehension of colour, etc. But then the self itself would be admitted, although only in a different manner.

Nor can consciousness be a quality of the object (*viṣaya*), because even in its absence (*asānnidhya*) or in its destruction, recollection and the like are observed to be produced. It is not justifiable that there should be the knowledge of qualities even when their substratum is absent or has been destroyed, because it would lead to a contradiction that they are *its* qualities (yet they can be apprehended *without it*).

Thus, all the alternatives being exhausted (*pariśeṣāt*), it follows that consciousness must reside in a substratum other than the body, etc. Hence, the self (as a distinct entity) is proved.

By this is also refuted the following view: there is manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of consciousness out of (the combination of) matter such as earth, etc., which are known by the names 'body', 'sense' and 'object', just like the power of intoxication (*madaśakti*) from (the combination) of flour (*piṣṭa*), water (*udaka*), molasses (*guḍa*) and *dhātakī*. Therefore, in spite of the possession of some distinctive characteristic, consciousness is not a totally distinct entity (*tattvāntara*). The realities (*tattva*) are earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*) and air (*vāyu*); the names 'body', 'sense' and 'object' are given only to their (i.e. of the forms of realities or matter) combinations (*samudāya*). The full implication (viz. there is manifestation of consciousness, etc.) is obtained by syntactically supplying (*adhyāhāra*) the verbal form 'goes into manifestation' to the statement 'consciousness, out of them'. Hence, the absence (*vyāvṛtti*) of the reason (viz. the possession of some distinctive characteristic) from a negative instance (*vipakṣa*) is doubtful.

Besides, this admission of the doctrine of the manifestation of consciousness is also in contradiction with (the Cārvāka's) refutation of the doctrine of the manifestation of sound in general.

Moreover, it is said that there is the manifestation of consciousness. But is this consciousness existent (*sat*), or non-existent (*asat*), or both existent and non-existent (*sad-asat*)?

The assumption of the first alternative would lead to the establishment of its beginninglessness (*anāditva*) and endlessness (*anantatva*), for the manifestation of a thing always existent is not logically justified without such establishment, as in the case of universals like earth-ness (*pṛthivītva*) etc. Thus, the statement—there being no one 'capable of travelling to the other world' (*paralokin*), there is the absence of the 'other world' (*paraloka*) itself—would be one made without proper critical judgement.

On the other hand, if it is admitted that there is manifestation of consciousness previously non-existent, there would be contradiction with its awareness, because the manifestation of what is totally non-existent is never observed. Besides, for one who maintains such a position there would be no difference between 'what manifests' (*vyañjaka*) and 'what produces' (*kāraka*), for, as it is well-known, they are differentiated as 'a *vyañjaka* is that which refines the nature of what already exists' and 'a *kāraka* is that which brings into being the non-existent'.

However, on the admission that there is manifestation (of consciousness) which is somewhat (*kathañcit*) existent as well as somewhat non-existent, there would follow the forced acceptance of the position of the opponent (i.e. the Jaina). For it is quite clearly admitted by the opponents (i.e. the Jainas) that, as in the case of the four forms of matter like the earth, etc. (in the case under consideration also) there is manifestation through matter (*pudgala*) in the forms of earth, etc., which have been transformed (*pariṇata*) into the shape of a body (*kāyākāra*), of consciousness which is somewhat existent as substance (*dravyataḥ*) as well as somewhat non-existent as special mode (*paryāyataḥ*).

But then, if it be so, there can also be no manifestation of the power of intoxication out of flour, water, etc., for the said alternatives (leading to the refutation of the view that consciousness is manifested out of matter) are equally possible in the present case as well. However, such an objection would be

improper, for in this case also, pre-existence as substance is admitted, all entities (*bhāva*) being beginningless (*anādi*) and endless (*ananta*) in such a form.

Others maintain that the objections raised against the view of the manifestation (of consciousness) have no scope, for, by supplying syntactically the verbal form 'is produced' (*utpadyate*) in the statement 'consciousness, out of them', what is admitted is the production (*utpatti*) of consciousness out of (the combinations of) matter known by the names of 'body', 'sense' and 'object'.

But then, let them clearly state what they will say in reply when the following is put to them: Are the forms of matter material causes (*upādāna-kāraṇa*), or co-operating causes (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*) for consciousness?

The forms of matter cannot be the material causes (of consciousness), because there would follow the absurdity of the presence (*anvaya*) of the properties of matter in consciousness, like the presence of the properties of gold in the crown and other such things which have gold as their material cause; or, like the presence of the properties of earth and others in the body, which has earth and others for its material cause. But it is not so in the present case. It is not established by any *pramāṇa* that a combination (*samudāya*) of the forms of matter—abandoning first their unconsciousness, and acquiring later the property of consciousness—becomes endowed with the properties of matter, namely, capacity to hold (earth), constant movement (air), fluidity (water) and hotness (fire); or the possession of colour and others. For one becomes aware of consciousness by internal perception as to what is without such properties as the capacity to hold and such like.

It cannot be argued that there is deviation (*vyabhicāra*) in the instances of collyrium, etc., which, though possessing flame, etc., as material causes, are not characterized by the properties of the flame, etc., for there also, the presence (of the properties of the material cause in the effect) is observed at least because of the possession of colour and others. Indeed, there is no

deviation to the rule that the effects (*vikāra*, lit. transformations) of matter are characterized by colour and others.

To argue that in the same way, matter and consciousness can also be the material cause and the effect in relation to each other, for here also, it is possible to have such presence by taking into consideration the properties of existence (*sattva*), etc., and performance of specific actions (*kriyākāritva*), etc., would not be proper. In that case, there would follow the absurdity that water, fire and others are also the material causes and the effects of one another, as in this case also, such presence would be equally possible if those properties (i.e. existence, performance of specific actions, etc.) are taken into consideration.

Moreover, from such inferences as the following—the first consciousness (*ādya-caitanya*) of living beings must have consciousness for its material cause, because it is a modified form of consciousness (*cid-vivarta*), like the modified form of consciousness in the middle (*madhya-cid-vivarta*); and also, the final modified form of consciousness (*antya-caitanya-pariṇāma*) must be the effect of consciousness on the same ground and the same instance—it is proved that (any form of consciousness) has, for its material cause, only another form of consciousness and as such, the assumption that the forms of matter are the material causes of consciousness does not logically stand.

If, on the other hand, (the forms of matter) are assumed to be the co-operating causes, then something quite different (from the forms of matter) has to be admitted as the material cause, for an effect which does not have a material cause is never found. To say that it (i.e. the opponent's view) is free from objection because effects like sound, lightning and others which do not have any material cause are also found, would be a statement made without proper judgement; for in the cases of such effects also, the fact of their having material causes is proved by the inference that sound and others have material causes, because they are effects, like the cloth and others.

It would be illogical to say that the (Jaina) argument suffers from irregularity (*anekānta*) since it is observed, for example,

that a conscious scorpion is born of unconscious cowdung, because the same (i.e the scorpion's consciousness) is also included in the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*). What is actually born of cowdung is only the unconscious body of the scorpion and not the scorpion's modified form of consciousness, for its production is admitted to be possible only from a previous modified form of consciousness.

Now, (the opponent may argue that) just as the first fire of the traveller which is born of the rubbing of fire-kindling wood (*araṇi*) is not preceded by fire (i.e. does not have fire as the material cause), but the other fire (i.e. the later one, e.g. the cooking fire) is preceded by fire (i.e. has fire as the material cause), so also, the first consciousness would be born of the forms of matter transformed into the shape of a body, but the other (later) consciousness would be preceded by consciousness (i.e. would have consciousness as the material cause), and there would be no contradiction in such a position.

But this is also mere wishful thinking (on the opponent's part). For, if one admits that the first fire of the traveller may have something other than fire as the material cause, one would be led to the absurdity that water, etc., too may have, as material causes, things other than water, etc , and thus there would be contradiction with (the opponent's own) view that the four forms of matter—earth and others—are distinct entities (*tattvāntara*) Things which stand as the material cause and the effect in relation to one another are not really distinct entities; for example, the products of earth (are not ultimately different from earth). But (according to the opponent,) the earth and others stand as the material cause and the effect in relation to one another and therefore, there would remain only one form of matter in reality, which would be the modified form of the earth and others. If, however, they are admitted to be co-operative causes, then let it be so in the case of consciousness also. Just as the first manifested fire is preceded by a latent (*tirohita*) fire, so also the first manifested (*āvirbhūta*) consciousness of the one in the womb is preceded by a latent consciousness.

Indeed, the facts of re-cognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), desire (*abhilāṣa*) and others, just after birth, in respect of objects desirable and undesirable, cannot be explained without admitting one single knower which is beginningless; for these are all preceded by (i.e. dependent upon) repeated experience (*abhyāsa*).

It would not be proper to claim that one may have repeated experience when one is confined to the mother's womb, even without perceiving external objects; for then there will be absurdities.

Nor would it be justifiable to claim that although re-cognition and the like are established to be preceded by repeated experience in the later stages, they are not preceded by it just after birth, for otherwise (it may also be claimed that) although smoke is observed to be preceded by fire (in many cases), it may also not be preceded by fire (in some cases).

It would also be impossible to contend that there would be no objection because these (re-cognition, etc., of the just-born infant) are preceded by the repeated experience of the parents; for absurdities will follow if re-cognition on the part of one person (*santāna*, lit. stream) is admitted to be due to repeated experience on the part of another person If so, each of the infants (born of the same parents) would have re-cognition in respect of the objects apprehended by its parents, in the form 'all this has been perceived by me'. Also, there would arise the absurd possibility of mutual re-cognition among themselves, as in the case of cognitions through the visual and the tactual senses produced in respect of a single person.

Moreover, the denial of the self is not justified, because it is established by an awareness involving the 'I', namely, 'I apprehend the jar and others through knowledge'. Here, just as the jar and others are revealed as the object (*karman*), so also is the self revealed as the agent (*kartṛ*). The body, the senses, or any other similar thing cannot be considered the agent, because like the jar and others, they are also revealed to be the object (e.g. in the awareness 'I apprehend the body, senses and others through knowledge'). There can also be an awareness involving

the 'I' even when the body is not revealed; in the awareness of a person whose physical form is covered by a veil of a dense mass of darkness and whose sense has ceased to function, such properties as a fair complexion, plumpness and the like are not revealed. Thus, awareness involving the 'I', experienced by all and self-revealing, is established as having for its underlying object (*ālambana*) something distinct from the body, the senses and others. So it is established on valid grounds (*pramāṇa*) that the self is a distinct substance, without origin and without destruction.

The inferential formulation is: the self is without beginning and without end, because it is a substance, like earth and others. The reason here is not one with an unproved substratum (*āśrayāsiddha*), because the self is proved by an awareness involving the 'I'. Nor is it a reason unproved in the substratum (*svarūpāsiddha*), because (the self) possesses the essential properties of a substance. That is, the self is a substance, because it possesses qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) like earth and others. This reason, too, is not an unproved (*asiddha*) one, because qualities like knowledge, belief, etc., and modes like pleasure, pain, delight, sadness, etc., are observed to be present there (in the self).

It also cannot be said that the reason (viz. because it is a substance) suffers from the fallacy of irregularity (*anekānta*) considering the instances of the jar, etc., because they are really the modes of earth and others.

But then, (it may be objected that) if there were ever any awareness of the self as dissociated from the body (*śarīra-rahita*), it would have been a distinct entity, without beginning and without end, like fire (which is known) as dissociated from water. But actually it is not so, because so long as there is worldly existence (*saṃsāra*), the self is known only as associated with the body. (Hence, the self is not distinct from the body.)

(The reply to this is as follows:) What is meant by the expression 'dissociated from the body' in your statement? Does it

mean that the self is not known to be uncharacterized by the nature of the body? Or, does it mean that the self is not known to belong to any space (*deśa*) other than the space occupied by the body?

As to the first alternative, (we contend that) there is indeed knowledge of the self as dissociated from the body, because, as has already been pointed out, the self, since it is by nature non-corporeal (*amūrta*) and consciousness itself, is perceived as distinct from the body, which is by nature a thing possessing colour, etc., and unconscious.

As to the second alternative, (we ask) is the non-existence of the self proved because it is not apprehended in some space other than the one occupied by the body, or because it is apprehended only in the space as is occupied by the body?

In the former case, it would be proving what is already proved (*siddha-sādhana*), because the absence of the self there (i.e. somewhere outside the body) is quite accepted (by the Jainas). Unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Jainas do not think that the self can be present somewhere outside the body.

In the second case, not only the non-existence of the self, but also the non-existence of the jar, etc., would be established, for they too are not apprehended in some space other than their own.

Moreover, on what ground is the self's absence of distinction from its body sought to be proved—because the self is of the same nature as the body, or because the self is a quality of the body, or because the self is an effect of the body? (The opponent can, at best, offer these three grounds), for no other alternative is possible. However, the answers to all the three alternatives have already been given.

Thus the existence of the self which is of the nature of consciousness itself is proved on valid grounds, and hence it is only proper that knowledge should be a property of it. Knowledge must be self-revealing in nature (*sva-vyavasāyātmaka*), because it is a modification of the conscious self; that which is not self-revealing in nature is not so (i.e. is not a modification

of the self), for example, a jar. But knowledge is so. Therefore it is to be admitted that knowledge is self-revealing in nature.

Prabhācandra's *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*

B. PRATYAKṢAIKA-PRAMĀṆA-VĀDA

For those who contend that there is only one form of source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and it is perception (*pratyakṣa*) alone, it would not be possible to include in perception the other sources of valid knowledge like inference (*anumāna*), etc., because they are distinct in nature and are also produced from different collocations of causes (*sāmagrī*).

But then, (it may be objected) there is no need to debate about the possibility of inference's inclusion (in perception), because inference is not a source of valid knowledge at all. In fact, perception alone is a source of valid knowledge, because a *pramāṇa* must be non-secondary (*agauṇa*). (But inference is secondary, or *gauṇa*.)

Moreover, a *pramāṇa* is what produces an ascertainment (*niścaya*) in respect of an object. But it is not possible to have, through inference, an ascertainment in respect of an object, because in the case of the general (*sāmānya*), there is the charge of proving the proved (*siddha-sādhana*), whereas in the case of the particular (*viśeṣa*), there is no universal agreement (*anugama*). Thus it has been said: 'In the case of the particular there is an absence of universal agreement and in the case of the general, the proved is being sought to be proved.'

Further, there can be inference only when concomitance (*vyāpti*) is ascertained and also the (probans') residence in the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatā*) is known for certain. But there can be no ascertainment of concomitance through perception, because it has no capability of leading to the ascertainment of concomitance as embracing all the objects (i.e. all relevant cases where

the probans and the probandum may co-exist) due to the fact that perception can apprehend only objects which are proximate (*sannihita*).

Nor is ascertainment of concomitance possible through inference, because it must itself be preceded by an ascertainment of concomitance. If there, also, the ascertainment of concomitance is admitted to be due to inference, there would result the fallacy of either infinite regress (*anavasthā*) or mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*). And there is no other form of source of valid knowledge which may be said to lead to its ascertainment. Therefore, how can inference have validity (or, be a source of valid knowledge)?

However, all this is being said without proper critical consideration. For the validity of inference, etc., is also well-established because of their uncontradictedness (*avisaṃvādakatva*) which follows from the fact that, through them also, there can be invariable specific determination (*vyavasthā*) of their respective objects (*sva-viṣaya*), as in the case of perception. It is a well-known fact that in the case of perception, validity is due to nothing but uncontradictedness; and it is the same also in the case of others, for there is no contradiction (*visaṃvāda*) in respect of an object even when it is ascertained by inference, etc.

As to the contention that (inference, being secondary, cannot be a *pramāṇa*) because a *pramāṇa* must be non-secondary, (we ask) why should inference be secondary—because it has a secondary object, or because it is preceded by perception?

The first alternative is not possible, because it is admitted (by us) that just like perception, inference, too, has for its object what is real (*vāstava*) and is of the nature of having general as well as specific characteristics. Unlike the Buddhists, the Jainas do not admit that inference has for its object only imaginary generalised forms (*kalpita-sāmānyārtha*).

If, on the other hand, the secondariness of inference be due to its being preceded by perception, then some cases of perception also—because of their being preceded by inference—would have to be considered as secondary (and consequently, would

not be valid), for it is observed that perception originates (subsequent to inference) when one exerts oneself after ascertaining the thing sought through inference.

Moreover, it is not a fact that inference is preceded by perception, because it is actually preceded by the source of valid knowledge known as deliberation (*ūha*).

As to the contention that there can be no ascertainment of concomitance through perception, etc. (we say that) all that is only empty talk, for concomitance is very well ascertained by the source of knowledge called deliberation proceeding on the strength of observation (*pratyakṣa*) and non-observation (*anupalambha*). The innumerability of the individuals or deviation (*vyabhicāra*) in relation to space (and time) cannot be an impediment to its ascertainment, because concomitance is determined through the generalities (*sāmānya*), the reality of which is established on the ground that it is the object of uncontradicted (*abādhita*) identical (*anugata*) cognitions.

Moreover, without admitting a source of valid knowledge in the form of deliberation, it cannot at all be claimed that 'perception is the only source of valid knowledge because of its non-secondariness,' etc. That is, the probans, non-secondariness or uncontradictedness, cannot lead to the inference of validity in perception unless its concomitance is rightly ascertained, for otherwise there would be absurdities. It is also to be admitted that the concomitance must be ascertained in its entirety, for otherwise validity would be established, on the ground of non-secondariness, only in that particular instance of perception in respect of which alone the concomitance between non-secondariness and validity has been ascertained; and not in the other instances, because concomitance has not been ascertained in respect of them. But concomitance in its entirety cannot be ascertained through perception, for it can have as its object only what is proximate.

Now, what if it be said that after ascertaining, through perception, in respect of one individual, the concomitance of the two (viz. non-secondariness and validity) (and concluding

therefrom, that) in other cases also, similar (i.e. non-secondary) perception alone would be valid, it is possible to have an ascertainment of concomitance, as embracing all the cases, between non-secondariness and validity? No, such a claim would not be proper, for there can be no ascertainment embracing all the cases when (some) lie beyond the scope.

Moreover, the admission of an ascertainment as embracing all the cases would be as good as admitting deliberation, only in a different name.

Also, in the same manner, why should there not be an ascertainment of concomitance between smoke and fire, and others? How, then, would your statement that inference is not a source of valid knowledge, because it is impossible to ascertain concomitance as embracing all the cases, be justified?

Further, what do you intend to establish—the invalidity of inference as such, or (the invalidity of) those inferences only which relate to imperceptible things?

In the first alternative, there would be a cessation of all practical activities which are well-established by general acceptance. In fact, it is actually observed that even ordinary people ascertain, without fail, the presence of one thing from the presence of another thing when the latter has an invariable relation with the former; but not anything from everything.

In the second alternative, how would there be the specific determination of validity and invalidity respectively by non-secondariness and secondariness in respect of perception and the other *pramāṇa*-s, which are all imperceptible? How would there be knowledge about the minds of others which are imperceptible on the basis of specific effects like some particular activity, speech, etc.? How would there be the negation of heaven (*svarga*), merit-demerit (*apūrva*) and the gods, etc., which are all imperceptible, on the basis of non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*)?

And how would the Cārvāka—claiming that the ascertainment of an object through inference is impossible because of the non-secondariness of *pramāṇa*—establish the validity and

invalidity of perception and others, on the basis of nothing but inference? If he has really to do so, why should he not accept, as valid, inferences having imperceptible and perceptible objects? As it has been said: 'The existence of a distinct kind of *pramāṇa* (i.e. inference) is established from the determination of validity and invalidity in general, from the knowledge acquired about the minds of others, and also from the negation of certain things.'

Therefore, the invalidity of inference is not established.

Prabhācandra's *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*

C. AKHYĀTIVĀDA

What if it be said that in the case of an illusory cognition (*viparyaya*), no object is actually cognized? Thus, for example (when water is wrongly perceived in a mirage), the cognition revealing water cannot have actual water as its underlying object (*ālambana*), for in that case, it would have been non-erroneous (*abhrānta*). Nor can the absence of water be said to be revealed by it, because one is led to activity (with the conviction that) water is present there.

On the same ground, neither can the group of rays be taken as the underlying object. If that is so, there also arises the absurdity of the cognition being non-erroneous.

It would also be illogical to say that it is a cognition of the ray *as* water, because the former is totally different from the latter. It is never observed, for example, that a cloth, which is totally different from a jar, is perceived as a jar.

Therefore it is to be concluded that the illusory cognitions of water, etc., are without any underlying object (*nirālambana*).

However, all this would appear pleasant only to one who speaks without proper judgement. For in such a view, there can be no specific verbal reference (*vyapadeśa*) (for any illusory

cognition). On what specific ground can a cognition which does not reveal any object be specifically referred to by words, as in the form, 'water-cognition' or 'silver-cognition'?

Moreover, in such a view, there would be another absurdity—there would be no distinction between illusion and the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*). Here (i.e. in the case of illusion), there is no other point of distinction except that there is some object being revealed (*pratibhāsamāna*), and that which becomes revealed (by a cognition) is said to be the underlying object of that cognition.

Therefore, it cannot be said that an illusion is an objectless cognition (*akhyāti*).

Prabhācandra's *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*

A. BHŪTA-CAITANYA-VĀDA

But then in the Cārvāka view, the four forms of realities (*tattva*), namely, earth, water, fire and air, which are characterized by mutually exclusive (*anyonya-asambhavi*) characters, which are capable of producing specific combinations serving specific uses, namely, body, sense and object, and the nature of which can be ascertained by the source of valid knowledge called perception, are well justified; for it has been said (by them): 'Earth, water, fire and air are the only realities; the names "body", "sense" and "object" are given to their (specific) combinations (*samudāya*).'

There is nothing over and above these, for there is no valid ground to prove its existence. Indeed, perception would not succeed in establishing the existence of *ākāśa*, etc., for it can act only in respect of colour, etc., and things that possess them. But it would not be possible in the case of *ākāśa*, for it is admitted to be a substance without colour. Also, since inference is not a

source of valid knowledge, neither can its existence be established by it

But then, in the absence of a knower (*grāhaka*) which is the self, how can the existence of even the four forms of realities be established, for the reality of a thing (*prameya*) invariably presupposes its cognition by some knower (*pramātṛ*)? Apprehending such an objection, it has been said: 'Consciousness is from them'. Here, some think that the verbal form 'manifested' (*abhivyajyate*) is to be added, and others think that the verbal form 'produced' (*prādurbhavati*) is to be added. Therefore, the contention that the knower is the self as conceived by others, or a beginningless stream of consciousness, is refuted, because there is no valid ground to establish its existence. The reality of a thing (is possible) when its invariable relation to just some knower is established, and as such, consciousness itself (produced out of earth, etc.) may well be the knower.

But then, how is it that there is no contradiction (in maintaining that) consciousness, which is identical, gets manifested or is produced out of different things like the earth, etc.? To this, it is said: 'consciousness is like the power of intoxication (*madaśakti*)'. Just as in the ingredients of a spiritous drink (*madya*) such as *kiṇva*, etc , there is produced, in some particular space, time and condition, a special character, namely, the power of intoxication; so also there is produced, in the earth, etc., in some particular (space, time and condition), a special character; namely consciousness, which reveals the jar etc., as restricted to its specific object.

It cannot be argued that the production of the various forms of effects, such as the specific kinds of pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be justified without a regulating factor (*niyāmaka*), and the regulating factor is established to be the *adṛṣṭa* (merit and demerit) acquired by actions in the previous birth, and as a result, the presence of the self, one who has performed the actions (*kartṛ*), is established even in the previous birth (as such, a distinct, permanent self has to be admitted); for 'beings are like water-bubbles (*jala-budbuda*)'. Just as in the ocean, etc.,

bubbles of various forms and nature appear without having any regulating factor in the form of *adṛṣṭa*, simply out of the capacity of the things themselves; so also (in this world) are born different beings subject to various kinds of pain, pleasure, etc. But there are no selves eternal by nature, distinct from (the collection of) matter as transformed into the shape of a body; for there is no proof of their existence.

What proof, indeed, is possible, in such a case—perception or inference?

Perception would not be capable of proving a self as distinct from the body, because perception can act only in respect of colour and things possessing colour, when they are related to the sense. As a result, it would not be able to act in respect of (such a) self which is (conceived to be) distinct from them.

It also cannot be said that such a self is revealed as what performs the act of knowing (*jñāna-kartṛ*) in the awareness involving the 'I', namely, 'I know a jar'. For it can easily be justified as referring to the body (by the word 'I'), as is the case with (such awarenesses as) 'I am fat' or 'I am lean'. In such an awareness, the self cannot be the object referred to, as properties like fatness, etc., cannot belong to the self. Similar is the case with an awareness like 'I know a jar', etc. In such an awareness too, no self distinct from the body as conceived by others is ever revealed as the underlying object, even in a dream. Even if the reality of a thing which is never apprehended is admitted, there would be an undue multiplicity of assumptions (*kalpanā-gaurava*) and also an absence of the fixed order of things. It is neither logical to consider a thing as one performing an act (*kartṛ*) when its existence is never apprehended, for then it may even be so in the case of a flower blooming in the sky (*khapuṣpa*). Therefore, it is only logical to justify that in respect of (the act of) knowing, the body alone is the one performing the act, since its nature is established (to be so) on 'unrefutable grounds.

Moreover, (consciousness is proved to be an effect of the body) because of its having agreements in presence and absence

with the body. When a thing has agreements in presence and absence with another, it must be an effect of that; for example, a jar is the effect of a lump of clay. Consciousness, also, has agreements in presence and absence with the body. The cause-effect relation is always ascertained through agreements in presence and absence and in the present case also, such agreements are available—when the body is there consciousness is found to be there, and in its absence it is not found to be there.

Therefore, the self cannot be established by perception.

Nor (can the self be established) by inference, because it is not a source of valid knowledge. Even if it be a source of valid knowledge, the reason (*hetu*) would be mistimed (*kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*) because of it being advanced after stating a subject of inference (*pakṣa*) which is contradicted by perception. A subject of inference in the form of the self as distinct from the body is contradicted by perception. In this regard, there is no valid reason; nor is its invariable concomitance with the inferable (*sādhya*) established anywhere. The awareness of pleasure, etc., being the effect of matter, it is possible for it to have invariable concomitance with them (i.e. forms of matter) only. Thus, no proof for the existence of the self being possible, its eternality, etc., would be like the fragrance of a flower blooming in the sky; and what intelligent man would put faith upon it? Therefore, it is to be concluded that, (during the time) beginning with conception (*garbha*) and ending with death, consciousness is produced out of matter only, or is manifested out of matter only.

'But then, if consciousness is manifested out of the earth, etc., then, as in the body, it should have manifestation even in the jar, etc.'—apprehending such an objection, it is said: 'In the jar, etc., there is no manifestation of consciousness, because of the absence of the other cause; just as there is no manifestation of the power of intoxication in the dust, etc.' The cause of the manifestation of consciousness is the transformation of the earth, etc., into the shape of a body, as in the case of the power of intoxication it is a (specific) transformation of *piṣṭa*, properties

of water and *dhātakī*, etc. Such transformation is not present in the case of the jar, etc., and so there is no manifestation of consciousness there, just like the absence of the power of intoxication in the dust, etc., due to the absence of a (specific) transformation of *piṣṭa*, etc.

It cannot, however, be said that in that case, there arises the possibility of finding consciousness even in a corpse, as the said transformation is equally present there; for the non-availability of consciousness there is justified by the absence of the cause. The cause for the presence of consciousness is a specific transformation of skin, bone, flesh and blood, etc. When it is disturbed due to striking by weapons and diseases, etc., consciousness cannot continue to be present and hence, it is not found there, just like the particular shape of the body (previously present).

Thus, it being established that, like the particular shape of the body, consciousness, too, is a property of the body, it is further established that 'due to the absence of the *paralokin* (one capable of travelling to the other world), there is the absence of the *paraloka* (the other world) itself'. A *paralokin* is one who is capable of comprehending the implications of the Śāstra, performing actions (accordingly), and enjoying the results thereof. But in the said manner it is proved to be non-existent. Thus, the non-existence of the other world becomes established without he least effort.

Now, the above is being refuted.

As to the statement 'earth, water, fire and air (are the only realities)', etc. (we say that) this is illogical. Because the specific conclusion that the realities are only four would be established only when the absence of any other reality has been established. But the absence of any other reality is unproved, because the existence of a distinct reality, the self (*jīva*), is proved by perception in the form of self-awareness (*sva-saṃvedana*), and also that of (other realities like) *ākāśa*, etc., by scriptural statement (*āgama*) as well as inference. The validity of these two has been determined while refuting the view that perception

is the one and only source of valid knowledge.

But then, it is unproved that the self is a distinct reality, for since it is of the nature of consciousness, it would be an effect of matter and like the jar, etc., would be included in it. However, this is a statement made without proper critical consideration, for a cause-effect relation between matter and consciousness cannot be logically justified. Thus, consciousness cannot be an effect of matter, because of its absence in spite of their (i.e. of the forms of matter) presence, just like the one which is always absent (in their presence). Just as even when the forms of matter like the earth, etc., are present, there being the absence of the one which is always absent, one is not (admitted to be) their effect; so also is the case with consciousness, there being no distinction.

Indeed, even though the forms of matter in their varied states, like clay, body, jar, etc., are always present, consciousness is not always to be found.

Moreover, in the present case, there can also be no cause-effect relation because of the absence of anteriority-posteriority (*pūrvāparībhāva*) which is there in the case of yarn and cloth, etc. (having a cause-effect relation). It is not that the transformation of matter, the body, is first apprehended as without consciousness, and then afterwards is found consciousness. Thus, since it is found that they are simultaneously produced (*sahasiddha*), there can be no cause-effect relation between them, as between water and fire.

Or, let it (i.e. a cause-effect relation) be there. Still, then, in relation to consciousness, would the forms of matter be the material cause (*upādāna*) or the co-operating cause (*sahakārin*)?

The forms of matter cannot be the material cause, for even though they may undergo changes, consciousness does not. Of two things, when one does not undergo changes although the other may, one cannot be the material cause of the other, e.g. a horse for a cow. Even though the forms of matter transformed into the shape of a body may undergo changes, consciousness does not. And this is not unproved. For it is well-known that

there is no change (*vikāra*) in consciousness in the case of persons whose minds are deeply absorbed elsewhere and to whom the stab of a knife is like the smearing of sandal-paste, even though their bodies may suffer changes on being struck by weapons, etc.

(The forms of matter cannot be the material cause) also because even though there may not be changes in them, there may be a change in consciousness, as in the case previously mentioned (i.e. in the case of a horse and a cow). And this, too, is not unproved. For even though there is no change in the existing condition of the body, changes in one's consciousness in the form of joy, etc., are observed when one is in the company of a charming lady.

Therefore it cannot be logically shown that the forms of matter are the material cause (of consciousness).

If, on the other hand, they are supposed to be co-operating causes, (the question arises), does it or does it not have something distinct from them as the material cause? If it does not, then how can it, without having any material cause, be produced at all? That which has no material cause is never produced, e.g. a horn growing on a hare's head; and you conceive of consciousness as something without a material cause.

If, however, it does (i.e. it has a material cause), then (the question arises), is this (material cause) dissimilar or similar to consciousness? Here, the first alternative is illogical, for if the production of something dissimilar out of something dissimilar be possible, there would arise the possibility of the production of fire, etc., even from water, etc., and as a result, there would follow the absence of the fourfold realities.

However, if (the material cause is admitted to be) similar, it would be quite logical, for in every case, only a similar thing is observed to be the material cause. Thus, whatever is the material cause of an effect is similar in nature to the effect; e.g. a jar possessing colour, etc., has (as its material cause) a lump of clay, which is of a similar nature. And you will have to admit that there is some distinct entity which would be the material cause of consciousness, which is of the nature of self-awareness.

Therefore it is only logical that the material cause should be something distinct from the earth, etc., having a nature similar to that (i.e. being of the nature of self-awareness), and hence, a reality in the form of the self is established.

Moreover, what kind of matter would be the cause of consciousness—unqualified (*nirviśiṣṭa*) or qualified (*viśiṣṭa*)?

If unqualified (matter be the cause of consciousness), then there arises the possibility of its production everywhere and always.

Again, if qualified (matter be the cause), (we ask) how do the forms of matter become qualified—because of collectivity (*samudāya*), because of transformation into the shape of the body, because of a specific state (*avasthā-viśeṣa*), or because of a different co-operating cause?

If (they be qualified) because of collectivity, then from the acts of putting the pot on the fire (*adhiśrayaṇa*), etc., there should have been produced consciousness, just like the cooking of rice, because their collectivity is equally present there.

If (they be qualified) because of transformation into the shape of a body, then, we ask, how do they get this transformation itself—not due to any cause, simply arising out of their own nature, or, due to *adṛṣṭa*?

If it is not due to any cause, it would be either present or absent always.

If it simply arises out of their own nature, there arises the possibility of that transformation occurring everywhere and always, for in their own nature they are equally present everywhere and always.

If it is due to *adṛṣṭa*, we ask, what *adṛṣṭa* would be the cause—the one produced in the present birth, or the one produced in some other birth?

In the first alternative, there is the absurdity of arguing in a circle (*cakraka*): after the production of the body there is the production of consciousness; after the production of consciousness there is the production of *adṛṣṭa* from the performance of acts productive of *adṛṣṭa*, on the basis of critical consideration

of the beneficial and the harmful; and then, there is the production of the body.

(In the second alternative), if *adṛṣṭa* be the one produced in some other birth, the existence of one capable of being related to the other world would be established and as such, the statement that due to the absence of one capable of being related to the other world there is the absence of the other world, would itself be unjustified.

Or, let them somehow undergo transformation in the shape of a body. Even then, if such a transformation is (admitted to be) the cause of consciousness, there would arise the possibility of consciousness being produced even in a corpse, there being no difference.

As against this, no doubt, the following may be put forward: a specific state (*avasthā-viśeṣa*) too, is the cause of consciousness; due to its absence, there is no possibility of consciousness in a corpse; the forms of matter transformed into the shape of a body, when characterized by a specific state, become the cause for the production of consciousness.

But then, we ask the following: What exactly is being characterized by a specific state on the part of these so transformed—being accompanied by consciousness, being related to a specific *adṛṣṭa*, preponderance of a particular body-constituent (*dhātu*), or being of some particular age?

The first alternative, being accompanied by consciousness, is not acceptable; for in that case, there arises the absurdity of their not being the cause for the production of the first consciousness (*ādya-caitanya*), as at that stage they are not yet accompanied by consciousness.

However, if it is intended that even then, they are accompanied by consciousness, then we ask, are they so by that very consciousness, or by a previous one? If they are so by that very one, then there is mutual dependence—when the first consciousness is proved, their accompaniment by it is proved, and again, when such accompaniment is proved, the first consciousness is proved. If, on the other hand, they be so by a

previous one; how can the existence of one capable of being related to the other world be denied, as it will have to be admitted, then, that the stream of consciousness (*caitanya-prabandha*) continues even prior to consciousness, belonging to the one in the womb (*garbha-caitanya*)?

If, again, it is said that being characterized by a specific state means being related to a specific *adṛṣṭa*, (we ask) why is it that it does not exist in a corpse—due to the absence of consciousness, due to the absence of the performance (of acts) productive of it, or because it is earned to last only for that span of time?

In the first alternative, being related to a specific *adṛṣṭa* cannot be the cause for the production of consciousness, there arising the contrary possibility that consciousness itself is the cause for its production. The second and the third alternatives, too, are negated by the same; for the performance (of acts) productive of it and also it being earned to last only for that span of time are both dependent upon a specific form of consciousness.

Nor would it be logical to say that being characterized by a specific state means preponderance of a particular body-constituent; because in the state of deep sleep, although there is such preponderance, the production of consciousness in the body is never observed.

That being characterized by a specific state signifies possession of a particular age is also refuted by this, for although the body of one under deep sleep and that of a corpse are of a particular age such as childhood, etc., they are never productive of consciousness.

Nor would the forms of matter be qualified because of a different co-operating cause, for it is not admitted (in the Cārvāka view) that there is any other co-operating cause distinct from the realities in four forms. If, however, it is admitted, then the specific determination that the realities are only four would be contradicted; and moreover, the self would be proved, for such (a co-operating cause) is, indeed, the self.

Moreover, every effect is found to have a substratum (*āśraya*). Therefore if consciousness is to be an effect, some substratum for it has to be cited. What would be such a substratum—the body, the forms of matter, the senses, the mind, or the object?

The body cannot be such, because it is made of matter, perceived by an external sense, and has a tangible form (*mūrta*); as in the case of the jar, etc.

That the forms of matter constitute the substratum of consciousness is also refuted by this, because their presence is possible everywhere and always, and as such, there is no difference so far as the presence of these everywhere and always in their perfect state (*avikala*), constituting the substratum of consciousness, is concerned.

Well, let the senses then constitute the substratum of consciousness, for through agreement in presence (*anvaya*) and agreement in absence (*vyatireka*) it is found to be produced by them. This too is not established, for contradiction by inferences (having as ground) 'because of being made of matter', etc., is equally possible here.

Moreover, how would the senses constitute the substratum of consciousness—separately (*vyasta*), or collectively (*samasta*)?

If (they do so) separately, then there arises the possibility of having many streams of consciousness (= selves) in the same body, and as such, as in the case of a single stream constituted of many individuals, there would follow the impossibility of recollection (*anusandhāna*). Also, how would the blind, etc., recollect colour, etc., when the sense is destroyed? How would there be the cognition of colour, taste, etc., in the states of dream, etc.? How would there be the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc., when the senses are destroyed by diseases like sleeping-sickness (*prasuptikā*), etc.? Of two things, when one does not undergo changes even though the other may do so, one cannot be the effect of the other, for otherwise there would be absurdities.

The alternative that (they do so) collectively is also refuted by this, for collectivity cannot be there in the absence of even a single sense and thus, in the case of the blind, etc., there should not be produced even the minutest amount (*leśa*) of knowledge. Indeed, collectivity or the production of a seedling is never observed when any one among the earth, etc., is absent.

And if it be said, then let the mind be the substratum of consciousness, for even when the (external) senses have ceased to function, knowledge in the form of internal awareness (*antaḥ-saṃkalpa*) is found to be there?

We then ask: is the mind eternal or non-eternal? It cannot be eternal, because in that case, the accepted view on the number of realities would be contradicted and there would also arise the absurdity of surrendering to the view of the opponent.

If, however, the mind is supposed to be non-eternal, we further ask, is it produced from matter or from something else? It cannot be produced from something else, because it is not admitted. If it be produced from matter it cannot logically be accepted as the substratum of consciousness because of (opposition by) the inference having as their ground 'because of being made of matter', etc., which have been mentioned earlier.

Moreover, does the mind as the conscious one produce the knowledge of objects independently of any other cause, or as dependent upon (some other cause)? If it would do so independently, it would be possible for one to acquire the knowledge of things, one and all, at the same time, and everybody would become omniscient.

If, however, it would do so as dependent upon some other cause, (we ask) what is that other cause—the mind, or something else? If it be the mind, (we ask again) would it be conscious or unconscious? It cannot be unconscious, because as a substratum of consciousness it has already been accepted as the conscious one; otherwise one would be forced to admit the unconsciousness of the first one as well. If, however, it be conscious, then it also would produce cognition of objects

independently of any other cause and as a result, there would be infinite regress.

It (i.e. the alleged additional cause) cannot be something else (i.e. other than mind), because in the case of one whose senses have ceased to function, there is no functioning of any other sense (except the mind).

Nor can the object be the substratum of consciousness, because the illogicalities pointed out against the alternatives 'body is the substratum' and 'senses are the substratum' can be equally applied to it.

Therefore a substratum of consciousness distinct from the body, namely the self, has to be admitted and thus it is established as a distinct reality.

How, otherwise, would be produced the desire, etc., leading to activities like movement towards the breast, etc., on the part of an infant born on that very day? That an activity is due to desire is not unproved. For instance (it can be inferred), an activity like movement towards the breast, etc., on the part of an infant born on that very day is due to desire, because it is a form of activity, just like an activity in the middle stage (of life). (The) desire (of the infant), again, is due to recollection (*smaraṇa*), and its recollection too is due to actual experience (*anubhava*), because they are so (i.e. a form of desire and a form of recollection), just like them (i.e. desire and recollection in the middle stage of life). The experiences, etc., cannot take place in the embryo, etc., and hence it is established that the experience takes place in a previous birth. The infant, suffering from hunger, recollects that the sucking of the breast, which is capable of removing its hunger, is a means for obtainment of pleasure, and because of a desire to suck, proceeds towards the breast. If he fails to reach it he starts to cry, and when he reaches it, he stops crying and engages himself in sucking the breast. Even the babies of a monkey become afraid as they recollect their pain due to falling down from a height, and hence they cling very closely to their mothers' laps and avoid places from which they may fall down. It is not possible that

those who have not earlier enjoyed the fruits produced by things leading to benefit or harm would, in a regular manner, desire to obtain or to avoid such things, for otherwise there would be absurdities. That in respect of which experiences in a previous birth are established is the self, which is a distinct form of reality. Its relation with a new (collectivity of) body, senses, etc., is its birth, but it is not an appearance of the previously non-existent. Again, the perishment of these (the body, etc.) is its death, but it is not a total annihilation.

As to the contention that consciousness is like the power of intoxication, (we say) this is illogical. The power of intoxication is found even in things which are not transformations of the ingredients of a spiritous drink, e.g. the *dhatturaka* (white thorn-apple), *kodrava* (species of grain), etc., and hence it is ascertained to be (produced) in a specific transformation of matter. As a result, there is no contradiction in (accepting) its appearance (out of them). But consciousness is not found in any specific transformation of matter, such as the jar, etc., even in a dream, for there is a contradiction.

As to the other contention that beings are like water-bubbles, (we say) this too is unjustified, for it is not possible to find any similarity between the two things compared to each other. Water-bubbles are not absolutely different from water itself; hence it is justified that they are produced only by it. As a result, their variety is justifiably explained to be due to it alone. But matter and consciousness are absolutely different from each other; hence there can be no cause-effect relation between them at all. As a result, without *adṛṣṭa*, the variety of pleasure, pain, etc., or the variety of body, etc., cannot be logically explained. Otherwise how is it that out of so many people engaged in service (*sevā*), agriculture (*kṛṣi*), etc., who put in the same amount of effort, or who are devoted in the same degree, only some achieve results while others fail to do so? Therefore, there being deviation (*vyabhicāra*) in the case of ordinary causes (*dṛṣṭa-kāraṇa*) and thereby an extraordinary cause (in the

form of *adṛṣṭa*) being established, it is proved that the variety of pleasure, etc., is due to the variety of *adṛṣṭa*. Thus it is not possible to deny the existence of one capable of travelling to the other world by admitting a cause-effect relation (between matter and consciousness).

Nor can (consciousness and matter) be related to each other as the thing that is manifested (*vyaṅgya*) and the thing that makes it manifested (*vyañjaka*), because such a relation would actually contribute to the establishment of the other world. Thus (it may be asked), is there a manifestation of consciousness which is existent (*sat*), or which is non-existent (*asat*), or which is existent as well as non-existent (*sad-asad-rūpa*)?

In the first alternative the other world would be established without any dispute, for the presence of consciousness would have to be admitted even prior to the transformation of the forms of matter into the shape of a body.

(The second alternative is also unacceptable.) The manifestation of something that is previously non-existent is contradicted by experience. As is well-known, manifestation means revealing clearly things like the jar, etc., which are already existent, by the lamp, etc; and not things which are non-existent.

(The third alternative is also unacceptable.) If (consciousness manifested is existent as well as non-existent), (we ask), is it so totally or partially? It cannot be so totally, because of contradictions. If it be so partially, the Jaina view will be established, for it is admitted by the Jainas that through the forms of matter (*pudgala*) like the earth, etc., transformed into the shape of a body, there is manifestation of consciousness, which is existent as substance (*dravyataḥ*) as well as non-existent as mode (*paryāyataḥ*). Thus it is established that this self is without a beginning and without an end.

As to the contention 'because there is no proof of its existence', etc. (we say) these are only empty words, for there is clear proof of the existence of the self, which is perception. Thus in

the case of every living being, there is observed to be produced a cognition in the form 'I experience pleasure', which is self-cognized and clearly refers to the thing known (*jñeya*), the knower (*jñātṛ*) and the knowledge (*jñāna*), which are all mutually distinct.

Such a cognition is not false, for there is no contradiction. Nor is it a form of doubt, because it does not involve two alternatives (*koṭi*). Nor would it be logical to say that such a cognition is without an underlying object, for then there would arise the absurdity of the cognitions of colour, etc., also being without any underlying object

Nor can such a cognition have the body as the underlying object, because it is produced exclusively by the function of the internal sense, independently of the external senses. The body cannot be the object revealed by such an awareness involving the 'I', because it is a thing perceivable by the external senses

Hence, some entity distinct from the body, which would be the underlying object of such an awareness and a substratum of knowledge, has to be admitted; for such an entity alone can logically be considered a knower. But the body (cannot be so), because it is made of matter, like the jar, etc Indeed, the jar, etc., which are made of matter are never observed to be so. It cannot even be claimed that although there is no difference so far as constitution by matter is concerned, still, the body can be the object revealed by an awareness involving the 'I'; because there will be deviation (*vyabhicāra*) in the case of the corpse. Such cognitions as 'I am fat', though produced in respect of the body, are to be taken in a secondary sense due to its (the body) being the most useful implement (*upakāraka*) for the self; just like the awareness of one in respect of one's most useful servant: 'this is none but myself'

Moreover, the self is known by inference as well: 'the knowledge of colour, etc , must inhere somewhere, because they are qualities, like colour, etc.' and 'knowledge, pleasure,

etc , must have some material cause, because they are effects, like the jar, etc.'

It cannot be said that it would be a case of proving the proved, as it is accepted that the body is their substratum or that the body is their material cause; because by the discussion previously made, the view that the body is the substratum and that the body is the material cause have been adequately refuted.

There are also (other inferences proving the self):

'The living body is governed by one capable of applying effort (*prayatnavat*) because it becomes a locus of wilful action, like a chariot.

'The auditory organ, etc.—the instruments for acquiring knowledge—must be employed by an agent; because they are instruments (*karana*), like the axe, etc.'

Therefore it being established that there is a substance in the form of the self, which is a form of reality distinct from the earth, etc., how can it be specifically determined that only four realities exist?

Prabhācandra's Nyāyakumudacandra

B. REJECTION OF CONCOMITANCE (VYĀPTI)

Well, it being impossible to state specifically the nature of concomitance, how can *tarka* be considered the *pramāṇa* in respect of it? To explain, concomitance is a relation among things; but is it a relation of one thing with another thing in respect of space or in respect of time? It cannot be in respect of space, for smoke is in the sky and fire is on the ground; the rain falls on the upper region and the swelling of the river occurs in the lower region. Nor can it be in respect of time, for the swelling of the river does not occur at the time when the rain is falling; and the Rohiṇī does not rise at the moment the Kṛttikā is rising

Moreover, between which two would there be this relation of one not being without the other (*avinābhāva* = concomitance)—

would it be a relation of one generality with another generality (*sāmānya*), or of a generality with the particulars (*viśeṣa*), or of particulars with particulars? In the first alternative, it would be proving the proved, for it is well-known that fireness and smokeness are related in respect of all space and time, because of eternality and ubiquity. In the second alternative as well, (it may be asked) has a generality concomitance with a mere particular not delimited by any space or time, or (with a particular) as delimited by them? If it be with a particular not so delimited, it would be nothing but a case of proving the proved. If it be with a particular as delimited by space and time, there would be absence of agreement (*anugama*). It is not that smoke in general which is present in the kitchen has agreement with a particular fire as located in the mountain, nor (smoke in general) which is present in the mountain with the particular fire as located in the kitchen.

Nor can there be concomitance of particulars with particulars, for (it may be asked), is it of observed ones with observed ones, or of non-observed ones with non-observed ones, or of observed ones with non-observed ones? If it be of observed ones with observed ones, it would be a case of proving the proved. In case a new (*apūrva*, i.e. as yet unknown) individual is perceived, inference would not be logically justified. If, again, it be of non-observed ones with non-observed ones, then due to the absence of the ascertainment of the relation as well as agreement, how would inference be possible? Nor can it be of observed ones with non-observed ones, for the said objections would follow.

Moreover, concomitance is a kind of relation (*sambandha*). Its ascertainment must be preceded by the knowledge of the relata (*sambandhin*). But the relata are always two particulars. So how can concomitance be ascertained as embracing all the cases (i.e. in general)?

Again, the word *avinābhāva* (used to mean concomitance) speaks only of the absence of the probans in the absence of the probandum, and it is thus only a word signifying absence and not one signifying a relation.

Also, (from the statement of) the inconsistency (*anupapatti*) of smoke, namely, 'smoke accompanied by the absence of fire cannot be explained', (it follows that) absence of fire is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). But is this absence of fire real (*pāramārthika*) or unreal? If it is real, then due to the absence of smoke as well, it would not be possible to ascertain concomitance as pertaining to the smoke. Indeed, when the substratum (smoke in the present case) is not known, the thing related to it also (concomitance, in the present case) cannot be known; for in that case there would be absurdities. If, again, the qualification is unreal, the inconsistency of smoke also, being qualified by it (i.e. an unreal qualification), would itself be unreal. As a result, there would follow the impossibility of inference as well.

Well, it may be said that (what is meant is that) if there is absence of fire, then the presence of smoke cannot be justified, for absence of fire is pervaded by absence of smoke. However, this also would be illogical. Only such concomitance is relevant for inference as is actually present and ascertained, not that which is only surmised to be there; for such concomitance, even though it may possibly be present, is not thus ascertained. Such knowledge (viz. if there is absence of fire, the presence of smoke cannot be explained) is only of the nature of a surmise (*sambhāvanā*); it cannot determine the true nature of a thing like (the knowledge), 'if the earth was not there, the mountains would have fallen down.'

Moreover, is it the case that smoke is not justified in the absence of any one particular fire, or in the absence of all fires? It cannot be so in the absence of any one particular fire, because even in the absence of that fire, but in the presence of some other fire, smoke may be justified. Nor can it be so in the absence of all fires, for it is impossible to know the thing qualified without knowing the qualifier. In the inconsistency of smoke, the qualifier is the absence of all fires; but it cannot be known

unless all the fires have been known, for the precondition for the knowledge of absence is the knowledge of the negatum (*pratiyogin*) and the substratum (*āśraya*).

Besides, (smoke being present) sometimes even in the absence of the absence of fire, it is to be concluded that there is opposition between absence of smoke and presence of smoke. Thus, the precondition for opposing smoke would be not the absence of fire, but only the absence of smoke.

Thus on critical examination, concomitance itself becomes unjustified; and then, how can *tarka*, alleged to be the cause for its ascertainment, or inference, which is said to be produced from such ascertainment, be held to be valid?

Or, let concomitance be admitted. Even then, (it is observed that) in spite of there being concomitance, the redness of fire is not inferred from smoke; for fire alone is inferred by smoke. Similarly, smoke only leads to the inference (of fire), but not to that of the blackness, etc., belonging to it, although they also are equally concomitant. (In short, one is not inferred from another, in spite of concomitance; so inference is impossible).

The above is now being refuted.

As to the statement 'it being impossible to state specifically the nature of concomitance', (we reply), this is not proper. Since by concomitance we accept non-deviation (*avyabhicāra*) due to a thing's own nature, how can it be said that it is impossible (to state specifically) its nature? (In the inference of fire from smoke), the specific nature of the probandum and the probans respectively is fireness and smokeness, as accompanied by a host of its own peculiar characteristics. This very nature (of smoke and fire), by dissociating them from others, such as space, time, form, etc., makes the relation pertain to nothing but themselves (i.e. smoke and fire) 'Make sure, make sure, that concomitance is dependent upon ourselves (smokeness and fireness)'—establishing concomitance, in this way, as pertaining to nothing but themselves, they make the knower aware of the concomitance which is due to their own selves.

Another statement made earlier, that concomitance is not

possible either in respect of space or in respect of time, is also rejected by this, for the concomitance of one (e.g. smoke) as characterized by its own properties, with another (e.g. fire) as characterized by its own properties, is revealed by an uncontradicted awareness. Concomitance is (established) only with that which is non-deviating. Space and time are not non-deviating, for smoke, etc , are observed to be present even in the absence of the (points of) space and time sought to be conveyed.

As to the statement 'concomitance—of what, with whom?', (we reply), concomitance is of one with another, when one has non-deviation with another. Smoke characterized by general as well as special properties has non-deviation with fire, characterized by general as well as special properties; thus smoke has concomitance with fire and nothing else. Therefore there is no scope for the said objection. The pervader (*vyāpaka*) is what is made known (*gamya*) and the pervaded (*vyāpya*) is what makes it known (*gamaka*). It is not that mere generality or merely the particular is observed to be of the nature of what is made known and what makes it known, for in spite of somehow being of the nature of both, the two are revealed to be things belonging to a quite distinct class.

As to the contention that concomitance is a kind of relation and its ascertainment is to be preceded by the knowledge of the relata, etc. (we reply that) it, too, is refuted by the above, for since concomitance can occur between two particulars as characterized by generalities, it is possible to determine it as embracing all cases. In that case, neither is there any scope for objections based on innumerability, etc.

(In reply to) the contention that the word *avinābhāva* speaks merely of absence and does not convey a relation, (we say that) this also is a group of empty words. For the word *avinābhāva* cannot be construed to mean absence alone, as in that case, there would arise the undue possibility of it being applied even to the case of the absence of the jar, etc.; but actually (it is to be construed to mean) an invariable

rule (*niyama*). Such a rule is established on the basis of such observation (e.g. smoke is everywhere accompanied by fire) and unjustifiability otherwise (*anyathā-anupapatti*; e.g. presence of smoke cannot be justified without the presence of fire). Therefore, the word *avinābhāva* is also used to mean the two invariable rules; namely, 'wherever there is smoke there is fire', and 'wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke'.

Well, how is it known that where there is no fire there is also no smoke? The answer is: in the absence of fire, smoke being invariably unperceived, smoke must be invariably concomitant with the presence of fire; otherwise, just as, even in the absence of smoke, fire is sometimes found, so also, in the absence of fire, smoke, too, would have been found, at least in some case. When the presence of one cannot be justified without the presence of the other, then one would invariably be concomitant with the other. For example, the presence of fire can be justified even in the absence of smoke, and hence fire is not invariably concomitant with smoke. But the presence of smoke cannot be justified without that of fire, and hence, smoke is invariably concomitant with fire.

It has also been objected that if the absence of fire be real, then because of the absence of smoke as well, it would not be possible to ascertain concomitance as pertaining to it. But this, also, is unjustified, for only in that particular space or time where there is actual absence of fire, is there also the absence of smoke; and not everywhere. Therefore how would it be impossible to ascertain concomitance as pertaining to it (smoke)?

As to the contention, 'Is the presence of smoke unjustified in the absence of only an individual fire, or all fires?', etc. (we reply that) this also is illogical; for concomitance is ascertained with reference to all—'whatever smoke exists, is all unjustified in the absence of fire', and (it is not ascertained) with reference to any particular individual, such as, 'smoke, as located in the mountain, a house, or a forest, is unjustified in the absence of fire'. Had it been ascertained in that way, there would have been no ascertainment of concomitance even in eternity; for the particular individuals are countless. Further, there would be an absurdity: inference would become useless, for all the spots where fire and smoke are present would already be known at the time of ascertaining the concomitance. (No unknown spot where fire may be inferred from smoke would remain.)

It also cannot be said that, if all fires are not ascertained, it would not be possible to know the absence of fire, which is a qualifier to the unjustifiability of smoke; for an absence of one is of the nature of such a spot as is other than a spot characterized by one, due to the fact that an absence is really of the nature of a different positive category (*bhāvāntara*) . . . (In the present case), it consists only of such spots as are not characterized by fire, and they can be known by perception. The knowledge of the negatum (*pratiyogin*) is a precondition only for the use of words to express (an absence), and not for ascertaining the absence itself. Otherwise, how can there be knowledge even of a jar? For by nature, a jar is different from all other objects in the three worlds; and unless the nature of all other objects in the three worlds is known, there arises the absurdity of a jar, also, remaining unknown.

As to the contention 'sometimes there being the absence of smoke even in the absence of the absence of fire, opposition to the presence of smoke is observed (only in the absence of smoke)', etc. (we reply that) these are only empty words. Since in the absence of fire, the presence of smoke is invariably denied, (it follows that) in the matter of opposing smoke, just like its own absence (i.e. the absence of smoke), the absence of fire, too, is justified to be a precondition. When in the presence of one, the other is invariably denied, one becomes the precondition for opposing the other; for example, cool touch in the presence of warm touch. And it is observed that in the absence of fire, the presence of smoke is invariably denied. Hence, it must be a precondition for opposing smoke.

(Objection:) But then, it is not proved that in the absence of fire smoke is invariably denied; for in the case of magical

smoke (*gopāla-ghaṭikā*), the presence of smoke is observed even in the absence of fire. (Answer) this, also, is illogical; for even here, the presence of smoke would only be possible in the presence of fire. Presence of smoke implies production of smoke, and that can take place only when there is fire. Therefore, in the case of magical smoke as well, how can there be any doubt as to the presence of smoke in the absence of fire? Well, then, as in the case of the mountain, in the case of a magical show as well, smoke should lead to the ascertainment of fire. Such a claim is illogical, for magical smoke is quite distinct from smoke located in the mountain, etc. Smoke located in the mountain, which is contemporaneous with the presence of fire, is observed to simulate a cluster of banners (fluttering in the air). But magical smoke is not of this nature. Hence, it cannot lead to the inference of fire.

As to the contention that in spite of there being concomitance, redness is not inferred from smoke, (we reply that) this, too, is unjustified, for inference is admitted to occur accordingly as concomitance (is established). The concomitance is ascertained through fireness and smokeness and not through the properties of redness, etc. as they are of innumerable kinds and have deviation. (Hence, only fire is inferred from smoke.) The deviation of properties belonging to fire is (as follows): yellowness is found to deviate in such cases as the pigeon, gold; brightness in the case of the sun, stars, lightning; substancehood in the case of all the nine substances; and upward movement in the case of the storm; etc. Similarly, (there is deviation of properties) belonging to smoke as well; for example, blackness deviates in such cases as the blue lotus, collyrium; acridity in the case of spices (*trikaṭuka*: black and long pepper and dry ginger); irritation to the eyes in the case of white mustard (*kaṭutaila*); choking the throat in the case of the unripe rose-apple (*jambūphala*); and upward movement in the case of vapour; etc. These (properties of smoke) are observed to be common (to other things as well). Therefore, those particular properties alone; i.e. only those specific properties by

which are brought together all the individuals of fire and smoke as existing within the limit of the three worlds and their properties; would establish invariable concomitance (between themselves), and such properties can be nothing except fireness and smokeness. The properties of redness, etc. are common to so many objects, but fireness and smokeness are not. When words denoting the two (fire and smoke) are uttered, the hearer only becomes aware of two things, fire and smoke; which are distinct from all other things in the three worlds and are characterized by their own group of specific properties. Thus it follows that for this reason, concomitance is established between the probans and the probandum only through fireness and smokeness.

But then, if there really is concomitance between smoke and fire, why is it that it is not referred to at the time of the first observation? Because of the absence of the means for cognizing (*grāhaka*) it. When the means for cognizing one is not present, one is not perceived; e.g. taste (is not perceived) at the time colour is being perceived. At the time of the first observation of smoke and fire, the knowledge which is the means for cognising concomitance is not present there. The absence of the means for cognizing at that time, is established by the absence of its cause. The cause for the ascertainment of concomitance is observation (wherever there is smoke there is fire), as well as non-observation (if there is no fire, there is no smoke). These two are not there at the time of the first observation. It is not to be said, however, that at that time, there should also be the absence of concomitance itself due to the absence of the means for cognising; because the absence of the means for cognising is incapable (*anyathā-siddha*) (of proving the absence of concomitance). Otherwise, at the time colour is being perceived at a distance, (one would have to admit) the absence of taste (which cannot be perceived, due to distance); as there is no difference (from the case of concomitance, as alleged by the opponent). If, at the time of the first observation, concomitance is not really there, how would it appear in an

awareness subsequently, like a flower blooming in the sky?

What if it be said that it would appear in an awareness subsequently on the strength of agreement in presence and agreement in absence? (We then ask:) Is concomitance produced (*janyate*) or conveyed (*jñāpyate*) by agreement in presence and agreement in absence? Concomitance cannot be produced (by them), because these two are the means for cognition

It is never found that the means for cognition produces the object of cognition (concomitance, in the present case). If, on the other hand, it is said that concomitance is conveyed (by them), then, (we ask), is it conveyed as being present only at that time (i.e. the time of the agreements, and not earlier), or as being so beforehand as well? It cannot be conveyed as being present only at that time, because there is no ground to prove that concomitance exists only at the time of agreement in presence and agreement in absence (and not at other times as well). If, however, it is conveyed as being present beforehand as well, then it is easily established that concomitance exists even at the time of the first observation. As such, how can concomitance itself and also the means for its ascertainment, namely *tarka*, be denied (by the opponent)? In case even what is actually experienced is negated, there should be the (absurd) negation even of colour, etc., or the awareness revealing them.

Therefore it is established that *tarka* can be the *pramāṇa* (in respect of concomitance).

Tāranātha

Born in AD 1575, the great Tibetan scholar popularly known as Lama Tāranātha wrote his History of Buddhism in India in AD 1608. The importance of this work as a source-book for Indian history is generally recognized. We give here his brief account of the refutation of the Lokāyata by the famous *ācārya* Candragomin. Although a quaint one, it seems to illustrate Mādhavācārya's remark that the refutation of the Cārvāka view is not an easy proposition (*durucchedaṃ hi cārvākasya ceṣṭitam*)!

The English translation used here is from *Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India*, Simla, 1970.

Tāranātha's

HISTORY OF BUDDHISM IN INDIA

In the east, [Fol 75 A] in Varendra*, there lived a *paṇḍita** who attained the vision of *ārya* Avalokiteśvara. He entered into a debate with a *tīrthika* Lokāyata teacher. He defeated his (*tīrthika's*) views no doubt; yet [the *tīrthika* claimed] that arguments depended on the intellect and hence one with keener intellect gained victory. [So he said]

'There is no direct evidence for anterior and posterior existence. So I do not admit this.'

Being thus told, he kept the king and others as witnesses and said, 'I am going to be reborn. Put a mark on my forehead.'

He placed on his forehead a mark of vermilion cut deep into the flesh. Putting a pearl into his mouth, he (the *paṇḍita*) died on the spot.

His corpse was kept in a covered copper vessel and it was sealed by the king.

According to his promise to be reborn as the son of a *kṣatriya paṇḍita** called Viśeṣaka*, a son with auspicious marks was born to the latter. His forehead was found to have the mark of vermilion and within his mouth was found the pearl. On being examined by the king and others, the dead body of the *paṇḍita* was found to have no mark of vermilion on the forehead and the place where the pearl was kept was found empty. It is said that the same *tīrthika* then came to believe in past and future existence.

[*mark in the translation indicates Tāranātha's use of Indian words in Tibetan transcriptions.]

Kṛṣṇamiśra's *Prabodhacandrodaya*

The *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra (*c.* eleventh century AD) is an allegorical drama intended to popularize the Advaita view. The author naturally feels the need to refute by ridicule the Cārvāka view, which he does in a section of the second act of the play. This portion is given here in translation (largely depending on that of Dr. Sita Krishna Nambiar, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971).

Kṛṣṇamiśra's *Prabodhacandrodaya*

[EXTRACT FROM ACT II]

(Then enters Grand Delusion (*mahāmoha*) pompously with his attendants)

Mahāmoha: (Smiling) The fools are without any check on them. 'The view that there is a soul separate from the body, which on reaching the other world enjoys rewards, is (like) a hope to get tasty fruits from a big flower of a tree in the sky' (16).

This world is deceived by the ignorant, who accept the existence of the mere creations of their own imagination. For—

There are talkative believers (*āstika*-s) who jabber in vain that a thing which does not exist, exists; condemning the truth-speaking non-believers (*nāstika*-s). Oh, consider from the viewpoint of reality: when the body is destroyed, has anyone seen a soul separate from it which acquired consciousness as a result of transformation (of material elements due to certain combinations)? (17)

They deceive not only the world, but also themselves. For—

If bodies are alike in their different parts, the mouth, etc., how can there be a hierarchy of castes? We do not accept any difference between a woman and wealth belonging (to us or)

to somebody else. Only those who are devoid of manliness consider whether an act should be done or not, whether it entails harm, whether to approach women at one's pleasure and to seize the wealth of others. (18).

(After thinking, proudly.) By all means materialism alone is the science, in which view, the only means of knowledge is perception. The elements are earth, water, fire, and air. Wealth and pleasure are the sole aims of man. The elements move through original impulse. There is no other world. Emancipation is death. This science was composed by Vācaspati who followed our view and has given it to the Materialist. This science is popularized in the world by him through his disciples and their disciples.

(Then enter the Materialist (Cārvāka) and his disciples.)

Cārvāka: My child, know that knowledge consists only of statecraft. The science of agriculture and trade is included in this. The three Vedas are the incoherent talk of cheats. It makes no difference just because they postulate heaven. Thus: If sacrifices obtain (for one) heaven, by the destruction of the sacrificial matter through the action of the officiating priest, then trees burnt by the forest fire would as well bear ample fruit! (19). Moreover—

If it is assumed that an animal slain (in sacrifices) goes to heaven, why does the sacrificer not immolate his own father? (20). And—

If Śrāddha (offering of rice balls to a dead person) produces gratification to beings who are dead, then oil as well may inflate the flame of an extinguished light (21).

Disciple: Venerable teacher, if the sole aim of man is to eat and drink, then why do these ascetics renounce worldly pleasures and afflict themselves with severe tortures caused by *parāka* (a sacrificial sword), *sāntapana* (a kind of rigid penance), and take food once in three days (as an expiatory act)?

Cārvāka: These fools who are deceived by the Vedas composed by cheats are content with the sweetmeats of their hopes. Thus:

How blissful is the embrace of long-eyed maidens, the embrace pressing their shoulders with one's arms which is so pleasing because of their prominent breasts compressed; how painful is begging, fasting, penance, and exposure to the burning heat of the sun, which only emaciates the bodies of these fools. (22)

Disciple: Revered sir, these ascetics say that worldly pleasure should be given up because it is mingled with miseries.

Cārvāka: (Laughing) This is only the expression of the foolishness of these human animals.

It is the reasoning of fools that the pleasure which arises in men from contact with sensible objects should be relinquished as it is accompanied by pain. What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away the berries of paddy, rich with finest white grains, because they are covered with husks and dust? (23)

Mahāmoha: Well, it is after a long time that my ears are gratified by words which are authoritative! (With joy:) Oh! it is my dear friend, the Cārvāka!

Cārvāka: So, this is King Delusion! (going near him) May the king be victorious! I, (Cārvāka), salute you.

Mahāmoha: Welcome, Cārvāka, be seated here.

Cārvāka: (sits) Kali (age) prostrates before you.

Mahāmoha: Ah! Kali (age), unimpaired blessings be upon you!

Cārvāka: By your grace all is good. He has accomplished everything (ordered by you) and wishes to (worship at) your feet. For—

After receiving the great command (from you) and having accomplished it by destroying his enemies, he is now happy and delighted, and with his great joy feels blessed and prostrates himself at the lotus feet of the Lord! (24)

Mahāmoha: And what has that Kali (age) achieved?

Cārvāka: Lord, he caused the virtuous to forsake the path shown by the Vedas and act according to their own wish. It is

thy glory, my Lord—neither mine nor Kali's—for this achievement. (25)

The people of the north and west have forsaken the three Vedas, not to speak of tranquillity and self-restraint. In other places too, the three Vedas exist only as a means of livelihood. The Ācārya (Bṛhaspati) has said:

'Oblations in the fire, the three Vedas, the carrying of three staves tied together, and smearing of oneself with ashes—all these are the means of livelihood of those who are devoid of intelligence and manliness. (26)

'Those in Kurukṣetra and other places, my Lord, need not fear the birth of knowledge or Spiritual Awakening, even in a dream.'

Mahāmoha: Well done. That great holy place is rendered useless

Cārvāka: My Lord! There is something more to be reported.

Mahāmoha: What is it?

Cārvāka: There is a Yoginī of great power called 'Devotion to Viṣṇu.' Though her popularity is lessened by Kali, we cannot even look at those who are blessed by her. Therefore, my Lord, you have to be on your guard against her.

Mahāmoha: (Somewhat afraid, addresses himself) Oh! it is difficult to destroy one whose great power is well-known and who is my natural enemy. Well. (To himself) Sometimes, drastic action has to be taken. (Loudly) Then, my dear, do not have any doubt. Where can she appear when Lust and Anger are her enemies?

Cārvāka: Even so, one who desires victory should not remain unguarded, even where the enemy is weak. For—

'Even a weak enemy may prove to be a fierce one in the end and inflict a mortal wound, like a small thorn that afflicts the foot.' (27)

Mahāmoha: (Looking behind the curtain) Who is there? (Enters the gatekeeper)

Gatekeeper: Victory to my Lord. Let my Lord command.

Mahāmoha: Oh! 'Companion of the wicked'! Go and direct Lust, Anger, Greed, Arrogance, Spite and others that they should be on their guard and kill the Yoginī known as 'Devotion to Viṣṇu'.

Gatekeeper: As your Lord commands.

(*Exit*)

PART II

Modern Scholars

J. Muir

First presented in 1861 and published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* in volume xix, pp. 299–314, this article bears for us the special importance of being the earliest compilation of the major references to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata view as found in the epics and the Purāṇas.

J. Muirs

Verses from the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, and the Rāmāyaṇa, illustrating the tenets of the Cārvākas or Indian Materialists, with some remarks on Freedom of Speculation in Ancient India.

In his essay on the heretical schools of the Hindus, Mr. Colebrooke has given an account of the tenets of the Cārvākas or Materialists (*Misc. Essays*, i., 402 ff). Professor Wilson, too, in his "Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (*As. Res.*, Vol. XVI., pp. 5, 6), alludes to the attacks made by the founder of the atheistical or materialistic school, Vṛhaspati, on the Vedas and the *Brāhmaṇas*, and quotes some verses attributed to that author in which he asserts that 'the whole Hindu system is a contrivance of the priesthood to secure a means of livelihood for themselves:' I am not aware whether either the aphorisms of Vṛhaspati (Vārhaspatya Ṣūtras), to which Mr. Colebrooke refers (*Misc. Ess.*, i., 404) as having been quoted by one of the commentators on the Vedānta, or the Work which contains the verses adduced by Professor Wilson, are still extant or not. As, however, the *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha*[1] of Mādhava Ācāryya (a work containing a concise account of the different philosophical schools of India, both orthodox and heretical), from which Professor Wilson derived the verses which he cites, contains a good many more of a similar tendency which are both satirical and clever I shall translate the whole and compare them with

passages of the same tenor which occur in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* and in the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

(1) The passage from the *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha* is as follows:

'All this has been uttered by Vṛhaspati as well:

'1. There is no heaven, no final liberation, no soul (which continues to exist) in another world; nor any ceremonies of castes or orders which are productive of future reward. 2. The Agnihotra sacrifice, the three Vedas, the mendicant's triple staff (*tridaṇḍa*),[2] and the practice of smearing oneself with ashes, are only a means of livelihood ordained by the Creator for men who have neither understanding nor energy. 3. If (it be true that) an animal slaughtered at the Jyotiṣṭoma Sacrifice is (in consequence) exalted to heaven,[3] why does the worshipper not immolate his own father? 4. If a *śrāddha* (offering of food to the manes)[4] satiates even defunct creatures, it is quite superfluous to furnish people who are setting out upon a journey with any provisions (as their friends who remain behind can offer food to them). 5. Since (as you say,) persons in heaven are filled with oblations presented upon earth, why is food not similarly offered (by those below) to people on the roof of the house? 6. While a man lives, let him live merrily;[5] let him borrow money, and swallow clarified butter; how can a body return to earth after it has been reduced to ashes? 7. If a man goes to another world when he quits his body, why does affection for his kindred not impel him to come back? 8. Hence ceremonies for the dead are a mere means of livelihood devised by the Brahmins, and nothing else. 9. The three composers of the Vedas were buffoons, rogues, and goblins; everyone has heard of *jarbharī, turpharī*, and other such (nonsensical) exclamations of the Pandits.[6] 10. It is well-known that in an *aśvamedha* (horse-sacrifice), the embraces of the horse must be received by the Queen;[7] and it is, in like manner, also well-known what other sorts of things are to be grasped by those buffoons.[8] In the same way, the eating of flesh is prescribed by those goblins."

(2) The ideas in the following verses from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*

are of the same tendency, and in part identical with those just quoted. The passage is considered by Professor Wilson to represent the sentiments of Vṛhaspati's school, and has already been translated by him in his *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (p. 340, f.); but I shall give a version of my own, prefixing to it the original Sanskrit, which has never been printed.

Viṣṇu Purāṇa iii. 18. 14: Anyān apyanya-pāṣaṇḍa-prakārair bahubhir dvija / Daiteyān mohayāmāsa Māyāmoha vimohakṛt / 15. Svalpenaiva hi kālena māyāmohena te 'surāḥ / Mohitās tatyajuḥ sarvāṃ trayī-mārgāśritāṃ kathām / 16. Kecid hi nindāṃ vedānāṃ devānām apare dvija / Yajña-karma-kalāpasya tathā 'nye ca dvijanmanām / 17. Naitad yuktiṃ-sahaṃ vākyam hiṃsā dharmāya neṣyate / havīṃsy anala-dagdhāni phalāyety arbhakoditam / 18. Yajñair anekair devatvam avāpy endrena bhujyate / śamyādi yadi cet kāṣṭhaṃ tadvaraṃ pattra-bhuk paśuḥ / 19. Nihatasya paśor yajñe svarga-prāptir yadīṣyate / Sva-pitā yajamānena kinnu tasmād na hanyate / 20. Triptaye jāyate puṃso bhuktam anyena cet xataḥ (tataḥ ?) / dadyāc chrāddhaṃ śraddhayā 'nnaṃ na vaheyuḥ pravāsinaḥ / 21. Janaśraddheyam ity etad avagamya tato vacaḥ / Upexya śreyase vākyaṃ iocatāṃ / yuktimad vacanaṃ grāhyaṃ mayā nyaiśca bhava-/mahāsurāḥ / yuktimad vacanaṃ grāhyaṃ mayā nyaiśca bhavadvidhaiḥ / 23. Māyāmohena te daityāḥ prakārair bahubhis tathā / vyutthāpitā yathā naiṣāṃ trayīṃ kaścid arocayat / 24. Ittham unmārgayāteṣu (teṣu?) daityeṣu te 'marāḥ / udyogaṃ paramaṃ kṛtvā yuddhāya samupasthitāḥ / 25. Tato devāsuraṃ yuddhaṃ punar evābhavad dvija / hatāśca te 'surā devaiḥ sanmārga-paripanthinaḥ / 26. Sa dharma-kavacas teṣām abhūd yaḥ prathamaṃ dvijx / tena raxā'bhavat pūrvaṃ neśur naṣṭe ca tatra te /

After describing how Māyāmoha, the great impersonated Delusion, had seduced the Daityas (who here stand for the heretical Indians in general) into embracing Jaina and Buddhist doctrines, the writer proceeds: 'The great Deceiver, practising illusion, next beguiled other Daityas by means of many other sorts of heresy. In a very short time these Asuras (= Daityas),

deluded by the Deceiver, abandoned the entire system founded on the ordinances of the triple Veda. Some reviled the Vedas, others the gods, others the ceremonial of sacrifice, and others the Brahmins. This (they exclaimed,) is a doctrine which will not bear discussion; the slaughter (of animals in sacrifice) is not conducive to religious merit. (To say that) oblations of butter consumed in the fire produce any future reward, is the assertion of a child. If Indra, after having attained godhead by numerous sacrifices, feeds upon *śamī* and other woods, then an animal which eats leaves is superior to him. If it be a fact that a beast slain in sacrifice is exalted to heaven, why does the worshipper not slaughter his own father? If a man is truly satiated by food that another person eats, then *śrāddhas* should be offered to people who are travelling abroad, and they, trusting this, should have no need to carry any food along with them.[9] After it has been settled that this doctrine is entitled to credence, let the opinions which I express be pondered and received as conducive to happiness. Infallible utterances do not, great Asuras, fall from the skies; only assertions founded on reasoning are accepted by me and by other (intelligent) persons like yourselves. Thus by numerous methods the Daityas were unsettled by the great Deceiver, so that none of them regarded the triple Veda with favour any longer. When the Daityas had entered this path of error, the deities mustered all their energies and approached to battle. Then followed a combat between the gods and Asuras, and the latter, who had abandoned the right road, were smitten by the former. In previous times they had been defended by the armour of righteousness which they bore, but when that had been destroyed, they too perished.'

(3) The following is the passage of the *Rāmāyaṇa* to which I have alluded. It contains the speech of the Brahmin Jāvāli, in which he endeavours, ineffectually, to shake the resolution of Rāma, who was unwilling to deviate from the arrangements made by his late father Daśaratha and return from the forests of the south to Ayodhyā to take possession of the throne now offered to him by his dutiful younger brother, Bharata. This

passage may be found translated in Carey and Marshman's edition of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, but I have rendered it anew, both according to the text of Schlegel's and of Gorresio's editions, and have placed my own two versions in parallel columns for facility of comparison. I have placed in italics the passages which coincide most closely with those from the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* and *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*:

Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, Section 108, Ed. Schlegel.

1. Jāvāli, most excellent of Brahmins, thus addressed Rāma, who was comforting Bharata, and who was thoroughly versed in duty, with the following words which were contrary to duty.[10] 2. You, descendant of Raghu, who are intelligent and of superior understanding, ought not to entertain such unprofitable notions, as if you were an ordinary person. 3. How can any one person be of kin to any other? What has any one to gain from any other, seeing that every creature is born alone and dies alone?[11] 4. Anyone, therefore, who feels attachment to any persons, such as his father and mother, is to be regarded as insane; since no one is anything to any other. 5. Just as in the case of a man who goes into a strange village, sojourns there, and then quits his abode and proceeds on his journey the following day; 6. so are men's fathers, and mothers, and houses, and property but temporary possessions (lit. abodes), on which the good will not allow their affections to fasten. 7. You, most excellent of men, ought not, by abandoning your paternal kingdom, to enter upon a wrong road, painful, uneven, and beset with troubles. 8. Permit yourself to be enthroned in opulent Ayodhyā; that city eagerly expects you, with her hair fastened in a single braid (in token of mourning). 9. Enjoying, prince, the exquisite gratifications of royalty, disport yourself there as Indra does in paradise. 10. Daśaratha (his father) is now nothing to you, nor you to him; that king (was) one person and you (are) another; do, therefore, as I advise. 11. A father is nothing more than the seed of a creature; his seminal principle and blood combined with the seminal substance of the mother—such is a man's terrestrial generation. 12. That monarch has

gone to the place to which he had to go; such is the course of human beings; but you are being needlessly injured. 13. Therefore, I lament[12] (the fate of) such men as adhere to justice, and of no others; for the just suffe- affliction here, and when they die, they incur annihilation. 14. Men are intent upon oblations to their progenitors and to the gods: but see what a destruction of food! For what can a dead man eat? 15. *If an oblation eaten here by one (really) passes into the body of another, then let a śrāddha be offered to a man who is travelling abroad; he need not eat upon his journey.* 16. These books composed by wise men (containing such precepts as) worship, bestow, offer sacrifice, practise austerities, abandon (the world); are mere charms to draw forth gifts. 17. Understand, intelligent (prince,) *that no one exists hereafter*; regard only that which is an object of perception, and cast behind your back whatever is beyond the reach of your senses.[13] 18. Acting upon this principle, which should be the guide of all mankind, allow yourself to be persuaded by Bharata, and accept the kingdom.

Rāmāyaṇa, *Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, Section 116, Ed. Gorresio.

1. 2. Then Jāvāli, most excellent of Brahmins, the king's logician (*naiyāyika*) versed in all learning, and acquainted with duty, being desired by them all, and seeking to comfort Bharata, addressed Rāma, who was unwilling to go to the city, with these words in consonance with duty. 3. You, descendant of Raghu, ought not, like an ordinary person, to entertain such unprofitable notions, the contemptible ideas of an ascetic. . . .[14] 12. How can any one person be of kin to any other? What has any one to do with any other? Seeing that every creature is born alone, and dies alone. 13. Hence a mother and a father both resemble a lodging; the man who feels any attachment to them is to be regarded as insane. 14. Just as in the case of a man who goes into any strange village, and sojourns there, and then quits his abode, and proceeds on his journey the following day; 15. So are men's fathers, and mothers, and houses, and property, but temporary possessions (lit. abodes); away with all idea of loving them. 16. You ought not, hero, to abandon a

level path, free from dust and alarm, and to enter upon a wrong road beset with troubles. 17. Permit yourself to be enthroned in opulent Ayodhyā; that city eagerly expects you, with her hair fastened in a single braid (in token of mourning). 18. Enjoying, prince, the exquisite gratifications of royalty, disport yourself there as Indra does in paradise. 19. Daśaratha (his father) is now nothing to you, nor you to him; that king (was) one person, and you (are) another; do, therefore, what I advise. 20. A father is nothing more than the seed of a creature; his seminal principle, with blood and air, combined with the seminal substance of the mother—such is a man's generation of a son. 21. That monarch has gone to the place to which he had to go; such is the course of human beings; but you are being needlessly injured. 22. Wherefore I inquire of such as adhere to justice, and of no others; for the just suffer affliction here, and when they die they incur annihilation. 23. Oblations are offered to progenitors and to the gods; men are intent upon the ceremony, but see what a destruction of food! What is left for the dead? 24. *If an oblation eaten here by one (really) passes into the body of another, then let a śrāddha be offered to a man who is travelling abroad, and let him carry no provisions for his journey.* 25. These books composed by wise men (containing such precepts as) worship, bestow, offer sacrifice, practise austerities, abandon (the world); are merely meant to multiply gifts. 26. Understand, intelligent (prince), *that no one exists hereafter*; regard not that which is beyond the reach of your senses, but only that which is an object of perception. 27. Acting upon this principle, which should be the guide of all mankind, allow yourself to be persuaded by Bharata, and accept the kingdom. 28–33. Follow, therefore, wise counsels, and abide in your proper path. Xupa, the illustrious mental son of Brahmā . . . these (whose names are enumerated in verses 29. ff) and many other excellent monarchs, abandoning their dear sons and wives, 34. have yielded to the power of time. We know not whither they nor the Gandharvas, Yaxas, and Raxasas, 35. may have departed; such a scene of illusion is this world. For it is the

names of these kings only which are now heard. 36. Anyone imagines them to exist in whatever region he pleases. Thus there is no firm foundation on which this world may abide. 37. *It is this which is the other (or highest) world*; enjoy, therefore, happiness; for just men are not qualified for this enjoyment. 38. Just men, descendants of Kākutstha, are very miserable, while the unjust are seen to be happy. 39. This world, again, is in every way confused and perturbed; do not, therefore, most eminent of men, condemn the fortune which seeks you 40. Accept this great kingdom which is free from rivals and enemies. When Rāma had heard this discourse, although slow to wrath, he was greatly incensed at being exhorted to atheism.[15]

As the doctrines, which in these verses are put into the mouth of the Brahmin Jāvāli, agree essentially in their tenor with those ascribed to the Cārvākas in the verses I have quoted from the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, it would appear (if the section be genuine) that those Materialists must be as old as the composition of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, to whatever era that may be referred. And that a sect bearing that appellation must have existed at the time when the *Mahābhārata* received its present form appears highly probable from the contents of the following passage from the Śāntiparva, or 12th Book, verses 1,414 ff., in which a story is told about a Rāxasa or demon of that name, who was a contemner of the Brahmins, and who, there can be little doubt, is meant to stand for a hostile sectary.

After Yudhiṣṭhira had entered the city and had bestowed largesses on the Brahmins, etc., the following scene is described to have taken place:

'When the Brahmins were now once again standing silent, Cārvāka the Rāxasa, in the disguise of a Brahmin, addressed the King. This friend of Duryodhana, concealed under the garb of a mendicant with a rosary, a lock of hair on his crown, and a triple staff, impudent and fearless, surrounded by all the Brahmins exceeding a thousand in number, who were anxious to utter their benedictions—men who practised austerity and

self-restraint—this wretch, wishing evil to the magnanimous Pāṇḍavas, without saluting those Brahmins, thus addressed the King: "All these Brahmins, falsely imputing the malediction to me, themselves exclaim, woe to you, wicked king, the slayer of your kindred. What can be the issue of this, son of Kuntī? Since you have slaughtered your kinsmen and elders, death is desirable for you, and not life." Hearing this speech of the wicked Rākṣasa the Brahmins were pained and indignant, being maligned by his words. But they, as well as King Yudhiṣṭhira, all remained silent, being ashamed and cut to the heart. Then Yudhiṣṭhira said: "Let all your reverences be reconciled to me, who bows down and supplicates you: you ought not to curse me who has recently (?) undergone such great misfortunes." All the Brahmins then exclaimed: "We never uttered the words imputed to us; may your Majesty enjoy prosperity." Then these noble-minded Brahmins, versed in the Vedas and purified by austerities, recognised (the pretended mendicant) by the eye of knowledge, and exclaimed: "This is the Rāxasa called Cārvāka, friend of Duryodhana; in the garb of a vagrant he seeks to accomplish the purposes of your enemy; we speak not so, righteous King; let all such fears be dissipated; may prosperity attend you and your brothers." Then all these pure Brahmins, infuriated with anger, uttering menaces, slew, with muttered curses, the wicked Rāxasa; who fell down consumed by the might of utterers of Vedic incantations, burnt up by the bolt of Indra, like a tree covered with leaves.'

Kṛṣna then, in the following verses (1,430–1,442), explains to Yudhiṣṭhira that formerly in the Kṛta age this Rāxasa, Cārvāka, had for many years practised austerities at Badari; and that having in consequence received from Brahmā his choice of a boon, he had selected that of being perfectly secure against the hostility of all creatures. This boon was granted under the sole condition that he should abstain from showing any disrespect to Brahmins (*dvijāvamānād anyatra*). Having obtained this prerogative of immunity from attack, he began to oppress the gods. The latter appealed to Brahmā, who told

them that he had decreed that the Rāxasa'a death should shortly be brought about through his friendship with Duryodhana, which would lead him to treat the Brahmins contemptuously, when they would consume him, as the King had seen; and that Yudhiṣṭhira was not to feel any remorse for the slaughter of his kindred, since this carnage had taken place in the exercise of his functions as a Xatriya, and its victims had gone to heaven.

Cārvāka is again briefly mentioned in the 'Lament of Duryodhana', 9th, or Śalya Parva, 3,619: when that prince had received his death-wound, his thighs having been fractured by the blow of Bhīmasena's club: 'If Cārvāka, the wandering ascetic, skilful in discourse, learns (that I have been mortally wounded), he will certainly perform an expiation[16] for me in the holy (lake) Samanta-pañcaka, renowned in the three worlds'.

I am not aware how far back the sect of the Cārvākas can be traced in Indian literature. Nāstikas (nihilists), Pāṣaṇḍis (heretics), and revilers of the Vedas are mentioned in many parts of Manu's *Institutes*, ii. 11: iii. 150, 161; iv. 30, 61, 163: V. 89; viii. 22, 309; ix. 225; xi. 65. 66; xii. 33; 95. 96. I quote two of these passages as specimens; ii. 11: 'Whatever Brahmin, addicting himself to rationalistic writings[17] (*hetu-śāstra*), shall despise these two sources (of knowledge, the *śruti* and the *smṛti*), is to be cast out by good men as a nihilist and reviler of the Veda.' xii. 95, 96: 'All religious systems (*smṛtis*) which stand apart from the Vedas, and all heretical opinions whatever, are unprofitable in the next world, for they are founded on darkness. Whatever books, separate from the Vedas, spring up and disappear, are worthless and false, due to their recentness of date.' Such heretics appear to have been numerous at the period when these *Institutes* were compiled, as the faithful are warned (iv. 61) against living in a village 'overrun with heretics'; a kingdom 'in which Śūdras predominate, overrun with nihilists, and destitute of Brahmins', is said (viii. 22) to be doomed to destruction; a king who is a nihilist is threatened with perdition (viii. 309); and it is enjoined (ix. 225) that heretics shall be banished. Nihilism is, however, only pronounced (xi. 66) to

be an *upapātaka*, or sin of lesser heinousness. Allusion is said to be made in v. 89, 90 and viii. 363 to female anchorets of an heretical religion.

The anti-brahminical opinions referred to here are, however, most probably those of the Buddhists, although some other sects may possibly be included.

It is evident from some of the hymns of the Veda (see Muller's *Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit.*, p. 556 ff.) that theological speculation has been practised in India from a very early period. In fact all of these hymns, even those of them which are most artless, poetical, and anthropomorphic in their character, may in a limited sense be regarded as speculative; since the religious ideas which they express, being founded on no external revelation, must have owed their existence not ony to the religious emotions and imagination of their authors, but also to a certain exercise of reflection, which assigned particular attributes and functions to the different deities and proceeded along a certain theory of the relations of the Godhead to the universe. Therefore, as the religions or mythological systems of India developed, it was to be expected that they should exhibit numerous variations springing out of the particular genius of different writers; and more especially that, whenever the speculative element predominated in any author, he should give utterance to ideas on the origin of the world and the nature and action of the deity or deities which were more or less opposed to those commonly received. In the stage here supposed, a fixed and authoritative system of belief or institutions had not yet been constructed, but was only in the process of construction, and therefore considerable liberty of individual thought, expression, and action would be allowed; as is, indeed, also shown by the existence of different schools of Brahmins, not merely attached to one or other of the particular Vedas, but even restricting their allegiance to some particular recension of one of the Vedas. Even after the Brahminical system had been more firmly established and its details more minutely prescribed, it is clear that the same strictness was not extended to speculation,

but that if a Brahmin were only an observer of the established ceremonial, and an assertor of the privileges of his own order, he might entertain and even profess almost any philosophical opinion which he pleased (Colebrooke, *Misc. Ess.*, i., 379; Muller, *Anc. Sansk. Lit.*, 79). In this way the tradition of free thought was preserved and speculative principles of every character continued to be maintained and taught without hindrance or scandal. Meanwhile the authority of the Vedas had come to be generally regarded as paramount and divine, but so long as this authority was nominally acknowledged, independent thinkers were permitted to propound a variety of speculative principles at variance with their general tenor, although perhaps not inconsistent with some isolated portions of their contents. It was only when the authority of the sacred books was not merely tacitly set aside or undermined but openly discarded and denied, and the institutions founded on them were abandoned and assailed by the Buddhists, that the orthodox party took the alarm.

Accordingly, traces of a sceptical spirit are not wanting in different parts of Indian literature.

In the *Ṛig Veda* viii. 89, 3, 4, reference is made to some free thinkers who had doubted the existence of Indra. (See *Original Sanskrit Texts*, iii. 151.)

In the *Nirukta*, Yāska refers to an older author named Kautsa, who had spoken of the hymns of the Veda as often being unmeaningful or contradictory (*Original Sansk. Texts*, ii. 180 ff.)

Śākya Muni, the founder of Buddhism, who is generally considered to have flourished in the sixth century BC and, as is well known, rejected the authority of the Vedas and promulgated a system of doctrine and practice at variance with their contents; most probably derived many of his tenets from other speculators who had preceded him. Burnouf (who is followed by Lassen, Muller, and others) is of the opinion that Śākya merely carried on a work which had previously been commenced by Kapila and Patañjali, and proceeded upon the

atheistical principles furnished to him by the former of these philosophers (*Bouddhisme Indien*, pp. 211; 520). This may be true and may be susceptible of proof from a comparison of the principles of these two systems and an examination of their mutual relations. In the meantime, however, it is worthy of remark that the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, i. 27–47, adduce and refute certain tenets which are those of the Buddhist schools. The opinions in question are, (1) the momentary duration of external objects, which succeed each other in a perpetual flux (*Sūtras*, 34, 35); (2) that things exist only in perception, and have no objective reality (*Sūtra*, 42),[18] (3) that there is nothing but a void (*śūnya*). All these doctrines are those of the Buddhist schools (as described in Mr. Colebrooke's *Essay on the Heretical Sects*). The first doctrine is mentioned in p. 397 of that *Essay* as Buddhist; while the second is that of the Yogācāras and the third that of the Mādhyamikas, who are both Bauddha sects, *ibid.* p. 391. (See also p. 380, where Mr. Colebrooke alludes to the Buddhists being noticed in the Sāṅkhya.) If, therefore, the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* are to be regarded as the original form in which that system was propounded by its author, and if they have remained free from interpolation, the Sāṅkhya must be later than Buddhism. It appears, however, to be *prima facie* very improbable that the *Sūtras* of the different philosophical schools (whatever may be the age to which the earliest nucleus of each may be referred) should have remained unaltered from the date of their first composition; and the mutual references which are to be found in the *Brahma* and the *Sāṅkhya* Sūtras to each other's doctrines, totally preclude such a supposition. The *Sūtras* must therefore either have received interpolations at some period subsequent to their first compilation, or must be regarded as nothing more than later summaries of doctrines which had been handed down, either orally or in writing, from an earlier period.

Mr. Colebrooke, with his usual caution, does not determine whether or not the Buddhist doctrines are derived from those of Kapila, but merely notices the 'strong resemblance' which

the latter 'manifestly bear to the opinions of the sects of Jaina and Buddha' (*Misc. Ess.* i., 228). In another place (i. 378), he says no more than that the last-named sects 'exhibit some analogy to the Sāṅkhyas.'

But it is not the systems of Buddha and of Kapila alone which are atheistic in their principles. Three of the other Darśanas, reputed as being more or less orthodox, or subdivisions of them, are known or suspected—not without some appearance of reason—to have once professed the same opinions, or to profess them still.

In his *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy* which have lately appeared, Professor K. M. Banerjea states his opinion (pp. 141, ff) that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems were originally atheistic although their modern adherents have adopted a theistic creed.[19]

The wide prevalence of atheistic sentiments in the middle ages of Indian history (i. e. in the centuries subsequent to the commencement of the Christian era) is, however, yet more distinctly shown by the remarkable fact that tenets of this description had, as the orthodox Kumārila himself confessed in one of the introductory verses of his *Vārttika*,[20] become, in his day, quite general among the adherents of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā School, who thus strangely combined the two characteristics regarded by Manu and the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* as incompatible; namely, recognition of the authority of the Veda and strict observance of Vedic ceremonies which these works so strongly enjoin, with the nihilism, atheism, or materialism (*nāstikya*) which they so strenuously denounce. If we are to understand from the term Lokāyata, applied by Kumārila to the hostile section of the Mīmāṃsakas, that they had abandoned the belief in a future life as well as in a God (as we, no doubt, should understand, and as I have been assured by Pandit Nehemiah Goreh, an intelligent and well-informed convert from Brahminism to Christianity); then they have only practised their Vedic ceremonies either for the sake of the prosperity and happiness which they conceived they would

procure in the present life, or on account of the gains and the respectability connected with their performance. In this case, it is a singular fact that the votaries of the Vedic rites should have adopted the speculative opinions of those very materialists by whom these ceremonies and their performers have been so keenly ridiculed and denounced.

P. S. Since the preceding paper was delivered to the Royal Asiatic Society, I have learned, from a letter from Dr. Fitz Edward Hall, that he had made a long but fruitless search in India for the aphorisms on Vṛhaspati.

NOTES

1. Published in the Bibliotheca Indica, nos. 63 and 142.
2. See Professor Wilson's *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, above referred to; and for the words *tridaṇḍa*, and *tridaṇḍin*, consult Boehtlingk and Roth's *Lexicon*, with the passages there cited from Manu, ix. 296, and xii. 10, 11, and other writers.
3. This refers to the notion expressed by Manu, V. 42: 'The twice-born man who, knowing the meaning and principles of the Veda, slays cattle on the occasions mentioned, conveys both himself and those cattle to the summit of beatitude.' (Sir W. Jones) In the second act of the drama called *Prabodhacandrodaya* (which has been translated into English by Dr. Taylor and into German by Professor Goldstucker), Māyāmoha (or Delusion) and a Cārvāka are introduced among the *dramatis personae* and give utterance to the tenets of the Indian materialists. The second and the third of the verses quoted in the text from the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* are adduced there also. Verse 4 of the text is varied as follows: 'If a *śrāddha* satiates even defunct creatures, *then oil must nourish the flame of an extinguished lamp*.' The following stanzas are of a similar purport with verse 1 of the text: 'The idea that the soul exists with an essence distinct from that of the body, and that it enjoys rewards after it has gone to another world, is (as vain as) the expectation of luscious fruit from trees growing in the sky.' 'If heaven is obtained by worshippers after the performer, the ceremonial, and the materials of the sacrifice have all passed away, then abundant fruit will be produced from trees which have been consumed in the conflagration of a forest.' In another verse, the gratifications of the voluptuary are contrasted with the mortifications of the ascetic in a sense favourable to the former.
4. See Manu, chap. iii., verses 122 to the end.

5. *Dum vivimus, vivamus, 'Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die'*, Cor. XV. 32.
6. Compare *Original Sanskrit Texts*, ii. 183. and iii. 45. The words *jarbharī, turpharī*, occur in *Ṛg Veda*, x. 106. 6, See Boehtlingk and Roth's *Lexicon*, under these words, and *Nirukta*, xiii. 5.
7. I give the literal meaning of this line in Latin: *'Fāmā notum est equi membrum genitale a reginā capiendum esse'*. See Wilson's translation of the *Ṛg Veda*, vol. ii., Introd., p. xiii; *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 13, 36 (Schlegel's edit.); i., 13. 34 (Gorresio's edit.); *Mahābh.*, xiv., 2645; *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā*, xxiii, 20 ff. and commentary; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, pp. 990 ff; Kātyāyana's *Sūtras*, p. 973.
8. I do not perceive the exact allusion here, unless it be to the Brahmins' grasping character. Possibly there may be a reference in the next line to the practice of the Śāktas. Goblins are represented by the Hindus as being fond of flesh.
9. The satirical purport of this half-verse has not been correctly understood by Professor Wilson, who renders it thus: 'It must be unnecessary for one who resides at a distance to bring food for presentation in person.'
10. Schlegel reads here *dharmāpetam*, and Gorresio *dharmopetam*. The former is the best reading.
11. The same reflection, with a different moral annexed, occurs in the very striking verses of Manu, viii., 17 and iv., 239 ff; which I have attempted to put into verse as follows:
    1. Our virtue is the only friend that follows us in death
       While other ties and friendships end with our departing breath
    2. Nor father, mother, wife, nor son, beside us then can stay,
       Nor kinsfolk—virtue is the one companion of our way.
    3. Alone each creature sees the light, alone the world he leaves,
       Alone of actions wrong or right, the recompense receives.
    4. Like log or clod, beneath the sod, their lifeless kinsman laid,
       His friends depart, with aching heart, but virtue guards the dead.
    5. Be then a hoard of virtue stored, to help in day of doom,
       By virtue led, we cross the dread, immeasurable gloom.

    This passage is imitated and expanded in the 13th or Anuśāsana Parva of the *Mahābhārata*, verses 5. 805–5. 815. The words in Manu, iv., 244, *tamas tarati dustaram*, 'he crosses the gloom difficult to cross,' are probably derived from the *Atharva Veda*, ix., 5, 1. *Tirtvā tamāṃsi bahudhā mahānti ajo nākam ākramatāṃ tṛtīyam*: 'Having crossed the dark abysses in many directions immense, let the unborn (or, the moving) one ascend the third heaven.'
12. Compare *Mahābhārata*, Udyoga Parva, verse 4205.
13. These are the principles of the Cārvākas. 'Perception is the only proof'.

says the Māyāmoha, in the *Prabodha-candrodaya*, Act. ii.

14. Verses 4–11 in Gorresio's edition, urging that Rāma had sufficiently fulfilled his duty to his father and exhorting him to take possession of the kingdom, have nothing parallel to them in Schlegel's recension.
15. The section of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and those which follow it, as given in the three different editions of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, well illustrate the peculiarities of their different texts. In Schlegel's edition, section 108 concludes with the 18th verse, which is immediately succeeded by the reply of Rāma to Jāvāli's suggestions, in the 29 *anuṣṭubh* verses, which stand at the commencement of section 109. To these are added nine more verses in a longer metre, the Upajāti, which Schlegel regards as spurious. As regards some of the verses his opinion is no doubt just; for Rāma is represented in the first of these additional stanzas as a *second time commencing* his answer to Jāvāli, and the tone in which he then repudiates the sentiments of the latter is much harsher than in the earlier (*anuṣṭubh*) verses of the section. In the 36th and following verses of the addition, Jāvāli is introduced as apologizing for, and half recanting, the opinions he had expressed: 'The Brahmin then addressed to Rāma these true, wholesome, and believing (*āstika*) words: "I do not utter the doctrines of the nihilists (*nāstika*): I am not a nihilist; nor does nought exist. Having regard to opportuneness of time, I have again become a believer (*āstika*) and on an opportune occasion, I may again become a nihilist".' In one of these Upajāti verses, the Buddhists are expressly mentioned. Gorresio's edition, however, contains much more extensive interpolations than Schlegel's. As we have seen, stanzas 4–11 and 28–39 of section 116 of the former, are all in excess of the verses contained in the corresponding section of the latter. But section 116 of Gorresio's edition does not stop even there. It contains, in verses 40 ff., a short repudiation by Rāma of Jāvāli's doctrines. Another discourse of Bharata's follows in section 117, and it is not until section 118 that Rāma is represented as beginning (a second time) the answer to Jāvāli, which corresponds to that in section 109 of Schlegel's edition.

Carey and Marshman's text generally coincides (as regards the sections under consideration) with Gorresio's, although in some readings it agrees with Schlegel's when that and Gorresio's differ.

I will not enter here on the question, of which I have not studied both sides, as to the comparative antiquity of Schlegel's and Gorresio's texts; but I will adduce from the speech of Vaśiṣṭha in the 110th section of Schlegel's edition, as compared with the corresponding section of Gorresio's, what I conceive to be one decided argument in favour of the greater antiquity of the former text. We there read (in Schlegel's edition), 'There was then nothing but water, in which the earth was formed

From thence was produced Brahmā *the self-existent, together with the deities He then, becoming a boar, raised up the earth* and created the whole world with his sons, who were perfected in spirit Brahmā was produced from the ether,' etc It is therefore *Brahmā*, who here becomes a boar and in that form raises up the earth—an incarnation and an act which are elsewhere as in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (pp 27–32 of Wilson's translation), and in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* i , 3,7 and iii , 13, 18 ff ascribed to Viṣṇu To harmonize the account in the *Rāmāyaṇa* with that in the Purāṇas (which is to all appearance, of later origin), the author of the recension edited by Gorresio changes the words *Brahmā svayambhūr daivatais saha*, 'Brahmā, the self-existent, with the gods', into *Brahmā svayambhūr Viṣṇur avyayaḥ*, 'Brahmā the self-existent *imperishable Viṣṇu*'; and in a subsequent line substitutes the words *Sacarācaram avyayam* for *saha putraiḥ kṛtātmabhiḥ*, i e 'he created the whole *imperishable* world, *movable and immovable*,' instead of 'he created the whole world *with his sons*', etc This last alteration was rendered necessary by the fact that sons are ascribed by mythological tradition to Brahmā, but none to Viṣṇu When therefore the name of Viṣṇu was introduced, it became necessary to strike out all reference to sons These alterations are not found in Carey and Marshman's edition, which here agrees with Schlegel's

16 The word which I have translated as expiation is *apacita* (*apaciti*?) The word *apaciti* occurs in the 7th or Droṇa Parva, 7, 811

17 Although reasoning is looked upon by Manu (ii 11) and other orthodox writings (e g , *Mahābhārata*, iii 13,463, *śuṣka tarka*) with great jealousy as likely to be employed against the Vedas, its aid is also invoked as necessary for their defence and exposition (Manu, xii 105); and professors of different systems of logic or speculation (*haituka* and *tarkin*) are referred to (xii 111) as essential component members of a Brahminical conclave of ten (*daśāvarā pariṣad*)

18 See Professor Banerjea s *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, where Śaṅkara's refutation of this doctrine, the Vijñāna-vāda, is quoted from his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*, ii , 2, 28

19 See also *Original Sanskrit Texts*', Part iii , p 216

20 He there says, 'For the Mīmāṃsā has generally been turned into a school of materialism (or atheism *lokāyatīkṛta*), but I have made this attempt to bring it into the paths of theism (cf the recognition of a future existence, *āstikapathe*) ' See *Orig Sansk Texts*, iii p 209 Comp Professor Banerjea's *Dialogues*, pp 78 ff , 477 ff

Rhys Davids

In the introduction to his English translation of the *Kūṭadanta sutta*, Rhys Davids finds it necessary to comment on the Lokāyata—a word frequently occurring in the Pali *Tripiṭaka* without it being anywhere explained, in the vast array of Buddhist canonical literature, what this view actually stands for Although the Indian philosophical tradition is almost unanimous in equating the Lokāyata to the extreme materialism of the Cārvākas, Rhys Davids argues that such a philosophy hardly existed in reality: it is more in the nature of a figment of imagination of the other philosophers, especially of Śaṅkara The portion reproduced here is from the first part of *Dialogues of the Buddha*, (pp 166–72, London, 1889)

On Lokāyata

I W RHYS DAVIDS

There is a curious expression in the stock phrase describing the learned Brāhmin, so often found in the *Piṭakas*, which I have left untranslated in this Sutta, being uncertain as to the meaning in which it was used at the time when our Sutta was composed It will be instructive in more ways than one to collect and consider the other passages in which the word occurs

Lokāyata is explained by Wilson as 'the system of atheistical philosophy taught by Cārvāka',[1] and by the *Petersburg Dictionary* as 'Materialism' Now the description of the good Brāhmin as put, in the Buddhist Suttas, into the mouth of Brāhmins themselves,[2] mentions Lokāyata as one branch of his learning The whole paragraph is complimentary And though the exact connotation of one or two of the other terms is doubtful, they are all descriptive of just those things which a Brāhmin would have been rightly proud to be judged a master of It is evident, therefore, that the *Dictionary* interpretations of the word are quite out of place in this connection

Yet they are each of them, at least for a later period, well authenticated. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in his *Vārttika* (verse 10), charges the Mīmāṃsā system with having been, for the most part, converted into a Lokāyata system, and claims for his own book the merit of bringing it back to theistic lines.[3] Now of course the Mīmāṃsists would indignantly deny this. Kumārila who seems to have been a good deal of a bigot, is here merely hurling at adversaries, who claimed to be as orthodox as himself, a term of abuse. But it is clear that he uses that term in the sense of 'atheistic'. The exact phrase would be *nāstika*, as opposed to his own *āstika-patha*: that is, the system or the man who says 'there is not', an infidel. This is somewhat wider than atheist; it comes, however, in Kumārila's mouth, to much the same thing.

Śaṅkarācārya uses the word Lokāyata several times,[4] and always in the same specific sense as the view of those who look upon the soul as identical with the body, as existing only so long as the body exists, not continuing, after death, in a new condition and separate from the body. A very similar, if not indeed the very same view is also controverted in the *Brahma-jāla* Sutta; and is constantly referred to throughout the Piṭakas under the stock phrase *taṃ jivaṃ taṃ śarīraṃ*.[5] But it is never called Lokāyata in the Piṭakas. It seems to be the view that there is a soul; but that it is diffused through the body and dies with it; and is not a separate unity, within the body but not of it, which flies away from the body after death. It is not necessary to suppose that either Śaṅkara or the Buddhists had in their minds any book setting forth a philosophy based on this single proposition, or any actual school using such a book as a manul. It may have been so. But the expressions used point rather to an opinion held by certain thinkers in union with other opinions, and not expounded in any special treatise. Nor do either the Buddhists or Śaṅkara pretend to set out that opinion in full. They are dealing with it only so far as is necessary to enforce their own contrary positions. And though 'materialist', as a rough and ready translation of Śaṅkara's Lokāyatika, gives a

good idea, to a European reader, of the sort of feeling conveyed to Śaṅkara's Indian readers, yet it is not quite exact. European 'materialists' (and one or two may be discovered by careful search) do not hold the view which Śaṅkara describes to his Lokāyatikas.

Buddhaghosa in our passage has: *Lokāyataṃ, vuccati vitaṇḍa-vāda-sattham*: 'the Lokāyata is a text-book of the Vitaṇḍas (Sophists)'.[6] This does not help us much but previously he explains Lokākkhāyika as follows: 'Foolish talk according to the Lokāyata, that is the Vitaṇḍa, such as: "By whom was this world created? By such a one. A crow is white from the whiteness of its bones; cranes are red from the redness of their blood." '

Other Pāli comments on the word are the *Abhidhāna Padīpikā* (verse 112), which says simply, probably following Buddhaghosa: *Vitaṇḍa-satthaṃ viññeyyaṃ yaṃ taṃ lokāyataṃ*. The date of this work is the middle of the twelfth century AD. Much clearer is *Aggavaṃsa* in the *Sadda-nīti*, which is a generation older. He says:[7]

Lokotibāla-loko; ettha āyatanti ussāhanti vāyamanti vadassādenāti lokāyataṃ. Ayatati vā tena loko, na yatati na īhati vā lokāyataṃ. Taṃ hi gandhaṃ nissāya sattā puñña-kiriyāya cittaṃ na uppādenti. Lokāyatam nāma: sabbam ucchiṭṭhaṃ sabbam anucchitthaṃ seto kāko kālo bako iminā va iminā va kāraṇenāti evam-ādi-niratthaka-karaṇa-paṭisaṃyuttaṃ titthiya-satthaṃ, yaṃ loke Vitaṇḍasatthaṃ vukkati yaṃ sandhāya Bodhisatto asamadhuro Vidhūra-paṇḍito:

Na seve Lokāyatikaṃ, Na, etam puññāya vaḍḍhanaṃ ti āha

'Loko means the common world. Lokāyata means: "on that they *āyatanti*"; that is, they exert themselves about it, strive about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion. Or perhaps it means: "the world does not *yatati* by it"; that is, does not depend on it, move on by it. For living beings do not stir up their hearts to right-doing by reason of that book.[8] Now the Lokāyata is the book of the unbelievers (of the *Titthiyas*) full of such useless disputations as the following: "All is impure; all is not impure; the crow is white, the crane is black; and for this

reason or for that"—the book known in the world as the *Vitaṇḍa-sattha*, of which the Bodisat, the incomparable leader, Vidhūra the paṇḍit, said:

"Follow not the Lokāyata, that works not for progress in merit."

The verse quoted—certainly a very old one—is in the *Vidhūra Jātaka*,[9] and the commentator there says: "This means:

Follow no Lokāyata disputation, Vitaṇḍa chatter, concerned with useless matters which neither give paradise nor lead men on into the Path"'

Śaṅkara says: 'There is thus, according to them, no soul separate from the body and capable of going to the heavenly world or obtaining release.'[10] The unknown author of the Jātaka commentary, who certainly wrote, however, in the fifth century, gives the allied proposition as his own conclusion from the uselessness of their discussions, not as the opinion of the Lokāyatikas themselves. It would be an easy transition from the one expression to the other. And the difference is suggestive, especially in the light of other passages in both Sanskrit and Pāli books.

For while the *Mahābhārata* has precisely the same use of the word as the Piṭakas, later works use it in a manner approximating more and more nearly to that of Śaṅkara. The passage in the *Mahābhārata* is at I, 2889 (= *Hari Vaṃśa* 14068), where, at the end of a list of the accomplishments of learned Brāhmins, they are said to be masters of the Lokāyata. Being mentioned, as in our passage, at the end of the list, it is plain that this branch of learning is meant to be taken as of minor importance. But it is not yet considered unfavourably, much less opprobiously. And the *Petersburg Dictionary*, from which I take most of these references, points out that the word may possibly, in this passage, have some other meaning than 'Materialism'.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* goes further. There the word is also in a list, but the Laukāyatikā are blamed as 'clever in useless things'.[11] So in the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka* the good Mahāyānist does not serve or court or wait upon (among other low people) 'the

Lokāyatikas who know by heart the Lokāyata *mantras* (mystic verses).[12] The date of this may be a century or two after Christ. And in the Jain book, entitled the *Bhagavatī*, which Weber puts at about the same time, the Lokāyatikas occur in a similar list of blameworthy persons.[13]

In the *Milinda*, which is probably somewhat earlier, the word is mentioned twice. One passage ascribes a knowledge of the Lokāyata (in a sentence expanded from the very clause in our Sutta) to the hero of the story, Nāgasena.[14] Here the *Milinda* is quite at the old standpoint. The other passage is in a parenthesis[15] in which the sub-hero, the king, is described as 'fond of wordy disputations, and in the habit of wrangling against the quibbles of Lokāyatas and Vitaṇḍas.' This may possibly be a gloss which has crept into the text. But in any case it is evidence that, at the time when it was written, the later view of the meaning of the word had become prevalent.

In the long list of various sorts of hermits given in the *Harṣa Carita* the Lokāyatikas come among others who would be classed by Vedāntists as heretics.[16] We cannot, unfortunately, draw any certain conclusion as to whether or not there were actually any Lokāyatikas living in Bāṇa's time. In expanding previous descriptions of the concourse of hermits in the forest, he may be merely including in his list all the sorts of such people he had ever heard or read of.

Lastly, the Lokāyata system is, in various works of the fourteenth century, and later, appropriately fathered on Cārvāka, a mythical character in the Mahābhārata, an ogre, who appears in the garb of a Brāhmin.[17] It is not certain whether this is due to the ingenuity of a friend or a foe. In either case, like the fathering of the later Sāṅkhya on the ancient sage Kapila; or the fathering of the collection of fables, made by Planudes in the fourteenth century AD, upon Aesop the story-teller of the fifth century BC, it has been eminently successful, has deceived many, and is still widely accepted.

Pending the discovery of other texts, and especially of such as are not only the testimony of opponents, the best working

hypothesis to explain the above facts seems to be that about 500 BC the word Lokāyata was used in a complimentary way as the name of a branch of Brāhmin learning, and probably meant *Nature-lore*—wise sayings, riddles, rhymes, and theories handed down by tradition as to cosmogony, the elements, the stars, the weather, scraps of astronomy, of elementary physics, even of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones, and of birds and beasts and plants. To be a master of such lore was then considered by no means unbecoming to a learned Brāhmin, though it ranked, of course, below his other studies. At that time there was no school so called, and no special handbook of such knowledge. But portions of it trenched so closely upon, were so often useful as metaphor in discussing the higher and more especially priestly wisdom, that we find sayings that may well have belonged to it preserved in the pre-Buddhistic literature. Such passages, for instance, as *Bṛ. Ār. Up.* III 8.3, *Chānd. Up.* IV, 17, I and VI, 2–7, on the worlds and on cosmogony; *Chand.* III on the colour of the rays of the sun; *Bṛ. Ār. Up.* II. I. 5–7, and III, 7, 3–7, on the elements; *Ait. Ār.* III, 2.1.4 and others on the parts of the body; and many others of a similar kind on these and other subjects might be cited as examples.

The amount then existing of such lore was too small to make a fair proficiency in it incompatible with other knowledge. As the amount of it grew larger, and several branches of natural science were regularly studied, a too exclusive acquaintance with Lokāyata came to be looked upon with disfavour. Even before the Christian era, masters of the dark sayings, the mysteries, of such mundane lore, were marked with sophists and casuists. This feeling is increasingly vouched for in the early centuries of our era. In the fifth century we hear of a book, presumably on the riddles and mysteries of the craft, as it is called 'a book of quibbles'. Various branches of mundane science had been by that time fairly well worked out. Lokāyata was still the name for the old *Nature-lore*, on the same level as folk-lore, and in contradistinction, not only to theosophy on

the one hand, but to such science as there was on the other.

In the first half of the eighth century Kumārila uses the word as a mere term of abuse, and in the sense of infidel, of his equally orthodox opponents, the Mīmāṃsists. And shortly afterwards Śaṅkara, in setting forth his theory of the soul, controverts a curious opinion which he ascribes to Lokāyatikas—possibly wrongly, as the very same opinion was controverted ages before in the Piṭakas, and not there called Lokāyata, though the word was in use in Piṭaka times.

Finally in the fourteenth century the great theologian Sāyaṇa-Mādhava has a longish chapter in which he ascribes to the Lokāyatikas the most extreme forms of the let-us-eat-and-drink-for-tomorrow-we-die view of life; of Pyrrhonism in philosophy, and of atheism in theology. The Lokāyata had, no doubt, at that time, long ceased to exist. His very able description has all the appearance of being drawn from his own imagination; and is chiefly based on certain infidel doggerel verses which cannot possibly have formed a part of the Lokāyata studied by the Brāhmins of old.[18] It is the ideal of what will happen to the man of some intellect, but morally so depraved that he will not accept the theosophist position.

Throughout the whole story we have no evidence of anyone who called himself a Lokāyatika, or his own knowledge Lokāyata. After the early use of the word in some such sense as *Nature-lore*, folk-lore, there is a tone of unreality over all the statements we have. And of the real existence of a school of thought, or of a system of philosophy that called itself by the name, there is no trace. In the middle period the riddles and quibbles of the Nature-lorists are despised. In the last period the words Lokāyata, Lokāyatika, become mere hobby-horses, pegs on which certain writers can hang the views that they impute to their adversaries, and give them, in doing so, an odious name.

NOTES

1. He gives as his authority the *Amara Koṣa*; but the *Koṣa* merely mentions the word in a list, without any explanation.
2. *Anguttara* I, 163, and other passages
3. The passage is quoted in Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, III, 95
4. For instance in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, I 1.2; II. 2.2; III, 3.53.
5. For instance in the *Mahāli* and *Jāliya Suttas*
6. *Sum* 1, 247. The Vitaṇḍas are quoted and refuted in the *Attha Sālinī*, pp. 3, 90, 92, 241 (where the word is wrongly spelt).
7. Quoted *sub voce* in Subhūti's *Abhidhānappadīpikā Sūci*, p. 310. According to the *Sāsana Vaṃsa Dīpikā* (Dr Mabel Bode's edition, p 74), he lived at Arimaddana in Burma in 1127 AD. See also *Sāsana Vaṃsa Dīpo*, verse 1238; *Gandha Vaṃsa*, pp. 63, 67; Forchammer, *Jardine Prize Essay*, p 34; J P T S., 1882, p. 103.
8. With this attempt at derivation may be compared Nīlakaṇṭha on the passage quoted below from the *Mahābhārata* (as given in B R.) *Loka evāyatante te lokayātikā*. Also Prof. Cowell's suggestion (*Sarvad S*, p 2) that Lokāyata may be analysed etymologically as 'prevalent in the world.' The exact meaning of *āyata* is really very doubtful.
9. Fausböll's edition, VI, 286. No less than four bas reliefs, illustrating this *Jataka*, have been found at the Bharhut Tope. See my *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. cii. On the greater age of the verses, as compared with the prose, of the *Jātakas*, see *ibid.* Ixxviii.
10. *Loc cit.* See Deussen, *Vedānta-system*, 310; and Thibaut, *Vedānta-Sūtras*, II. 269.
11. Gorresio's edition, II, 109. 20. Both these passages from the epics are from later portions of them.
12. Chapter XIII, at the beginning. Burnouf (p. 168) reads *tantras* (instead of *mantras*), no doubt wrongly, and has a curious blunder in his note on the passage (p. 409). He says Lokāyata means in Pāli 'fabulous history, romance': and quotes as his authority, the passage given above from the *Abhidhāna Padīpikā*, in which Lokāyataṃ is simply explained as *vitaṇḍa-sattham*. This last expression cannot possibly mean anything of that sort.
13. Weber, *Ueber ein fragment der Bhagavatī* II, 248.
14. My *Milinda*, I, 7.
15. *Ibid* I, 17
16. Cowell's Translation, p. 236.
17. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Prabodhacandrodaya*, *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*
18. *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, Chapter I, translated by Prof. Cowell in the version published in 1882

H. P. Sastri

In this article, originally published as a booklet, *Dacca University Bulletin* No. 1, 1925, the distinctive feature of H. P. Sastri's argument is that the Lokāyata view might originally have been the same as the theoretical position of the Kāpālikas, and hence it continues to survive in the country in the form of some obscure popular cults, like that of the Sahajiyās

Lokāyata

H. P. SASTRI

The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series in 1858 under the editorship of Paṇḍit Iśvar Chaṇdra Vidyāsāgara. The first chapter of this work contained an account of the Cārvāka Darśana—a system of philosophy which believed neither in God nor in a future existence. But the most attractive feature of this account was the bold speculations of the system and the sarcastic tone it assumed against the cherished doctrines of Hindu Orthodoxy. Those were days of translations from Sanskrit into Bengali and the translation of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was undertaken by the most learned man of the time, Paṇḍit Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, Professor of Hindu Philosophy in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. But that conscientious scholar soon found that the task was beyond him. He translated the Cārvāka Darśana all right. But the next Darśana, the Buddhist and the Arhata, proved a stumbling block to him and he gave the work up in despair. But there was a bolder spirit among his pupils. This was Paṇḍit Maheś Candra Nyāyaratna, then about thirty years of age. He boldly translated the whole work and issued it in his own name, his *Guru* writing a foreword on the translation, which gave Maheś Candra a name and I should say, a fortune.

This book early attracted my attention and I read not only the Bengali but also the Sanskrit. The versified portion of the account of the Cārvākas I soon made my own. Curiosity impelled me to look at other references to the Cārvākas and I got one in the Seventeenth Canto of the *Naiṣadhacarita*—a work which was very popular in those days. The tone of sarcasm was more bitter, but there was no new information. References were found in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* and in the Kāvyas and Nāṭakas, but information about the doctrines was very meagre.

The *Sarvadarsánasaṃgraha* was written by Mādhavācāryya in the second half of the fourteenth century, and the *Naiṣadha*, according to the Bombay editor, in the end of the twelfth century. But the late lamented Paṇḍit Vindhyeśvarī Prasād Dube, in his Chronology of Nyāya works, says that Hira Pandit, the father of the author of *Naiṣadha*, was a contemporary and a rival of Udayana early in the eleventh century. The Cārvāka Darsána, when it is mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, must be older than them, and I began my search anew. The result of the research is given below.

One of the six heretical teachers who were either older than or contemporary to the Buddha was Ajitakeśakambalī. He held a doctrine which was rank Materialism. He said that there were four elements—earth, water, air, and fire—a combination of these in certain proportions and under certain circumstances produced vitality, and at death, earth went to earth, water to water, fire to fire, air to air and that vitality was gone. Just as certain ingredients coming together produce the power of intoxication, so the elements came together and produced what is life. Life beyond this is a myth. This body is *ātman*. *Ātman* is nothing beyond this body. Ajitakeśakambalī is regarded in some quarters as Cārvāka. But I suspend my judgement for the present until I have exhausted my references in Buddhist and Jaina literature—store-houses of information about the most productive period of Indian thought.

Ajitakeśakambalī must have lived either at the end of the

seventh or the beginning of the sixth century BC, according to the date of Buddha's *nirvāṇa* in 543 or 483 BC.

Kauṭilya, in the fourth century BC, speaks of the Lokāyatikas only once in his work, but the connection in which he speaks of them seems to indicate that they had a system like that of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

In the second century BC Patañjali speaks of the Lokāyatas and of *Bhāgurī* as their *Vārttikā* or supporter.

In the second century AD, Vātsyāyana in his *Kāmaśāstra* quotes a number of Lokāyata sūtras and refutes them. These sūtras relate to the desirability or otherwise of the study of Dharmaśāstras. The Lokāyata, who believes neither in Dharma nor in Adharma, says:

1. Religious rites should not be practised.
2. Because their fruition depends upon the future.
3. And is doubtful.
4. Who, unless he is a fool, gives away what belongs to him to others?
5. A pigeon today is better than a peacock tomorrow.
6. A sure kaudi is better than a doubtful gold coin. So says the Lokāyata.

These six seem to be genuine aphorisms from the Lokāyata Sūtras.

In the eighth century, Haribhadra Sūri, a voluminous writer of the Jainas, writes six verses in his *Ṣaḍdaraśanasamuccaya* noting the fact that the Lokāyatas regard earthly enjoyment as the highest aim of human life. But his commentator Gunaratna gives us a quotation from Vācaspati, which may be synonymous with Bṛhaspati: *Pṛthivyaptejovāyuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye śarīraviṣayendriyasaṃjñās tebhyaś caitanyam.*

The ordinary derivation of the word Cārvāka is *cāru* and *vāk*: charming, alluring, entertaining speech. But the commentator gives another and more attractive derivation. He says that the word is derived from *carva*: chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating, swallowing virtue and vice. Those who take no notice of virtue and vice are Cārvākas. He also says

that Bṛhaspati is the author of their doctrine and so they are called Bārhaspatyāh.

From the statements of the commentator Guṇaratna, it appears that there were Lokāyatikas even in his time, the end of the fifteenth century AD; that they were given to eating and drinking; that they indulged in all sorts of sensual excesses; that they were Kāpālikas besmeared with dust; and they were Yogins belonging to all castes.

In a work entitled *Sarvasiddhānta-saṃgraha* attributed to Śāṃkarācāryya in the early part of the ninth century, it is stated that Bārhaspatya, Ārhata and Bauddha are non-Vedic systems of philosophy. The well-known verse *agnihotram trayo vedāḥ* etc. Śaṃkara attributes to Bṛhaspati, and he says that the Lokāyatas do not believe in the blessings of the future existence, but only in such blessings as agriculture, commerce, dairy farming, and daṇḍanīti, which produce tangible results in this world. This is what Kauṭilya also says about the followers of Bṛhaspati, the author of an ancient *Arthaśāstra* before him, who, he says, believed only in vārtā (Economics) and daṇḍanīti (Coercion).

There is another work on the History of Indian Philosophy entitled *Sarvadarśanasamuccaya* written under the patronage of a Rajput Prince at Delhi by Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri in 1340 AD. He includes the *ślokas* on the Lokāyatikas as found in Haribhadra's work and attempts to refute their contents.

This is all the information we can pick up from known literature in Sanskrit. From this, it is possible to recount a history of the system from the seventh century BC to the present day. The Lokāyatas do not believe in Īśvara or in a future existence. Virtue and vice they have none. They believe in the present, and not in the past nor the future. They are Positivists. They have few doctrines to defend but many to assail, and in the matter of assailing they are bold, direct and exceedingly sarcastic. Some of their sarcastic arguments are very enjoyable. I cannot resist the temptation of quoting one or two.

(1) Those who take a dip under the water of the Ganges

with a view to rise up to heaven seem to be no better than sheep who, in order to advance for a fight in front, always retrace their steps.

(2) If the animal immolated in a sacrifice goes to heaven, why does the sacrificer not kill his father and send him to heaven—a consummation so devoutly to be wished?

(3) A Lokāyata had a very orthodox wife, who always dinned into his ears that what learned men say after long deliberation cannot but be true. He said, very good, come. They went at midnight to the city gate. The broad road leading from the gate was full of dust. They made marks with three fingers on both sides imitating the footprints of wolves, and returned home. Next morning the footprints frightened even the best of citizens who were afraid that wolves were frequenting the city. The man now succeeded in bringing his wife completely around to his own opinion.

The orthodox Brāhmins hated them with a genuine hatred. Himādrī in the 13th century says that they should be expelled from the Śrāddhasabhā like dogs.

Dr. F. W. Thomas has recently published a work entitled *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* which has been eagerly studied by all scholars interested in Indian history, thought and society. The school of Bṛhaspati is older than Kauṭilya who quotes their opinion. Bṛhaspati is said to have been propounder of the doctrine of the Lokāyatikas. He is also the writer of a Smṛti work. Some people think that there were three Bṛhaspatis: the economist, the philosopher and the law-giver. Of the law-giver we have a number of verses printed in the collection of Smṛti works. Of the philosopher, we have two quotations. The Sūtras now published by Dr. Thomas, written in the form of aphoristic lectures by Bṛhaspati to his pupil Indra, the ruler of heaven—in which form the Smṛti work is also written—related to Economics. Dr. Thomas is, however, not disposed to consider these *sūtras* as genuine. He thinks there are *sūtras* which relate to things very modern. Rejecting those *sūtras*, and their number is large, there are enough in the book which should be

as ancient as Bṛhaspati the economist. These ancient *sūtras* speak of the Lokāyatas with approval, extolling them to the skies. After enumerating the branches of economics then known, namely agriculture, cattle-breeding and commerce, Bṛhaspati says that in the matter of acquisition of wealth, Lokāyata is *the* Śāstra. Again, Lokāyatikas say that the fruit of Vārtā, if not for the support of an army, soon perishes. Even in those Sūtras which Dr. Thomas considers spurious, we get more information about the Lokāyatikas than anywhere else.

One sūtra says, if one not believing in Orthodoxy attempts to attain a human object in the right direction, he is a Lokāyata. Another says that the Lokāyatikas hold Dharma to be futile. It conduces to wealth (for the priests). It is like stealing iron from a lump. Agnihotra, morning and evening rites, reciting *mantras*—everything is done for wealth. One reads the Vedas, which are full of earthly desires, to hide one's own transgressions. Similarly, Agnihotra is performed with the object of drinking wine and enjoying women.

But the most important piece of information the *Bṛhaspati Sūtras* give us is the close connection of the Lokāyatas with the Kāpālikas. It says, for the production of wealth Lokāyata is *the* Śāstra; in the same breath it says, for Kāma or earthly enjoyments, Kāpālika is *the* Śāstra. If Bṛhaspati says so he is sure to be denounced by orthodox people as Nāstika. But that is not our present purpose—our present purpose is the Kāpālika. These are always looked down upon by all classes of people. They are fond of cruel rites. None can forget the fierce Kāpālika bent upon woman-sacrifice in Bankim Chandra's most powerful novel, *Kapālakuṇḍalā*. The scenes in that work are set in the Bengal coast in the early seventeenth century. In the year 1092 Kṛṣṇa Miśra, in his wonderful allegorical drama the *Prabodhacandrodaya*, introduces a Kāpālika and a Kāpālikī to test the character for continence of a Buddhist monk and of a Digambara Jaina priest. The pair is bent upon Kāmasādhana. Bhavabhūti speaks of a Kāpālika Aghoraghaṇṭa and a Kāpālikī Kapālakuṇḍalā

bent upon the seduction of Māltī and upon her destruction. But the *Bṛhaspati Sūtras* tell us that the Kāpālikas are an ancient sect, at least as ancient as the Lokāyatas; and that as the Lokāyatas, with their Materialistic philosophy, marked the beginning of the science of Economics, so the Kāpālikas, with what system of philosophy we do not know, marked the beginning of the science of Erotics. Bṛhaspati considers them to be distinct sects, but Guṇaratna identifies the Kāpālikas with the Lokāyatikas.

The influence of the Lokāyatikas and of the Kāpālikas is still strong in India. There is a sect, and a large one too, the followers of which believe that *deha* or the material human body is all that should be cared for; their religious practices are concerned with the union of men and women and their success (*siddhi*) varies according to the duration of the union. These call themselves Vaiṣṇavas, but they do not believe in Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa or his incarnations. They believe in *deha*. They have another name, Sahajiā, which is the name of a sect of Buddhists which arose from Mahāyāna in the last four centuries of their existence in India. But *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* gives the idea that there are more Kāpālikas bent on Kāmasādhanā than Buddhists.

G. Tucci

In this article, originally published in the *Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1925, the main drive of Tucci's argument is in favour of the possibility of the materialist view having been a forerunner of Nīti and Artha *śāstra*, or ancient Indian political science.

A Sketch of Indian Materialism

G. TUCCI

It will seem strange enough that among the multiplicity of Indian philosophical schools and systems I have chosen as the subject of my paper the Cārvāka—or Lokāyatamata—which as a particular school has disappeared long ago from India, and which was so greatly looked down upon that according to Brahminical orthodoxy, no sin could be compared with *nāstikya*.

Nevertheless it is necessary to pay attention to it, because the study of it sheds new light on this many-sided activity of the Indian mind which had, and has, so many aspects and tendencies that there is perhaps no Western thought that was not anticipated in India. We are proud of our absolute idealism which seems to us to be one of the greatest conquests of the European mind, because it veils the materialism and the practical mechanicism which constitute the real essence of our civilization.

Evidently it is ignored that Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were the greatest and unsurpassed forerunners of the same principles which Hegel started and our contemporary Italian school, with Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile at its head, has emphasized. On the contrary, our colleagues of China and Japan are quite right when they assert that the East has its own idealistic philosophy which is far better than any other Western system, as it is born in its own country and harmonizes, therefore, with its spiritual exigencies; and when

they consider, as their text-book, the *Vijñaptimātrasiddhiśāstra* of Vasubandhu. In fact, this book is one of the greatest monuments of Indian thought; and I hope that in the near future the collaboration of Chinese scholars and Indian pundits will restore the Sanskrit text, which seems hopelessly lost.

But if it is difficult to find a European philosopher who rightly appreciates the value of Indian philosophy, nobody would deny that the fundamental characteristic of Indian thought is an idealistic one.

In fact, India is traditionally believed to have been the country of thinkers and yogins, Brahmins and ascetics; a country which, plunged in dreams of mysticism and abstruction, denied life and any form of activity. Even now, this is the most prevalent opinion on India we have in Europe.

But they ignore that even according to the more orthodox Indian conception, life is considered the result of *kāma*, *artha* and *dharma*. As in individuals there is a time when *kāma* and *artha* predominate, so in the history of Indian civilization, side by side with the Upaniṣads and Buddhism we find Lokāyatas and Cārvākas, hedonists and politicians who were so outspoken in defence of that *Wille zum Leben* which mysticism seemed to check, that perhaps we ourselves in the West cannot vie with them.

But India was not just a country of saints and hermits: she not only prayed and meditated, but also had her struggles and her history. Without men working in this life and for this life it is not possible that this eternal drama, of which God only knows the end and the goal and which we call history, can take place. Those who know only an ascetic India do not understand India, that India who is revealed by her poems, her dramas, her *nītis*. On the contrary, you find that this home of idealism has produced the crudest form of hedonism and political science that we know, a political science compared with which the principles of Machiavelli or Hobbes would appear quite soft.

In my new book, *History of Indian Materialism*,[1] I think that I

have succeeded in giving a general idea of what Indian materialism was. But as this book is written in Italian, that is, in a language which is not yet largely known in India, I shall try to expose some results about the principal materialistic schools that I could gather from the philosophical literature I have perused.

It is well known that no Lokāyata text has come down to us; therefore the principal tenets of the school can be restored only on the basis of the more or less detailed exposition of the Lokāyatamata that is to be found in the *pūrvapakṣa* of many Brahminical or Buddhist philosophical works, and in some quotations we can meet with in books on Nyāya. But from this to assume, as some scholars did, that Lokāyata texts never existed, is to go too far. I cannot give all the arguments which I have collected to refute this opinion, without taxing your patience; I shall only briefly expose some of the facts which, it seems to me, clearly point out that Lokāyata texts were known in ancient times. A Lokāyata Śāstra is quoted in Candrakīrti's commentary to *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, or rather to the *Prajñā-śāstra*, as its original title seems to me to have been; in Āryadeva's *Śataśāstra*, recently translated by me from the Chinese,[2] there is a quotation from the *Bṛhaspati Sūtra*; according to the unknown author of the marginal notes to the *apabhraṃśa* work, *Tisaṭṭhimahāpurisa-guṇālaṅkāra* of Pupphadanta, the Purandara named in the text was a *Cārvākamate granthakartā*,[3] according to Kṛṣṇa Miśra, Cārvāka was an ancient master of the school to whom Bṛhaspati transmitted his doctrine. And in an ancient well-known authority, namely the *Vārtika* of Patañjali, we find a *nāstika* master named Bhāguri expressly mentioned. Moreover, the tradition attributes to Bṛhaspati himself the first treatise of the system called after him Bārhaspatya, and I do not know why we should not accept it; of course, we cannot assume that the *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* edited by Prof. Thomas is the original book of the school, inasmuch as it bears a clear Brahminical character: but in spite of that you will find some quotations in it on the Lokāyata, which are likely to

have been taken from an ancient but now lost compilation of a peculiar Lokāyata character. Certainly, we cannot accept the tradition when we are told that the author of this book was Bṛhaspati himself who, according to the *Maitrī Up.* (Ed. An. Aś. S.s. p. 466), *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (III, 17,41), *Matsyapurāṇa* (47, 184) conceived this devilish doctrine in order to spread untruth and disbelief among the Asuras; but what must chiefly interest us is only that Brahminical authority too, that should have had some interest in freeing their heavenly representative from such a responsibility, did not object the authorship of the doctrine and the book to Bṛhaspati. How, moreover, can we explain the similarity in many a quotation from the Lokāyatamata which can be found in the most different texts? This similarity, besides, is not only to be met with in recent philosophical literature, but also in ancient texts; as, for instance, between the tenets attributed to Ajita Keśakambalin in the *Dīghanikāya* and the principal school of the Akiriyāvāda in the Jaina *Sūyagadaṅga*, in which the commentator Silāṅka recognizes the Lokāyatika or Bārhaspatya.

But from which school did the first Lokāyata text issue? This is a question difficult to answer; because materialism is a general name under which we can collect many tendencies and systems, as the multiplicity itself of names for *materialist* seems to point out: *nāstika*, Cārvāka, Lokāyata, Bārhaspatya, Svābhāvika, Bhūtavādin, Icchāntika. Without discussing here the etymology and the different meanings of all these names, I shall point out that even if in later times they became almost synonymous, we are not authorized to assume that this actually did happen in ancient times. But of course it is evident that there must have been a common store of general and fundamental principles that characterized these heretical schools and distinctly diversified them from the Brahminical ones; so that, owing to such a connection even among their own peculiarities, they went under the general name of *nāstika*. But what did they deny? What was their *nāstikya*? To answer this question it is necessary to remember two things. First, that materialism

means either a conception of the reality which explains everything on the basis of mechanical laws and denies the existence of every transcendent being, or, in the usual vulgar sense, an epicurean manner of life which ignores every religious feeling and whose only goal is to enjoy life. The theory of Vihārabhadra in the *Dasakumāracarita* (p. 193, Nirnaya Sagara edition, Bombay 1898) can be considered a peculiar type of this hedonistic conception. Secondly, that Indian religious conception differs in some points from ours. Certainly, according to Brahminical sources, it was sufficient not to admit of the authority of the Vedas in order to be called a *nāstika*: these are the *vedavādāpaviddha* of *Mahābhārata* (XII,2, 15), the *vedanindāka* of Manu (II,11), the *aśraddadhāna* of *Gita* (IV,40).[4]

And according to orthodox theism or pantheism a *nāstika* can also be one who does not believe in any God. But even if to some strict Brahmins, disbelief in Īśvara seemed to be *nāstikya*, atheism is so often to be met with in India that it cannot be considered the principal characteristic of the Lokāyatamata. Buddhism was atheistic—I do not speak of course of later Mahāyāna Buddhism, and Buddhist literature is full of treatises aiming at refuting the Īśvaravāda. I quote the *Īśvarakartṛtva-nirākṛti-viṣṇorekakartṛtva-nirākaraṇa* attributed to Nāgārjuna, the *Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā* of Kalyāṇa Rakṣita, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* Śāntideva (IX, 119–126). The Jainas followed their example and the refutation of God made by Mallisena Sūri in his *Syādvādamañjarī* can well be considered a standard work of Indian atheism. It is quite useless for me to remind you that Sāṅkhya—although included among orthodox systems—was atheistic, at least in its ancient form. And that the same thing is to be said for Vaiśeṣika was already pointed out by Faddegon, and is demonstrated by a very important treatise of Āryadeva on the *nirvāṇa* of heretics recently translated by me from the yet extant Chinese text. Mīmāmsakas also did not believe in a personal God, and owed their epithet of[5] (*prāyeṇaiva hi loke mīmāṃsā lokāyatīkṛtā*) Lokāyatika to the refutation of the personal God as we can see in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha[6] or in the *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila.

Therefore the peculiar characteristic of the Lokāyata must be found elsewhere. They denied the turning-point around which Indian philosophy, theology, theosophy, religion ever moved; consequently, they opened a chasm between themselves and other orthodox schools, giving birth to this *nāstikya-karmāṇam* already quoted in Manu (III, 65) which is so characterized in some Buddhist texts: *n'atthi sukata-dukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko*.

This is the central idea of Indian materialism and the principle of many important consequences. If there is no *karman*, there is no *ātman*, there is no *paraloka*. King Prasenajit who is a supporter of the *natthikadiṭṭhi*, in the *Dīghanikāya*, tries to defend his thesis that there is no *ātman*, and that our *ātman* is only our body.

The analogies which the *Payāsisuttanta* shows to have with the Jaina *Rāyapaseṇiya* and some passages of *Samaraicchakaha*[7] cannot be explained as mutual borrowings, but rather as various derivations from real doctrines followed in ancient times.[8]

But as a consequence of this rejection of every transcendency and of the coming back to the enjoyment of life, a tendency began in India which we can call a realistic one.

The conception of *saṃsāra* had contributed a colour of pessimism to the Indian vision of life which conveyed that our aim is not to be attained in this life, but in a higher world: not *loka*, but *nirvāṇa* is to be sought.

The Lokāyatikas represent a reaction to this thought as they teach that only that which can be perceived (*pratyakṣeṇa*) exists, direct experience is the only *pramāṇa* for men; what we cannot see is mere fancy: so that one may be induced to consider them the forerunners of scientific research, as Mr. Rhys Davids[9] and Prof. Franke[10] did. They believed that the Lokāyatamata, to be met with in Buddhist texts, was a doctrine specially aimed at studying nature and the laws of nature. But I cannot accept their opinion. *Loka* never had, in Sanskrit, the meaning of nature for which it is used: *pradhāna*, or *prakṛti* or *svabhāva*; so that Buddhist texts when discussing cosmological questions, in order to avoid misunderstanding, are obliged to prefix to *loka* the word *bhajana* when they conceive the cosmos as a

material thing: while *loka* in itself has, rather, the meaning of human world or class of beings, *lokayātrā*, *lokokti*, *lokavāda*, *devaloka*. Therefore the interpretation we have to give to the name Lokāyata is quite different. It is but a science which has for its only object the *loka*, that is, this world; and this interpretation is quite in accordance with the Chinese translation of the word by Shun she or Shun su: 'those who follow the world or the customs of the world'. Therefore this Lokāyata, which has for its aim the *lokayātrā*, is the forerunner of *nīti* and *arthaśāstra*, that is of a science which was attributed by Brahminical sources also to Bṛhaspati from whom Lokāyata is called Bārhaspatya as well as Bārhaspatyamata and had the meaning of *nīti*; in his translation of *Lalitavistara*, Devākara, in order to render the name of the Bārhaspatyamata included in the list of sciences known by the young Bodhisattva, uses the Chinese expression: *wang lung*, that is, the doctrine of the king; *Khattavijjā* (Kṣatravidyā) according to which *attano attho kametabbo*[11] as Lokāyata teaches that *arthakāmau* are *puruṣārthau*.

Āryaśūra[12] and the Milindapañha[13] include this science among the philosophical systems as previously, the *Kauṭilyārthaśāstra* had quoted the Lokāyata along with Sāṅkhya and Yoga.[14]

At its very beginnings this doctrine represented the science of the *purohita* who on earth assisted his King, as in heaven Bṛahaspati assisted Indra: *artha* and *dharma* for a certain period followed the same way. So that we find the Lokāyata included in the list of the sciences studied by Brahmins in the stereotyped formulas of the Pali or Sanskrit Buddhist texts; and according to the *Vinayapiṭaka* there were also some Buddhist monks who endeavoured to study it, were it not that the Buddha prevented them.[15] But political intrigues and religious purity cannot go together, and in fact, signs of a real contrast between *artha* and *dharma* can be traced back to the times of Yājñavalkya[16] and of Nārada.[17] Vijñāneśvara, quoting Bṛhaspati, distinguishes the Lokajña from the Dharmajña.[18] In course of time, among the masters of this political science there were some who refused to acknowledge any authority of *dharma* and proclaimed

that in this world of men, God and priests should not interfere: *Trayī saṃvaraṇamātram*. As it happens in such a case, the reaction of the *artha* against the *dharma* went further: *artha* not only broke up any relation with *dharma*, but rose against it. From this time onwards we have, therefore, two *artha* schools: the orthodox one which remained under the authority of *dharma* and was generally included in the *dharmaśāstra*; and the other following its heretical principles until at the end asserting *artha* and *kāma* to be the only goal of humanity (*arthakāmau puruṣārthau*) *daṇḍanīti* and *vārttā* the only science, denying God and *karman*, and assuming an increasingly materialistic, hedonistic character, splitting, by and by, into a number of schools and sects.

But India was a country where everything had to be demonstrated: it was not sufficient to assert a principle, it was necessary to defend it with logical arguments against the attacks of opponents. Two aspects in particular were to be demonstrated:

1. That no *karman* exists.
2. That *pratyakṣa* is the only means of knowledge.

As to the first point, this assumption offended the well-known principle *karmaṇā sarvam idaṃ tatam* generally admitted and to which orthodox schools found good support in the *vaicitrya* which can be seen in the world. The Lokāyata sought to escape this difficulty raised by their opponents appealing to the Svabhāva theory, which, having evolved from the same principles that brought about the formulation of Sāṅkhya, is sufficiently attested in the epics, and which can be traced back to the Aupanishadic times: Makkhali Gosāla and Purāna Kassapa were strictly related to it. This *svabhāvavāda*, although having with the Lokāyatamata only one, but the most important point in common, that is, the negation of the Karma theory, had striking analogies to the fatalistic schools of Kālavāda or Parināmavāda inasmuch as it maintained that everything which happens on earth is only the effect of the various combinations of material elements: human effort is useless: not enjoyment, therefore, of life, but the accomplishment by destiny

of its own ends. The Lokāyata accepted this theory; it is not necessary to assume *karman* in order to explain the *vaicitrya*: everything happens *svabhāvena*, according to the various combinations of the four elements which constitute the body of every being. As to the second point, that is, only that which is demonstrated *pratyakṣeṇa* exists, they had to have recourse to all variety of logical subtleties in order to support it.

Logical works from general expositions of Indian philosophical schools like the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, or the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra with the commentary of Guṇaratna, to all special treatises on Nyāya, are pregnant with arguments aiming at refuting their assumption which are of the greatest interest to the history of Indian logic, concerning, particularly, the syllogism and the theory of *vyāpti*.

So by and by, ancient Lokāyata lost its original character; it was no more a *nīti*, as we presume it was at its very beginnings, but became a *hetuvidyā*, a *tarkavidya* full of logical subtleties. The *dhūrta-cārvāka* became a *suśikṣita-cārvāka*. Those who did not recognize any value to *pramāṇas* other than *pratyakṣa* were obliged, as justly the *Bhāmati* (III, 3, 54), the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* (p. 88), the *Nyāyakandalī* (p. 259) and other Nyāya works remark, to have recourse everywhere to inference.

Later on, the Lokāyata appears to have disappeared; but its doctrines still remained occasionally accepted by disbelievers or materialists, who always exist in every country—even in a country which can be called the fatherland of idealism.

If later Śāstrakāras on *Nyāya* begin their treatises with the refutation of the Cārvākamata, even though as a school this actually was dead, this fact is owed only to a traditional custom.

NOTES

References:

1. *Linee di una stovia del materialismo indiano*, in memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei, Ser. V. Vol. XVII, fasc. VII, 1924 (Part I)
2. Studie materiali di storia delle religioni, 1925 fasc I–II, p. 76

3. Bhavisyattakahā, ed. by C. D. Dalal (Gackwad's Or series. XX). p. 42.
4. Accoding to Śaṅkara the *aśraddadhāna* are those who believe that for *mokṣa* sacrificial *karman* only is sufficient
5. *Ślokavārtika* i. IO
6. Pp. 137–140 (Chow. S. S.)
7. Pp. 113–117 (*ibid*)
8. Pp. 170 ff.
9. A later refutation of *ātman* is contained in the commentary of Guṇaratna to the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra (Bibl. Ind., pp. 139 ff.)
10. *Dialogues of Buddha*, I, p. 168.
11. *Dīghanikāya in Auswahl ubersetzt*, Gottingen, 1913, p. 19, n. 3.
12. *Jātaka*, V. 228
13. Mahabodhijātaka 20,21
14. P. 3 (S. B. E. I. p. 6)
15. One might object that in this book Lokāyata is not the Bārhaspatya, because Bṛhaspati along with Uśanas is quoted before one of the masters of the *artha*-school which seems, therefore, to be quite distinct from the Lokāyata. But it must be observed that here, we have to do more with methods than with systems. In fact, interference between philosophy and other sciences is ascertained in the same chapter when Kauṭilya says that *ānvīkṣikī* is the best guide in every discipline, in *vārttā* as well as in *daṇḍanīti*, and *ānvīkṣikī*, according to Vātsyāyana, had two aspects. It is not only an *ātmavidya*, but also a *hetuvidyā*
16. Cullavagga V, 33.2
17. II 21.
18. E 39

D. R. Sastri

Of the traditional Indian scholars, D. R. Sastri wrote on Indian materialism practically throughout his career, although shifting his basic position from time to time. We have reproduced here an abridged form of his brief work on Indian materialism (originally published in 1930) which is frequently referred to but has been out of print for a long time. We are indebted to Sri Biswanath Bhattacaryya for permission to reprint it.

A Short History of Indian Materialsim, Sensationalism and Hedonism

D. R. SHASTRI

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITON

It is well known to students of Indian philosophy that the original *sūtra* works of the materialists, sceptics and agnostics of India are now lost to us. Compelled to rely exclusively for a certain doctrine or way of thought on its presentation by its avowed opponents, one can seldom be free from prejudices and personal predilections. *Pūrvapakṣas* or the opponent's views are almost invariably presented in an inadequate and unsympathetic manner, so that no sound judgement as regards their proper philosophical worth can easily be formed. If one notes how the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādin Buddhists, the Pāśupatas, and the Pāñcarātras have suffered at the hands of Śaṅkarācārya, it would be clear that the study of a certain system from its presentation by its opponents has to be undertaken with a proper appreciation of these difficulties. An attempt has been made here to collect, from different sources, fragments of actual statements made by the founders and propounders of different schools of the materialists, sceptics and agnostics

of India. *Kusumāñjali, Nyāyamañjarī, Advaita-brahmasiddhi, Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*, and numerous other works by orthodox writers, Hindu and Jain, Sanskrit and Prakrit works, and Buddhist Pali works, all contain a good deal of useful information on these schools. But these are only fragments of the original works of these schools now irrevocably lost to us. The *pūrvapakṣas* or views of opponents, in which form they appear in subsequent literature, have been studied in the light of, and consistently interpreted in the spirit of, the fragmentary texts as yet preserved of the earliest exponents of the systems.

It is pointed out in this connection that the Oriental Institute of Baroda published in the year 1940 '*Tattvopaplavasiṃha*' of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, which is an interesting work of the Lokāyata school of philosophy. Attempts have been made in the present edition to utilize Jayarāśi's work.

The first edition of this short history published in 1930 was completely exhausted long ago. Since then, the book was almost lost to interested readers who insisted on its re-publication from time to time. In spite of the fact that I also felt some sort of responsibility to bring out its second edition, I failed to do so earlier due to indisposition of health and other unavoidable shortcomings.

At length, the publication saw the light of day being embodied with the results of my further study on the subject, the credit for which goes directly to my affectionate Sriman Banikantha Chakravarty, B.Sc., C.A. and to the authorities of Bookland Private Ltd. But for their enthusiasm, the matter would have been delayed for an unlimited period.

D. R. S.

Calcutta,
31 March 1957

A Short History of Indian Materialsim, Sensationalism and Hedonism

D. R. SHASTRI

INTRODUCTION

Indian materialism has passed through four logical stages of development. In its first stage it was a mere tendency of opposition. It called in question all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate and all evidence, perception as well as inference. It denied the authority of even the Vedas. In that period, its name was Bārhaspatya. In its second stage, Svabhāvavāda, recognition of perception as a source of knowledge, and the theory of the identification of body with the self, were incorporated into it. In that stage, it took the form of a system of philosophy. However low its position may be in the rank of philosophical systems, it can by no means be denied that, at that remote period of Indian history, it was the only system of philosophy worthy of its name. In that period flourished famous materialists like Ajita Keśakambalin, Kambalāśvatara and Purāṇa Kāśyapa. In this stage it came to be known as Lokāyata. In its third stage, an extreme form of hedonism, which was due perhaps to the corruption of freedom of thought—social, religious and political—formed the most important feature of this school. Gross sensual pleasure superseded bliss or contemplative joy and licentiousness replaced liberty. Devils occupied the seats of angels. As a consequence of this impact of corruption and misunderstanding, Cārvākism originated. In that stage this school preached—'Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we may die.' The reaction to this extreme form of licentiousness was destructive to the very vitality of this school. From that period this extremely materialistic school leaned towards spiritualism. So long, it had maintained that the body was the self. In that period, under severe attack from the spiritualists, it gave up the theory that there was no self

apart from the body and tried, gradually, to identify the sense-organs, breath, and the organ of thought with the self. Before that the materialists had affirmed that inference was not a means of knowledge. But at this stage they accepted at first probability and then even inference, though in a restricted form, as a source of true knowledge. Philosophers like Purandara were the advocates of this form of Indian materialism. In its fourth stage, it came to be at one with the Buddhists and the Jains in opposing the Vedicists, and acquired the common designation Nāstika. A Nāstika is one who condemns the Vedas—*nāstiko veda-nindakaḥ*. The texts, added in the appendix with evidences of their genuineness, record some of the views of these different stages in a blended form. As the literature of this school is now entirely lost, except what has reached us in fragments, we are quite unable to produce here *verbatim* all the original *sūtras* of this school which represent its various aspects and phases. But there are passages both in *sūtra* and *śloka* form which embody in substance these different stages of the Lokāyata school. We can gain a complete systematic work on the materialists of India if we gather these together in a sympathetic manner.

Tradition ascribes to Bṛhaspati the first treatise of this school and there is no reason for rejecting this view. It is evident from the *sūtras* extant and quoted under Bṛhaspati's name that he was not a mythical figure, but a historical personage. But it is very difficult to ascertain who Bṛhaspati was. It is probable that the conception of this school first dawned on Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the gods, who is regarded by scholars like Professor Belvalkar as the first founder of this Bārhaspatya system. If we are authorized to give the credit for founding this system to more men than one, then we should like to mention the names of Ajita Keśakambalin, Cārvāka and Purandara as the second, third and fourth founders respectively of the Lokāyata, Cārvāka and Nāstika systems. We know from the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali that Bhāguri was one of the expounders of the Lokāyata dogmas. Not a single *sūtra*

attributed to Bhāguri of the Lokāyata school having been recovered, we cannot give him any position in these stages of development of Indian Materialism and Sensationalism. We shall deal now more elaborately in the following pages with these four distinct steps of evolution of Indian Materialism.

EVOLUTION OF MATERIALISM AND SENSATIONALISM IN INDIA

In ancient India, the necessities of life being abundantly provided by nature, the struggle for existence was not very great. People's tastes were not sophisticated. In order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, they took to shady groves or the caves of mountain valleys. Their peace of mind was not disturbed by political strife. In the absence of the art of writing, people were strangers to literary ambition. Nor were their energies called forth by art or science. There was no literature except what could be retained in memory. Metaphysical and religious problems formed almost the only subjects of speculation. They meditated on how and why the world was in which they lived. What were they? From where did they come? Where would they go? What had they to do? They made an endeavour to answer these questions in their own way, and thus laid the foundation of philosophical enquiries in India.

These queries are recorded in the Vedas, the oldest literature of mankind still extant. These early attempts cannot properly be called philosophical systems, rigidly consistent and calmly reasoned. They are mere tendencies, scattered and unsystematic like landmarks in an ocean. After a long course of development from their first hesitating and imperfect stage as tendencies, they became perfect. Amongst these re-arranged, systematic, consistent, calmly reasoned, perfect systems of Indian philosophy, materialism can be counted as very old. Some go so far as to count it as the oldest and adduce, among others, the following reasons in support of their opinion. It is a fact that all other schools, in their respective systems, try to refute the truths established by this school, thus admitting its priority. It is also

a fact that the word *darśana* in its primary sense means perception. In its secondary sense it means the Śāstra, which is as good an authority as perception. This emphasis on perception reminds us of the materialists and there are scholars who maintain that the word was first originated by the followers of Bṛhaspati. It was from them that the word was borrowed by other schools. This fact induces them to establish the priority of this Darśana to all other Darśanas. Scholars are also bold enough to declare that the materialistic school is the only original school of philosophy. All other schools were originated simply for the sake of refuting and destroying this school, whose teachings, according to them, were detrimental to the best interests of mankind. Others, again, do not go so far. It may be, say they, as old as other schools of philosophy, but not older. Materialism is preached nowhere as a doctrine of philosophy, except as a reaction against some perverted ideas or practices. The materialists of India, namely Bṛhaspati and his followers, do not pretend to lay down a constructive system of philosophy of their own. They try to refute the foolish orthodoxy of other schools. This, in their opinion, proves that the system of Bṛhaspati cannot be the first system. It is rather, the last. It raises objections against the views of all other systems and presupposes the existence of all other schools thereby.

But all systems of philosophy are the growth of years—of centuries. The systems which we possess of the different schools of philosophy, each distinct from the other, are rather the last summing-up of what had been growing among many generations of isolated thinkers, and cannot claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment. A large mass of philosophical thought must have existed in India long before there was any attempt at dividing it into well-defined departments of systematic philosophy or reducing it to writing.

But such a growth must have required a great length of time. So it is probable that during that long period, the views of one system were discussed in another. During that period anything could be added and anything left out. Subsequently, each system

reached the form in which we possess it. It is not improbable that the Lokāyata school of philosophy, being developed as the first system of philosophy, raised objections against the views of other schools which were even then mere tendencies and which took shape as systems later on. Thus, although as mere tendencies, almost all philosophical thoughts are contemporaneous, as systems they belong to different ages. The school of Bṛhaspati is regarded as the weakest school of philosophy in comparison with other schools. The law of evolution or gradual development proves that the earliest school is the weakest and the latest the strongest. If the Materialistic school be the weakest, it is probable that it is the earliest as well.

THE FIRST STAGE

Originally, the school of Bṛhaspati meant Vitaṇḍā or casuistry and nothing else. In it Vitaṇḍā was essential. With its impatience of all authority, it tried to refute the views of other schools. It was, in its original stage, without any constructive element and without any positive theory to propound. It was negative and destructive. The record of this period is kept by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, author of *Tattvopaplava-siṃha*. This negative aspect of the doctrine finds expression in the Vedas themselves. From the earliest Vedic times, there were people who denied the existence of even the Vedic deities. The Vedic hymns pointedly refer to scoffers and unbelievers. Those hymns, which are traditionally ascribed to Bṛhaspati, son of Loka, contain the first germs of protest against a mere verbal study of the Veda and emphatically declare that a man who tries to understand the Veda is far superior to a mere sacerdotal priest. The Maṇḍūka hymn is a panegyric of frogs who are described as raising their voices together at the commencement of the rains like Brahmin pupils repeating the lessons of their teachers, and this celebrated hymn on frogs is a satire, says Professor Max Müller, upon the Vedic priesthood, or better, upon the system of hymn-chanting. Yāska clearly tells us that those who merely memorize the

texts without knowing the meaning, do not see the real form of the Veda, and that such people are deluded inasmuch as the way to attain the *summum bonum* is not revealed to them. In various *Brāhmaṇas* mere knowledge of a performance has been mentioned as having the same effect as the performance itself. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it is stated that a performance accompanied by knowledge, produces a better result than a performance without knowledge. Jaimini, in his Pūrvamīmāṃsā system, recording this opposition, devotes an entire chapter to drawing the conclusion that study consists not only in learning by heart the letter of the Veda but also in clearly understanding its spirit. Traces of an opposition to the religion of the Vedas appear in the Vedas and in later works. In *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* we find—'Why should we repeat the Veda or offer this kind of sacrifice!' Later on, the very authoritativeness of the Vedas was questioned by Kautsya. Opposition was the only duty of the followers of Bṛhaspati and they did it from the very beginning of their career. They opposed the Vedas and the practice of repeating them without understanding their meaning. But all these represent only the opposing, destructive or negative aspects of the Bārhaspatya system. And it is well-known that a system ceases to have any great interest and even value without a constructive element, without a positive theory to propound. So the doctrine of the followers of Bṛhaspati appeared to be incomplete without any positive element in it. It felt the necessity of a positive element. Everybody knows that necessity is the mother of invention. Bārhaspatya in its very early stage found out the means of being complete. So long, under the designation Bārhaspatya, it admitted no authority other than its own. Now, in its second stage, in explanation of the why of an event or product, it accepted the doctrine of Svabhāva. This doctrine of Svabhāva maintains that 'the effects are self-existent and are produced neither by different things as causes nor by themselves, inasmuch as no cause can be found for the filament of the lotus or the eye-like marks on the peacock's tail. If it cannot be found, it certainly does not exist. Such is the case with this

diversified universe. Similarly, feelings like pleasure, pain, etc. have no causes, because they appear only at times.' This doctrine of Svabhāva had been in vogue in independent forms. In course of centuries, this doctrine, like many other doctrines, lost its independence altogether and came to be affiliated to the Bārhaspatya system. The consequence of this gradual assimilation has been a blending of thoughts. The followers of Bṛhaspati became one with, and the earliest representatives of, the extreme form of Svābhāvavāda. From this time, the rejection of causal principle, the rejection of good and evil consequences of actions, formed its most important feature. The product comes into existence without any cause. This materialistic view was emphasiszd by Bṛhaspati in Vedic times. 'In the first age of the gods, the existent was born of the non-existent—*asataḥ sad ajāyata*.

The *Śvetāśvatara Upanisad* contains a nominal enunciation of some of the most popular theories current in its times in explanation of the origin of the universe, and Naturalism forms one of this number—*kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatiryadṛchhā* etc. Uptil then it was an independent doctrine, and the Bārhaspatyas were merely the oppositionists. Bṛhaspati, with lofty enthusiasm, flung away the fetters of religion that he might be righteous and noble. Some of the verses of the Vedic hymns ascribed to Bṛhaspati are very noble in thought. Whatever may be said of his followers, his own teachings were of an elevated character. Bṛhaspati had many followers and all of them were independent thinkers raising objections against current superstitions. It is perhaps for his freedom of thought that he was regarded the priest—the adviser, the counsellor of India, the king of the gods.

But this state of things changed very soon. A reaction against the school of Bṛhaspati appeared. Perhaps the negative or destructive element of the doctrine was responsible for this reaction. Vedic literature posterior to the Mantras is disfigured by filthy anecdotes in which pious sages poured out vials of their wrath on the devoted heads of those early oppositionists,

i.e. Bṛhaspati and his followers. The *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* relates an interesting anecdote which runs as follows. 'Once upon a time Bṛhaspati struck the goddess Gāyatrī on the head. The head smashed into pieces and the brain split. But Gāyatrī is immortal. She did not die. Every bit of her brain was alive.' Some scholars have found a very valuable truth behind this anecdote. They find an allegorical meaning here. Gāyatrī is the symbol of Hinduism. Bṛhaspati tried to destroy it by introducing opposition. But Hinduism is eternal. It was not destroyed. In *Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad* we find another anecdote—Bṛhaspati, having assumed the shape of Śukra, brings forth false knowledge for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the Asuras. By it, the Asuras show that good is evil and evil is good; and they say that this new law, which upsets the Vedas, should be studied. Here, Bṛhaspati is painted as a deceiver, a hypocrite. The *Mahābhārata* records a story of this period relating how Bṛhaspati, the sceptic, had a long discussion with Manu, one of the founders of the sacrificial cult, and was in the end converted to the latter's viewpoint. Another anecdote records—'The reason why I was born a jackal,' says a character, 'is that I was a blamer of the Vedas, a reviler and opposer of priests, an unbeliever and a doubter of all things.' In another place it records—'The ignorant and unbelieving man who has a soul of doubt is destroyed; neither this world nor the next exists, nor happiness, for him who has a soul of doubt.'

In another place of the *Mahābhārata* which records past events, an unbeliever is threatened with a sudden enlightenment hereafter—'the devil in hell will soon change your ideas on that subject.' The worst that is said of Bṛhaspati's teaching is that it is drawn from a study of the female intellect, which is full of subtlety and deceit. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* records that a number of Daityas one day, in ancient times, began to practise severe penances following the injunctions of the Vedas. This caused great apprehension to Indra. At his prayer, Māyāmoha was created who preached to the demons the pernicious doctrines of Bṛhaspati not for their benefit, but for their destruction.

Having gradually been overpowered by that folly, they became enemies to Brāhmins, gave up their duties and were averse to the study of the Vedas. Then, as they had strayed from religious observances, Indra killed them. Almost similar is the account recorded in the *Padmapurāṇa*. All human institutions prosper through opposition. As a reaction against the opposition of Bṛhaspati and his followers, the Vedic schools became more extensively engaged in popularizing the Vedic creed of life by means of the most elaborate and thoroughgoing presentations and expositions of their Vedic doctrines. The result was the production of the six Vedāṅgas, the Smṛtis, the Epics and other such useful works. Never has religion flourished with such luxuriance and in such wide variety, from the purest to the most abominable shapes, as in this period of Indian cultural history. A dark shadow fell upon the oppositionists—the independent thinkers. All independent lines of thinking became, for hundreds of years to come, an impossibility, through the powerful influence of various schools of the Vedicists.

THE SECOND STAGE

The state of things turned, however, through the influence of Naturalism. Opposed by the strong advocates of the orthodox community, the Lokāyatikas returned with the affiliation of naturalism or Svabhāvavāda. Neither of these two doctrines, Lokāyata and Svabhāvavāda, accepted the good or evil consequences of actions. The Lokāyata school, for so long a mere tendency, with the incorporation of naturalism, formed a philosophical system. Thus originated the first Darśana, or the Lokāyata Darśana. Perception was emphasized in the very name of this newly built-up system, i.e. Darśana. So long, the Bārhaspatyas did not admit any authority whatsoever. Now in its new shape, the school accepted the authority of perception. Perception became the only criterion of existence. Whatever was not perceived was held to have no existence at all. The

causal principle was rejected, because sensuous perception is not an evidence in support of its existence. For mere perception of two events, which stand isolated and self-contained, is not sufficient to establish between them a causal relation. 'To ascertain whether a given antecedent condition has the character of a true cause, it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability and of relevancy involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at.' Universal propositions cannot be established by our limited perceptions. Perception presupposes actual contact of the object with the perceiving organ, and is thus necessarily confined to the present. It is a case of the here and now. It does not extend to the past or the future, and is thus unable to establish universal connections of things. In other words, sense-perception can give us only particular truths. But knowledge of particular facts cannot give us knowledge which is universally true. Therefore, perception cannot give us universal relation. Nor can universal relation be established by inference alone. For the inference, which yields a universal relation as its conclusion, cannot work unless it presupposes another universal connection as a necessary pre-condition of its possibility, and that again another, and so on. In other words, the process of reaching a universal conclusion is always like arguing in a circle. *Vyāpti* is derived from *anumāna*, and *anumāna* again from *vyāpti*. Thus even inference in itself is not sufficient to produce a universal proposition. Nor is the universal relation supplied by testimony. For, testimony involves inference. Comparison is equally unable to establish a universal relation. Comparison only establishes the relation of a name to something that bears that name. Now, such relation of the name and of the named is a particular relation, while we are in search of an unconditional universal relation. Thus the universal relation, which is indispensable to all inference, is not given by any of the so-called sources of knowledge. Therefore universal relation cannot, by any means, be established. As inference is not possible without universal connection and universal connection is unattainable,

the Lokāyata as a system discarded, in its earlier stages, inference as a source of knowledge.

It rejected ether as an element because ether cannot be known by perception, and it maintained that the four elements of earth, air, fire and water are the original principles of all things. The four elements, in their atomic condition, when mixed together in a certain proportion and according to a certain order, become transformed into an organism.

Consciousness is a function of the body. For the manifestation of consciousness, the body is an indispensable factor. Consciousness does not inhere in particles of matter. When these particles come to be arranged into a specific form in a manner not yet scientifically explicable, they are found to show signs of life. Life and consciousness are identical. Our thinking power is destroyed with the dissolution of the elements from whose combination it is evolved. Consciousness is produced from the body, which is endowed with life and vital air. Without sensation, no consciousness is possible. When the body perishes, no consciousness can remain: it must also perish. So there is nothing to transmigrate. The body, consciousness and sense-organs are momentary. Mind is merely the product of a combination of elements, just as some acid eructations or wines are the results of chemical combinations. The four elements, when combined, produce or manifest the mind. There is no other reality than the four Bhūtas. The instinctive movements and expressions of new-born babies are due to 'external stimuli, as much as the opening and closing of the lotus and other flowers at different hours of the day or night, or the movement of iron under the influence of lode stone. In the same way, the spontaneous generation of living organisms is frequently observed, e.g. in the case of animalcules which develop in moisture or infusions, especially under the influence of gentle warmth, or of maggots or other worms which in the rainy season by reason of the atmospheric moisture, are developed in the constituent particles of curds and the like, which begin to live and move in so short a time'. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and

perceptions can arise only insofar as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But it would not be so, were not the body the receptacle of consciousness. The properties of particular preparations of food and drink, conducive to the development of intellectual powers, afford another proof in favour of the fact that consciousness is a function of the body. Points and evidences of correspondence between mind and body—correspondence between the psychical and nervous processes—and correspondence between mind and brain, the seat of mind, are not rare. The most definite aspects of this correspondence are correspondence in quantity, correspondence in change, correspondence in growth and development, correspondence in inheritance and correspondence in quality. When communication is cut off between the brain and any other part of the body owing to the nerves of that part being diffused, there is no longer any feeling or sensation connected with that part. Psychological experiments prove a measurable interval of time between the application of stimulus and the corresponding sensation. Prolonged thought and intense emotion produce the sensations of fatigue and exhaustion in the brain, which, if carried further, produce pain and disorder. Increase of mental work is accompanied by an increase of brainwork. Intense mental activity is followed by a casting-off of a kind of brain substance known as phosphorus. Comparison of the brains of different creatures, different races of men and different individuals shows that there is a connection between intelligence and the size, weight and complexity of the brain. Generally speaking, the larger the brain in relation to the rest of the body, the greater the intelligence. So the Lokāyatas say that mind is only a form or product of the body. The ultimate reality is matter. Consciousness is a function of the body. As contraction is the function of muscles, as the kidneys secrete urine, in the same way does the brain generate thoughts, movements and feelings. Mind, therefore, has no substantial reality of its own, but springs out of the vibrations of molecules of the brain. When the molecular activity of the brain sinks below a certain level,

generally known as the threshold of consciousness, consciousness disappears and mind ceases to exist, as in sleep. When, again, it rises above a certain degree, consciousness re-appears. Conscious life is not a life of continuity. It is a coming-out-of and an again-going-into-nothing. The hypothesis of a continuous stream of consciousness is a myth of the Divines and the Theologians. This theory is sometimes known as the theory of automatism—mind is merely Epiphenomenon, or by-product. But there is a difficulty in establishing this theory. The spiritualists raised an objection against the newly built-up materialistic system. The objection is this. As the body is declared to be the agent of all actions, it should be held responsible for their natural consequences. But this is impossible. The particles which form the body are always in a state of flux and the body which performs an action at one moment does not persist at the next to feel its reaction. It is, on the other hand, undeniable that the body suffers change. Otherwise bodies could not have different sizes. To this, the reply of the Lokāyatikas is as follows. The Lokāyata system does not admit the existence of *karmaphala* or the consequence of good or evil actions. The experiences of pleasure and pain come by chance. Nature is all-powerful. Moreover, recognition proves the identity of the body through all its changing states. There is another difficulty. The spiritualists advance another objection against the materialists. The objection is put in the following manner. The theory of matter is unable to account for the facts of memory and recognition. Necessity of thought demands that memory, and original experience which gives rise to it, should be referred to one and the same conscious subject.

But this identity of reference would be possible only when the subject is fundamentally an unchangeable unity. This difficulty is removed by the Lokāyatikas in the following manner. Traces left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted from the material cause down to its direct product, an analogous instance being the transference of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. But the general answer of this

school to every 'why' is the doctrine of Svabhāva. Everything happens through the influence of Svabhāva, which is all-powerful. It is Svabhāva, or law of nature, that consciousness is a function of the body and the body is the self. The Lokāyatikas refuted the theory of *paraloka*—or previous and future births—as there was no reality existing before birth or after death. The four '*bhūtas*' or atoms of primary elements are the only realities. Mind is the production of these elements. So it cannot be maintained that the mind at death passes on to another body. Mind in different bodies must be different. The consciousness of a body which has already perished cannot be related to a body which comes into being. One mind cannot produce another mind after total annihilation. The theory that the foetus is endowed with consciousness cannot be asserted. Without sensation, no consciousness is possible. All knowledge is derived from sense-experience alone. All knowledge is posterior to and derived from experience. The sense-organs cannot revive sensations when they are not in existence. Therefore, the foetus cannot be endowed with consciousness. No power is possible without a recipient. When the body perishes, consciousness cannot remain as there is no recipient of consciousness. With the destruction of the body, consciousness must also perish. If you hold that previous, present and future births are nothing but particular conditions of the stream of consciousness which, according to you, is eternal, the Lokāyatikas would say that the chain of consciousness is not an entity, and a condition that can be predicated only in respect of an entity cannot therefore be proved. A future existence of an entity which is non-existent cannot be predicated. With this line of argumentation the Lokāyatikas of that period rejected the existence of future or previous births. The Lokāyatikas of that stage also maintained that there was no soul apart from the body. If there is any soul, it is only the living principle of all organisms. It exists only so long as our body exists and ceases to exist when the body ceases to exist. It is the body that feels, sees, hears, remembers and thinks. In sayings like 'I am fat,' 'I

am lean,' 'I am dark', by 'I', we evidently mean the body. Fatness, leanness or darkness reside only in the body. Such phrases as 'my body' are metaphorically used. Just as a knave might induce an innocent person to accept glass and such other worthless materials in exchange for precious stones, so has the Śruti misled the innocent devotee by making him believe that the soul is distinct from the body, displacing his inborn and therefore correct belief that the body and the soul are identical. As nothing like the soul exists after death to go to the next world, there is no necessity of admitting the existence of such a place. With the denial of *karmaphala*, this school denied the existence of the universal mysterious agency called Fate or Adṛṣta or Daiva. It denied the existence of merits or demerits acquired in our previous existence. In answer to the objections that fate must be admitted as the cause of the differences and determinations of the phenomenal world, Bṛhaspati's followers bring forward the doctrine of Svabhāva or spontaneous generation of things according to their respective natures. So there is no use practising virtue and avoiding sin. Religion is as harmful as opium intoxication. Prayer is the hope of men who are weak, without will-power to do anything; worship is an insincere egoism to save oneself from the tortures of hell; prophets are the greatest liars among men. The Vedas are no authority. There are *mantras* in the Vedas which do not convey any meaning whatsoever; some *mantras* are ambiguous; some are absurd; some are contradictory; some repeat what is already known. As regards the other portions of the Vedas we always find discrepancies and contradictions among them. Cases are not rare where a line of action prescribed by one text is condemned by another. Again, they speak of results that are never realized. Some portions are rejected by the Vedicists themselves as interpolations. There are proper names and epithets as well as foolish statements like the ravings of a madman. Hence, the Vedas are not only human compositions, but even worse. The buffoon, the knave, and the demon—these are the three authors of the Vedas. All the obscene rites commended for the queen

in the horse-sacrifice have been invented by knaves. So also, the custom of giving presents to priests and of eating flesh have been commended by night-prowling demons. If it were possible for the sacrifices to make one reach heaven after their performances ceased, the performers themselves perished and the requisites were used up, then the trees of a forest burnt down by fire might produce abundant fruit. The exercises of religion and the practices of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. Therefore the so-called sacred books, the three Vedas, have been composed by rogues and can command no authority. A Putreṣṭi sacrifice performed for the birth of a child may yield either of two results—positive and negative, which is doubtful. When a child is born, the knaves say that it is due to the power of their incantations uttered in performing the rites. When a child is not born, they explain the event as being due to the rites being incomplete in some way or another. The priests say that a beast slain in a sacrifice will itself go to heaven. How is it that they do not kill their own old fathers in a sacrifice in order to send them directly to heaven? If the offerings in a funeral ceremony may produce gratification to beings who are dead, then in the case of travellers, when they start it is needless to give provisions for the journey. All these ceremonies were ordered by the Brahmins as a means of their livelihood. They are worth no better than that. Hence, our religious ceremonies, our endeavour to propitiate the gods, to satisfy them by prayers and offerings, are vain and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals desirous of deceiving their fellow men in order to further their own selfish and ambitious motives. So let us eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die.

As the consequence of this kind of thinking, Kāma, or fulfilment of desire, became the *summum bonum* of human life. They were in search of the supreme bliss or contemplative joy, which was available in freedom only. They maintained that there is no particular place named heaven. Even the Vedas themselves doubt the existence of a world beyond. If a man may go to

another world after death, why may he not come back again perturbed by the love of his friends and relatives? When once the body is reduced to ashes, how can it ever go to another world? When we die, everything ends there. We do not enter into a region of pain or of darkness unrelieved by a single ray of light. That God is the judge does not stand to reason, because in that case, partiality and cruelty on the part of God will be indispensable. If God visits us with the evil consequences of our sins, He becomes our enemy for no reason. Therefore it is better not to have a God than to have a cruel and partial God. So there is not even such a thing as God, the supreme author and governor of the world, an omniscient spirit. The senses cannot reach Him. *Adṛṣṭa*, principle of causality, and inference itself have been denied. The Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility. How can we ascertain that an all-knowing, all-pervading and all-powerful spirit exists? Nature, and not God, is the watchword of our school.

With this enlightened credo the Lokāyatikas laid aside the traditional life of religion and settled down to strain every fibre of their being, so long frittered away for heaven's sake, to work out their immediate earthly welfare. The result of this movement was an aspiration for freedom. By freedom, they meant all-round freedom—freedom for the individual as well as for society; freedom for man as well as for woman; freedom for the rich as well as for the poor; freedom for all individuals and for all classes. They exhorted all people to cast off all the shackles which had bound them for ages and to march shoulder to shoulder towards freedom. The wonderful consequence of this struggle for freedom was the rise of Buddhistic culture. Buddha's views against the Vedic sacrifices, the memorizing of Vedic *mantras* and fruitless repetition to retain them in memory, the caste system, the authority of the Vedas and the worship of deities, magic practices and the mortifications and other ascetic practices—have their counterpart in the views of Lokāyata. It is perhaps because Buddhism was greatly influenced by the Lokāyata School that we find, in later accounts of Lokāyata, the doctrines of Buddha and Cārvāka almost amalgamated and the name Cārvāka sometimes applied to Buddha.

India had been seething with free thinking and the Buddha was the product of this freedom. No man ever lived so godless yet so god-like a life. But the people were not satisfied merely with social and religious freedom. Their aspiration was for political freedom as well. This aspiration was realized in the rise of Candragupta and his grandson Aśoka, who brought the jarring states of India under one rule and set up the Maurya Empire. Politics became incorporated with the Lokāyata School, which ignored Ānvīkṣikī and Trayī, the sciences dealing with the supersensuous, and appreciated Daṇḍanīti and Vārtā—Coercion and Economics—as the only branches of knowledge deserving special cultivation. The earthly king became the only god. So long, Kāma or pleasure was considered to be the only good of human life. Now, Artha, or material advantage, was added to it. As the Lokāyatikas captured the hearts of the cultured as well as the common people, they became earnest in working out their immediate earthly welfare.

The result of this movement was the generation and propagation of different arts and sciences. Vātsyāyana keeps records of some sixty-four names of Indian fine arts which probably flourished in this period of Indian materialism. Kambalāśvatara, Ajitakeśakambalin and many other materialists flourished and wrote their works on Indian materialism in this period. The *Samaññā-phalasutta* keeps the following records of Ajita's view. There is no such duty as the giving of alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good and evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father nor mother nor beings springing into life without them. There are, in the world, no recluses or Brāhmiṇs who, having understood and realized by themselves alone both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built up of four elements. When he dies, the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire and the wind to the air. The four

bearers take his dead body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter forth eulogies; but there his bones are bleached and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, the talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is a prophet therein. Fools and the wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated and after death, cease to exist. Ajita flourished during the lifetime of the Buddha. Up to that time, politics was not incorporated with the Lokāyatika. So there is no trace of politics noticeable in the teachings of Ajita. In later accounts, specially in the record preserved by Kṛṣṇa Miśra, it is mentioned very distinctly. Kṛṣṇa Miśra gives almost a perfect account of the doctrines of the Lokāyata School formed in that period. His account contains almost all the elements belonging to the teachings of this school. 'Lokāyata is always the only śāstra. In it, only perceptual evidence is authority. The elements are earth, water, fire and air. Wealth and enjoyment are the objects of human existence. Matter can think. There is no other world. Death is the end of all.'

THE THIRD STAGE

This prosperity and success of the Lokāyata system ended in corruption and misunderstanding. An extreme form of freedom gave birth to licentiousness. Supreme bliss was transformed into sensual pleasure. Enjoyment of pleasure—gross sensual pleasure—became the only end of human life. Licentiousness became predominant in the country. India lost its previous supremacy—freedom of society, freedom of religion and freedom of polity. People became slaves of their senses. The elevated teachings of Bṛhaspati became absorbed into the eroticism of his wicked followers. Gratification of the senses became the only good of this school. Let us enjoy pleasure and pleasure alone. Pleasure is the only thing which is true and good. The only reasonable end of man is enjoyment. We know that pleasure is never pure, never free from pain. How, then, can pleasure be the highest end of life? But because there is pain, and because

pleasure is mixed with pain, should we therefore reject our life? Should we fling away sheaves of paddy rich with the finest white grains because they are covered with husk and dust? Should we refrain from plucking lotuses as there are thorns in them? Shall we not take fish because there are bones and scales? Should we exclude rice from our meal, only for the trouble it will give in husking? Who will not soothe his mind and body in ambrosial moonlight though there are spots in the moon? Shall we not enjoy the pleasant breeze of summer, because there is also a slight dust in it? Shall we abstain from sowing a ploughed land watered by rain, lest the water on its surface should become muddy? Should we not prepare food, for fear of beggars?

Unmixed happiness is not available in this world; yet we cannot overlook the least bit of it. In wordly life, we smile on the joy of our dear ones and weep on their woes. If the laughing face of a son, or the lustre of a delightful daughter, can impart to us celestial happiness, why will their death or their attack with some fatal disease not find us overwhelmed with grief? If the presence of a beloved wife makes a heaven of this earth, her departure will surely leave us in eternal darkness. Thus, what gives you pleasure now will cause you pain another time. We cannot totally get rid of troubles even when we have no tie of affection in this wide world. The heart of a man who has none to call his own in this populous world is depressed, full of misery and dry as a desert. He must not be a common man, who, even in such conditions, can maintain peace of mind. But even a man who is quite aloof from all social ties cannot escape occasional mishaps, such as disease and accidents. The sudden attack of an ailment can make a total change in our happy state of affairs. And when health goes, it takes away pleasure with it. The loveliness of a moonlit night, the cool breeze at daybreak, the beauty and scent of flowers, the melodious songs of sweet birds—none of these can please a man when he is not in good health. You may remain jolly even without a friend. But bodily pain is sure to render you feeble and restless. Besides, we are

placed in terrible distress by the occasional appearance of a cyclone and thunderstorm, the sudden attack of a ferocious animal, or the undesirable occurrence of famine, drought or deluge. Still we must say that this world of ours is not full of troubles. True, there is sorrow everywhere; in kings' palaces and beggars' huts, in the high souls of the learned and the superstitious minds of the illiterate, in the beautiful mansions of the luxurious and the dark caves of the sages. Sleep in your house or walk outside, enter the temple or hide in the forest, run to the burial place or wherever you like—nowhere can you escape misery and pain. Still we must say that the amount of pleasure in this world is greater than that of pain. If such be not the case, why do people so earnestly desire to live, and become frightened at the name of death? Tell them to renounce this world, and they will at once exhibit utter reluctance. For, how is it possible to bid adieu to this pleasant world which is the abode of joys and luxuries? How delicate are the green leaves of the spring, and how lovely is the rose! Is not the sunshine a glorious thing?

If sorrows were more frequent than delight, men would have escaped misery by suicide. Most men are unwilling to die; hence it is evident that in human affairs, pleasure has a larger sphere of influence than pain.

It is also to be remembered that happiness is at its best only when experienced by contrast with misery; and hence it may be said that the existence of troubles in the world has a certain necessity. Blessings of rest can be fully enjoyed only after hard labour. The ever-healthy man cannot comprehend the ease and comfort of having a sound body and a sound mind. If you are to receive full satisfaction in your diet, suffer from hunger first. The more you sustain the agony of thirst, the greater will be your delight in drinking cool water. You fear a dreadful night with heavy rainfall and a terrific thunderstorm when dark and dense clouds have covered the whole sky, and all the trees and houses have been blown away by the furious wind. But after such tedious hours, when the sun with celestial beauty appears

for the first time on the eastern horizon of the bright sky, dispersing the lingering darkness and unfolding all the lotuses of the earth, will you not look more happy than ever? The same thing happens when two lovers meet after a long separation. They have long been tormented by heart-rending affliction, they have shed constant tears and breathed many a long sigh. Now, their re-union will produce a heavenly bliss which an ever-happy couple cannot have any idea of. Perpetual happiness may be desirable, but it is practically unbearable. What pleases you now, will be disgusting after constant use. Even a palatable dish cannot but bring satiety if we are to take it daily. Variety of taste is needed: pungent, astringent, and bitter flavours should be interchanged with sweets. So it is foolishness, no doubt, to overlook pleasure only on the ground that it is not constant, owing to the intervention of pain. Therefore a man should do that which yields pleasure in the end. Even sages like Vyāsa tell you that one should fulfil the desire of a woman who is overcome with passion. The moon-god, the lord of the twice-born, enjoyed very eagerly the wife of his preceptor Bṛhaspati, the founder of our school. Everybody knows the story of Indra, the god of gods, and Ahalyā, the wife of Gotama. Hence there is no need to restrain sexual appetite. Enjoy all sorts of pleasure, according to your own desire. Where is unanimity among the great men in accepting the interpretations of the Śruti and the Smṛtis? An intelligent interpretation should not be rejected if it favours the enjoyment of pleasure. The sage Pāṇini, who says in '*Tṛtīyā apavarge*' that the third sex will be engaged in finding out a means of salvation, is necessarily of the opinion that the other two sexes should enjoy sensual pleasures. Carry out the commands of Kāma, which even gods like Brahmā could not transgress. The Vedas, too, are nothing but the commands of the gods. Then why do you show more respect to the latter? Forbear from all disparaging and contemptuous remarks about women, in order that you may hope to have the company of the most excellent of the deer-eyed beauties in heaven. Exert yourself to please your beloved, and indulge your own incli-

nations. These are the only roots of the tree of happiness. 'Pleasure is the good'—is the cry of nature. The animals know no other principle of action than pleasure. Children are sensitive to pleasure alone. The grown-up man, the apparently grave and sober, all seek and pursue pleasure; the virtuous man enjoys pleasure in the cultivation of virtue; even those who refute the statement that pleasure is the object of desire, find pleasure in such refutation.

> 'Whatever the motive, pleasure is the mark:
> For her the black assassin draws his sword;
> For her dark statesmen trim their midnight lamps;
> For her the saint abstains, the miser starves;
> The stoic proud for pleasure, pleasure scorns;
> For her, affliction's daughter grief indulge;
> And find, or, hope, a luxury in tears;
> For her, guilt, shame, toil, danger we defy.'

Therefore, pleasure is the highest good of human life. The only good of life is human life. The only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. We should fully enjoy the present. To sacrifice the present to the future is unwarranted and perilous. The present is ours. The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful. The present is all we have. Let us make the most of it. With this credo, the Lokāyatikas of that remote period of Indian history preached and practised the theory of an extreme form of hedonism, according to which sensual pleasure is the only end of human life. Here, in this stage of Indian Materialism, the school of the Lokāyatikas, in addition to its old names Bārhaspatya and Lokāyata, gained the designation Cārvāka. The word means entertaining speech. It is derived from *carva*, chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating, swallowing virtue and vice. 'While you live, drink, for once dead, you never shall return.' 'As long as he lives, let a man live happily; after borrowing money, let him drink ghee.' The propagation of this rampant eroticism was the first step towards the downfall of the elevated system of Lokāyata, which was considered so long the only

system of philosophy in India. In this stage of Indian Materialism, the Buddhists and the Jainas came to the field of philosophy to preach spiritualism. In their first appearance they pretended to be the successors of the old heretics, i.e. the followers of Bṛhaspati, by directing their attacks mainly against the doctrines of sacrifice as actually preached and practised in the Vedic School. They became, like the Lokāyatikas, very popular for the time being, as the minds of the people were then still captured by Materialistic doctrines.

But as time went on, the state of things began to change. The Cārvākas came to know what these newcomers really were. They led their opposition against the orthodox Buddhists and Jainas as they previously did against the Vedicists. The result of this opposition was that the Lokāyatikas met with opposition from the side of the Vedicists as well as from the side of the Buddhists and the Jainas. By this simultaneous attack from various sides they were, for the first time, pushed to a corner. The philosophers of the Vedic Schools now became very strong, being aided by the spiritualistic doctrines of the new heretics—the Buddhists and the Jainas—and took the field as successors of the sages of old and repelled the attacks on the permanent principles of spirituality. As time passed, these Vedicists appeared on the field one after another in order to oppose the heretics in general—both old and new—the Lokāyatikas, the Buddhists and the Jainas. They opposed the materialistic views of the old heretics and the anti-Vedic doctrines of the new heretics. The pioneer of these advocates of the orthodox Vedic schools was perhaps the sage Gotama, who adduced very strong arguments against the theory of Dehātmavāda or the theory which preaches that the body is the self, of the old heretics, and established the theory that the body is different from the soul. Then came Kaṇāda, who made an endeavour to refute the theory of Svabhāvavāda or Naturalism of the old heretics, and propagated the theory that the diversity of creation is not possible for *svabhāva*, which is unconscious. The diversity, according to Kaṇāda, is produced from atoms,

which are unconscious, through the will of God in agreement with the doings of previous births. After him Kapila, who is regarded by some as representing the oldest tendency of philosophy, came to the field and formulated his arguments in favour of Dualism, for which the field had already been prepared by his predecessors. Then came Patañjali, who propagated the theory of Yoga and tried to establish the theory of the existence of God. When, through the influence of these teachers, the mass mind was almost inclined towards spiritualism, and belief in the transmigration and spiritual nature of the soul took almost complete possession of the mass mind of India, Jaimini appeared and made an attempt to establish, by argumentative discussions, that the Vedas are infallible and authoritative; that *Karma* or action is more powerful than even God, if there be any; that for the sake of the purification of mind, the performance of *Karma* is indispensable. When through the influence of Jaimini, the minds of the people became prepared, by performing duties sanctioned by the Vedas, for conceiving the spiritualistic soul, and the influence of anti-Vedic doctrines and tendencies was for the time being almost removed from the mass mind, Vyāsa came to the field and preached spiritualistic or idealistic philosophy. Lokāyata, being thus opposed by these strong enemies, grew impatient and leaned towards spiritualism. This stage may be called the second or the middle stage of its downfall. In this stage it admits, gradually, the identification of self with the sense-organs, the principle of life and with mind, shaking off its old doctrine of Dehātmavāda or the doctrine of the identification of self with the body. The first view or the doctrine of the identification of self with the sense-organs, is based on the facts that consciousness and bodily movements follow from the initiation of the senses and that the judgements expressed in 'I am blind', showing the identity of the self with the sense-organs, are universally accepted as valid. Still opposed by the spiritualists, it maintains that the vital principle itself is really the source of intelligence, as the senses depend for existence and operation upon it. When this view too was attacked, its

sponsors came to maintain that consciousness is a quality of the mind. The other organs are only the means of indeterminate sense-knowledge. It is mind alone that introduces the element of determinateness. Moreover, mind controls by its power of volition the outer organs, and may persist and function singly even when the latter happen to be absent. Therefore, the mind is the true self. All these have been recorded by Sadānanda in his *Advaita Brahma Siddhi*. 'Sadānanda speaks of four different materialistic schools. The chief point of dispute is about the conception of the soul. One school regards the soul as identical with the gross body, another of the senses, a third with breath, and the fourth with the organ of thought.' On the other hand, the Lokāyatikas had so long maintained that perception is the only source of knowledge. Now being severely attacked by its opponents, who maintained the authority of inference, it showed for the first time its leaning towards admitting inference as a source of knowledge. In the first step, it said that for practical purposes *probability* was sufficient. At the sight of smoke rising from a certain place, there arises in the mind a sense of the probability of fire, and not of its certainty. This is enough, for all practical purposes. For this end there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence, called *Inference*. When further pushed to the corner, this school said that the followers of this school were prepared to accept inference as a means of right knowledge as it was useful in our daily life.

But the mechanical form of inference as proposed by the Buddhists and others can by no means be considered a medium of right knowledge, as it is thoroughly impracticable for daily use. In other words, there are two classes of Inference—one class inferring something restored in future and the other class inferring what has already taken place. The inference about what is past is accepted and the inference about what has not been perceived, such as Paraloka, God, or Soul, is rejected. Purandara flourished in this period as an advocate of the Cārvāka school. Saṅkara, Kamalaśīla, Abhayadeva, Jayanta and the unknown author of *Sarvamata Saṅgraha* record his views.

Being pushed further to the corner, this school accepted, in this stage, even ether as an element. Guṇaratna keeps its record.

FOURTH STAGE

But every action has its reaction. The opposition of the Vedicists against the Materialists was not without its reaction. As they were supported by the Buddhists and the Jainas in their attack on the Vedic sacrifices, the old heretic oppositionists became very powerful. They got their general name Nāstika, in this period. Vedic rites proper were gradually more or less pushed to the background. New scriptures were then in course of preparation, fully adapted to the needs, tastes and tendencies of the changing times, but not entirely divorced from all connection with the Vedas. Voluminous Tāntric and Paurāṇic works grew up in this period and satisfied the needs of the times. As these schools were originated for satisfying the needs of people of different mentalities, elements of different nature were expressly visible in them. As representatives of the old heretic school, whose influence was then still predominant in the country, they included and adopted the popular doctrines regarding indulgence of the senses; and as successors of the spiritualistic schools, they gave them an esoteric purpose and thus modified them to some extent. Since then, the period of the great Hindu revival after the fall of Buddhism, India has been popularly Vedic, i.e. Paurāṇic and Tāntric in her broad outlook. For this reason perhaps, in the centuries after Christ we meet with very few names of Lokāyata philosophers, although the system must have been in existence even as late as the time of Haribhadra; Guṇaratna; Śāntarakṣita; Kamalaśīla; Siddhasena; Abhayadeva; Kṛṣṇa Miśra; Śrīharṣa; Jayanta; Sadānanda; Mādhavācāryya, etc., who have recorded and criticized its theories in their works. It was Śaṅkara and his school who did not even consider the Cārvāka school as a system of philosophy, although in *Sarva Siddhānta Saṅgraha*, he maintains that by adopting only those means which are seen such as

agriculture, the tending of cattle, trade, politics and administration, etc., a wise man should always endeavour to enjoy pleasure, here, in this world. It was with Śaṅkara and his school that the great reaction proceeded against Indian Materialism which in Mādhavāçāryya, who considered the Lokāyata system as the lowest system of philosophy, secured the most decided victory.

CONCLUSION

Just as Plato, one of the spiritualistic thinkers of the West, in his fanatical zeal would have liked to buy up and burn all the works of Demokritos, the father of western Materialism, so it is probable that these advocates of Vedic orthodoxy, in their fanatical zeal, collected and destroyed the original works of the Bṛhaspati School of Philosophy, the extreme materialistic system of India. As the Buddhistic and the Jaina schools were spiritualistic in essence, they did not meet with total annihilation. Or it may be that for a considerable time, the views of this school became feeble and unpopular, after which they lost their independent existence and became absorbed into other schools of spiritualistic philosophy. Although the works of Bṛhaspati were destroyed, the continuity of the influence of his school was at no period completely broken.

We have already seen that the Lokāyatikas got the designation Nāstika as they became one with the Buddhists. Some of the sects of the degenerated Buddhists, in which laxity in sexual morals was one of the features, became gradually affiliated to the Lokāyata school. One of these sects was the Kāpālika sect. The Kāpālikas are a very ancient sect. They drink wine, offer human sacrifices and enjoy women. They strive to attain their religious goal with the help of human corpses, wine and women. They are dreaded by all for inhuman cruelties. Bhavabhūti, Kṛṣṇa Miśra and Kavikarnapūra refer to such Kāpālikas in their respective works the *Mālatīmādhavam*, the *Probodhacandrodayam* and the *Caitanyacandrodayam*. Bṛhaspati, of *Arthaśāstra* fame,

says that the Kāpālika is alone to be followed for the purpose of attaining pleasure.

Formerly, this Kāpālika sect flourished in an independent form. In course of time it became weak, and lost its independence. Probably the inhuman cruelties, or the dreadfulness of the sect, brought about its ruin. As *kāma* or the enjoyment of sensual pleasure was the goal of this sect, it came gradually to be affiliated to the Nāstika form of the Lokāyata school, according to which the *summum bonum* of human life is, as shown before, the enjoyment of gross sensual pleasure. Thus the Kāpālikas, like the Assassins, became the solitary historical example of a combination of materialistic philosophy with cruelty, lust, supernatural power and systematic crime. Or, it may be that the followers of orthodox schools, through bitter contempt, identified the Lokāyatikas with the fierce Kāpālikas, as in previous cases the Vedicists used freely terms of abuse like 'bastard', 'incest' and 'monster' with regard to the Lokāyatikas. At the time of the author of *Arthaśāstra*, these Kāpālikas were a distinct sect. In Guṇaratna's time we find them identified with the Lokāyatika school which had already become a hated name in the country.

The Lokāyatikas were a creed of joy. Through their influence at that period of Indian history, the temple and the court, poetry and art, delighted in sensuousness. Eroticism prevailed all over the country. The Brahmin and the Caṇḍāla, the king and the beggar, took part with equal enthusiasm in Madanotsava, in which Madana or Kāma was worshipped. References to this festival are not rare in works of poets like Kālidāsa, Biśākha Datta and Śriharṣa. 'Dance and song, flower and the red powder *fāg*, swinging and playing, all these created an atmosphere of light amusements from which all sterner laws of sexual ethics were dismissed for the time being and men and women mixed indiscriminately, the green trees wearing red apparel, as it were, owing to profuse *fāg* that filled the whole atmosphere over which the April sun threw its gaudy purple rays. They assimilated the element of sexual romance from the Kāpālikas.

The essential feature of this romance is—love for one with whom one is not bound in wedlock.

As a reaction against this practice of sexual romance, Vaiṣṇavism made its appearance and the Madanotsava, the doctrine relating to sense-indulgence, must have been favourably received by a large number of people. To counteract this evil, the orthodox school of the Vaiṣṇavas included and adopted the popular doctrines regarding indulgence but gave them an esoteric purpose and thus modified them to some extent. For this reason we find that the *Dolotsava* has retained the light pleasures and gay amusements of Madanotsava in many respects, and the Vaiṣṇavas have given these festivals a far more sober character in respect of sexual freedom.

But the ever-flowing current of the Lokāyatikas never did remain suspended for a considerable period of time in Indian cultural history. It made its way in the teeth of all obstacles. After the great Brahminic renaissance, the Lokāyata sect took shelter under different forms in different parts of India. In Bengal, an old sect of the Buddhist Mahāyāna school, chiefly concerned with sexual romance, gave up its independent existence; and like the Svabhāvavādins and the Kāpālikas, became one with the Nāstika Lokāyatikas; and the Lokāyatikas on their part incorporated themselves with that community. The old element of sensualism of the festival Madanotsava of the Nāstikas, a sanction for the gratification of grosser pleasures, is still found to linger in this sect. The name of this sect is the Sahajiā sect. The very name Sahajiā reminds us of the doctrine of Svabhāva of the old heretics. The three chief physical appetites of man are eating and drinking whereby his body is sustained, and sexual intercourse whereby human life is propagated. Considered in themselves, they are natural and harmless. So the Sahajiās say, 'there is no wrong in the eating of meat and drinking of wine, nor in sexual intercourse, for these are natural inclinations of men.'

In the meetings of the Sahajiās, men and women take their seats indiscriminately, without any scruple, and with full

freedom. The Caṇḍāla cooks the food and the Brahmins take it without hesitation. Unless hunger is appeased, the Sahajiās cannot pray. Large plates full of eatables are brought to the bed spread before the members. Men and women sit there and eat them freely. In their joy women put food into the mouth of men, the latter are not slow in returning the attention, and the house rings with merry laughter. They consider the Vedas and other holy scriptures to have been manufactured by worldly men for their own selfish ends. They have no regard for the Brahmins. They entertain no respect for either the priestly class or for their elders. Women care nothing for their husbands. They revolt openly against the Brahmins, the Vedas and Hindu society. Most of the songs of the Sahajiās are about boats, trades, mortgages, farming and a hundred other topics of rustic interest of Lokayātrā. They set forth canons and theories with a boldness which is really amazing. Caste, rank in society, or orthodoxy of views are out of the question in their society. They entertain the utmost freedom in thought, religious and social matters. They are absolutely beyond the prejudices and conventions of ordinary people. The Sahajiās allow the indiscriminate mixing of men and women. The motto of a Sahajiā woman is—'he who will capture our heart, we will belong to him.' If the man of her love wants her body, she must give it.

She must give her all without reserve. The Sahajiās do not believe in the established ideals of womanhood represented by Sītā, Sāvitrī and the *satis* who burnt themselves with their dead husband in days gone by, as living examples of absolute devotion. These wives of Hindu scriptures and epics were actuated by hopes of getting rewards in the next life and praises from society in this for their chaste life. To the Sahajiās, love *is* religion. They believe that the *Deha* or material human body is all that should be cared for and their religious practices are concerned with the union of men and women. The famous Bengali poet Caṇḍidāsa was a follower of this cult. But Caitanya, apprehending its corruption and misuse, declared himself in clear language as against all sexual romance. The Sahajiās did

not believe in the human soul and in anything beyond the pleasures of the present moment. They believed in *Deha* and in nothing else. On one occasion, some Brahmins of the orthodox community were performing *tarpaṇa* in the river Ganges. This was the custom of taking handfuls of water from the river and throwing them down, by which acts they believed the thirst of their departed ancestors would be allayed. One of the founders of the Sahajiā cult saw this, and taking handfuls of water like them, threw them on the bank. This act attracted the attention of the Brahmins, who asked him the reason for his doing so. The Sahajiā replied—'If your water will go to your departed forefathers who are far away, mine ought to go to my vegetable garden which is only a mile from here, and certainly not so remote as the land of the dead.' This sect raised objections against the superstitions and conventions of the orthodox schools. Extreme lawlessness characterized this sect.

All these views of the Sahajiā Lokāyatikas remind us of the old heretics. Most of the views of the Nāstika Cārvāka or Lokāyatika of this form are recorded by Cirañjīb Bhattacharyya of Bengal in his famous work *Vidvānmodataraṅgiṇī*. In his account of the Nāstika school, we find a blending of several independent doctrines like Bārhaspatya, Svabhāva, Bauddha, Jaina and Kāpālika. The orthodox community amongst the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Hindus were bitterly hostile to the supporters of these views of the Sahajiā Lokāyatikas in every stage of their development. This is perhaps why its followers tried, by all means, to hide their societies from public view. For this reason, perhaps, the Sahajiās hold their meetings in secret. All their old books being destroyed by their opponents of the orthodox schools, they now have a particular language in circulation amongst themselves named the Sandhyābhāṣā, a language which is not understood by people outside the pale of their own society. But thus hidden like owls at daylight, the Lokāyatikas of the Sahajiā sect of Bengal could not fight long with the orthodox communities.

After the Brahminic revival, in the age of Caitanya, they

sought shelter, and in Bengal, Bīrabhadra, son of Nityānanda, gave them a shelter and converted them to the Vaiṣṇava faith. This conversion, however, does not mean much. They merely cried aloud the names of Caitanya and Nityānanda, and there ended all their connection with Vaiṣṇavism. They adopted the Vaiṣṇava creed merely for expediency's sake, in order to have some status in the society which had rejected them altogether. Although, with the revival of the Brahminic form of Vaiṣṇavism, the Lokāyatikas became very weak and identified themselves with the Vaiṣṇavas, yet the school of free-thinking did not die out in India. It still lives not amongst a few but amongst thousands today. They are not guided by the spirit of the Hindu Renaissance. They have now included the *Bible*, the *Korān* and even the *Granth Sahib* of Guru Nānak. A movement of absolute freedom is visible in every department of Indian life—social, political and religious. The advocates of free-thinking of this age are no doubt the successors of the old heretics—the Bārhaspatyas. They have now taken complete possession of the mass mind of India. They constitute the bulk of the cultured.

Appendix (abridged)

SOME RELEVANT NOTES

Nāstika

(1) The word is as old as the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, III 5, Nāstikyam VII 10'

(2) Pāṇini gives its derivative meaning. Pāṇini IV 4. 6. According to Pāṇini, a Nāstika is one who maintains the view that there is no other world.

(3) According to Manu, a Nāstika is one who condemns the Veda. II. 11. It is mainly the Veda which establishes the 'next world'. If the authority of the Veda is rejected, the 'next world' cannot stand. So, one who condemns the Veda also discards the 'next world'.

(4) The word has been used in the *Mahābhārata* in the same sense as suggested by Manu.

(5) According to the *Gītā*, the Nāstikas are godless people. XVI. 8. Kumārila, in his *Śloka Vārtika*, maintains the same view. (Pratijñā Sūtra, tenth verse).

(6) In the later works, the word has been used for vilification. The Mādhvas vilify the Śaivas and *vice versa* by using this term.

Lokāyata

(1) Old as *Rāmāyaṇa*. The word means 'dry arguments' or '*vitaṇḍā*' or 'casuistry'.

(2) It is often used in old Pāli texts in the same sense.

(3) The word is available in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*: VII. 3. 45.

(4) The name Lokāyata occurs in Pāṇini's *ukthādigaṇa*. Pāṇini IV. 2. 60.

(5) Lokāyata has been recognized by Kauṭilya as Darśana: *Artha Śāstra* I. 1.

Cārvāka

Cārvāka is met with in the *Mahābhārata*. Later on, this is the only term by which Indian materialism is designated.

The word *cārvāka* is often taken as *cāru* (beautiful) and *vāka* (speech). And it is interesting to find that *cāru* is also a synonym for Bṛhaspati. Thus it may be suggested that *cārvāka* stands for 'the word of Bṛhaspati'.

Pāṣaṇḍa is also a term which is used in the same sense.

Materialists, Sceptics and Agnostics

Viśvakarman speaks of a class of thinkers who are wrapt in a misty cloud (*nīhareṇa prāvṛtāḥ*), and with lips that stammer (*jalpya*). The subsequent thinkers speak of *avidyā* or ignorance, and *vicikitsā* or perplexity. *Saṁśaya* or doubt is another term which is met with in this connection in subsequent literature. The Muṇḍakas and the Vājasaneyas use the term *avidyā* in the sense of anything which is not transcendental knowledge (*parā vidyā*) *or the knowledge of Brahman (Brahma-vidyā)*, and anything which is not conducive to ideal self-realization. The word *vicikitsā*, according to Āsuri, means a mental state. In the *Kaṭha*

Upaniṣad (1. 20) the word has been used in the sense of philosophic doubt as to man's existence after death: 'some say he exists; others, he does not.' These latter are, no doubt, the sceptics and agnostics of ancient India. Viśvakarman evidently had in mind: (1) those hymnchanters who doubted the existences of Indra; (2) Parameṣṭhin, who saw no possibility of knowing any cause or reality beyond original matter; and (3) Dīrghatamas, who was ignorant of the nature of a first cause. In subsequent literature we find that the *kenīyas* were of the opinion that the know-all does not know at all, while the know-nothing knows everything.

And as stated above, some sages, according to the *Kaṭha-upaniṣad*, doubt the existence of man after death (1. 20). Scepticism and agnosticism are the expressions of a free mind that refuses to accept traditional wisdom without thorough criticism. In this respect, the materialists of ancient India are very closely related to the present-day sceptics and agnostics. However minor their position may be in the field of philosophy, they are, no doubt, the fathers of free and independent thinking in India.

*Bṛhaspati Laukya*or *Brahmaṇaspati*, who may be termed the founder of Indian materialism, first embodied his views about the origin of the world in the hypothesis that in the beginning, being came out of non-being—*asataḥ sadajāyata;* that matter is the ultimate reality. Parameṣṭhin treated matter as the ultimate reality as Bṛhaspati did, but disavowed all possibility of knowledge of the ultra-material substratum, if there were any. He refused to extend his metaphysical inquiry beyond matter. Bṛhaspati was a materialist. Parameṣṭhin was a sceptic. But they were inter-related. Subsequently Mahāvīra speaks of the Aṇṇāniyās, who pretend to be intelligent but are in fact unfamiliar with truth and have conveniently got rid of perplexity or puzzlement. These Aṇṇāniyās are ignorant teachers who teach ignorant pupils and speak untruth without proper investigation of knowledge (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1. 12. 2). These ignorant teachers seem to be the agnostics of ancient India. Subsequently, Bṛhaspati of the Cārvāka School is pictured as an agnostic of this type. The close relation between the agnostics of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and the materialists of the Purāṇas cannot be ignored.

In the Buddhist records Sañjaya, who maintains a sort of indifferent or neutral attitude towards such problems of metaphysical speculation as those which are concerned with the first cause, the final cause, future life, retribution, and so forth, is best known as a sceptic. According to Sañjaya, the same philosopher tends to be an agnostic as well as a sceptic. When he freely confesses his inability to know the ultimate beginning and end of things, which is virtually the same as admitting that these are unknown and unknowable, he is an agnostic. When he doubts or hesitates to admit the correctness of all bold assertions about matters beyond human cognition, he is a sceptic. What we find in the teachings of Dīrghatamas, Parameṣṭhin, the *kenīyas* and the *kāṭhas* is represented by the agnostics and sceptics.

Jayarāśi and Tattvopaplavasiṃha

The work of Jayarāśi is an important new chapter in the history of Indian philosophy. No work of the Cārvāka school itself was known before. Jayarāśi's treatment is clear from the very title of the book, '*tattvopaplava*,' which means 'upsetting of all principles.'

There were different classes of Cārvākas. A particular division of the school engaged themselves in rejecting all sorts of *pramāṇas*. Jayarāśi belonged to that group. This is in addition to what has been discussed in this book regarding the first stage of Indian Materialism.

Jayarāśi has accepted Bṛhaspati as his Guru and with his permission, demolishes the doctrines of other schools.

The method adopted by him may well be called critical. To him, there are no valid means of knowledge and to establish his thesis, he has very sharply examined different schools of Indian philosophy.

The probable date of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is the first half of the seventh century AD.

Th. Stcherbatsky

This article originally appeared in the Russian language in *Vostochnye zapiski Leningr. instituta zhivykh vostochnykh yazykov*, Leningrad, 1927, vol. i, pp. 1–10. As translated into English by H. C. Gupta, it first appeared in *Indian Studies: Past & Present*, vol. x (1968–69), pp. 143–50, and was later incorporated in the book *Papers of Stcherbatsky*, Calcutta, 1969.

History of Materialism in India

TH. STCHERBATSKY

Amidst the diverse philosophical systems, ancient as well as modern, which we find in India, it is quite natural that there must exist some materialistic system too. The main approach of such a system lies in reducing all psychic processes to purely physical ones, negating the independent existence of the soul, and affirming that the so-called soul is simply one of the properties of organized matter. This is philosophical materialism.

Another approach that we find in India is that of raising the practical question of the aim of human life and of the prevalence of material aims therein. Here, materialism is distinguished from all other trends by the fact that it negates the law of so-called *karma*, i.e. retribution for good or bad actions. The greater abstraction of the Indian mind, as compared with other ancient civilizations, is expressed in the fact that there the moral law is not embodied in the person of God, the judge, but in the form of impersonal *karma*, which may be characterized as the law of moral progress, as faith in the fact that the world is ruled by a special mechanism directing its evolution from the low and the unjust to the good and the perfect.

This law is fully negated by the extreme Indian materialists. Nowhere perhaps has the spirit of negation and resentment of the fetters of traditional morals, and the religion connected

thereto, been expressed so clearly as among the Indian materialists. This is evidenced, for instance, by the following verses of Indian materialism.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes—
Bṛhaspati says, these are but a means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.

The three authors of the Vedas were
The buffoon, the knave and the thief.
All the well-known formulae of the paṇḍita-s *jarpharī*, *turpharī*, etc.
And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśvamedha,
Those were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,

While the eating of flesh was similarly commended by night-prowling demons.

There is no other hell than the mundane pain produced by such purely mundane causes as thorns, etc;
The only supreme is the earthly monarch, whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight;
And the only liberation is the dissolution of the body.

According to the generally accepted systems in ancient India, human life was regulated by three main aims: property, love and duty. By the first were meant the various occupations giving means for life—cultivation, cattle-breeding, trade and industry. Government control, with all its ramifications, also came under this category. By the second aim was meant family life, children and also extra-familial satisfaction of the passions. What was meant by the third was mainly religious duty, the control of passions with a view to secure rewards in the next life or eternal divinity. The normal life of man, according to the views of the orthodox Hindu, must have all these three aims in view. It is

his duty to create a family and to provide for it: this is interpreted as the service of love even to material aims. Later, having established his family, the Hindu may forsake it, become a *sannyāsin*, i.e. a poor homeless wanderer, directing all his thoughts to eternal bliss.

In individual cases, however, this equilibrium among the three aims of life was destroyed in favour of one of them. The materialists, naturally, did not give any importance to the aim of religious duty and openly proclaimed property and love as the only aims of man.

On the other hand, there were many people in India who fully renounced all property and avowed celibacy, rather, a complete annihilation of all desires. They formed communities of poor wandering monks. These communities sometimes became so numerous that they posed a calamity for the working population, which had to support them somehow or the other.

Like all other Indian teachings, Indian Materialism was the speciality of a specific school, which preserved its traditions, developed its teachings and put them into practice. Its origin goes back to hoary antiquity. As early as *c* 1000 BC in the *Upaniṣads*, there is a reference to a teaching which does not acknowledge anything except matter. Five hundred years before Christ, at about the time of Buddha, there were certain schools which did not acknowledge anything except matter or, as put at that time, the four great elements: earth, fire, water and air. There were also some who added a fifth element, ether, thinner than air, and filling the whole of space.

Buddhism was on the one hand very close to Materialism, since it also negated the existence of God and the eternal soul. But the two differed sharply in that Buddhism accepted the law of *karma*, i.e. retribution for good and bad actions. In all the proceedings of the initial sermon of Buddha, his hostile and sharp attitude towards all theories which accepted the existence of the soul is clearly manifest. But at the same time, it was with equal resoluteness that Buddha opposed Indian

materialism, which did not accept the moral law or so-called *karma*.

Later, at a time when the Mauryas built a large and blossoming empire in Northern India, the materialists worked out a specific philosophical school. Cāṇakya, Minister to the King Candragupta, has left a treatise on politics in which he enumerates the existing philosophical systems. There, he refers to materialism as one of the main systems which the future ruler must study.

In this epoch, all the three main aims of man in life—property, love and duty—are treated scientifically. During this period, we have the practical sciences (*arthaśāstra*), the science of love (*kāmaśāstra*) and the science of religious duty (*dharmaśāstra*). Among the practical sciences, that of governing the country occupies first place. With his teaching, Cāṇakya marked the beginning of a special school of politicians. Quite independently of Cāṇakya and probably at the same time there also existed the theoretician Uśanas, whose political teaching differed considerably from that of Cāṇakya. The latter was the representative, so to say, of the official political doctrine according to which it was necessary to support religion with all force, and which was convinced that temporal power was illuminated with a religious basis. Uśanas, on the other hand, did not consider it necessary to found temporal power on a religious base. According to him, there is only one science and that is the science of punishment, or literally, the science of the rod (*daṇḍanīti*). Bṛhaspati, to whom the main schools of Indian materialists are attributed, was also first a founder of a school of politicians. But his political school diverged from religion still further and remained known in history as an ardent hater of religion and advocate of theoretical materialism. It was called either the Bṛhaspati school after the name of its founder, or Cārvāka's school, i.e. of the materialists proper who cared for daily bread alone. Another name for it is Lokāyata, that is, of the people who care only about the earth and not about heaven.

No complete text or work of this school has reached us; however, several extracts and passages preserved in the works of other schools enable us to form a notion of its main aspects and the methods by which they are proved. A list (as complete as possible) of the works, in which there are references to the teachings of the Cārvākas and excerpts from their works, will be given below.

Now I shall dwell on two such works, in which have been found extracts from the works of Cārvākas unknown till now. The first of them is the *Nyāyamañjarī* by the well-known philosopher Jayantabhaṭṭa. Here the materialists have been mentioned twice. Speaking of the number of sources of valid knowledge, he refers to the first main aphorism or *sūtra* of their main work. Some *sūtra*-s had already been restored from various sources by Prof. Hillebrandt. It is now possible for us to restore the first one as well. It reads:

athā'tas tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāma iti

Here, the word *tattva* is set against the word *dharma*, which is prominent in orthodox schools. This *sūtra* means: In our work, we shall talk of reality and not of duty. From the interpretation of this *sūtra* it is clear that the materialists were then divided into two camps: those who held the extreme view, fully negated consciousness and considered the human body a simple mechanism (*jaḍa*) without any consciousness, and those who were moderate in their views and acknowledged its existence, but only in the form of a special function of the body. Jayanta calls the former sophists (*dhūrta*). It is the latter whom he calls the real scholars. And in fact, the discussions of the former appear to be of a sophistic nature.

The fact (*tattva*) mentioned in the first *sūtra* cannot be either calculated or classified. Also, even the methods of its cognition cannot be found out, and all attempts made in this connection prove futile. Thus, for instance, sitting in a dark room, we nevertheless know that there are fingers on our hands and that there is a distance between them. We could not have known

this by sight, because it is dark. We did not know it by sense of touch either, for the skin is the organ of the sense of touch and it cannot touch itself. We also cannot know it from inference. Hence it is proved by this method that all the accepted teachings about the sources of valid knowledge do not withstand criticism. Once it is seen that the cognition cannot be determined, it follows therefrom that it does not exist and that the processes, however conscious, are in reality only mechanical phenomena (*jaḍa*).

Jayanta distinguishes the highly educated materialists from these materialist-sophists. They claimed as follows: 'There is undoubtedly a sole conscious element, localized in the whole living body. We also allow that this consciousness is subject to synthesis and other mental processes. One would hardly argue against this; but that this continues to exist after death cannot be proved. The consciousness, leaving one body, naturally cannot settle in another. Had this been possible, we would have remembered those things which occurred in our previous births exactly in the same manner as in this birth we remember things done in our childhood. We cannot show any reason why the same eternal soul, living now in one and sometimes in another body, has different memories: it remembers what it undergoes in one body, and does not recall what it does in other bodies. Having been convinced, therefore, that there is no soul after the death of the body, it is necessary to do away with any talk of future life which is traced back to the theory of the eternal soul, and to try to live happily according to the principle:

> So long as we live, we shall be happy!
> There is none here who will not die;
> When he dies and is turned to ashes,
> From where is he to appear again?'

Another extract to which we would like to draw attention occurs in the work of Vācaspati Miśra, in his interpretation of *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.39. The school of Indian realists supposes that matter consists of particles moving in and combining in the

body. Like Aristotle, they assume that the natural motion of all particles is rotatory (*parispanda*). The conscious motion (*kriyā*), i.e. the following-up and achievement of aims, is under the influence of impulse from the side of psychic elements. This impulse was represented in semi-anthropomorphic features. The main argument of the materialists was that a conscious act could be fully explained by the motion of particles of matter. The difference between the two motions is only superfluous. Just as the different material elements connected with each other may form such a substance such as alcohol which does not resemble the substances of which it is made, in the same manner, the different material elements, connected in the living body, develop a new quality, a conscious act, which is not similar to them.

But to this, the Naiyāyikas raise the following objection: in a drink, each particle has alcohol; whereas in the case of material elements of the body, each one individually does not have consciousness. Any property of matter, as for instance weight, must be wherever matter is. If the consciousness and the will were also qualities of matter, they would then have existed everywhere where there was matter. However we do not see this; for instance, in a pot and similar objects. One cannot therefore contend that consciousness and will appertain to matter.

The materialist objects thus: consciousness and will are not at all such properties as belong to matter in general, as for instance, weight. They belong to it only in known combinations. Just as the seed *kiṇva*, mashed and fermented, gives us alcohol, exactly in the same manner the elements of matter, having formed a body, may be converted into consciously moving objects.

To this, the Naiyāyikas reply that every particle of alcohol taken individually has an intoxicating effect. This power is not inherent in the known organized whole consisting of parts. Similarly, even the parts of the body would have to be able to think, if each were taken separately. One cannot affirm arbitrarily that matter thinks as a whole but does not think as parts of the body. It is possible that if one separates three or four

members, thought will continue to work. If it be assumed that thinking is inherent in parts of a body, then a whole series of thinkers would have to be there in one body.

'Let it be so', replies the materialist; 'this does not contradict my principle.'

'No', the Naiyāyika replies. We see that different people, if they are self-dependent, have different aims, and all of them cannot do one job together, for there is no such law that many people could accidentally have one aim and would do one job. Besides, in the case of a single person, in a single body, separate thoughts exist in agreement among themselves; but this is not the case with different bodies. This can be explained only by the fact that in one body, there is only one organ of thought. After the sensual sensation and its object change, there remains, nevertheless, their cognition in memory, and we have a right to conclude that the cognition is not a property of either the organ of feelings or its object. In exactly the same manner, although the body changes, as evidenced by changing age—infancy, youth and old age—nevertheless the same memory remains.

Therefore one cannot affirm that consciousness is a property of the body. Besides, speaking of conscious motion, we have in view not merely a motion which is possessed by all particles of matter, but a conscious attainment of aim, an achievement of what is desired and an avoidance of what is not desired. The materialist, not paying any attention to this difference, founds his thesis on motion in general, and not on the fact of motion towards aim.

Literature of Indian Materialism

A. In Sanskrit

1. Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, ed. Bibl. Ind. 1858, pp. 1–7.
2. Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, ed. L. Suali, Bibl. Ind 1905, p. 300ff.
3. Guṇarantna, *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, ib.

4. Jayanta, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Benares 1895, pp. 64, 466ff.
5. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya-bhāṣya* on *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 39.
6. Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārtika*.
7. Vācaspati Miśra, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*.
8. Śaṃkarācarya, *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha*, ed. & tr. by M. Rangacarya, Madras, 1909.
9. *Sāṃkhya-sūtra-vṛtti*, iii. 17–22.
10. *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, on Kārikā 5.
11. *Śaṃkaradigvijaya*.

B. European Studies

1. H. Jacobi, *Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie* (Sitzb. K. Preuss, Ak. d. w., 1911).
2. L. Suali, *Materiaux pour servir a I' Histoire du Materialisme Indien*, Le Museon, N. S. 9, Louvain, 1908.
3. Pizzagalli, *Nāstika Cārvāka e Lokāyatika*, Pisa, 1907.
4. A. Hillebrandt, *Zur Kenntniss der indischen Materialisten*.
5. Ego-khe, *Ueber Materialisten and Skeptiker, Alt-Indian*, Breslau, 1890. p. 168ff.
6 Statii R. Garbe & L. de la Vallee Poussin in Hasting's *Encyclopaedia*. viii. 138 & 93.
7. John Muir, in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1861.
8. Hopkins, *Great Epic*, 1901, p. 86.
9. Dahlmann, *Sāṃkhya*, p. 208.
10 Max Müller, *Six Systems*, p. 94.

Gopinath Kaviraj

Originally published in *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, vol. ii, pp. 93–111, the main interest of this article seems to be that in it, the author attempts to show that the earliest representatives of the extreme form of Svabhāvavāda were those philosophers who eventually came to be known as the Lokāyatas, and still later, as the Cārvākas.

Lokāyata and the Doctrine of Svabhāva

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

As a brief introduction to the study of theistic philosophy in ancient India, it is desirable to make a short survey of the old controversy over the Causal (efficient) Problem and the kindred questions centred around it. It is an interesting question—one which inevitably presents itself in the study of all ancient philosophy—and we cannot well afford to leave out a short discussion of it here.

It may be said, broadly speaking, that the doctrine of Īśvara is as old in its systematized formulation as the age of the *Mahābhārata* and of the Upaniṣads. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* contains a nominal enunciation of some of the most popular theories current in its time in explanation of the origin of the Universe, and Īśvaravāda forms one of this number. Thus, we read:

kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam /
saṃyoga eṣāṃ na tvātmabhāvād ātmāpyanīśaḥ sukhaduḥkhahetoḥ //

In the second half of this famous passage, although suffering from a slight ambiguity of expression, the doctrine of Īśvara is, I believe, undoubtedly indicated.[1] A more pronounced statement, however, appears in *Suśruta*, where six diverse

views are mentioned. Puṇyarāja in his commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, Sarvajñātma Muni in the *Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka* (i. 528), Guṇaratna in the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayavṛtti*, Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda on *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* no. 61, Bhaṭṭa Utpala on *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* (ii. 7), Acārya Nemicandra in *Gommaṭasāra*, verses 877–83, and Gotama in *Nyāya Sūtras*, IV. 1. 14–43, speak of various rival theories about the origin of the world (Cf *Śivapurāṇa*, *Vāyavīya Saṃhitā*, Uttara Bhāga, VIII. 14). Many of these had been in vogue in independent forms, and inter-related, long before the rise of Buddhism. And there seems to be good reason to believe that in course of centuries, with the systematization of the schools, some of these doctrines lost their independence altogether and came to be affiliated to the systems newly built up. The inevitable consequence of this gradual assimilation would appear to have been a blending of thoughts which sometimes seriously hinders historical discrimination. I am, however, trying to append below a short note on each of these doctrines, taking special care to keep their integrity as closely as feasible;[2] and it will be evident from a glance at this description that theistic studies were very intimately connected in early times with the study of the fundamental Causal Problem, with which all these theories had endeavoured to deal, and that they are traceable to a great antiquity in the past.

Svabhāvavāda

Under the name of Svabhāvavāda we may comprise almost[3] all those modes of thinking which may deny the principle of causality, more particularly efficient causality, and assert the supremacy of the inherent or immanent nature of a thing. Theoretically, it may be thought of under a twofold aspect—extreme and moderate:

A. The Extremist View:

It repudiates the possibility of discovering the cause of a thing at the very outset of the inquiry, and sets up in explanation of the why of an event or product, the doctrine of Svabhāva. This is Svabhāvavāda *par excellence*.

B. The Moderate View:

It allows causal analysis as possible and even as legitimate within certain limits, but holds that this discursive process of seeking for a sufficient reason cannot be carried very far. At the last stage, however, where no adequate explanation is forthcoming, an appeal must be made to 'the nature of the thing'; and this is Svabhāva. This is practically a confession of the impotence of human reason with regard to all first principles, on which some assumptions have necessarily to be made.

From the above it would appear that the former kind of *svabhāvavā* is inimical to scientific progress, in that it puts a stop to the initiative of all researches by denying the existence and knowledge of the principle of efficient causation, while the latter view is quite sane and sound.

The earliest representatives of the extreme form of *svabhāvavāda* seem to have been a set of free thinkers in ancient India who were originally called *lokāyatikas*,[4] but subsequently came to be more widely known under the name of *Cārvākas*.[5] Rank materialism, an absence of belief in the unseen and of regard for authority, and an uncompromising rationalism—more correctly casuistry (*vitaṇḍā*)[6]—were their general characteristics.

There are evidences in Pali Literature as to the existence, during the age of Buddhism or even earlier, of a class of persons, Brahmins by caste, who spent all their mental energies in the subtleties of futile controversies. What the nature of these controversies was in which they found so much pleasure and showed such skill, we do not exactly know. But one thing stands out as certain. They did not believe in the Vedas, nor even in the Dharma Śāstras—the canonical works—of the Buddhists and the Jains. Hence their arguments did not appeal to any of those religious communities in which, in spite of mutual

differences, there was unanimity in an unquestioning and unquestionable obedience to authority (in the form of Veda or Buddha Vachana or Jinaśāsana).

Thus we find that the Brahmins, the Buddhists and the Jains were all equally ill-disposed towards the Lokāyatikas, whom they looked upon with contempt as their common enemies: (a) In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (II. 100. 38–39) Rāmacandra is said to have spoken to Bharata—

> *kaccinna lokāyatikān brāhmaṇāṃ stāta sevase /*
> *anarthakuśalā hyete bālāḥ paṇḍitamāninaḥ //*
> *dharmaśāstreṣu mukhyeṣu vidyamāneṣu durbudhāḥ /*
> *buddhim ānvīkṣikīṃ prāpya nirarthaṃ pravadanti te //*

Here the commentator Rāma explains the word Lokāyatikas as *cārvākamatānusāriṇaḥ* or as *śuṣkatarkavāvadūkāḥ*. There is little doubt that Manu, II. 11 refers to these Lokāyatika Brahmins given to casuistry by the expression *nāstika*. (b) Pali works abound in references to this sect. The Buddha did not allow his Bhikṣus to learn or teach the Lokāyata system (Vinaya Piṭaka, Culla Vagga, V. 33. 2). The notorious Chabbaggiya monks, whose names occur so often as mischief-makers in the Vinaya Piṭaka, were adept in this branch of learning. It is condemned among other low arts in the *Mahāśīla* 5. The Nepalese Buddhists refer to it as one of those things with which a Bodhisattva should not occupy himself, or in which good disciples should not take any pleasure (*Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, Ch. XIII). (c) The attitude of the Jains may best be evidenced by their describing it as a form of *micchādiṭṭhi*, or heresy (Weber, *Bhagavatī*, II. 248).

The extreme form of Svabhāvavāda may be thus illustrated. It has already been noted that in this view, the rejection of a causal principle forms the most important feature.[7] It is averred that neither sensuous perception nor inference is an evidence in support of its existence. For, mere perception of two events is not sufficient to establish between them a causal nexus, the reason being that even when a thing is observed by the senses, doubt may still arise as to its being a cause. To ascertain whether

a given antecedent condition has the character of a true cause, it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability (*niyama*) and of relevancy (*ananyathāsiddhi*) involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at. As for inference being, possibly, a means of the ascertainment of causality, the Lokāyatika contests its evidentiary value. The problem of Induction is, to him, insoluble. The conviction of Universal Concomitance, or of the absence of a condition limiting the Universality of the relation on which all inference is based, is inaccessible to human resources. The result is that to the Lokāyatika, there is no order revealed in the world, either of sense or of intellect. Everything stands isolated and self-contained.

In this state of intellectual confusion, the fact of contingency observable in phenomenal creation appears to be very hard to explain; but an explanation may be suggested. Contingency means that a product comes into existence at one particular moment rather than another. But how is this particular time to be determined? The usual reply of the causalists consists in referring this time-determination to the co-operation of the antecedent conditions. But the Svabhāvavādī staves off this difficulty by an appeal to *svabhāva*, remarking that no further question on this point is relevant. Let us try to understand the situation. It is well-known that even the doctrine of causality fails to explain the ultimate principle; it is then simpler, so it is affirmed, to assume at the very start that causes, known or unknown (*adṛṣṭa*), are all superfluous. Varieties and inequalities remain after all unexplained facts, and no amount of analysis will ever furnish us with the right solution. The only reasonable conclusion, therefore, in such cases, is to say that it is the nature of the thing to happen at such and such a time, and that is all. The only law here is the law of *svabhāva*. Just as a piece of cloth occupies the same space as its material cause—the threads (*tantu*), and not the shuttle, etc., although the threads and the shuttles are both equally causes; in the same way a product, though destitute of a cause, may appear at one time, and not at another.

As in the former case space association (*deśaniyama*) is due to *svabhāva* and not to a cause, so in the latter, time-relation (*kālaniyama*) is to be similarly explained. This being so, the contingency of the visible-phenomena need not be in opposition to the fact of their being self-sufficient (*nirapekṣa*) and uncaused (*ahetuka*).[8] The position of the Lokāyatika on this point is thus summed up by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī:

adṛṣṭāṅgīkāre'pi kvacid gatvā svabhāve paryavasānāt svābhāvikam eva jagadvaicitryam astu dṛṣṭe sambhabatyadṛṣṭakalpanānavakāśāt ataḥ kāma eva prāṇināṃ kāraṇaṃ nānyad adṛṣteśvarādityāhuriti lokāyatikadṛṣṭir iyam. (com. on *Gītā* xvi. 8).

From what we have seen of *svabhāvavāda*, we can well understand that it is a doctrine of unmitigated automatism, in the sense that all movements, within the organism and outside it, are held to proceed from the inherent necessity of the body rather than from an extrinsic principle of efficiency, such as Personal Will or Adṛṣṭa.[9] The power and freedom of Will being thus totally disavowed, the theory commits itself to the awkward position of a queer sort of Determinism.

The literature of the Svabhāvavādins is now entirely lost, except what has reached us in fragments. Here is a verse which appears to have originally belonged to a standard work of this literature, describing in outline the three main theses of this doctrine, viz. (1) varieties due to *svabhāva*, (2) movement (*pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*) due to *svabhāva*, and (3) denial of free will:

kaḥ kaṇṭakānāṃ prakaroti taikṣṇyaṃ vicitrabhāvaṃ mṛgapakṣiṇāṃ ca/ mādhuryam ikṣoḥ kaṭutāṃ ca nimbe svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṃ pravṛttam//

I quote this from Bhaṭṭa Utpala's Com. on *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* (under 1. 7), but it also occurs in the *Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya Vṛtti* (p. 13), in Dallana's Com. on *Suśruta* (Śārīra, Ch I), and among other *ślokas* of a similar nature, in Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* (IX. 47–52).[10] In the last there is a slight variation in the reading of the verse in the second half: thus,

svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṃ pravṛttam. (line 3)
na kāmakāro's ti kutaḥ prayatnah. (line 4)

This view is probably referred to as *nimimittavāda* in *Ny. Sūt.* 4. 1. 22–24. Udayana, in his *Kusumāñjali* (1. 5.), appears to make *svabhāvavāda* one of the five forms of *ākasmikatvavāda*, the remaining 4 forms being (1) *ahetuvāda*, (2) *abhūtivāda*, (3) *svataut-pādavāda* and (4) *anupākhyotpādavāda*. A brief note on these tenets is, I believe, necessary to make the discussion complete.

(1) The first view is apparently a formal denial of causality, but not of production. This much is common with *svabhāvavāda*, but it does not accept the elaborate explanation of *svabhāva* as offered by the latter. This *ahetuvāda* seems to me identical with the famous *adhiccasamuppannavāda* so often met with in Pali literature. (cf. Brahmajālasutta, 1. 30. 34 = *Dīgha nikāya* Vol. I, pp. 28–30, *Milī. Pañ.* 1. 443. *adhicca* = fortuitous, opposed to *abhiṇha* = habitual, *Mil. Pañ.* 1. 442, or *paticca* = having a cause). As for the meaning of the term *adhicca*, cf. Udāna VI. 5, where the word from its context seems to mean neither *svata utpanna* nor *parata utpanna*. Buddhaghoṣa (*Sumaṅgala* 1. 118) explains it as *ahetuta utpanna*. This is really the so-called *ahetuvāda*. Buddhaghoṣa explains its form as *ahutvā sattattāya pariṇata* (i. e. *abhūtvā bhavanam*). There is reference to the Ahetu-vāda in the Mahābodhi jātaka (Fausboll, *The Jātaka*, VI, pp. 228, 237), but the doctrine appears to have a slightly different shade of meaning there.

(2) The second view is a downright rejection of production (*bhavana*) itself. I cannot say anything about the historical setting of this *vāda*. Could it be an extreme form of Śāśvatavāda, which in later times entered into Vedānta and Sāṅkhya-Yoga?

(3) The third view is a strange doctrine in which the duality usually set up between an effect and its cause is denied. This view is referred to in (1) above, and in Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka Kārikā*.

(4) The last doctrine is evidently some form of Śūnyavāda in which a product is said to appear from a pre-existing Void

or Nothing. In this view of causality, the reality of both *upādāna* and *nimitta* is denied.

Ujjvaladatta divides Svabhāva as twofold, viz, (1) *nisarga* and (2) *svabhāva* proper. The former is explained as habit and the latter as nature. Habit has its origin in conscious and repeated effort in the past, but nature is spontaneous and has no extrinsic source of origin at all.

> He says: *vahirhetvanapekṣī tu svabhāvo'tha prakīrtitaḥ /*
> *nisargaśca svabhāvaśca ityeṣa bhavati dvidhā //*
> *nisargaḥ sudṛḍhābhyāsajanyaḥ saṃskāra ucyate /*
> *ajanyastu svataḥ siddhaḥ svarūpo bhāva ucyate //*
> (Quoted in *Nyāya-kośa*, 2nd ed , p. 971.)

Yadṛcchāvāda

Yadṛcchā is defined by Śaṅkarācārya (on *Śvetāśvatara Up.*) as *ākasmikaprāptiḥ* or coincidence (Cf. Guṇaratna, p. 15) The upholders of this doctrine were also deniers of the uniformities of nature (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), and asserted that the knowledge of the causal relation was unattainable by any of the accredited means of proof. It is observed that the same product arises from each of a variety of antecedents,[11] and this would not be possible if there were a definite and invariable relation between the cause and the effect The connection between an antecedent and the consequent following upon it is always casual, rather than causal.

It is very difficult to distinguish between Svabhāva and Yadṛcchā, as both are identical so far as the rejection of the causal principle is concerned. But the distinction, however, may be taken to lie in this, that whereas in *svabhāvavāda* a *niyama* is formally admitted which is technically known as *svabhāvaniyama*, in *yadṛcchāvāda* there is no scope for any such restriction.[12] With reference to the question—why a jar should be produced from clay and not from threads—the answer of the Svabhāvavādin is a plain statement of the nature of the thing which is unchangeable; but the answer of the Yadṛcchāvādin would be a flat denial of the reality of any such natural principle. The

observed order and regularity in our experience is due to mere chance, they would say. Amalānanda, in his *Vedānta Kalpataru* on 2.1.33, brings out this distinction very clearly in the following remarkable sentence: *niyatanimittam anapekṣya yadā kadācit pravṛttyudayo yadṛcchā, svabhāvastu sa eva yāvadvastubhāvi yathā śvāsādau.*

NOTES

1. Cf. The well-known verse, *ātmā jantur anīśo'yam*, etc., which forms the nucleus, as it were, of all subsequent literature on Īśvaravāda. The *locus classicus* of this *śloka* is *Mahābhārata*, Vanaparvan, 30, 28.
2. Dr Schrader, in his excellent tract 'Uber den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Ziet Mahāvīras und Buddhas' (Strassburg, 1902), has attempted to sum up the views of some of these theories.
3. I say almost, as some of the other Vādas also (e.g. Yadṛcchā, etc.) reject the principle of causality altogether.
4. cf. Bhaṭṭa Utpala (on *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* 1.7): *apare anye laukāyatikāḥ svabhāvaṃ jagataḥ kāraṇam āhuḥ svabhāvād eva jagad vicitram utpadyate svabhāvato vilayaṃ yāti*. See also Schrader, pp. 30–32; Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 134.
5. As to the reason why and the circumstances under which the name *lokāyata* went out of popular use and was superseded by the term *cārvāka*, nothing is definitely known. But it is interesting to note that the meaning of the two terms is virtually the same. Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha's Com. on M.Bh., I. 91.48 Kumbh. Kon. Ed., p. 164 (Mādhava's *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha*, Poona Ed., P. I).
6. The word Lokāyata is explained as Casuistry (*vitaṇḍavādasatya, vitaṇḍāsatya*) by Buddhaghoṣa and in the *Abhidhāna Padīpikā*. Cf. *Nyāyamañjari*. Viz, Ed., P. 270:

   na hi lokāyate kiñcit kartavyam upadiśyate / vaitaṇḍikakathaivāsau na punaḥ kaścid āgamaḥ //

   In the Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka (Fausboll, *The Jātaka*, VI, p. 286), Vidhura declaims against it (*na seve lokāyatikam*), where the commentator expounds the word as *vitaṇḍasallāpaṃ lokāyatikvadam*. But cf. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, III. 58.1, III. 59.1, *Kūṭadanta sutta* 14, *Assalāyana Sutta* (beginning), *Milinda pañho* (p. 10, Trenckner's Ed.), where the word Lokāyata stands for a branch of learning distinctive of well-educated Brahmins. It is clear, therefore, from a glance at the testimonies of these

literary usages, that the word originally meant Vitaṇḍā or Casuistry and nothing else, and that its adherents brooked no authority other than their own. That Vitaṇḍā too has a recognized place in a well-organized system of debate seems evident from *Nyāya Sutra* 4 2 50. What makes it repugnant to the orthodox community, therefore, is its impatience of all authority. In Nyāya the function of Vitaṇḍā is destructive, negative (*parapakṣapratiṣedha*) and is necessarily subordinate, whereas in Lokāyata it is essential; and we know that without a constructive element, without a positive theory to propound (*svapakṣasthāpanā*), a Śāstra ceases to have any great interest or value. It is this negative element generally characteristic of the Lokāyata school that has earned for it the opprobrius nickname of Nāstika.

(For some interesting notes regarding this sect as bearing on the M. Bh., see Hopkins, *The Great Epic*, pp. 86–90).

7. In the commentary on *Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka* (I 528), where the *svabhāvavāda* is alluded to, Rāmatīrtha attributes the view to the *nāstikas* and Madhusūdana explains it, saying that it consists in holding that the product comes into existence without any cause: *kāraṇaṃ vinaiva kāryaṃ bhavatīti svabhāvavādinaḥ*. Agnicit Puruṣottama adds: *svabhāva eva hetur iti cārvākāḥ*.

8. See *Nyāya Kusumāñjali*, I 5. Guṇaratna, in the Introduction to his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 13, also gives a report on the views of these Svabhāvavādins on causation.

9. (a) While denying the effectuating power of a *nimittakāraṇa* and conceiving matter as moved into action of its own nature *pariṇāmasvabhāva*, the Sāṅkhya too approaches the position of a Svabhāvavādin. (cf. the identification proposed by Nīlakaṇṭha in his Com. on M. Bh., Śāntiparva 231. 53, p. 1635. But this is historically untenable). But it has this difference from the above, that the necessity of a *nimitta* is here not entirely dispensed with:
   (1) The Puruṣa, though exercising no volition, is still a *nimitta* by mere virtue of its Presence. This Presence is indispensable to set into motion all varieties of existence which lie eternally embosomed in the Primordial Unmanifest Matter.
   (2) And the efficiency of *adṛṣṭa* is also accepted, insofar as it determines the precise nature of the product, by removing the obstructions which stand between the cause and its manifestation as (i. e. transformation into) the product.
   (3) In addition to this, the efficiency of *puruṣārtha* viz. *bhoga* and *apavarga* is admitted, though as a Final Cause—*uddeśyatvena*. The aim and purpose of all natural evolution is either one or the other, according as the Self is on the path of Enjoyment or of Renunciation. All movement is governed by purpose.

(b) Of the four Buddhist systems in Nepal, of which Hodgson gave a brief sketch in his famous essay on the subject (*Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XVI, pp. 435–40), I feel disposed to identify the Svābhāvikas, the Yātnikas and the Kārmikas with sects which held *svabhāva*, *prayatna* (Will) and *karma* (Adṛṣṭa) respectively as the sole principle of efficiency. The Aiśvarikas, of course, are the well-known Īśvaravādins.

10. Cf. *Gommaṭasāra*, verse 883, where the reading is—*ko karai kaṃṭayāṇaṃ tikkhattaṃ migavihaṃgamādiṇaṃ / vivihattaṃ tu sahao idi savvaṃ pi ya sahāotti // The verse—Agnir uṣṇo jalaṃ śītaṃ samasparśas tathānilaḥ / kenedaṃ citritaṃ tasmāt svabhāvāt tadvyavasthitiḥ //*—quoted in *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha* (Poona ed., p. 4) and in Varadarāja and Vardhamāna on *Kusumāñjali*—may also be compared.

11. Cf. Guṇaratna, p. 15.

12. Nīlakaṇṭha attributes, evidently, this chance-theory to the Ārhatas: *yadṛcchetyaniyatavādināṃ ārhatānāṃ* (on M. Bh., Śānti, Ch. 231. 53).

Ananta Kumar Bhattacharyya

Our author surely ranks among the foremost of the recent great traditional Indian scholars of Bengal. The special interest of this article is that it shows how a Cārvāka in modern times could defend his position in terms of traditional Indian philosophy. The article, originally written in Bengali, appeared in the Bengali journal *Darśana*, 6th year, Nos. iii–iv, 1365 (Bengali year). We are indebted to Sri Udayana Bhattacharyya for permission to translate and print this article.

Cārvāka Darśana

ANANTA KUMAR BHATTACHARYYA

(TRANSLATED FROM BENGALI)

Let that lord of the Ganas, who has a body of pure consciousness, on the very utterance of whose name all obstacles are immediately removed, be ever victorious.

With the greatest devotion I praise the young Tripurasundarī, without whose embrace the Lord would not have been able to attain His sovereignty.

Oh! One with the greatest powers! I pray to you to endow me with extraordinary power by dint of which this work intended by me may be made free of faults.

This new effort on my part is not for fame; nor is it for any material gain; it is meant only for the purification of learning, or for the comprehension of the unintelligent.

The systems of Indian philosophy are mainly divided into two groups, namely, the Nāstika systems and the Āstika systems. Those systems of philosophy which do not accept the validity of Veda are called the Nāstikas, and those which accept the validity of Veda are called the Āstikas. Four systems of philosophy—the Lokāyata or Cārvāka, the Vaitaṇḍika, the Bauddha, and the Ārhata or Jaina—are known as the Nāstika

systems; and six systems of philosophy—the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga or Pātañjala, the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsa or Vedānta—are known as the Āstika systems.

In India, the Cārvāka sect is very ancient. They had preached their doctrine in this country long ago. It is well-known that, among the Nāstikas, those who are known as Cārvāka or Laukāyatika are generally the followers of the Bārhaspatya doctrine and discuss the nature of things (*tattva*) in accordance with it. In the Cārvāka system, only four basic categories (*maulika-padārtha*) have been admitted, namely, earth, water, fire and air. That is, of the seven categories admitted in the Vaiśeṣika view—substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, inherence and non-existence—only the category of substance is partially admitted in the Cārvāka view. According to this view, quality and action are not separate categories distinct from the substance itself which is their substratum, and universality, particularity, inherence and non-existence are completely imaginary or unreal.

Again, of the nine substances admitted by the Vaiśeṣika, five substances, namely, *ākāśa*, time, space, self and mind are not admitted as realities in the Cārvāka view. In this view, hard things have been called earth, liquid ones water, hot ones fire, and (constantly) moving ones air.

Self in the Cārvāka View

Due to a specific form of mixture of semen and female blood, the four forms of matter—earth, water, fire and air—combine in a peculiar way. This very group of the four kinds of matter, combined in this peculiar way, is called by the term 'body'. Life-breath (*prāṇa*) and consciousness are present only in such a body. There is no life-breath or consciousness in the minute particles (*kaṇa*) of matter which are the basic constituents of the body, when they are in a disjoined state. At that time, they remain in a lifeless and insentient state. However, due to that very peculiar mutual combination or mixture, there first appears

life-breath and then consciousness.

In this view, such a body only which is a combined form or a totality of material elements has been called the self. Anything distinct from the body and ever-permanent, i.e. eternal, has not been called the self in this view. It is well-known that in the scriptures as well as in common usage, by self is meant that which is revealed in an awareness involving the 'I' as the doer (*kartṛ*), experiencer (*bhoktṛ*) or seer (*draṣṭṛ*). In an awareness involving the 'I', generally the body itself is revealed as the doer, experiencer and seer. Therefore the body itself, which constitutes the object of an awareness involving the 'I', should be considered the self. In the awareness involving the 'I', namely, 'sitting in the room, I am reading and writing', the 'I' is revealed as the doer of the act of reading and writing. This awareness also reveals the fact that the 'I' is something located inside the house. But the thing located inside the house is only a body. Therefore the body only is the self; in the said awareness involving the 'I' it is being revealed as the doer. Another instance of an awareness involving the 'I' is: 'I can see the moon while sitting in my room.' Here, the 'I' has been revealed as the seer of the moon. By this awareness it is further revealed that the one who is the seer of the moon is located inside the house. But here, in fact, only a particular body is located inside the house. Therefore the body alone is the self; in the said awareness involving the 'I', it only and nothing else has been revealed as the seer. A further instance of an awareness involving the 'I' is: 'Falling into this pit, I have suffered much pain.' Here, the 'I' has been revealed as the experiencer of pain. By the same it has also been revealed that the one who is the experiencer of pain has fallen into the pit. Here, what has fallen into the pit is only a particular body and nothing else. Therefore, only the body is the self; in the said awareness involving the 'I', it has been revealed as the experiencer. Thus, analysing the (different cases of) awareness involving the 'I', the Cārvākas consider only the body as the self.

Argument for the View that Knowledge is Located in the Body

Almost all philosophers admit a general rule to the effect that (of two things), when one's presence agrees with the other's presence, i.e. when the one is present the other too is present and when the one is absent the other too is absent, then the one becomes the substratum of the other. The colour of the flower, etc., is present only when the flower is present, and not otherwise; and none of us can ever deny the fact that the colour is located in that very flower. Such 'presence in presence' and 'absence in absence', i.e. the presence of one in the presence of the other and the absence of one in the absence of the other respectively, are what the authorities call 'conforming to agreements in presence and absence' (*anvaya-vyatireka-anuvidhāna*). Between the two, namely, body and knowledge as well, we find conformity to agreements in presence and absence. None of us can deny that when the body, i.e. the sense-organ, is present, knowledge too is present, and when the sense-organ is absent, knowledge too is absent. The visual sense remaining intact, yet an inability to see, and blindness, yet an ability to see—not a single such case has been discovered up to this day. Thus, by this conformity to agreements in presence and absence between the sense-organ and knowledge, it becomes proved that all the instances of knowledge acquired by us are located only in the sense-organs

Well, it may be objected that the Bārhaspatyas or the Cārvākas cannot advocate, in the said manner, the view that knowledge is located in the sense-organ; because it has been done taking recourse to an argument (*yukti*), which is conforming to agreements in presence and absence, and the Cārvākas do not at all admit the validity of an argument. It is a well-known fact that they admit the validity only of perception and contend that inference, etc., are not sources of valid knowledge.

In that case, in reply, the following may be urged. Keeping

in mind only those who admit the validity of inference, the view that knowledge is located in the body has been sought to be established with the help of an argument, for those who admit the validity of an argument would not be able to deny a view established in such a manner. To their own followers, it would be established on the basis of nothing but perception. For example, we always express in words our own cognitions in such forms as, 'while walking I have seen it', 'falling into the pit I have suffered much pain', etc. In the first instance, one who is moving has been called the seer. But the act of moving is a characteristic of the body. Therefore if the thing which is moving would be the knower or the seer, then the knowledge, the visual cognition, would ultimately become the property of the body. In the second instance, the thing falling into a pit has been called the experiencer of pain. But falling into a pit is a characteristic of the body. Therefore if the thing falling into a pit would be the experiencer, then the experience of pain would ultimately become a property of the body. In this way, the view that knowledge is located in the body can be supported on the basis of perception as well.

The doctrine of 'consciousness of matter' (*bhūta-caitanya-vāda*) is only another name for this doctrine of 'consciousness of sense-organs' (*indriya-caitanya-vāda*), for in the Cārvāka view the sense-organs, the visual, etc., are admitted to be made of forms of matter, the earth, etc.

However, an objection may be raised against this doctrine of consciousness of matter in the following manner. We can recollect, even in old age, things experienced in boyhood. This well-established fact cannot be explained if the doctrine of consciousness of matter is accepted. Therefore the said doctrine is not acceptable. There is no difference of opinion among philosophers regarding the fact that there can be no recollection of an unknown thing. To establish the fact that there can be no recollection of an unknown thing it is also to be necessarily admitted that an impression of the same form, i.e. an impression of a thing having a form exactly similar to the

form in which a thing is recollected, would be the cause of recollection, and we get these impressions from previous experiences of the same form; i.e. from experiences of the same form, these impressions are produced as belonging to the person who experiences. Only if such a position is maintained can it be explained why the possibility of recollecting an unknown thing does not arise. A thing would be unknown if there is no previous experience in respect of it; therefore, since there can be no impression in respect of an unknown thing, neither can there be a recollection of an unknown thing due to the absence of the cause (viz. impression). Following such a line of argument, if an impression of the same form is proved to be the cause of recollection, then the Bhūtacaitanyavādins would not be able to explain the fact of recollection of a thing in old age previously perceived in boyhood. This is because the impression which was produced from the experience in boyhood must have been located only in the sense-organs (of boyhood), which were the experiencers in the state of boyhood. But due to the dissolution (*viśleṣaṇa*) of the atoms of matter, the sense-organs of boyhood no longer exist in old age. Therefore, the impressions which were located in the sense-organs of boyhood must also have been destroyed. When the thing itself to which the properties belong does not exist, the properties too cannot remain in existence, having nothing to hold on to. Therefore, the causes, the impressions, not being present up to old age, the Bhūtacaitanyavādins cannot give any explanation for the recollection, in old age, of a thing experienced in boyhood.

Even then, following the Cārvāka view, it may be said in answer that no such objection really arises in their view. For in the Cārvāka view, an impression of the same form as produced from a previous experience has not been admitted to be the cause of recollection. The existence of a thing which is not established by perception is not admitted in the Cārvāka view. Therefore, according to the Cārvāka view, an impression which (according to others) can only be inferred by its effects, namely, recollec-

tion, etc., is not the cause of recollection. In fact, because of its own peculiar nature, recollection is produced depending upon, i.e. having for its object, a thing previously experienced. Because of such a nature, no unknown thing is presented as the object in a recollection. Only because of the peculiarity of nature are different things with different forms produced in different times, in different places. For this there is no need to admit any cause. The cause-effect relation is not admitted at all in the Cārvāka view, for in that view perception alone has been admited as the source of valid knowledge. No cause-effect relation in general can be established by perception.

Knowledge in the Cārvāka View

According to this view knowledge is generally divided into two classes, namely, apprehension (*anubhava*) and recollection (*smaraṇa*). Apprehension is also divided into two classes, namely, perception and assumption (*kalpanā*). Perception is knowledge acquired by the five sense-organs—visual, gustatory, olfactory, cutaneous and auditory—respectively of colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. The Cārvāka view on mental perception will be discussed later on. The said sense-organs produce certain knowledge in respect of their own objects. According to this view, the certain knowledge of objects, namely, colour, etc., which is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge, is to be called valid knowledge (*pramāna*). Therefore in the Cārvāka view, the sense-organs, the eye, etc., being the causes for such valid knowledge, are to be called the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Thus according to the Cārvāka view, all other forms of knowledge which are neither valid knowledge nor recollection would be assumption, e.g. inferential knowledge or verbal knowledge. (Knowledge derived through) postulation and non-apprehension are included, according to this view, in inferential knowledge. Therefore they also would be of the nature of assumption.

The Cārvākas think that in the case of inference, etc., the forms of knowledge are not certain as far as the object-part

(*viṣayāṃśa*) is concerned. The implication is as follows. Finding smoke in the mountain, etc., people think that there is fire there. This awareness concerning the presence of fire, which is unperceived, has been called inferential knowledge by the authorities. This can never be certain knowledge. So long as people do not actually see it, they cannot have a firm belief in the presence of the fire. Relying upon the words of people in general, the person who infers takes for granted the smoke's invariable relation with fire, i.e. smoke is not present in a spot where there is no fire. In all the spots where the person concerned has himself observed smoke, he has also, without fail, observed fire. Due to his having had such an experience in some particular cases, he is forced to put reliance upon the popular belief that smoke, in general, is invariably related to fire. In this way, he forms the assumption that smoke, whenever perceived, must be accompanied by fire; later on, he perceives smoke in the mountain, etc., and comes to the conclusion that fire is also present in the same mountain, etc. The knowledge of an unperceived thing resulting from the ascertainment of invariable relation in this manner, is called inference. The Cārvākas think that since there is no firm conviction as regards the knowledge of invariable relation from which proceeds inferential knowledge, people cannot have a firm belief in (the validity of) inference. Therefore since it is only based upon popular belief, they have included inference under assumption.

Verbal knowledge too is a form of assumption, because even though it may be known in that way, one does not have total reliance upon such a form of knowledge as long as it is not known perceptually. After listening to the statement 'one desirous of heaven should perform the Aśvamedha sacrifice', etc., the listener thinks that the Aśvamedha sacrifice is a means to attain heaven. In spite of this, since it is not perceptually known that any man has ever attained heaven by performing the Aśvamedha sacrifice (there is neither any way to ascertain it, for heaven is not attained while one is living), one cannot put sufficient faith upon such knowledge. These statements,

so far as they convey their meanings, are to be taken as traditional hearsay (*aitihya*) and not as sources of valid knowledge. The validity of a statement depends upon the perception of the objects referred to by it; only if the objects referred to by a statement can be grasped by perception, can the statement be taken as valid in respect of the objects referred to by it. Therefore there is no statement which may be said to be valid itself (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*). The validity of the Veda which speaks of extra-ordinary things is not at all possible, for the things spoken of by it, heaven, etc., are totally unfit to be perceived. That knowledge derived through postulation, is of the nature of assumption, is easily understood. For on being aware that a certain accepted meaning is unjustifiable in any other way, when one makes a presumption about another unconveyed meaning (to justify the meaning), then the (latter) presumptive knowledge is called postulation. In such cases, even the knower himself is aware that his knowledge is a kind of assumption, for he (subsequently) apprehends his own knowledge in the form, 'I *presume* such a meaning'.

We have been hearing all along that due to the performance of sacrifices like the Aśvamedha, etc , a kind of *adṛṣṭa* or merit is produced in the person who performs the sacrifice. According to the Mīmāṃsaka view, this *adṛṣṭa* or merit is proved by postulation. They have explained the matter in the following manner.

It has been stated by scriptural statements such as 'one desirous of attaining heaven should perform the Aśvamedha sacrifice', etc , that the Aśvamedha sacrifice is the cause of heaven. But this cannot be logically justified unless some *adṛṣṭa* lasting uptil the time of attaining heaven is postulated; for the act of sacrifice performed at the present time, being short-lived, cannot continue to be present up to the moment immediately preceding the attainment of heaven. This is because the person who has performed the sacrifice would attain heaven only after his death. Therefore it must be admitted that from the acts of sacrifice, etc., a kind of *adṛṣṭa*, namely, merit, is produced in the person concerned, which would ultimately make him attain

heaven. The sacrifice which is of the nature of an act (*kriyā*) may be short-lived; even then, the merit produced by it lasting as long as the attainment of heaven, there would be no difficulty for the sacrificer in the matter of attaining heaven. This ascertainment of virtue, vice, etc , arrived at according to this procedure is valid knowledge derived through postulation. Finally, the implication is that since the basis of postulation is only traditional hearsay in the form of Vedic statements, the Cārvākas cannot characterize it as anything other than assumption.

Non-existence (*abhāva*) is known by (the *pramāṇa* called) non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). In the Cārvāka view, non-existences are absolutely unreal. Therefore, in this view, the knowledge of non-existence would be nothing but assumption. Thus in this view, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-apprehension have not been accepted as sources of valid knowledge. People put reliance or faith only upon perception. Therefore, perception alone is a source of valid knowledge. Perceptual knowledge, as is uncontradicted, is valid. Thus, the definition of valid knowledge would be: a perception which has for its object (*viṣaya*) an uncontradicted thing. The validity of recollection would be negated by the word 'perception' (in the definition). The knowledge of movement in the passing tree, etc., on the part of a person seated in a fast-moving vehicle is also (a kind of) perception. Apprehending that the definition of valid knowledge may unduly apply to it, and to negate such a possibility, the qualifying expression 'uncontradicted' has been added to the definition. The object of that cognition, namely, movement, is (ultimately) contradicted, and hence, the definition would no longer be too wide.

In this view, all perceptual knowledge is indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). It reveals only the mere nature of a thing. The actual nature of a thing has no real connection with a name or a universal. Although the names are of the nature of sound and their nature is determined by auditory perception, and they are not unreal or non-entities, still, the names which are of the nature

of sound have no real connection with the things as the names of which they are used. As the *udāna* air strikes at specific parts of the body, such as the throat, palate, etc., words (sounds) are produced and air is their substratum, i.e. the place of residence. Such sounds (words) cannot have any relation with things like a jar, cloth, etc., which are situated in different places. Therefore, when people understand a thing by associating it with a name in the form 'it is a jar', or 'it is a cloth', then what can that awareness be except a kind of assumption? The universals, jar-ness, cloth-ness, etc., are imaginary by nature. Finding merely some common points in a number of material bodies which, as individuals, are totally different from one another, people assume them to be of the same kind, and this renders them some help in carrying on their ordinary activities. This is how the universal has been postulated; hence by their very nature, they are products of imagination. Therefore when people understand a thing by associating it with a universal, such an awareness can be nothing other than assumption. Therefore determinate knowledge, by which the individual is revealed as related to name, universal, etc., is only a form of assumption, and not perception.

Illusion in the Cārvāka View

In explaining the nature of illusory knowledge, the Cārvākas subscribe to the theory of *asat-khyāti* (lit., awareness of the non-existent). They say that in the case of illusory knowledge, for example, of silver in a shell, an imaginary, i.e. unreal, silver is revealed as identical with 'this' which is real, i.e. the shell, referred to as 'this'. Because of some defect (*doṣa*) in the form of darkness or distance, one fails to comprehend the shell as the shell, and finds in it similarities with silver; namely, brightness, whiteness, etc. Later on, with the help of the two, namely, the ignorance, i.e. absence of the knowledge of shell-ness (in the shell) and the knowledge of similarity (with silver), he imagines the shell, referred to as 'this', to be silver. Therefore can that silver—produced by imagination—be anything other than a non-entity, or unreal?

However it is not that, according to this view, in all cases of illusion what is revealed is a non-entity. Rather in certain cases, an illusory knowlege may have, for its object, something real as well. For example, a man travelling in a fast-moving vehicle finds the post, tree, etc., standing on the sides, moving at the same speed as the vehicle. This perception of a moving post or a moving tree is illusory knowledge, for the post or the tree are actually not moving. The movement or running revealed in these instances of illusion is not something produced by imagination, as in the case of shell-silver illusion. The movement of the vehicle which is perceptible to the man travelling in it is revealed as related, due to some defect, to the post, tree, etc. In these instances of illusion, the relation is only imaginary. Actually, that movement is related to the vehicle; it is not related at all to the post or the tree. Yet a man assumes that the movement is related to, or connected with, the tree, etc. Other cases of illusions, the illusions of a 'yellow conch-shell', etc., are also to be explained in the same manner. One should make such further explanations by oneself.

Mind as a Sense-organ and Mental Perception

In this view, mental perception is to be explained in the following manner. In the views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and others, a separate sense-organ called the mind has been admitted. With its help people experience pleasure, pain, etc. But in the Cārvāka view, no separate internal sense-organ in the form of the mind has been admitted in such a manner. Therefore, in this view, there really is nothing called mental perception. The sense-organ called 'skin' (*tvac*) is uniformly present everywhere, outside and inside the body. According to this view, that part of the sense-organ called 'skin' which is situated inside the body would be the mind, or the internal sense-organ. The Cārvākas think that with the help of the mind, which is of such a nature, people have experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. In many cases, pleasure or pain is produced due to the experience of (a particular kind of) touch, and its substratum is the inside part of the sense-

organ called 'skin'. In this view, pleasure or pain would, by their very nature, be a kind of knowledge. In other words, pleasure would only be a kind of tactual experience. Pain, too, would be a kind of tactual experience. In this view, desire and aversion would also be of the nature of knowledge (and not distinct qualities). From an ascertainment in the form 'it is a means for my desired end' (*iṣṭa-sādhana*) is produced desire, and from an ascertainment in the form 'it is a thing which would lead me to harm' (*dviṣṭa-sādhana*) is produced aversion. The substratum of these, also, is nothing but the sense-organ. In a particular case, desire or aversion would be produced in that particular sense-organ, only with the help of which has been produced a knowledge in the form 'it is a means for my desired end', or a knowledge in the form 'it is a thing which would lead me to harm'. All this is by way of illustration. (In other cases) one should oneself make the explanation in a similar manner.

In this view, knowledge of the nature of recollection is also produced with the help of the sense-organ. Unlike the views of the Nyāya, etc., an impression produced by a previous experience is not admitted to be the cause of recollection in this view. We have already pointed this out. Because of its peculiar nature, such knowledge (i.e. recollection) never has for its object an unknown thing. Due to different kinds of physical stimulation (*uttejana*) i.e. stimulation as occurring in the sense-organ, people recollect things previously experienced. Those modifications (*vikāra*) of the sense-organ cannot be taken as contributing factors for the production of recollection by framing a general rule, for it is not really the case that from the same kind of modification of the sense-organ is invariably produced the same form of recollection. One particular modification of the sense-organ may produce the recollection of a jar; but then, it is not that in the event of such a modification in all cases would one recollect a jar, since as a result of such a modification, one can sometimes even recollect a cloth. Therefore uniformly, i.e. by framing as general rule, no cause-effect relation can be established between the modification of the sense-organ and

recollection. Those modifications are also not produced following any fixed rule. In fact, in the Cārvāka view, such discussions about the cause-effect relation have very little value, for the Cārvākas do not admit any cause-effect relation based on a fixed rule.

Sense-organs Act after Reaching the Object

In the Cārvāka view the three sense-organs, the gustatory, the olfactory and the cutaneous, are *prāpyakārin*; i.e. they reveal their objects only after coming in contact with them. For instance, the gustatory sense reveals taste. But the sweet taste of molasses, etc., kept in a different place and not connected with the sense-organ, cannot perceptually be known as long as they are not connected with the tongue, i.e. the gustatory sense. Therefore it is to be admitted that it is *prāpyakarin*, i.e. the gustatory sense perceptually reveals only such a thing as is connected to itself. Like the gustatory, the olfactory sense is also *prāpyakārin*. Although it is true that generally, people think that even the fragrance of a flower at a distance is received by the olfactory sense, yet the olfactory sense is not *aprāpyakārin*. In the said instance, people perceive the smell of only those fragrant pollens of the flower which, being carried away by the wind, get connected with the olfactory sense. As these pollens are not visible to the eye, ordinary people think that they are perceiving the fragrance of the flower at a distance. Like the olfactory and the gustatory, the cutaneous sense is also *prāpyakārin*. It, too, cannot perceptually reveal a thing or its touch, etc., if (the thing is) unconnected with itself.

In this view, the eyeball itself is the visual sense-organ. In the Nyāya view, the visual sense-organ has been admitted as a special kind of substance of the nature of fire, imperceptible and located in the eyeball. In the Cārvāka view on the contrary, no such separate substance located in the eyeball, has been accepted as the visual sense-organ. Therefore according to this view, the visual organ of each living being who possesses two eyeballs would be two in number. On the same ground, in this

view, the tongue itself would be the gustatory sense, the nose itself the olfactory sense, the skin itself the cutaneous sense, and the ear-drum itself (not the hole) the auditory sense.

In the Cārvāka view, material substances such as jar, cloth, etc., are of the nature of collections (*saṃghāta*). According to the views of the Nyāya and others, a jar is not actually a mere collection of earth atoms: it is made by the atoms gradually following the sequence of the dyad, etc., and is a separate thing in the form of the 'whole' (*avayavin*). But as contrasted with such a view, according to the Cārvākas, it is not a separate 'whole'; a jar is nothing but a group of atoms which are united with one another in a specific manner. It is not of the nature of a 'whole' distinct from (the collectivity of) its component parts, the atoms. The nature of other material things is also to be understood in the same manner.

In this view, atoms would be the minutest particles of earth, etc., which are perceptible. In the Nyāya view, an atom is said to be a part without any further component part and it is imperceptible. But unlike it, no such atom has been admitted in the Cārvāka view. Although it is the minutest part, it is not itself proved to be partless or without any further component part. An atom is proved by perception and has a distinct shape. That is, what is called a triad in the Nyāya view would be the atom in the Cārvāka view.

Are the atoms, as admitted by the Cārvākas, eternal, just like the ones accepted in the Vaiśeṣika and other views? In the present context, such a question may naturally arise in the mind of the reader. Therefore following the Cārvāka view, let us try to answer it. If, in the Cārvāka view, the atoms be nothing but the minutest perceptible parts, then the atoms, as admitted by them, would have to be considered partless. If they be composed of further parts, they can no longer be called the minutest parts or atoms. Again, if the perceptible minutest part (= atom) even be conceived as composed of further parts, these further parts would have to be imperceptible, because the 'whole' (= atom) for those further parts has already been admitted to be

the minutest of the perceptible things. Therefore the Cārvākas, upholding as they do the view that perception is the only *pramāṇa*, cannot speak of further parts of an atom as conceived by them. In short, in the Cārvāka view also, atoms are to be conceived as partless, or without any component part.

In spite of their being of such a nature, the atoms in the Cārvāka view are not without production and destruction; i.e. they are not eternal and partless. Since the eternality and partlessness of a thing cannot be proved by perception, according to the view that perception is the only *pramāṇa*, nothing can be admitted to be eternal and partless. Although it is ordinarily observed that a substance is destroyed due to disjunction of parts and is produced due to conjunction of parts, still, it cannot be said that these are the only modes or means of production and destruction. In some cases, a thing may be produced from absolute destruction (*niranvaya-vināśa*) or non-existence. In the Cārvāka view, production and destruction of the atom are to be explained according to this process.

According to this view, qualities, e.g. colour, taste, etc., and actions, e.g. rising, falling, etc., are to be understood as only some particular states of the four forms of matter already referred to. That is, in the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika view, quality and action are admitted to be quite separate entities distinct from the substances of earth, etc., which are their substratum; but unlike such a view, according to the Cārvākas, these have not been admitted as entities distinct from the substances in which they are located. In this view, the universals, e.g. jar-ness, cloth-ness, etc., have only an imaginary existence. In the Cārvāka view, it cannot be admitted that there may exist a single universal, called jar-ness or cloth-ness, residing in each of the innumerable individuals of jar or cloth in all the three divisions of time—past, future and present; for such an entity or a common property is not proved by perception.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, inherence, particularity and non-existence have been accepted as distinct realities; but they have not been likewise admitted as distinct realities in the

Cārvāka view. Although they are not really existent, people continue to carry on various activities on their basis; these are all effects of the imagination. All this is only by way of illustration. Explanations as regards other things are to be made up in the Cārvāka view following this procedure.

Denial of Rebirth

In the Cārvāka view, the self's connection with the 'other world' has not been admitted. Nor do the Cārvākas subscribe to the view that, in a state without birth even after death, it waits for God's judgement. Therefore in this view, only worldly pleasures should be sought after uniformly by all living beings. Man may have a keener intellect, but so far as the search for mere worldly pleasures is concerned, no difference or distinction of man from the other animals is admitted in the Cārvāka view.

Right and Wrong in the Cārvāka View

If, by murdering a man, somebody actually makes some worldly gain, then that murder or act of violence would not really be wrong on the part of the man committing the murder or the act of violence, because an action which contributes to a man's own benefit cannot really be turned into an offence or something unjust on his part even by hurling hundreds of insults at him ('the man is a murderer', 'the man is an offender'). When by performing an action, a man himself comes to no harm, but on the other hand derives some benefit, that action can never be unjust on the part of that man. Some people may decide that such a man is guilty since (his action) is harmful for others; but the Cārvākas would not look upon such people as true judges. Persons who, even denying virtue and vice, consider some action to be harmful for the nation and decide that the performer of that action is guilty, would be deserving of praise, according to the Cārvākas, in case they would do so only for their personal gain. On the other hand, if they think that they have done so for the benefit of others, i.e. the nation, then in the eyes of the Cārvākas, they would be quite contemptible. What if it be said that such actions (murder, causing injury, etc.) though they are beneficial for a single person, are not beneficial for the majority of people, and hence truly are offences? Even then, the Cārvāka would say that it is opposed to the Cārvāka viewpoint. Because so far as one's own self is concerned, the majority of people besides one's own self has no relevance. That which is beneficial for me may be harmful for all besides myself; but it does not matter in the least for me, so long as it does not do me any harm. There are many who, without paying due attention to their own doctrine or comprehending it rightly, taking up the catchy slogans offered by the doctrine of somebody else, sing in praise of the state system. They may do so; but they will never make true Cārvākas. Actually, a true Cārvāka should never make any rule or regulation for the general people. This is because when a person has to suffer some personal loss on account of a law, there is no reason why he—suffering loss—should abide by the same law. Indeed for the Cārvākas, the nation, too, is merely a fiction. To the Cārvākas, the question of its well-being or woe is nothing but a nightmare. It has already been stated that to a person suffering loss, numerical majority does not matter at all. The Cārvākas would have no objection if any person or a party, purely for his or the party's own benefit, takes recourse to various kinds of deceptions—'it would be beneficial to all', 'it will contribute to the welfare of the nation', and so on, and gathering support from the deceived, derive some benefit for themselves on the basis of such slogans as 'this is a law made by yourselves', etc. This is because everybody has the right to do everything to derive his own benefit. But if some intelligent person succeeds in seeing through the deceptions practised by that party and works against that party for his own benefit, he will also get the support of the Cārvākas. In the Cārvāka view, except such kinds of arbitrary rules, no other kind of (fixed) written rule is possible for the state or society. There are people who devote themselves to the welfare of the nation, subscribing

to the view that when an individual dies, everything connected with him too disappears for ever; we do not know if the Cārvākas would forgive such a band of cheats or not, but we only pray earnestly that God give them the power to comprehend (things rightly). That which produces pleasure for a person while he is living, is just for him, and that which produces suffering for a person (while he is living) is unjust for him. In the Cārvāka view, there can be nothing uniformly just or unjust.

Establishment of the Invalidity of Inference in the Cārvāka View

While trying to negate the validity of inferential cognition or that inference is a source of valid knowledge, the Cārvākas contend that whenever one acquires knowledge about an unseen object, it is always based on general belief (*aitihya*). Thus, none of the knowledge produced is certain so far as the object-part is concerned. But knowledge which is not certain with reference to the object-part cannot be valid. Since the effect in the form of inferential cognition is not a kind of valid knowledge, the instrument (*karaṇa*) by which it is produced cannot be a source of valid knowledge.

While describing the cause of inferential cognition, the Naiyāyikas say that when a man knows for certain one kind of thing as invariably concomitant with (i.e. pervaded by) another kind of thing, then, finding in a particular spot the kind of thing invariably concomitant, he ascertains, in the same spot, the presence of that kind of thing with which invariable concomitance has been already ascertained. The latter knowledge, which is certain in nature, is an inferential cognition, and the instrument thereof, namely, the prior ascertainment of invariable concomitance, is the *pramāṇa* called inference. For example, a man ascertains that a thing of the nature of smoke is invariably concomitant with a thing of the nature of fire; when, some other time, the same man sees a column of smoke in the hill, etc., i.e. finds that smoke is rising up from the hill in a continuous flow;

then, even without actually seeing the smoke, he can conclude, for certain, that fire is present in that hill. This ascertainment of the presence of unseen fire in the hill is the inferential cognition of fire in the hill, and the instrument thereof, namely, the ascertainment of smoke's concomitance with fire, is the *pramāṇa* called inference. Therefore knowledge which is of the nature of inferential cognition, since it is certain knowledge, would surely be valid knowledge, and its instrument, too, a *pramāṇa*.

Even then, the Cārvāka would say in reply that the above explanation is not correct, for the so-called certain knowledge of invariable concomitance is only an assumption due to ignorance. It can never be known for certain that one kind of thing is invariably concomitant with another kind of thing. The ultimate instrument for acquiring certain knowledge is the sense-organ; it can reveal the relation of one thing with another only individually; the relation of one as a class with another as a class cannot be revealed by it. The individuals separated by time and space are also counted as belonging to the class, but those separated individuals cannot be known perceptually. Therefore through the sense-organ, there is no possibility of acquiring the knowledge that smoke as a class is invariably concomitant with fire as a class, i.e. (every instance of smoke) is related to some instance of fire. When people (allegedly) acquire knowledge of invariable concomitance as relating to class, it would be nothing but a notion based on general belief. Accepting, somewhat, (as true) such popular notions as 'smoke has invariable concomitance with fire', etc., people think that perhaps smoke is invariably concomitant with fire. But it is not a form of certain knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of the presence of unseen fire also, acquired by people on the basis of such knowledge, cannot be certain in nature. Thus, since inferential cognition is not a form of valid knowledge, its instrument, the notion of pervasion or invariable concomitance, also would not be a *pramāṇa*.

The Cārvākas have also refuted the validity of verbal testimony. By such refutation, they do not mean to say that even

an experienced person does not comprehend any meaning after listening to such statements as 'to live, it is necessary for a man to exert himself', 'the crystal-clear water of the Mandakini is a great asset to India', etc. What they mean to say, rather, is that knowledge derived through such statements is not valid, because no such knowledge can be certain as regards the object-part, so long as it is not corroborated by perception. Therefore, since such knowledge is dependent (for validity) on something else, namely, perception, the Cārvākas do not admit to the independent validity of any such knowledge. Since the forms of knowledge which are the effects are not valid, the instruments thereof, the groups of words or the sentences, would also not be *pramāṇa*. This is the basic implication of the Cārvākas when they try to refute the validity of verbal testimony. It spread among the Cārvākas in various ways, and due to impatience they also hurled abuses in many forms at the Āstikas. Ultimately, all their animosity centred as if against the Veda. Impatient with the urge for villifying the Veda which is the repository of all wisdom, they have said that by no means can the Veda be considered valid (i.e. as if validity cannot approach within a radius of ten to twenty miles in all the four corners of the spot where the Veda is present), because there are false statements in it. That which is vitiated by falsehood can never be a source of valid knowledge. The Veda says that if the rite called Putreṣṭi is performed, the performer obtains a son. There are indeed many who, allured by such statements, have performed the rite called Putreṣṭi. But they have been rewarded with nothing but pecuniary loss and physical strain. No doubt in some particular case, the birth of a son to the performer after the performance of the rite may have been observed; but it is actually not the effect of the performance of the rite; it has happened only due to some ordinary causes. Similarly, other Vedic statements such as 'by performing the Agnihotra sacrifice the sacrificer attains heaven', etc., are totally false. It implies that the sacrificer will attain heaven after his death. But after a man's death, what indeed remains so that he may (be said to) attain heaven?

Not instances of falsehood alone but instances of contradiction as well are also quite numerous in the Veda. Can a contradicted statement be accepted as valid? While prescribing the time for the Agnihotra oblation, the Veda says that one should offer an oblation either after sunrise or before sunrise, or when neither the sun nor the star is seen in the sky. But in spite of specifying the time in this way, later, the offering of oblations at these times has been censured. Thus, the earlier prescription about time is contradicted by the subsequent censure. While censuring, it has been said that if one offers an oblation after sunrise, the things offered by one are eaten up by the dog called Śyāva or Śyāma; if one offers an oblation before sunrise, the things offered by one are eaten up by the dog called Śavala; and if one offers an oblation when neither the sun nor the star is seen one's offering of oblation is spoiled jointly by the two dogs called Śyāva and Śavala. Therefore the Veda which contains statements contradicted in this manner can never be accepted as valid.

Besides, the fault of repetition is also to be found in the Veda: it cannot be valid as it is vitiated by the fault of repetition. In the Veda, a group of eleven special *mantra-s* is given the name Sāmidhenī. Because they are applied in the act of kindling the fire, they have been given the particular name Sāmidhenī. To turn those eleven into fifteen, it has been prescribed that the first and the last ones are each to be uttered three times. This utterance of the same again and again leads to the fault of repetition. The Veda thus becomes vitiated by the fault of repetition; therefore, it can have no validity.

Eric Frauwallner

This article is taken from the author's *History of Indian Philosophy* (translated from the German into English by V. M. Bedekar), vol. ii, pp. 215–26; first published in India by Ms. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973. The main drive of the argument here is that materialism in India originally developed as an ideological justification of the rising despotic powers, though in the subsequent portion of this discussion, he takes into account the ancient non-conformists, inclusive of some generally accepted to be Materialist.

Materialism

ERIC FRAUWALLNER

It is advantageous to join the nature-philosophical schools with the description of Materialism, as the latter stands nearer to them than all other schools. By the way, the Indians themselves, as a rule, speak not of Materialism, but characterize its adherents usually as deniers or negativists (*nāstikāḥ*). And this has its good ground. For Indian Materialism, the essential thing is not the denial of the soul and the exclusive restriction to matter as the cause for the explanation of the world. The decisive thing, on the contrary, is its purely *negative* interest. Its aim is to dispute and deny the continuance of life after death, the retribution of good and bad work, and the moral claims derived out of them. It is interested in philosophical questions only so far as they serve this aim. Concerning the rest, it is indifferent to them. That distinguishes it from all others and also from the nature-philosophical schools. Naturally, Materialism could reach its aim most quickly if it denied the existence of the soul. But so far as the assumption of a soul served only the explanation of the phenomenal world, as was the case in the old nature-philosophy before it was connected up with belief in God and with the doctrine of Deliverance, it was also acceptable to

Materialism. As a matter of fact, there are also found given materialistic directions which recognize a soul in this sense, and which have established a connection, therethrough, with the nature-philosophical schools. But while these nature-philosophical schools were governed by a striving towards the understanding of the phenomenal world and their attempts at explanation gradually formed into a full-fledged philosophical system, the materialists satisfied themselves all the while with their positing of a purely negative aim. Therefore, the Indian characterization of them as 'deniers or negativists' is appropriate. But in my presentation, I will follow the usual practice for the sake of simplicity and speak of Materialism by which a man should not lose sight of the right understanding of what has been said.

Materialistic directions of the above-mentioned kind are found in India since early times. The old maxim, that materialism is as old as philosophy, holds good here also. And just as we find, in the oldest recorded Vedic monuments, believers in god and also god-deniers, there is also information about materialistic directions standing side by side with the oldest recorded monuments of philosophical doctrine. In India, there early emerges a characteristic feature which also holds good for the later period—a close connection of materialism with political theory.

The Indians had early developed a systematic doctrine of statecraft which made light of all moral scruples in the positing of its aim and its choice of means, which, therefore, corresponds to what for us is associated with the name of Machiavelli. The embodiment of this statecraft is the legendary Minister of the King Candragupta of the Maurya family, who founded, for the first time, an indigenous empire on Indian soil at the end of the fourth century BC. The Indian tradition ascribes the merit for the success of Candragupta to this Brhāmaṇa named Cāṇakya or Kauṭilya, and has always seen in him an unsurpassed master of the art of statecraft. The most famous Indian literary work about the science of statecraft is handed down under his name.

This Cāṇakya, as is shown by tradition, is the prototype of the unscrupulous Real-politiker who avoids no means, if only it leads him to his goal. And his ideal as well as his theory have been much esteemed in the circles of practical Politikers or politicians.

It is now easy to understand that such a Politiker, from the points of world-view, supported himself on a doctrine which put out of the way or removed all moral scruples that were hindrances to his action. One such doctrine was Materialism. Its positing of the aim, as we have described above, corresponds entirely with its purpose. It was created for this circle, whether it may acknowledge it openly or secretly. It is, therefore, certainly no accident that the first materialist, whom tradition has handed down to us in living vivid colours, is a King.

King Paesi: We find in the canon of the Jainas as also of the Buddhists, the account of a conversation which one of their teachers had with a King who adhered to a gross form of materialism. The conversation ends, as is to be expected according to the origin of the report, with the conversion of the King. But the narration is carried out in such a lively way and gives such a graphic picture of the materialistic views in the period of the Jaina and the Buddha that I cite a few pieces out of them.[1]

In the City of Seyaviyā, there rules a bad King Paesi (the Buddhists call him Pāyāsi) who believes in no God and no beyond. One day, the holy man Kesi arrives in this city. Now the King has a charioteer named Citta who was won over earlier by Kesi as an adherent, and who longingly wishes that the King also should be converted. He knows how to arrange it skilfully so that the King, during his morning drive, alights down in the park in which Kesi is staying, and it comes to a conversation between the King and the holy man. The King has heard that Kesi believes in a soul which is different from the body, and he reproaches him as follows:

'If you have the conviction that the soul is different from the body and not the same, I have, on the other hand, to cite the following. I had a godless, wicked grandfather who did not administer his Kingdom well and who, after his death, must have reached hell on account of his bad actions. If now he would come to me who am ever his beloved grandson—his joy and care—and warn me against living as godlessly as he did, in order that I should not go to hell, then I would believe that the soul is different from the body. But as he has not come to warn me, I am convinced that the soul and the body are the same.'

Thereupon Kesi replied: 'If you notice, oh King, that your wife has given herself up to another man, what punishment would you inflict on this man?' 'I would get him executed in any way.'

'If the man were to request you that he should be given some time before his execution in order to warn his relatives and acquaintances against a similar offence, would you grant him also at least only one moment?'

'No, why should I?'

'Entirely in the same way, thy godless grandfather, who, according to our doctrine, is in hell, has not come; he has, no doubt, the wish to come to thee, his beloved grandson—his joy and care—in order to warn thee. But he cannot. Because there are the most diverse grounds that a being tarrying in hell, however much he would like to come to men, cannot come. Therefore believe, Paesi, that the soul is different from the body.'

And again the King says: 'What you say is merely a comparison and does not apply to the following. I had a very pious grandmother, who, according to your doctrine, must have got, after her death, into a world of the gods, for her pious acts. If she would come to me who was her most beloved grandson—her joy and care—and admonish me to live piously like her, in order that I should attain the world of the gods, then I would believe that the soul is different from the body. But she has not come to admonish me and I am convinced that the soul and the body are the same.'

Upon this, Kesi knew how to reply. But Paesi has also made an experiment. He reports for example: 'I was once in my reception-hall surrounded by the distinguished elite of my kingdom. There the city watchman brought a thief whom they had caught. I got him thrown alive into a brazen pot, with a brass lid strongly soldered laid over it, with the coppersmith watching over him.

After some time, I got the lid opened and found the man dead, though there was no opening in the pot through which the soul could have escaped. Had there been an opening in the jar through which the soul could have escaped I would believe that the soul is different from the body. But it was not the case. So I am convinced that the soul and the body are the same.'

And another experiment: Paesi had first executed one offender and then got him locked up in a jar and when it was opened after some time, the corpse was full of worms. The jar, however, had no opening through which the souls of these worms could have reached the inside. Another offender was weighed by Paesi. Then he was killed, except that only his skin was injured and he was once again weighed. But the weight was the same. Therefore, no soul could have escaped. Another offender he got hacked to pieces in order to search the soul, but it was not to be found. Such other similar experiments were made by Paesi. Kesi knew appropriate answers to all these arguments and finally Paesi gives himself over as beaten and converted.

This account gives a lively picture of an old Indian Materialist on the King's throne. And Paesi was certainly not the only one of his kind. But however interesting and characteristic such accounts are, they can rarely claim a place of the same kind in a history of Indian philosophy. Materialism gained for itself importance only from the moment when it emerged in the form of a regular doctrine and took up arms against the remaining philosophical schools. That also occurred very early. The old writings of the Buddhistic canons report that, in the time of the Buddha, a large number of teachers stalked the land and gathered students around themselves. Among them are found

such as represent the materialistic doctrines.[2]

The oldest Materialistic doctrines: We hear of a certain Pūraṇa Kāśyapa who taught the following: 'Anybody may do or allow to do anything, mutilate or allow somebody to be mutilated, roast or allow somebody to be roasted, persecute, plague, harass or get somebody persecuted, plagued or harassed, may rob life, steal, break into a house, drag away the loot, plunder a sequestered house, carry on highwaymanship or brigandage, commit adultery or lie; but he, with all this, does nothing bad. If anyone, with razorsharp quoit, reduces a living creature on the earth to a heap of flesh, transforms him into a single lump of flesh, he would thereby prove himself as nothing bad; it would not appear as anything bad. If anybody would go to the southern bank of the Gaṅgā,[3] murdering and allowing somebody to murder, mutilating and allowing somebody to mutilate, roasting and allowing somebody to roast, he would prove himself as nothing bad; it would not appear bad. And if he would go to the northern bank of the Gaṅgā,[4] giving gifts and causing them to be given, sacrificing and causing sacrifices to be offered, it would thereupon prove in no way meritorious; it would not appear as merit. Through presents, self-discipline, self-mastery and veracity, there arises or appears no merit.'

A second teacher, Ajita Keśakambala, represented the following view: 'There is no gift in charity, there is no sacrifice, there are no offerings. There is no fruit and ripening of good and bad actions. There is not this world or that. There is no mother nor father. There are no suddenly-born beings. In the world, there are no ascetics and Brāhmaṇas who have gone along the right path of conduct and follow the right conduct, who have seen this world and that world out of independent knowledge and proclaimed it. A man consists of four Elements. When he dies, earth goes into the mass of earth (*pṛthivīkāyaḥ*), water into the mass of water, fire into the mass of fire, breath into the mass of air, and the sense-organs enter into space (*ākāśaḥ*). Four men, with the bier as the fifth, carry forth the dead person, and they carry on their talk until they come into

the place of cremation. Then there remain only white bones and all the sacrifices end in ashes. The gift of charity is, therefore, the doctrine of a buffoon; it is empty and false talk when anybody asserts that there is something beyond. Fools and wise men are destroyed and disappear when the body falls to pieces. They are no more after death.'

Finally a third teacher, Kakuda Kātyāyana, teaches the following:

'There are seven masses (*kāyāḥ*) which are neither created nor brought forth. They are unfruitful, unchangeable, and are firm like a pillar. They move not, nor do they change, they do not disturb each other, nor are they able to procure joy, grief or joy and grief. Which are these seven masses? The earth-mass, the water-mass, the fire-mass, the air-mass, pleasure, pain and the souls (*jīvāḥ*) as the seventh. These seven masses are neither created nor produced, they are unfruitful, unchangeable, and firm like a pillar. They do not move nor do they change, they do not disturb one another and they are not able to procure pleasure, pain or pleasure and pain. There is no murderer, nor one who allows to murder, nor anyone who hears or allows to hear, no knower or one who allows to know. When anybody with a sharp sword strikes off a head, nobody robs nobody of life. The sword passes, on the contrary, through the empty space, between the seven masses.'

Of these three doctrines, the first exhausts itself in mere denial of all moral obligations. The second seeks to prove it with a gross materialism. The third finally represents an ancient nature-philosophy which explains all occurrences through the interplay of a number of permanent factors. The soul also occurs among these factors. But this doctrine also denies everything transcendent. And all the three are unanimous in the fact that they deny continuance after death and the moral consequences arising therefrom, and are, in this sense, genuine materialistic doctrines.

The old writings of the Jainas also describe similar materialistic doctrines. We therefore see that Materialism arose early

in the form of a regular theory. But the development thereby does not remain stationary. It led to the creation of a fully formed materialistic system which was handed down like all other systems, in the form of a School—that of the Lokāyata.

The Lokāyata System: The Lokāyata, i.e. the doctrine which concerns this world, arose in the pre-Christian period. As its founder is regarded one Cārvāka, about whom nothing further is known.[5] It is characteristic for this system that it is clothed in the same form as the remaining systems. Like these, its doctrines are written down in aphorisms which were orally handed down.[6] Further one took care to refer his doctrines to a holy seer of antiquity in Brahminical circles. In a similar way, the Lokāyata derived its doctrine from a higher authority. As we have already heard, Materialism was connected most closely with the circles which taught the art of Statecraft. As the highest teacher of the art of Statecraft and as its legendary proclaimer was considered Bṛhaspati, the teacher of the gods and besides him, there was Uśanas, the teachers of the Asuras, the demons. Accordingly, the Lokāyata traced back their aphorisms to Bṛhaspati. Besides, we also hear of a school which refers itself to Uśanas.

Like the aphorisms of the Vaiśeṣika and other systems,[7] the aphorisms of the Lokāyata also begin with the words: 'Now we shall explain the truth.' Now the chief maxims of the system follow sharply and trenchantly.[8] 'Earth, water, fire, air: these are the entities.' 'One designates their connection or combination as body, sense-organs and objects.' 'Out of them develops the mind or spirit itself.' 'Knowledge arises like a force of fermenting intoxicant out of yeast, etc.' 'The expressions of life (*jīvaḥ*) resemble bubbles in water.' 'And because there is nothing that continues in the world beyond, there is, therefore, no world beyond.' With this has been said what is essential of the Lokāyata. Man consists only of four elements; there is no soul. Therefore there is no beyond, and no retribution of good and bad actions.

These short maxims or aphorisms were explained and further

set forth first in oral and later on in written elucidations. For example, the question was raised by the opponents' side, why, when as a matter of fact, everything consists of the elements, sentiency emerges only in the human body and not in inanimate things like a pot or a vessel. Thereupon the reply was: 'The sentiency does not emerge into appearance in vessels, etc., because the remaining causes are missing, just as in sand, the force of intoxication or intoxicant does not appear forth'.[9] 'Again, the force of intoxication, when it is to appear forth, presupposes not only the presence of necessary things—flour, water and molasses and the remaining ingredients—but also the fact that these must be in a particular condition of mixture. So also the elements may produce the sentiency only when they appear in a particular state, i.e. in the form of the body as skin, bones, flesh and blood. In the corpse already, this condition is not preserved unchanged and therefore sentiency has vanished from it.' In order to derive all the psychical processes out of the elements, one took hold of the doctrine of the three juices in the body—phlegm, bile and wind.[10] It was taught that through phlegm there arises desire, through bile, hatred and through wind, delusion. The manifoldness of life-forces that one experiences in incalculable alternation—now joy, now grief—was traced by the opponents of the Lokāyata to the power of good and bad actions which, according to the rigorous law of retribution, lead to joy and grief. This law was denied by the representatives of the Lokāyata and they appealed to the incalculable accidental rise of bubbles in water for explaining the accidentality of joy and grief. They also asserted that natural feelings or experiences ascribe all these life-forces to no soul. Because, for example, when a man says: 'I know', or when a man also says, 'I am lean; I am fat', he speaks of no soul, but only of a body. Because there is no soul.

The Buddhist teachings demanded a special comment, as they assumed no soul but only a stream of consciousness, i.e. a connected series of knowledge-moments.[11] What was concerned here was not the contesting of the belief in a soul—which was

also denied by the opponent—but of the proof that the series of knowledge-moments does not endure uninterrupted and does not continue from one existence to another. Because that was the proof of these schools in asserting in support of a continuance after death and of a retribution of good and bad actions. Accordingly, the representatives of the Lokāyata emphasized that the coming into existence of knowledge was bound up with a body and with entirely definite prerequisites. Therefore no knowledge comes into existence in the embryo, because the sense-organs are still not developed and there is no object (for them). So also, knowledge is suspended in a state like that of swoon. The knowledge in an alleged rebirth depends, however, on entirely another body and is entirely different—like the body—from an earlier knowledge. There is therefore as little connection as that in the knowledge of two different beings who live simultaneously near each other. It is also not right to trace back, as one does, the expression of passions and instinctive behaviour of small children to experiences in earlier births. For then, a man must be able to remember earlier (former) births not only in isolated cases asserted by the opponent, but in general, just as all people who were together in one village would remember it in a similar way.

There is therefore no soul, no survival after death, and no retribution of good and bad deeds. When one speaks of such things it is only a misuse of words which originally implied something quite different.[12] The 'other world' (*paralokaḥ*), which word in India denotes a peculiar meaning, is nothing but another place, another time and another condition.[13] Hell is nothing other than grief, full of agony. Deliverance is the destruction of the body. The highest god is an almighty King.

The adherents of the Lokāyata developed and proved their doctrines in this manner. But there were not only systematic explanations or proofs with which they met their opponents. They also knew to use, especially effectually, the weapon of derision, and knew how to make the opponent a laughing-stock. Their derision, in the first place, was directed against

the sacrificial cult of the Brāhmaṇas. They said, for example,[14] 'If a man after leaving the body enters into a world beyond, why does he not again come back, driven by the impulse of love or affection to his relatives?' But the belief in the other world is meaningless. Because if 'a sacrificer would reap the reward of heaven after the sacrificer himself, the sacrificial act and the implements of sacrifice are long gone (into the limbo of the past), the trees which were consumed by a forest conflagration would as well bear fruit.' Equally meaningless is it to offer an ancestral sacrifice to the dead. 'If the ancestral offering of worship would be the source of gratification to the dead, then one could as well feed the flame of a lamp which is extinguished.' 'Fine, indeed, would be any such effect on things which are distant. Then a man need not provide provisions (of food, etc.) to the people who go on a journey. Because then, nothing would prevent one from satisfying him (his hunger and thirst) by an ancestral offering of worship performed at home! But it is all a swindle! The ceremonies for the dead which the Brāhmaṇas performed have been performed to provide themselves with a means of maintenance. There is nothing else in that.' Generally, 'the fire-sacrifice, the three Vedas, the bundle of three sticks which the Brāhmaṇas carry, and the besmearing of the self with ashes, serves only as a means of livelihood for men who lack intelligence and energy for any other occupation.' 'The mortifications, the different self-torments, the self-discipline, the deceits for sense-satisfaction and the sacrificial acts like the fire-sacrifice are regarded as childish play' by reasonable men. If that really would have been true, 'if' really, as the Brāhmaṇas assert, 'the animal slaughtered in the sacrifice would go to heaven,' why does not, then, the sacrificer kill his father, in order to despatch him to heaven? But 'the authors of the Vedas are none else than the three categories of crackers of jests, rogues, and night-sneakers, when they utter their unintelligible gossip, their "*jarbharī*" and "*turbharī*",'[15] passing it for the words of wise men. That is why one should not believe in anything of this kind but should live happily, so long as life

lasts. There is nothing which does not expire after death. Once the body becomes ashes, there is no recurrence.

Thus represents itself, in broad features, the doctrine of the Lokāyata of the older period. Its thought-processes are simple and have rarely interfered in philosophical development. But they have continually found adherents and their school has maintained its ground through entire centuries. Its situation becomes more difficult at the end of the classical period of Indian philosophy, when logical and epistemological questions moved to the forefront of interest and when every system was compelled to take them into consideration, on which their systems were founded. The adherents of the Lokāyata also could not escape this demand. Originally, they made light of the fact In the *sūtras* of Bṛhaspati[16] it is said: 'Inference is not the means of right knowledge.' One therefore appealed only to sense-experience, and simply dismissed the further assertions of the opponent One could do it so long as inferences which were arrived at by antagonistic schools were simple inferences by analogy. It was enough to show the faultiness of every conclusion, in order to decline every inference as unreliable. Things, however, were different, as the opponent developed firmly grounded scientific doctrines forming conclusions. One had to discuss these; nay, one was compelled to establish his own doctrine differently as from what he had done hitherto, and to defend it. Partly one tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for instance, when one explained[17]: 'The aphorisms of Bṛhaspati have only this aim, viz. to refute the opponent.' But in the majority of cases, one decided to discuss the doctrine of inference and to take it over, at least in parts. This desertion of the original attitude led, in no way, to the consequence of the decline of the system. The taking up of foreign thoughts and occupation with them led, on the contrary, to regular activity and to a blossoming of a literature richer than that which existed hitherto. We have, however, reached with it a turning point in the development, at which we must provisionally halt.

Also, among the other systems with which we have dealt, we

have seen that at the end of the classical period of Indian philosophy, about the middle of the first post-Christian millennium, system-building in essentials had come to a close and was at a stand-still. In its place there stepped to the forefront the theory of knowledge, and a lively and fruitful activity developed in this sphere for several centuries. The presentation of this development, which appears to a certain extent as a second blossoming of the classical period, has hitherto been placed in the background in order to handle it separately as an independent section of Indian philosophy. Now we see that the Lokāyata also came round to the same path at about the same time. But before we can proceed to a presentation of these sections of development, there remains for us a group of systems to handle which later sprang forth and to which we have only briefly referred uptil now, which developed themselves to such great importance and scrambled for the lead through several centuries—namely, the systems of the Buddhists.

NOTES

1. This deals with the second Uvaṅgaṃ of the Jaina, the *Rāyapaseṇaijjaṃ*, to which from the Buddhistic side Dīghanikāya XXIII (*Pāyāsisuttantaṃ*) = Dīrghāgamaḥ 7 corresponds. Of both the versions, the Jainistic one is, according to all appearances, the original one. Compare E. Leumann, *Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur zu andern Literaturkreisen Indiens*. Actes du sixieme Congres International, des Orientalistes tenu en 1883 a Leide, Troisieme Partie, Section 2, Leiden 1885, pp. 467–564. I closely follow, in the following, the translation by E. Leumann, although in doing so I have made it more smooth and short.
2. Compare Dīghanikāya II (*Sāmaññaphalasuttaṃ*) = Dīrghāgamaḥ 27.
3. The northern bank of the Gaṅgā was considered at that time an old Brahminical holy land, in contrast to the southern bank.
4. The beings in hell and the world of the gods are not produced, but originate suddenly and directly. The belief in such suddenly-originated beings is, therefore, of importance for the doctrine of rebirth and of the retribution of good and bad actions in the world beyond.
5. The word Cārvāka holds good partly as the name of the founder of the system but is also explained in a different way.

6. The aphorisms of Bṛhaspati are not preserved to us but are only known from quotations. And as the remaining literature of the system is lost and besides, the works and the authors about whom we hear belong to a later time, I have not further gone in this place into the literature of the Lokāyata.
7. The beginning of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* runs originally: *Yad iha bhāvarūpaṃ tat sarvam abhidhāsyāmi* (compare Vyomaśiva, *Vyomavatī* p. 47, 13 f. and 492, 25).
8. The quoted Sūtras are often quoted in an isolated manner. In the cited order, they appear in Prabhācandra, *Nyāyakumudacandra, Māṇikacandra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā*. vols. 38–39. Bombay 1938–41, p. 341, 17 ff. I follow it here.
9. Prabhācandra, *Nyāyakumudacandra* p. 343, 9 f.
10. Compare p. (27) f.
11. For the following, compare Śāntirakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 30–31, Baroda 1926, v. 1857 ff.
12. Compare Sāyaṇamādhava, *Sarvadarśanasaṃgrahaḥ*, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series No. 51, Poona 1928, p. 2. 23 f. and 3. 1–4.
13. Śāntirakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* v. 1874.
14. The verses employed for the following are found in their largest number in Sāyaṇamādhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṃgrahaḥ*, p. 5, 1 ff.
15. *jarbharī* and *turpharī* are antiquated obsolete Vedic words which become unintelligible in later times and appear to the sceptics as a senseless Abrakadabra.
16. *Pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam anumānam apramāṇam*. Compare Abhayadevasūri, *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* on Siddhasenadivākara's *Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇam*, Purātattvamandira Granthāvalī Nos. 10, 16, 18, 19 and 21, Ahmedabad, 1923–30. p. 70, 18 f. and 73, 14 ff.
17. *Sarvatra paryanuyogaparāṇi eva sūtrāṇi Bṛhaspateḥ*. Compare Abhayadevasūri in his above referred-to work, p. 69, 39.

PART III

On The Tattvopaplavasiṃha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

Tattvopaplava-siṃha

Much furore was created among scholars of Indian philosophy with the publication of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's *Tattvopaplava-siṃha* (GOS, Baroda, 1940) as edited by Sanghvi and Parikh with an English introduction (reproduced below) in which it was claimed that at last, an actual text of some hitherto-unknown school of Cārvākas had reached us. On various circumstantial evidences, the editors claimed that the work belonged roughly to the eighth century AD and mainly depending on a statement of Śrīharṣa as well as one of his commentators, Śaṅkara Miśra, it was sought to be shown that although not representing the Cārvāka view as generally understood, it could have been written by some follower of the view that did not accept even perception as a *pramāṇa*. The text itself claims to demolish all philosophical views by showing that no *pramāṇa* whatsoever was possible. Interestingly, the text nowhere mentions or refutes Śaṅkara's *māyāvāda* and as the editors admit, it closely resembles the method followed by Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* to establish the Advaita view by rejecting all the *pramāṇa*-s. Though still claimed by many scholars that it is a work of some Cārvāka school, this claim is now receding to the background inasmuch as many other serious scholars are inclined to view the text as representing extreme scepticism, pure and simple. In any case, it defends neither materialism nor perception as the only source of valid knowledge

Tattvopaplavasiṃha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

SUKHLALJI SANGHAVI AND R. C. PARIKH

INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLISHED TEXT

As far as our knowledge goes, the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* is a unique work of its kind. The school of Cārvāka otherwise known as the Lokāyata Darśana was long known to students of Indian philosophy as a Pūrvapakṣa in almost all the systems, and also from such works as the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Sūri (about AD 700–70) and the *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya (about fourteenth century AD). No work belonging to the Lokāyata school itself was, however, known. The TPS fills, at least partially, that gap in our knowledge. As we shall see later on, the TPS goes a step further and carries to its logical end the sceptical tendency of the Cārvāka school as it is known to us from this work itself and other sources, and ends in '*tattvopaplava*' or 'upsetting of all principles'.

Description of the Ms.

This palm-leaf ms, which as noted in the Preface, belongs to the Saṅghavinā pādāno Bhandār, is noticed in A Descriptive Catalogue of MSS in the Jaina Bhandars at Pattan Vol. I. p. 165, G.O.S. No. LXXVI, published in 1937. It consists of 176 leaves. Its length is 14" and breadth 1½". A few lines in the beginning and a few in the body of the work are illegible.

It becomes clear from the colophon that the ms was copied in Samvat 1349 Marg. Vadi 11 Śanau (December sixth, AD 1292) at Dholkā by Maham Narapāla. At the time, Śāraṅgadeva (AD 1274–95) of the House of the Vaghelas was reigning. Dholkā had been a second capital of Gujarat for more than half a century from the time of Vīradhavala (AD 1233–38) and it appears from

the colophons of a great number of mss that it had developed into a centre of learning as well.

The Present Edition

The single palm-leaf ms on which the present text is based presents, on the whole, an accurate version of the work. At some places, however, the writing is blurred and those places are indicated in the footnotes as *ghṛṣṭam* or *ghṛo*; at other places, the trend of the meaning required amendations in readings, and these have been indicated in the footnotes as *parimārjitam* or *pario*. When in the body of the text we have supplied some readings, we have put the same in rectangular brackets.

The paragraphs in the text are, of course, made by us. We have also supplied the headings of different sections in rectangular brackets.

This, we hope, will greatly facilitate the study of the work. The passages that seemed to be quotations have been indicated by " ", and wherever possible we have given the names of original works in [ ]. The proper names have been underlined.

At the end of the text we have provided three appendices. The first gives the index of important philosophical terms, the second that of the proper names and the third that of quotations.

All this, it is hoped, will enable the scholars to utilize this important work for further researches in the subject.

Comparative Unfamiliarity of the TPS

Before we attempt to discover the date of the TPS, we propose to consider its comparative unfamiliarity and the type of thought it represents. Verses attributed to Cārvāka and the name of Bṛhaspati as the founder of the Lokāyata school, more familiarly known as the Cārvāka Darśana, are known to us from such works as the *Śāstravārtā Samuccaya* and the *Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccya* of Haribhadra Sūri (AD 700–70), the *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya (fourteenth cent. AD) and such other works as the *Sarvamata Saṅgraha*. As every student of Saṃskṛta

systems of philosophy knows, Cārvāka or Lokāyata is referred to in many of the major works on the subject. This school of thought supposed to be founded by Bṛhaspati, who is also supposed to be the founder of the Science of Polity (*Arthaśātra*), seems to have developed at least in two branches, as becomes clear from the reference to Navya Nāstikas in the *Syādvādalatikā* of Yaśovijaya (AD 1608–84), a commentary on the SVS of Haribhadra and the commentary of Śaṅkara on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* (about AD 1450).

We are here concerned only with the references of Śaṅkara.

Śrī Harṣa in the KKK refers to Cārvākas, Mādhyamikas and Śaṅkarācārya as those who do not accept any Pramāṇas. He says:

tad-anabhyupagacchato'·pi cārvāka-mādhyamikāder vāg-vistarāṇāṃ pratīyamānatvāt . so'yam apūrvaḥ pramāṇādi-śattānabhyupagamātmā vāk-stambha-mantro bhavatābhyūhito nūnaṃ yasya prabhāvād bhagavatā suraguruṇā lokāyatikāni sūtrāṇi na praṇītāni tathāgatena vā madhyamāgamā nopadiṣṭāḥ bhagavatpādena vā bādarāyaṇīyeṣu sūtreṣu bhāṣyaṃ nābhāṣi.

Now all the different commentators who seem to be familiar only with that branch of Cārvākas which recognizes the validity of Pratyakṣa and the existence of four elements, are at great pains to explain this passage by saying that because Cārvākas do not recognize the validity of Anumāna, and as Prāmāṇya can only be proved through Anumāna, only they are said to recognize no Pramāṇa. But surely, this explanation is far-fetched. Only Śaṅkara, after giving the above explanation, gives the other explanation *Cārvākaikadeśī vā cārvākaḥ*. According to him, this particular division of Cārvākas do not recognize any Pramāṇas. This, as far as we know, can apply either only to TPS or a similar work, which does away with each and every Pramāṇa known to Indian schools of philosophy.

It is also very likely that Śrī Harṣa also has TPS or a similar work in mind when he refers to Cārvāka as not recognizing any Pramāṇa; for it is not possible that such an accurate and learned Pandit as Śrī Harṣa would not distinguish between

Cārvākas who recognized Pratyakṣa, and others who did not. If this assumption is correct, as there is reason to believe, we may say that *tattvopaplava-vāda* was familiar to Śrī Harṣa; and looking to the smiliarity of the argument of both the works, may we suggest that Jayarāśi (or someone else of his school of thought) might have inspired that grand dialectical work, viz *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, though recognizing at the same time that their aims are altogether different? Śrī Harṣa tries to show the *anirvacanīyatā* of Brahma, while Jayarāśi shows the invalidity of Pramānas and the consequent invalidity of everything. The difference may be explained by the fact that Jayarāśi does not go beyond the plane of Pramānas—Reason—while Śrī Harṣa, the Advaita Vedāntin that he is, accepts the possibility of knowing Brahma—the ultimate reality—through means other than Tarka. However that may be, we can safely say that the type of thought represented by the TPS was not so unfamiliar to the old savants as it at first sight may appear; and as will be seen from what follows, Jain dialecticians, both Digambara and Śvetāmbara, were quite familiar with the TPS.

The Age of the Work and its Author

Coming to the question of the age of the work, we take the date of the palm-leaf ms as our starting point. That date is sixth December, 1292 AD. Now let us make an attempt to find how far we can go into times earlier than this.

Mallisena Sūri in his commentary on *Anyayogavyavaccheda Dvātriṃśikā* of Hemacandra Sūri (AD 1089–1173) named *Syādvādamañjarī*, while commenting on verse 17 after putting forth the view of Śūnyavadins, says: 'For a detailed refutation of Pramānas, *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* should be consulted.' In this reference we are to note that the work is mentioned with its full title and for the purpose of *pramāṇa-khaṇḍana*. The title agrees completely with one of the works under consideration and *pramāṇa-khaṇḍana* which starts on page one of our text forms its main theme. This leaves no doubt that Mallisena Sūri has our work in mind, and no other. SM was finished on the

eleventh of October, AD 1292—less than two months before the date of our palm-leaf ms. This also suggests that M had a copy of this work other than the one available to us.

Candraprabha Sūri, in his *Prabhāvaka-carita*, chapter 16, mentions that the poet Dharma of the Kaula sect and a native of Broach had a dialectical duel with the great Jain dialectician Śānti Sūri of Anahillapura Pattan, and that he used the arguments taken from the TP for this purpose. Ch finished his Pra in V.S. 1334, AD 1277, March twelfth. So the TP was known fifteen years before our ms was copied. We may, however, go further. As there is nothing which goes against the historicity of the incident mentioned by Candraprabha Sūri, we may say that the TP was a well-known work even in the eleventh cent AD and that it was used as a powerful dialectical weapon.

Abhayadeva Sūri—the teacher of Śānti Sūri in Pramāṇa-śāstra—in his commentary on *Sanmatitarka* called *Tattvabodha-vidhāyinī*, popularly known as *Vādamahārṇava*, has passages which seem to be adapted from the TPS as shown by Pandit Sukhlalji and Pt. Bechardas in their excellent edition of *Sanmati-tarka*, Vol. IV, pp. 547–51, footnotes. Now Abhayadeva Sūri being a teacher of Śānti Sūri who died in V.S. 1096, AD 1040 falls in the first half of the eleventh century AD. Thus the evidence considered above enables us to say that the TP was well-known in Gujarat during the period of eleventh to thir-teenth centuries of the Christian Era. The Digambara Jain works of Southern India lead us still further.

Students of South Indian Jainism know very well that the great Digambara pontiff Akalaṅkadeva (AD 620–80) wrote a number of authentic philosophical works and gave great impetus to the development of Jain Nyāya. In that tradition, Vidyānan-din who wrote such works as *Tattvārtha-ślokavārtika* and *Aṣta-sahasrī*, is a great name. Anantavīrya is another important name. He wrote a commentary on the *Siddhiviniścaya* of Akalaṅkadeva. This commentary, not yet published in printed form, exists in the MS library of Kodai in Kutch. We possess a copy made of it. These two authors, viz. Anantavīrya and Vidyānandin, refer to TP in their works.

Anantavīrya, in his *Siddhiviniścayavṛtti* on folio 228a, says *atra tattvopaplavakṛd āha*, etc., and further on in the same folio, *tattvopaplavakaraṇād jayarāśiḥ*, etc. These two passages leave no doubt that Jayarāśi wrote the TP and that he and his work TP are referred to by Anantavīrya.

Similarly Vidyānandin, in his work named *Aṣtasahasrī* which has been published by the N.S.P., says on p. 37, *eke hi tattvo-paplavavādinaḥ*, etc., and after devoting about five pages to the refutation of *tattvopaplavavāda*, says: *vicārottarakālam api pramā-ṇatattvaṃ prameyatattvaṃ copaplutaṃ saṃvidanta evātmānaṃ nirasyantīti vyāhatiḥ*. The passage may be compared with the last few lines of our text, wherein Jayarāśi says: *tad evam up-apluteṣveva tattveṣu avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭante*. Vidyānandin refers to *tattvopaplavavāda* in his other work, viz. *Tattvārthaślokavārtika*, also. He devotes about a page to the dis-cussion of *tattvopaplavavāda*. Again, on page 195 of the same work, he mentions Tattvopaplavavādins with Śūnyavādins and Brahmavādins.

These passages confirm us in our view that Vidyānandin also refers to our TP and no other work. In addition to this, we may point out that Vidyānandin first refutes the views of the other section of Cārvākas (pp. 35–37 AS.) and then grapples with *tattvopaplava vāda*, which means that in V's view, these two are different sections requiring separate treatment.

Thus we find that Anantavīrya mentions Jayarāśi by name, and Vidyānandin devotes considerable space to refute *tattvo-paplavavāda* separately and in addition to the refutation of other Cārvākas who accept one Pramāṇa and the existence of four elements.

Now we find that Anantavīrya is referred to by Mādhavā-cārya (fourteenth cent. AD) in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*. He is also mentioned by the great Digambarācārya Prabhācandra in his *Nyāyakumudacandra*, a commentary on the *Laghīyastraya* of Akalaṅkadeva. Pandit Mahendrakumar, the learned editor of the NKC, puts Prabhācandra between AD 950–1020 and Anantavīrya in the ninth century AD.

As to Vidyānandin, we find that he mentions Dharmottara,

Prajñākara and Maṇḍanamiśra and quotes Kārikās from the *Vārtika* on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* of Sureśvara. The first two are put in the eighth century of the Christian Era; Maṇḍanamiśra is later than Kumārila, and Sureśvara, being a disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, later than S. Mr. P.V. Kane puts Sureśvara in between AD 800–840. Pandit Mahendrakumar, following this order, puts Vidyānandin also in the ninth century. Dr. Satishchandra puts him about AD 800. Pandit Vamsidhara, the editor of *Aṣṭasahasrī*, puts Vidyānandin in the middle of the ninth century of the Vikrama Era—that is to say, about AD 796

From the consideration of the dates of Anantavīrya and Vidyānandin, we are inclined to believe that TPS and its author Jayarāśi are earlier than the ninth century of the Christian era.

In order to find out the earlier limit of the age of TPS, we have to rely upon the references to other works and their authors, as well as to other Darśanas in it. The main theme of TPS is the examination of the Instruments of Valid Knowledge, and so with that aim it surveys the entire field of the then known schools of Indian philosophy. It mentions Sāṅkhyas (p. 79), Mīmāṃsakas (pp. 23, 58, 82), Kāṇādas, i.e. Vaiśeṣikas (p. 117), Naiyāyikas (pp. 6, 12, 14, etc.), Bauddhas under various names (pp. 27, 35, 41, 42, 45, 56, 79, 81, 83, etc.) and the Digambaras of the Jain Sect. It also refers to the *ānandarūpam ātmanaḥ kaivalyam* (p. 81), which seems to be a Vedānta view older than that of Śaṅkarācārya, and also refers to the Sambhava and Aitihya Pramāṇas, subsuming the former under Anumāna and the latter under Āgama (p. 113). The last section of the work is devoted to *sādhupadād artha-pratipattiḥ* doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇas, expecially that of Bhartṛhari.

Thus it becomes clear that TPS is familiar with the philosophical views of almost all important schools—Vedic, Jain and Buddhist—as we find them developed in their respective works by the ninth century of the Christian Era. We also find that the Māyāvāda and the Kevala Advaitavāda as developed by Śaṅkarācārya are conspicuous by their absence. All this in itself, however, carries us nowhere; and it is curious to note that the individual references to authors and works in the TPS are only

two. One is to Bṛhaspati, the founder of the Lokāyata school, and the other to *Lakṣaṇasāra*, probably a work of Jayarāśi himself or someone belonging to his school. The other references, as said above, are general. So the only course left open to us is to make an attempt to identify the quotations given in the TPS with the original passages, and to try with the help of these identifications to settle the earlier limit of the age of the work.

Of the numerous quotations, we have been able to trace only a few. These come from the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* of Jaimini, the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* of Kaṇāda, the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama, the *Bhāṣya* of Śabara, the *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila, and the *Pramāṇavārtika* and the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. Of the two verses noted in the footnote, we are able to trace the latter to ŚV 2 v. 184 and the context requires that the former also must be either from the ŚV or a similar work of Pūrvamīmāṃsā; but it is not found in the published editions of the ŚV and strangely enough, is found in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita (*kārikā* 2895, G.O.S.). The context in the TS, however, shows that it must belong to some Pūrvamīmāṃsā work—presumably the ŚV of Kumārila—as the *Pañjikā* on the verse in question gives in support of a quotation from *Śābarabhāṣya*.

Now if the quotations we have identified cannot be traced to some earlier works, we may, from what we have discussed above, come to the conclusion that the TPS and its author Jayarāśi cannot be placed before Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Dharmakīrti. Now Kumārila is assigned by different scholars to somewhere between AD 600 and 700. He is, according to Keith, earlier than AD 838 and 'wrote' perhaps, about 700. Similarly, Dharmakīrti is also placed between AD 600 and 700. According to Keith, he belongs to the seventh century AD, while Satishchandra would place him about AD 635–50. So also Stcherbatsky. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana is of the opinion that AD 625 should be the latest date for DK. and Mahendrakumar would assign him the period AD 600–60–90.

These considerations drive us to the conclusion that the TPS and Jayarāśi cannot be earlier than the seventh century of the Christian Era, and as we saw above, they cannot be assigned to

an age later than that of Vidyānandin and Anantavīrya: that is, later than about AD 800. So we are inclined to put TPS and its author Jayarāśi in the eighth century AD.

The absence of a reference by itself may prove nothing, but in a particular context where a certain reference would reasonably be expected, its absence may be regarded as significant. TPS, while refuting the theory of Pramāṇas and incidentally some Prameyas, takes cognizance, as we saw, of all the principal schools vi'. Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṇkhya, Buddhist, Jain, etc., but there is no reference to the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkarācārya as there is reference to the Saṃvṛti of Madhyamakas (pp. 98–100). The only reference to the Vedānta doctrine that one finds, as we also saw, is to the *ānandarūpaṃ kaivalyam* which comes after the refutation of Sāṅkhya Kaivalya (p. 81). This conspicuous absence of reference inclines us to the view that Śaṅkarācārya was not known to Jayarāśi, probably because he was either prior to him or was his contemporary; because, considering the influential character of Śaṅkarācārya's works, if it existed in J's time, his not taking cognizance of it in such a polemical work as TPS would be a puzzle. Now Ś., who according to Keith 'may have been born in 788, and may have died or become a Sannyāsin in 820, at any rate worked in c. AD 800'. If both J. and Ś. were contemporaries, or J. prior to Ś., it would agree with the conclusion that we have arrived at about the age of J. and may lead us to assign Jayarāśi to the first half of the seventh century AD.

Similarly Haribhadrasūri, who is placed by Jinavijayaji in the period AD 700–70—a view accepted by Keith—does not mention the TPS or *tattvopaplava-vāda* either in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* or *Śāstravātāsamuccaya*, though he describes the Lokāyata-darśana in the SDS and discusses it in the SVS. This also agrees well with the age which we assign to Jayarāśi.

Native Place of Jayarāśi

We have no means of ascertaining the birthplace of Jayarāśi. But from the fact that the earliest references to the TPS and Jayarāśi are in the works of Vidyānandin and Anantavīrya,

both of them Digambara Jain Acharyas of Southern India, and from the fact that the TPS refers only to the Digambara Jain Sects (p. 79), we are inclined to guess that probably J. came from the land which produced Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, Dharmakīrti, Akalaṅka, Vidyānandin, Anantavīrya and Śaṅkarācārya.

As to the caste of Bhaṭṭa Jayarāśi as he calls himself, there cannot be much doubt. He must have been a Brahmin like Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, though the title Bhaṭṭa is sometimes found with the names of some Digambara Jain pontiffs, e.g. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva. But Jayarāśi could not have been a Jain or a Buddhist, as he mercilessly attacks their views; while his being a Brahmin would not prevent him from attacking other Brahminical systems with which he could not agree. In our view, the Lokāyata Darśana is one of the Brahminical Darśanas, though not one of the Āstika Darśanas, because Bṛhaspati is not outside the Brahminical fold. Śrī Harṣa, as we saw above, refers to him as *bhagavatā sura-guruṇā*.

Works of Jayarāśi

Whether J. wrote any other work besides TPS we do not definitely know, but it is likely, as the following reference shows, that he may have written another work named *Lakṣaṇasāra*. But as we have said above, the possibility of *Lakṣaṇasāra* being the work of some other author of the same school is not altogether excluded

TPS—a Work of the Lokāyata School

We have said in the beginning that the TPS is a work of the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school, or to be more precise, of a particular division of that school. Our reason for this statement is that J., in support of his opinion, quotes Bṛhaspati only, and that too with great regard (pp. 45 and 88).

He also refers to him as Sūtrakāra and quotes a verse of his to abuse the Digambara Jains (p. 79). The very first quotation *pṛthīvyāpaḥ* to *saṃjñā* (p. 1) in our text is given in the commentary on the SDS of Haribhadra called *Tarkarahasya Dīpikā*. Thus, *yaduvāca bṛhaspatiḥ pṛthīvyāpaḥ*. This also signifies that

Jayarāśi quotes from Bṛhaspati. The word *paramārthavidbhiḥ* (p. 1) no doubt, also refers to Bṛhaspati as the quotation *laukiko mārgo'nusartavyaḥ*, etc., suggests. At the end of his work, Jayarāśi tells us that arguments which could not even occur to the Preceptor of Gods, that is Bṛhaspati, obtain in his work TPS.

That J. is developing the doctrine of the orthodox (!) Lokāyata also becomes clear from the first paragraph of the text. He has to explain as to why he talks of *tattvopaplava* when Bṛhaspati says: *athātastattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ, pṛthivyāpastejo vāyuriti tattvāni*, etc. Jayarāśi in effect says that B. is merely reflecting (*pratibimbanārtham*) in his statement the belief of the people; but what B. really means is that when one thinks, one finds that even Tattvas like *pṛthvī*, etc., do not stand—what is one to say about others? Jayarāśi thus disposes of the orthodoxy and starts, so to say, with the permission of his Guru, by removing him out of the way, on his campaign of demolishing the doctrines of other schools.

The Critical Method of Jayarāśi

The method which Jayarāśi adopts is what may be called a critical method, using the word in the Kantian sense. He, in effect, says that the system of knowables depends upon the system of means of knowledge; while means of knowledge, in order to be valid, have to conform to reality. So one has to examine whether there are any valid means of knowledge before one can say anything about reality. J. is of the opinion that there are no valid means of knowledge and in order to prove his thesis, he examines the different theories of the Pramāṇas or valid instruments of knowledge of the different schools of Indian philosophy. That is why we call J.'s method critical.

Jayarāśi starts with the examination of the *pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa* of Naiyāyikas and tries of prove that it cannot stand (pp. 2–22). Then he discusses Mīmāṃsaka and Buddhist views of Pramāṇa as such (22 to 32), and follows it up with the criticism of their respective *pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-s* (32–58, 58–61). Then comes the

turn of the Sāṅkhya view of *pratyakṣa* (61–64). Then again, the Naiyāyikas have to withstand his attack on their theory of *anumāna* (pp. 64–74). While discussing *anumāna*, Jayarāśi finds it convenient to examine the various theories about *ātman* or soul. In this connection, he deals with the Naiyāyika, Jaina, Mīmāṃsaka, Sāṅkhya and Vedānta theories of soul (pp. 74–83). Having finished this part of his argument, he again turns to the theory of *anumāna*, this time of the Bauddhas, including their *svabhāvānumāna* (pp. 82–109). Then the six types of *arthāpatti* of Mīmāṃsakas are considered (109–10). Upamāna of the Naiyāyikas and Abhāva of the Mīmāṃsakas are briefly dealt with (pp. 110–19), and a reference to Aitihya and Sambhava also made, by saying that they come under *śabda* and *anumāna* respectively.

The last section is directed at the examination of *śabda-prāmāṇya* (113–25), and in that connection the theory of the grammarians, especially that of Bhartṛhari, is also examined (120–23). After this detailed criticism, Jayarāśi comes to the conclusion: *tadevam upapluteṣveva tattveṣu avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭante*.

This summary account of the main contents of the work clearly shows the viewpoint of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa as critical. In fact he has criticized all the varieties and theories of *pramāṇa* known to Indian philosophy of his time. Here, a question arises as to whether this method is merely *vitaṇḍā*, or an honest effort to show that, as there are no valid means of knowledge, nothing which can be said to conform to reality can be asserted. *Vitaṇḍā* has been defined by Gautama as *sa pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīno vitaṇḍā*. The Jalpa (the sort of discussion which uses all sorts of arguments with a view to defeat the opponent), which has no opposite view to establish, is Vitaṇḍā. Can we say that J. has written this work merely for the fun of confounding different dialecticians and that he has nothing to say as a result of all this cogitation? We do not think so. A careful reading of the text leaves the impression that J. is as serious a thinker as any other, and that he wants to reveal the incapacity of human instruments

of knowledge to really know anything. This tendency in Indian thought is not altogether new, and can be traced from the Vedas down to Jayarāśibhaṭṭa. But for the present, suffice it to say that the TPS of Bhaṭṭa Jayarāśi adds a new chapter to the history of Indian philosophy!

Walter Ruben

Ruben's analysis of the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* originally appeared in *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud-Und Ostasiens Und Archive fur Indische Philosophie*, Sonderabdruck Aus Band II, 1958. As translated into English by Professor Haridas Sinharay, it was published in *Indian Studies: Past & Present*, Calcutta, Vol. vii, nos. 2–3. In this article Ruben characterizes Jayarāśi as an 'agnostic critique of knowledge' and not as a Cārvāka/Lokāyata materialist, notwithstanding Jayarāśi's admiration for Bṛhaspati.

On the Tattvopaplavasiṃha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

WALTER RUBEN

AN AGNOSTIC CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE

Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi, the learned editor of the text, is justified in claiming that Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa belongs to the school of Bṛhaspati, because he quotes him and him alone with reverence.[1] One may add that he does not recognize at all the other well-known trends of philosophy in preference to Bṛhaspati's materialistic teachings, although he does not seek to defend it positively. He opens his text with an announcement of the title: *tattvopaplava*, i.e. annihilation of all *tattva*-s or all realities or categories. He makes a pretext that it has indeed been taught (by Bṛhaspati[2]): 'Now, therefore, we shall explain reality (*tattva*). Earth, water, fire and wind are the realities.[3] Their combinations are termed body, sense-organs and object, etc.'[4] This clear materialism of Bṛhaspati, however, does not professedly contradict Jayarāśi's teachings of 'the annihilation of all realities', particularly because of the 'objective of reflection' which is intended. The elements, earth, etc., would be reflected in these teachings of Bṛhaspati so far as these are known in the

world (*loke*), i.e. in the world of laymen.[5] 'But even these—the elements—cannot be taken as real if these are examined critically, not to speak of the other realities.' (He obviously means the atoms of the Vaiśeṣika; the primeval matter of the Sāṃkhya; the soul; god; etc.)

Now, if an opponent asks as to how far these universally-recognized realities will be annihilated, i.e. shall not exist, Jayarāśi answers: 'The evidence of the existence of the instruments of valid knowledge depends on their right definitions; the evidence of the existence of the objects of knowlegde (e.g. the elements earth, etc.) depends on the instruments of valid knowledge. In default of the instruments of valid knowledge, how can the objects of knowledge be taken as objects of correct expression (or practice)?'

As it continues, after a lacuna in the manuscript, 'the soul could as well be attributed with colour, or a jar with intelligence.' With this intention he composes his work, which shatters to pieces the then prevalent idealistic definitions of all instruments of valid knowledge.

In this introduction, the materialism of Bṛhaspati is represented in a somewhat obscure way—as an obviously unphilosophical reflection of matter—and thereby a unique conception of reflection as a kind of knowledge is introduced as justified in a certain sense.

Accordingly, Jayarāśi is, presumably, a Bārhaspatya. But his work is, nevertheless, not a materialistic one; it is, rather, anti-philosophic, and in a definite sense, agnostic. It denies, without representing any positive materialism, all the idealistic definitions of the various instruments of valid knowledge with which the author is familiar, such as perception, inference, etc., with 'pure'—i.e. apparently logical—argumentations; while the other materialists[6] of ancient India known to us admit the validity of perception. With this our author denies, at the same time, as he expressedly says,[7] all the prevailing philosophical knowledge of the objects, such as of the elements, and therefore of matter. That is to say, he turns away from any sort of philosophizing from the definitions of all the schools (except that of the materialist in the above-mentioned sense), without himself representing the materialistic or idealistic teachings, but at the same time without denying the existence of matter or the possibility of practical life.

He quotes at the beginning of his work,[8] 'the knower of the summum bonum' (*paramārthavid*, and thereby he presumably refers to Bṛhaspati[9] again) that one should follow the worldly path, because with reference to the ways of the world (of the daily life) laymen (*bāla*) and the wise (*paṇḍita*) are the same.

Therefore men may lead the usual life, think, etc., but all philosophizing is false. He refers back to this at the end of his work[10] and exclaims that he has now nullified all realities and categories, but at the same time all the modes of expression or behaviour (whose definitions he has shattered) could be admitted if one takes them without analysis. Thus is rejected, with a sham proof, by our agnostic the nature of the materialistic criterion of practice, which had theoretically been treated by Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (circa AD 400), and afterwards by the Buddhist logicians of Dignāga's school.

Vātsyāyana introduces his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* with the following: 'Successful activity results when the object is cognized by the instrument of valid knowledge. Hence the instrument of valid knowledge is invariably connected with the object. There is no cognition of object without the instrument of valid knowledge; without cognition of object, there is no successful activity. On being aware of the object with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge, the knower wants either to get it or to avoid it. His specific effort, prompted by the desire of either getting or avoiding (the object), is called activity; whose success, again, lies in its invariable connection with the result (*phala*). One who thus exerts, being desirous of getting or avoiding the object, either gets it or avoids it. By object is meant pleasure and (objectively) its cause, as well as

suffering and its cause. Those objects of the instruments of valid knowledge are innumerable, because the species of living beings are innumerable.'

Uddyotakara, commenting[11] on this, rejects all sorts of sophisticated pretexts. But Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa does not enter into all these. On the other hand, he starts the rejection of this criterion with the denial of the definition of Vātsyāyana: 'The success of the activity is its invariable connection[12] with the result: results are garland, sandal, women, water, etc: because these are real and causes of results; that is why these are called results (i.e. enjoyment). The success of the activity is, therefore, based on the fact that it is connected with the body (the enjoyer). Activity is thus the motion which pre-exists (inheres)[13] in the body. Its success determines the rightness (of the instruments of knowledge). But is this criterion of success known or unknown? If it is unknown, how can one know of its existence? If, on the other hand, it is known (the question arises), how can the knowledge of its invariability be known?' Thus the question arises[14]: Is it known through sense-perception or through inference? It cannot be the first, because it is supra-sensuous. Nor is it the latter, because then one should have to perceive a special characteristic by means of which one could infer.

Further, the validity of the previous knowledge of water is confirmed by obtaining water.[15] Now, is it concerned with the obtaining of:

(i) water that was thus known, or
(ii) water of the same nature, or
(iii) water later orginiated from that known water?

(i) The first is illogical, because the previously-known water has no permanence but flows away (before it can be obtained through activity)[16] according to the law of motion of particles, which results from the movements of fishes and buffaloes.

(ii) To the second alternative, the answer is that people sometimes obtain water even when they have not attained a correct knowledge of water; for in that case, this incorrect

knowledge should have been eventually proved to be correct. Now, if one argues that false knowledge, as contrasted with right knowledge, does not lead to the attainment of the water in the same time and space, then (the answer is) the knowledge issuing forth from the words of a dying person, or the knowledge of the moon, the sun, the stars, the constellations, etc., also becomes false (since the dying person attains nothing, nor is able to lead another to attain anything, and none can ever attain the heavenly bodies). Besides, one cannot attain the water in the same time and place,[17] as the place, like the water, may be destroyed (i.e. may change before one can attain it).

(iii) The third alternative is illogical, as finished objects[18] (basically in accordance with the definition) can be no cause: water as something finally produced cannot produce another water, just as a pot cannot produce another pot. Besides there is no multiplicity of water, as has been shown elsewhere.[19] Water differs from not-water inasmuch as it has the form of water. How can it differ from that which has the form of water? Is it through the form of water, or through another form (i.e. through the form of not-water)? In the first case, the form of not-water gives way to other waters. In the second case, it would itself have the form of not-water; thus one cannot distinguish between the known water and the water obtained later.

Further: is the validity of the previous knowledge said to be proved through the success of the (latter) activity, known through a characteristic which necessitates an inference; or is it directly perceptible and as such, proved?

In the first case, one cannot know the connection (between the characteristic, i.e. the success, and the knowledge). But if one could know it, the success of the activity becomes unnecessary (since then, one would have directly known the connection between the knowledge and the water, and thus would not have to wait for the activity). In the second case, the reply is that a contact (as, according to the Nyāya view, for every perception a contact is necessary between the sense and the object), with the knowledge previously born and immediately

destroyed, is not at all possible. A sense-percepton of past knowledge is as illusory as the vision of a tuft of hair,[20] because it can as little be the object of perception. One cannot perceive the absence of knowledge as an object of perception, nor the existence of past knowledge, because it exists no more. One should, then, recognize something non-existent as the object of perception. But how? Insofar as it imparts the form,[21] or as endowed with attributes like dimension (*mahattva*) etc [22] or through its sheer existence, or through simultaneous origination with knowledge[23]? Whichever of these contentions of the functioning of perception may one accept? How can one accept the past knowledge of perception? In case one accepts it, nonetheless one must seek a cause for it, as in the case of the false knowledge of the tuft of hairs. If one champions the sheer existence of the (knowing) soul as such, it follows that every knowledge is false. And our doctrine of the nullification of all realities or categories holds good.

With such meaningless hair-splittings, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa exposes, in fact, the uselessness of all his polemics. A better criterion than that of practice has not been found till today by science and epistemology. He who rejects it opens wide the door to illusionism.

Contrariwise, the illusionism of the Buddhistic Vijñānavāda[24] is, however, rejected: in your view, the object, e.g. blue, is unique. It produces, on the one hand, the knowledge 'blue', while on the other, the perceptual object 'blue' (i.e. the unique real splits itself in previous perceptual knowledge into a subjective and an objective phenomenon).[25] But how can the product be a dual one? By means of a unique form, or a variety of forms? In the first case, it gives rise to the faulty inference that all products have one and the same form, i.e. the one becomes a unity as well as a plurality (and that becomes an aspersion on the teaching due to contradiction, which our agnostic seems to recognize here temporarily to suit his purpose). In the second case, the unity is destroyed due to the variety of forms. If the original unity is destroyed, one does not need to contend, as

you do, that the one generates a manifold product.

From the standpoint of science today too, Buddhistic illusionism is to be rejected; but not with such dilemmatic terminology as the agnostic here uses. These tests of his methods of argumentation might have once been necessary. If we make a short résume, he avoids both the fundamental aspects of a philosophy of materialism and thereby establishes the idealistic philosophy and rejects materialism. In any case, he overlooks that there is the philosophy of the scientist between the knowledge of the layman and that of the philosophers. Thus he becomes a cynical agnostic with reference to the knowledge of reality, so far as it prevails over the knowledge of day-to-day life. He does not understand that materialism by its nature is a philosophy.

Thus this work is based on an anti-philosophic—and therefore, also on an anti-materialistic—standpoint; because materialism is, indeed, a philosophy. A similar standpoint is represented by the Bārhaspatyas and Auśanasas already in Kauṭilya's polity[26] roundabout 300 BC. They have equated philosophy with religion, which is understandable according to the Upaniṣadic idealism prevalent in those days. They, however, do not in any case recognize that philosophy has two fundamental directions, the idealistic and the materialistic.

Some Vaitaṇḍikas who are referred to in the Epic[27] perhaps thought likewise, and possibly also Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta of the Buddhistic canons. *Vitaṇḍā* is, at least in the *Nyāyasūtra*, defined as a form of discussion in which one advances all sorts of sham arguments in order to demolish the opponent at any cost, though it dispenses with the presentation of its own thesis.[28] This mode of argumentation is recognized expressedly in the *Nyāya-sūtra* as sometimes justified, e.g. when a good purpose can be reached thereby [29] Corresponding to it is *Mahābhārata* ii. 36. 4f, where *vitaṇḍā* is regarded as not to be criticized as it is highly efficacious, by which, with learned discussion, a lean thing is proved to be fat and a fat thing lean. This is done during the horse-sacrifice of the Pāṇḍavas in the palace of Aśvatthāmā (*Mahābhārata* vii. 61.13)[30]. Sañjaya

Belaṭṭhiputta, however, teaches an 'indifferentism', which appears to be very similar to that of the Jainas and cannot fit in with any positive formulation in philosophy.[31] Thus it is also expressedly different from the agnosticism of Jayarāśi

Nāgārjuna, later in the second century AD, uses a clearly thought-out agnostic—or, as some way, nihilistic—method to defend, systematically, his extreme Buddhistic idealism[32] and its problems. He can, in a certain way, base himself on the Buddha who withheld from his students some apparently very deep wisdom. Nāgārjuna postulates various grounds—e.g. that all phenomena have a cause and hence are not absolutely real, or that all human concepts are relative and thus are not absolutely valid—to show that everything except the Buddha (equated to Nirvāṇa) is empty. Nirvāṇa is the only reality which, however, lies beyond all concepts and possibilities of knowledge. Nāgārjuna next asks himself as to with what justice he, being an extreme sceptic of this type, is at all entitled to discuss.[33] He denies the reality of an opponent and of his teachings, and thus virtually disavows the teachings of the Buddha. He does not believe in proofs and thus does not, in fact, even seek to prove his nihilism itself. In particular, he turns himself against the validity of the instruments of knowledge with the statement that these do not hold good in 'the three times', neither before nor after nor as simultaneous with its object; and that one has the necessity of finding a proof for every proof and another proof for it again, and thus come to an infinite regress. Further, the knowledge of a piece of cloth is inexact; more exact is the knowledge of the threads, etc., and this *ad infinitum*.

Against him, the *Nyāya-sūtra* advances very solid arguments.[34] Nāgārjuna's line of argument is later advanced further by Buddhapālita (Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika) in the fifth century AD. In the middle of the sixth century AD, Bhāvaviveka (Svātantrika-Mādhyamika) opposes him inside the school of Nāgārjuna. But Candrakīrti, in the seventh century, seeks to follow Buddhapālita's method of agnosticism, the method to drive all opponents to absurdity, without advancing any proof to justify

his own thesis.[35] About the turn of the fifth-sixth century, the Brahmanic logician Uddyotakara, on the other hand, sometimes advances comparable sophistry against the definitions in the logic of Dignāga.[36]

He shatters, for example, the concept of *kalpanā*,[37] which is the fundamental concept for Dignāga's definition of perception. (H. Jacobi seeks to compare it with the spontaneity of understanding according to Kant.) Dignāga advances the view that the pure sense-knowledge should be devoid of *kalpanā*. And Uddyotakara asks, what is it? Dignāga defines it as connection of sense-impression with name, form, etc.[38] Uddyotakara asks, but what sort of a thing can then be cited as standing for the name 'sense-perception'? Is it sense-perception? But then, it should indeed be cited with the name. Is it something other than sense-perception? But then, the word sense-perception loses all import. The opponent could reply that by the word sense-perception the form of perception, but not the individual perceptions themselves, are cited. But is the form different from the individual products, or not? If it is different, the word sense-perception does not refer to the individual sense-perceptions; if it is not different, then the form is the same as the individual product of sense-perception. And then this would be connected with the word; which should not be, according to Dignāga's definition. Dignāga naturally means it to be otherwise, namely that the perception of a colour which in reality is something unique is not to be connected with the general name 'blue', etc., without its concept overlapping the pure sense-perception. Uddyotakara, perhaps, knows this. But he advances here a sophistry which is later similarly used by Jayarāśi, though not, of course, with regard to a similar problem.

Dharmakīrti opposes Uddyotakara in the seventh century. Against Dharmakīrti and philosophers of other tendencies, however, fights our Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa in the same manner as that of Uddyotakara, Buddhapālita, etc.

Jayarāśi[39] asks Dharmakīrti, e.g., what he means by *kalpanā*. Is

it: (i) the knowledge which is produced through the specialities as attributes, motions, generalities, etc.? (ii) Or, a knowledge which produces memory? (iii) Or, has *kalpanā* the form of memory? (iv) Or, is it to be produced through memory? (v) Or, is it the manifestation[40] of the connection of the pure sense-impression with a sign? Somewhat fully, he repeats the fifth[41] after he shatters the first four alternatives. Is *kalpanā* a knowledge which has the appearance[42] of connection of sense-impression with a sign? This connection can be either real or unreal. In the first case, it will not be *kalpanā*, i.e. no fiction. On the other hand, this real connection would be as valid as the knowledge of a colour, etc. In the second case, the question is: how, then, can the knowledge appear in this form? Jayarāśi continues with similar hair-splittings through six further alternative explanations of the concept *kalpanā*. The fifth, which has just been dealt with, corresponds, however, to a certain extent, with the definition which Dharmakīrti himself offers: *kalpanā* is a definite knowledge as a 'mental reflex',[43] which is able to become connected[44] with a sign. In a sensible debate, Jayarāśi would have cited this definition of his opponent word for word, and then refuted it. It is not clear whether he himself thinks out the ten other alternative explanations of *kalpanā* in order to refute them, or whether he quotes them from other Buddhistic writings.

Some of Jayarāśi's viewpoints find place in Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti. If Jayarāśi mentions in the discussion of the criterion of practice that the water attained through activity cannot be the water of the moment of past knowledge, but that the right knowledge makes us attain water in the same time and place, then Dharmottara certainly makes a pretext of the same sort. If the opponent gives in that one attains the object of a definite place and form[45] but not of definite time, Dharmottara allows it to a certain extent. The times of the knowledge and the attainment are different. But nonetheless, one attains the same object which one has known for a definite time, because one sees, indeed, the want of difference, and knows therefrom that it is one and the same in the chain of the

continuous moments following one another. Dharmottara believes, indeed, in the momentariness of all appearances.

Thereby, the age of our author is known to be as somewhere near the eighth century AD. A Buddhalogist can, perhaps, arrive at more definite conclusions with the help of Tibetan and Chinese texts. Thus he belongs to the same century as the Buddhist Śāntarakṣita (a commentator of Dharmakīrti)[46] whose argumentation against the contentions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, the Jainas and the Upaniṣads on the topic of the eternal soul[47] are similar to those of our author, and are directed against the same schools, though Jayarāśi turns against the proofs of a soul while Śāntarakṣita, against the idea of the soul itself. In any case, it is comparable that Jayarāśi, in his refutation of the idea of soul of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, does not recognize the inherence of knowledge, feeling, etc., as attributes of the soul, and asks whether the connection of the soul with these so-called attributes could not be understood as the *causa materialis* and its product.[48] Śāntarakṣita discusses the same possibility.[49] In the refutation of the Upaniṣadic teachings of *ātman* which is the eternal bliss, Jayarāśi, emphasizes the possibility of the *ātman* to be free and mature also in *saṃsāra*, so that the strivings for liberation are unnecessary.[50] Śāntarakṣita[51] argues, in fact, on similar lines. However, the dependence of one author on the other cannot thereby be proved, and the definite chronological relation between the two is yet obscure.

Śaṃkara, who cares little for theories of knowledge but sometimes attacks the Vaiśeṣika concepts in somewhat the same way as Śāntarakṣita,[52] belongs to about AD 800. The agnostic and often the elaborately meaningless method of Jayarāśi and his predecessors—specially Nāgārjuna—is basically established by Śrīharṣa, a follower of Śaṃkara, in his voluminous work *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*,[53] about AD 1150. Like Jayarāśi, he too attacks all the important definitions of his time and turns himself specially against Nyāya.[54] He argues, e.g., thus: that everyone meets, sometimes, something camouflaged

which he cannot see, and yet rightly recognizes it, or blunders into a right conclusion; that one cannot thus define knowledge as the product of valid perception or inference.[55] Jayarāśi uses a similar argument, among others, in his denial of the criterion of practice.[56] Not only the Bārhaspatya Jayarāśi, but also the famous Buddhist and Brahmanic Vedāntic idealists, have incidentally thus practised agnosticism of this type.

In this way, a definite sophistic-agnostic-antiphilosophic tradition comes down through more than a thousand years and our author is to be placed as belonging to this trend to certain extent; but the difference of his argumentation, in several instances, is also to be noted. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa specially invents for himself a bagful of points of opposition and hair-splittings, but he lets alone the basically established idea of the general relativity of all concepts of Nāgārjuna and his school and the general argumentation against the concept of instruments of knowledge.[57] He declares with pride at the end of his work that his arguments have not come under the purview of Bṛhaspati.[58] As Jayarāśi's agnosticism does not hold good philosophically, so is his claim of originality unfounded and the sign of pettiness. Accordingly, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa does not play a famous role in the history of Indian philosophy and it is also a fact that only a single manuscript of his writing is preserved. The references to it are also rare. Had his writing been materialistic, it would certainly not have been preserved. Thus we have, indeed, no epistemological materialistic writing of the ancient Indians at all.

NOTES

1 *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, ed. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi and Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh, B. A. (Hon). Baroda 1940. (Gaekwad Oriental Series, lxxxvii), p. xi. f.

2 *Ib.* p. xii

3 cf. the similarly formulated first *sūtra* of the Vaiśeṣikas: *athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*.

4 cf. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv. 2.1: *tat punaḥ pṛthivyādikāryadravyaṃ trividhaṃ śarīren driyaviṣayasaṃjñakam.*

5 This passage is explained by Sukhlalji, p. xii, in a different way. The matter is not reflected in the materialistic philosophy, but Bṛhaspati 'is merely reflecting in his statement the belief of the people.' I take it that Bṛhaspati's teachings reflect the matter without analysing it philosophically. This materialism of Bṛhaspati thus represents natural science, which is wanting in India and which reflects the matter, while the materialistic philosophy of its teaching is an abstract of the natural sciences.

6. But Sukhlalji has commented on this in p. iii that Śrīharṣa called the followers of Bṛhaspati Cārvākas who did not recognize any instrument of knowledge, and thus they agree with Mādhyamikas and Śaṃkara. On this similarity we shall return later.

7 Jayarāśi as in note 1

8 *Ib.* p. 1

9 cf. Sukhlalji p. xii—Jayarāśi p. 125, line 15, emphasizes that he has composed his book for the attainment of a great purpose. Is this 'purpose' which is twice mentioned, the *artha* of the *Arthaśāstra*?

10 *Ib.* p. 125, line 11f

11 *Nyāyavārttikaṃ*, ed. Chowkhamba Sans. Series, p. 3, line 13ff.

12 Jayarāśi, p. 3, line 9ff.

13 But Jayarāśi in p. 7, line 12 ff rejects the concept of *samavāya*.

14 Jayarāśi refers back here to p. 2, line 5ff.

15 cf. *Nyāya-bhāṣya* i. 1. 4: the water of a mirage leads us astray.

16 See Dharmottara, 4 8 ff; 12. 16ff.

17 Similarly, in Śrīharṣa, see note 56. Cf. S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. ii, Cambridge, 1932, p. 133

18 *antyadravya*; cf. the definition in Nyāyakośa

19 See Jayarāśi, p. 5, lines 11–16.

20 The tuft of hair is an old topic since *Nyāyasūtram* iv. 2.13. cf. E. Fraüwallner. *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin, 1956, p. 360ff, on the perception of the 'whole' in the teaching of Vasubandhu

21 Jayarāśí, p. 52, line 15ff.

22 cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtram*, iv. 1.6 on the dimension etc. of objects.

23 cf. Jayarāśí, p. 56, line 20ff.

24 The illusionism of the Vedānta was in those days certainly not yet formulated very clearly.

25 cf. Fraüwallner, *op. cit.* p. 329f., 371f., 396ff.

26. W. Ruben, *The Beginning of the Epic Sāṃkhya*, 'Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, vol. xxxvii, 1957, p. 174ff.

27 cf. J. Dahlmann, *Das Mahābhārata als Epos und Rechtsbuch*, Berlin, 1895, p. 216ff.
28 *Nyāyasūtram*, i. 2. 3. cf. Caraka, Vimāna, 8. 28; Dasgupta, *op. cit.* I. 302.
29 *Nyāyasūtram*, iv. 2. 48.
30 Mbh. ed. Sukthankar, 1955.
31 W. Ruben, *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, Berlin, 1954, p. 107.
32 *Ibid.* p. 228ff.
33 *Ibid.* p. 230.
34 *Ibid.* p. 230ff.
35 cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927, p. 87ff; Dasgupta, *op. cit.* II. p. 164; Fraüwallner, *op. cit.* p. 221ff.
36 On Uddyotakara, cf. Ruben, *op. cit.* p. 252ff—according to Fraüwallner, Dignāga lived between AD 480–540: *op. cit.* p. 390.
37 *Nyāyavārttika* 41ff.
38 *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, ed. H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar, Mysore 1930, p. 15.
39 Jayarāśi p. 32, line 5ff; see Uddyotakara in note 37.
40 *nirbhāsa*.
41 Jayarāśi p. 33, line 20.
42 *pratibhāsa*, cf. *pratibhāta* in Jayarāśi p. 3, line 17 etc.
43 *pratibhāsa*
44 *Nyāyabindu*, ed. Stcherbatsky, Leningrad, 1918, i. 5; the above translation follows freely that of Stcherbatsky (Buddhist Logic ii, p. 19). Jayarāśi has expunged '*yogya*' and has not equated *pratibhāsa* and *pratīti*, if Sukhlalji expresses rightly; he has not noticed the similarity with *Nyāyabindu*.
45 *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* 4. 8ff; Stcherbatsky (*op. cit.* ii. 9) has, however, translated *prāpaya* as 'distinctly cognized' and thereby follows the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* 12. 16ff. He does not know Jayarāśi, who interprets *prāpaya* in our sense, inasmuch as Dharmottara does from 3. 5, where he deals with *arthakriyā* in the sense of *loka*.
46 Fraüwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
47 cf. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, ii, 178ff. on this polemic. In it one argument against the Jainas is lacking.
48 Jayarāśi p. 74, line 21.
49 *Tattvasaṃgraha*, ed. E. Krishnamacharya, Baroda, 1926, verse 191.
50 Jayarāśi p. 81, line 15ff.
51 *Tattvasaṃgraha*, verse 330ff.
52 Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, ii. 189ff.
53 *Ib.* ii. 133; see note 6.
54 *Ib.* ii. 127, 133, etc.; Vedānta and Nyāya were the chief antagonists in Indian feudalism.

55 Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, ii. 133: one guesses, e.g. rightly, what another conceals in his hand, or rightly infers from fog (instead of smoke) the fire, which is behind a hill (which is only incidentally there).
56 See note 17.
57 A few are used when Jayarāśi in p. 2ff. deals with the concept of *avyabhicāri* in the *Nyāyasūtram*.
58 Jayarāśi, p. 125, line 13.

K. K. Dixit

On the special request of the editors of *Indian Studies: Past & Present*, Calcutta, K. K. Dixit makes here (Vol. iv, pp. 98–104) a critical analysis of the ideological affiliation of Jayarāśi.

The Ideological Affiliation of Jayarāśi—The Author of 'Tattvopapalavasiṃha'

K. K. DIXIT

Jayarāśi, the author of *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*, is usually characterized as a follower of Bṛhaspati, that is to say, an adherent of the Cārvāka school. But the characterization is not quite apt, even if there is no gainsaying that in relation to the Cārvāka school, Jayarāśi stands in a unique position. As is suggested by the title of his available text, Jayarāśi meant to uphold the doctrine of *tattvopaplava* and the crucial questions are whether this doctrine can be treated as a variety of Cārvāka philosophy and whether Jayarāśi so treated it. To us it appears that both these questions ought to be answered in the negative, and here are our reasons.

Tattvopaplava is not a standard phrase of Indian philosophy and so we should first try to determine its meaning. Fortunately, here Jayarāśi himself comes to our help; for in the body of his text he has used the phrase twice. The first occurrence is where Jayarāśi is saying to an adversary that if the latter adopts a particular position, there arises the contingency of everything being unreal, and from it follows *tattvopaplava*. The second occurrence is where he is, in effect, saying to the same adversary (though in another connection) that if our knowledge of existence is no guarantee of actual existence and our knowledge of absence no guarantee of actual absence, we would be plunged

into uncertainty about everything whatsoever, and that would mean *tattvopaplava*. So according to Jayarāśi, the doctrine of *tattvopaplava* should at least mean the doctrine that everything is unreal and that we have no certain knowledge about anything whatsoever. Now, nobody has ever attributed this doctrine to the Cārvākas, who are invariably treated as philosophers maintaining that everything is made up of four physical elements, viz. earth, water, fire and air, and that perception is the sole (at least basic) means of valid knowledge. In a nutshell we can say that the doctrine of *tattvopaplava* is equivalent to absolute skepticism, while the doctrine upheld by the Cārvākas is equivalent to materialism. And certainly, nobody can be a materialist and an absolute skeptic at one and the same time. As a matter of fact, even in the case of Jayarāśi—the self-proclaimed advocate of *tattvopaplava*—it has never been argued that he was a materialist; what is instead suggested is that he was an adherent of the Cārvāka school. Now the possibility (like any other which is not logically absurd) is not absolutely ruled out that there were persons who claimed to be adherents of the Cārvāka school and yet advocated the doctrine of *tattvopaplava*, but we are not, for the present, concerned with the general possibility. The question is whether Jayarāśi is such a person.

The fact that Jayarāśi, who is so harsh on the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Buddhists, the Jainas and others, is so friendly in his references to Bṛhaspati, tends to prove that the illustrious iconoclast was a *Bṛhaspatiite*. In fact, however, Jayarāśi nowhere quotes Bṛhaspati in support of the doctrine of *tattvopaplava*, but always in support of certain materialist positions. The opening section of Jayarāśi's text might appear to be the only exception in this connection, for here the author seems to be putting a nihilistic interpretation upon a famous (and fundamental) aphorism of Bṛhaspati. Unfortunately, the full text of this opening section has not come down to us, and so we cannot be absolutely certain as to the context in which the interpretation in question is being offered. But the testimony

of the entire text will very strongly suggest that Jayarāśi is here offering not an interpretation of Bṛhaspati but an explanation of his own friendly attitude towards this arch-heretic. That is to say, when Jayarāśi seems to be saying that the real meaning of Bṛhaspati's aphorism under consideration is something nihilistic, he is actually saying that he (i.e. Jayarāśi—not Bṛhaspati) takes this aphorism to mean something nihilistic; (let us, however, admit that the former is the more natural meaning of Jayarāśi's words left intact). A more straightforward course for Jayarāśi would have been to say that all philosophical positions are more or less nonsensical, but that Bṛhaspati's position is least so (as a matter of fact, this is Jayarāśi's actual stand). Why Jayarāśi—who is otherwise so outspoken—here adopts a roundabout course, is intriguing. But one thing is certain. Jayarāśi is too independent a personality to be a mere follower of any school—not even of Bṛhaspati's school, towards which his attitude is that of most sincere friendliness.

The question why the pro-Bṛhaspati Jayarāśi should feel inclined to criticize all philosophical positions whatsoever is as difficult to answer as the question why the orthodox Vācaspatimiśra should feel inclined to defend the mutually conflicting schools of Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In both cases, we will have to depend largely on conjectures, and to us it appears that both are results of a certain independence of mind of the authors in question. Such independence of mind was rare in medieval India, and the type represented by Jayarāśi rarer still. Not that there had been no philosophers who would criticize everybody with a view to drawing nihilistic conclusions, for this is actually what all Śūnyavādins and Advaita Vedāntins did. But Śūnyavādins were a recognized sect of Buddhism, while Advaita Vedāntins a recognized sect of Brahmanism, and so their nihilistic philosophy was subservient to whatever positive theology they chose to preach. This was not the case with Jayarāśi, whose polemics against the Brahmanical, Buddhist as well as Jaina philosophers should leave one in no doubt that neither Brahmanical nor Buddhist

nor Jaina orthodoxy could own this anarchist. Certainly, only one outside the pale of these various orthodoxies could be bold enough to say: 'This difficulty should not be urged against our objections, because we do not posit *mokṣa*.' On the positive side Jayarāśi seems to have been some kind of worshipper of commonsense, an attitude which might explain—at least to some extent—his antipathy towards the ivory-tower philosophies of the scholarly world, as also his sympathy for Bṛhaspati's 'philosophy of the people'. Thus, while the professional schools of Indian philosophy unite in condemning the materialist for his alleged lack of sophistication, Jayarāśi condemns these schools for their very sophistication and praises the materialist for his alleged comparative immunity therefrom.

The non-materialist schools of Indian philosophy divide their investigations into two sets, one dealing with the problems of epistemology and logic, and the other with that of ontology. In the former set the usual problems are those pertaining to the definition and classification of valid knowledge (and of its means), in the latter, those pertaining to the definition and classification of reality. Jayarāśi's declared aim is to critically examine the epistemological and logical findings of the non-materialist philosophers, but he so develops his argument that a good number of their ontological doctrines too come in for animadversion at his hands. Thus he proposes to examine the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist accounts of *pramā* or valid knowledge in general; the Nyāya, Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya accounts of *pratyakṣa*; the Nyāya and Buddhist accounts of *anumāna*; the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā accounts of *upamāna*; the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist-cum-Vaiśeṣika and Vaiyākaraṇa accounts of *śabda*; the Mīmāṃsa account of *arthāpatti* and *abhāva*; and the account of *sambhava* and *aitihya* offered by those who treat them as additional means of valid knowledge. But in the course of his examination of the non-materialist philosophers' treatment of these epistemological and logical topics, Jayarāśi also finds occasion to examine the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā arguments in support of the existence of 'universals'; the Nyāya,

Mīmāṃsā, Jaina, Sāṅkhya and Vedānta(?) theories of soul; and the Buddhist arguments against the existence of a composite body over and above its constituent-parts, against the existence of a thing for more than one moment, against the existence of the external world.

Now certain interesting and important conclusions emerge even from a cursory perusal of these issues as raised by Jayarāśi. The most noteworthy point is that Jayarāśi nowhere criticizes a view that was upheld by the materialists alone. An examination of Bṛhaspati's account of perception—an account which must have been significantly different from those of his rivals—is conspicuous by its absence. In all probability Jayarāśi does not mean to suggest that Bṛhaspati too, like himself, denies the possibility of perception as a means of valid knowledge (an exceptional case will be considered below); but he deems it impolitic to enter into controversy with a philosopher whom he almost venerates. This presumption is amply strengthened when we have a look at the analogous attitude adopted by Jayarāśi towards Bṛhaspati's fundamental ontological thesis. Thus, even after having expressed, at the very beginning of his enquiry, his misgiving concerning the materialist thesis that everything is made up of four physical elements, Jayarāśi criticizes it nowhere in the whole course of this considerably comprehensive enquiry. On the other hand, he never misses an opportunity to pass critical comments on the one most fundamental doctrine that unites the non-materialist philosophers against materialism—that is, on the doctrine that consciousness is not a product of physical elements. This doctrine is most glaringly upheld by those who posit a soul independent of the body; but it is no less emphatically endorsed by the Buddhists who deny the existence of soul. Jayarāśi polemizes against the non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist versions of the doctrine and is proud to proclaim that in the controversy in question, Bṛhaspati stands on his side (this is in striking contrast to the usual attitude of Jayarāśi who never quotes an authority by way of strengthening his position). This much about Jayarāśi's stand *vis-a-vis* the rather moderate form of spiritualism—a form rejected by him in favour of Bṛhaspati's uncompromising materialism. But Jayarāśi also takes note of that extravagant form of spiritualism—better called 'idealism' and better still, 'illusionism'—according to which the physical world is an illusory show, whose underlying reality is consciousness. By the time of Jayarāśi, illusionism had been vigorously preached by certain sections of Buddhists and an array of pro-illusionist arguments had appeared in the writings of Buddhist logicians whose inclination towards this trend was more or less pronounced. While refuting illusionism, Jayarāśi directs his attacks against these Buddhists—particularly the logicians among them—but his arguments are equally valid against illusionism as preached by certain sections of Vedāntins, to be more precise, against Advaita Vedāntic illusionism, the widespread propagation of which seems to have been a post-Jayarāśi phenomenon.

Interestingly, however, Jayarāśi has refuted a view according to which the soul is essentially and really of the nature of bliss, and is also cognizant of itself, but that its blissful nature is obscured owing to a beginningless dirt accumulated thereupon; this view, though unidentifiable as it stands, has obvious potentialities of developing into full-fledged Advaita Vedānta—whose most conspicuous, if not sole significant, difference from Buddhist illusionism lies in its characterizing the ultimate reality not only as consciousness pure and simple, but also as soul.

Then, Jayarāśi has refuted the Buddhist criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine that a composite body is something over and above its constituent parts, and he also refutes the famous Buddhist doctrine of momentarism. In the eyes of a good number of Buddhist logicians, these positions of theirs criticized by Jayarāśi were subservient to illusionism which was their fundamental world-outlook, and it is as such that they are criticized by Jayarāśi. But it is obvious that these positions—which are dialectics (as understood by Hegel and Marx)

in embryo—can be defended even without subscribing to illusionism, and a section of Buddhist logicians did actually defend them without subscribing to illusionism. However, Jayarāśi's attitude towards the positions in question renders one presumption fairly valid: in Bṛhaspati's school they were either ignored or criticized. And this, in turn, would bring to light an important truth about our philosophical heritage: those among our ancient philosophers who advocated materialism failed to appreciate the elements of dialectics discovered in other quarters, just as the discoverers of these elements of dialectics were blind to the truth inherent in materialism. Lastly, we notice Jayarāśi's positively deplorable stand on the question of 'universals', for at one place he criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of universals and at another place, the Buddhist refutation of this doctrine. So far as his treatment of ontological topics is concerned, this is perhaps the only place where Jayarāśi comes out as a *tattvopaplavavādin* in true colours; this is, perhaps, also the only place where it would be difficult for him to avoid coming in conflict with Bṛhaspati's materialism. For whatever else the universals (as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā philosophers) might or might not be, they were certainly non-physical entities, which means that their existence was bound to be repudiated by a materialist. In fairness, let it be noted that while arguing against the Buddhist, Jayarāśi makes a feeble attempt to steer clear of both the Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika positions.

Jayarāśi's stand on epistemological and logical problems is a matter for much more serious concern. In one word we can say that it is unfair to both his materialist friends and his non-materialist adversaries. Jayarāśi makes no explicit mention of Bṛhaspati's view on these matters, but at least one passage would suggest that he treats the latter as a denier not only of inference, but of perception as well. For here we find quoted with approval somebody's statement to the effect that 'it is impossible to grasp the relation of invariable concomitance (which is why inference is an impossibility),' and by way of

introducing it, Jayarāśi says that it has been made under the conviction that perception is an impossibility. Now the fact that Jayarāśi quotes with approval none but Bṛhaspati, and the fact that the argument in question against the possibility of inference is attributed to Bṛhaspati-ites also by certain other philosophical texts, will lend support to the presumption that Jayarāśi is here speaking of Bṛhaspati's attitude towards perception and inference. But no evidence—supplied either by Jayarāśi or by the tradition—is forthcoming to prove that Indian materialists denied the possibility of perception. On the contrary, the tradition frequently tells us that with the materialists, perception is the sole means of valid knowledge. Jayarāśi's oft-repeated argument against the possibility of inference is that if the probandum is some such thing whose concomitance with the probans was earlier perceived the inference is needless; while if it is some such thing whose concomitance with the probans was not earlier perceived the inference is impossible. As a matter of fact, in an inference the probans and probandum are two characters that have been observed earlier and known to go together, but are now occurring in new set-up—so that the probandum is neither something entirely old, nor something entirely new. As hinted just before, this argument against the possibility of inference has been attributed to the materialists also by certain other philosophical texts; but in all probability this is a result of caricaturing the authentic materialist position that the only existing entities are perceivable entities. For it is easy to twist this position into the form that the only existing entities are entities that are being perceived—from which might, possibly, be drawn the conclusion that perception is the only means of valid knowledge and that inference is no means of valid knowledge; (this is how Udayanācārya has actually made his Cārvāka philosopher argue). However, even the tradition grants that the position adopted by a section of Cārvākas was that not all inference whatsoever, but all inference concerning the alleged non-perceivable entities is invalid; that this was the position adopted by all Cārvākas is a fair presumption.

For as Udayanācārya's performance teaches us, a defence of the validity of perception coupled with an all-out attack on the validity of inference can be undertaken only by a solipsist, and certainly the Cārvākas were no solipsists—just as they were no absolute skeptics. In any case, Jayarāśi's presentation of his own absolutely skeptic stand should not mislead us into thinking that this was the Cārvāka stand, just as the anti-materialist philosophers' occasional misrepresentation of the Cārvāka stand should not mislead us into thinking that this was a solipsist stand. As a matter of fact, any epistemological doctrine (for that matter, any doctrine whatsoever) whose acceptance is incompatible with faith in materialism, should not be attributed to the Cārvākas. To the extent that Jayarāśi insinuates that his absolute skepticism on the questions of epistemology is shared by Bṛhaspati, he is being unjust to this redoubtable materialist.

In relation to his non-materialist adversaries, Jayarāśi's unfairness is of a different kind. Jayarāśi chiefly polemizes against the Nyāya, Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā logicians, in most cases for their having taught doctrines that are their most precious contributions to the treasure-house of Indian philosophy. One can appreciate—and even admire—Jayarāśi's impatience with these logicians, insofar as they invariably resort to pseudo-logical devices in order to buttress spiritualism in one form or another, but his impatience with Logic itself is downright perverse. Jayarāśi's constant harangue that all attempt at defining valid knowledge in general, or a particular means of valid knowledge, is foredoomed to failure, can find echo nowhere else but in the worst nihilist quarters; and it is well-nigh probable that Śrīharṣa—that arch-nihilist of Indian philosophy—physically drew upon the material supplied by Jayarāśi. We need not deny that there are cases when Jayarāśi's criticism (for that matter, even Śrīharṣa's criticism) against the logician is valid and fair; but it is equally undeniable that such cases are few and far between. Thus Jayarāśi has thought fit to take exception to the absolutely valid theses—endorsed by all logicians—that valid knowledge is knowledge that is true of

reality; that practice is the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge; that perceptual knowledge is knowledge born of sense-object contact; that invariable concomitance between probans and probandum ensures the validity of a piece of inferential knowledge; that all (worthwhile) cases of invariable concomitance derive their validity from some causal relationship or other; that an uttered sentence enables us to infer the intention of the speaker concerned, while it is a source of valid knowledge in case the speaker is an authority on what he is speaking about; etc.

It is true that the various logicians' endorsements of the theses in question were more or less enthusiastic and valid, but that is another matter and nothing justifies the way Jayarāśi makes short shrift of these most positive fruits of the logical endeavours of his predecessors. That Jayarāśi is a competent student of the systems of logic he chooses to scrutinize is beyond doubt; but a peculiar kind of colour-blindness either prevents him from seeing the bright spots of these systems, or turns these bright spots into dark ones.

Why an author who has so much genuine regard for the materialist world-outlook should thus turn a worshipper of illogic is worth being investigated into, and the investigator will have to take into account the whole range of Jayarāśi's activities, intellectual and otherwise. Lack of historical data at our disposal renders impossible such an investigation being undertaken just now, but in any case it will be unwarranted to argue that Jayarāśi is a worshipper of illogic because he is a materialist. For faith in materialism implies not worship of illogic, but rather fidelity to logic; in other words, the argument in question is vitiated by the fallacy designated '*viruddha*' in Indian logic. To say that a Cārvāka philosopher, though not a materialist philosopher, might well be a worshipper of illogic, lacks the sanction of history. As noted earlier, the non-materialist philosophers have often spoken of two schools of Cārvākas, one accepting the validity of inference and the other denying it. But the latter of these schools is, in all probability, these

philosophers' own creation, the reason for which seems to be their failure—or refusal—to appreciate the Cārvāka thesis on the supremacy of perception as a means of valid knowledge However, none has misunderstood the Cārvākas to the extent of attributing to them a non-materialist world-outlook—or to the extent of attributing to them a denial even of perception as a means of valid knowledge, and consequently a denial of our ever acquiring a true view of reality. Jayarāśi claims that he has been able to expose even such philosophical errors as were not taken into account by Bṛhaspati. This claim is tenable in the sense that Bṛhaspati was a very early philosopher, while Jayarāśi's treatment of the topic is most up-to-date; but a more honest (though presumptuous) claim on Jayarāśi's part would have been that he has been able to expose such philosophical errors as could make even Bṛhaspati their victim!

Index

abhāva 7; non-existence 79, 81, 170, 210, 229, 282, 291–2, 305, 331, 461–2, 467, 503, 520; destruction 108, 166, 171; absence 154, 170, 173, 226, 230, 234, 236, 291, 293; negation 291–3 *see also* dissolution
Abhayadevasūri 421–2, 487, 496
Abhidhamma 64
Abhidhāna-padīpikā 371
abhidheya 256–66
abhūtivāda 447
absence *see* abhāva Ācārya Sūri 231, 233
accident *see* yadṛcchā action 64, 68–9, 92, 94–5, 234, 262, 272, 275–6, 290, 389, 391–2, 408, 420, 432, 434, 467, 479, 481–3; dharma 7, 92, 95, 157; rebirth (including birth, dead body, death, another/other/previous life) 8, 10–22, 31–2, 49, 60–2, 94, 96, 99, 102, 111, 113–14, 122–3, 127, 157, 163, 165–6, 186, 189, 192, 199, 212–14, 216–17, 220–1, 248, 261–2, 265, 278–9, 285–6, 289, 309, 318, 320, 324–5, 330, 343, 370, 378, 410, 412–14, 420, 437, 468, 474, 477, 480, 483–4; karma 8, 10, 47, 68; fruition 10–12, 14–22, 213; adharma (includes demerit) 74–5, 92, 111, 127, 258, 267, 269, 273; desire and aversion 87–90, 93; vice (includes pāpa) 95, 259, 266–9, 275, 350, 468; virtue (includes puṇya) 95, 259, 266–9, 271, 275, 366, 380, 468; dharma (includes merit) 111, 127, 258, 260, 267, 269, 273, 276, 354, 382, 460–1, 479; adṛṣṭa (includes unseen) 156, 158, 244, 253, 257, 274–5, 318–19, 324–6, 330–1, 410, 412, 445–6, 450–1, 460 *see also* heaven, hell paraloka (includes after)/another/other/this world, loka) 11–12, 14–15, 17–18, 20, 22, 49, 96, 110, 114, 140, 156, 161–2, 167–9, 174, 200, 209, 211, 214, 216, 221–2, 248–9, 254, 258–60, 262, 264, 267–8, 271–2, 274–6, 279, 319, 321, 325–6, 331, 336, 339, 344–5, 357–8, 365, 368, 389–90, 411–15, 421, 428, 442, 476, 479, 481, 483–4, 506, 524
adharma *see* action (adharma)
adhiccasamuppannavāda 447
adṛṣṭa *see* action (adṛṣṭa) advaita 82, 234, 246, 491, 498, 522, 525
Advaita-brahma-siddhi 421
āgama *see* Veda; verbal testimony
agent 94–5, 97, 101–4, 113, 226, 234, 245, 278, 301–303, 309, 408; *see also* self
agnosticism 394, 431, 510, 512, 516
ahetuvāda 447
aitihya 503, 523
Ajātasattu 33, 66
Ajita-késakambalin 32, 378, 387, 396–7, 413–14, 479
ākasmikattavāda 447
akhyāti 317
Akṣapāda *see* Kaṇāda
ālayavijñāna 196 *see also* cognition; consciousness
Amalānanda 449
Ambattha 37
anekānta 307, 310
Aṅguttara-nikāya 9, 40–1, 65–7
aniyama 89–90
anumāna *see* inference
anupākhyotpādavāda 447
anvaya *see* inference

(concommitance)
āpta *see* verbal testimony
Arhat 36–7, 39–41, 51, 57, 65, 68, 72, 164, 200–1, 380, 451–2 *see also* Buddhism; Jainism
arthāpatti 282, 293, 503
Arthaśāstra 154, 380, 384, 390, 424, 475, 494, 517; translation of its 1st chapter 73–5
arūpa-vimokkhas 64
Āryadeva 386
Āryasūra 390
āsavas 72
asiddha *see* fallacy (asiddha)
asuras *see* daityas
atheism 364, 375, 388 *see also* nāstika
ātman *see* Self (ātman)
Ātmatattvaviveka 141, 149
ātmavādins 295
atoms 86–90, 92, 101, 119–20, 152, 174–5, 188, 280, 406, 409, 419, 466–7, 506; pākaja 119; pilu-pāka 119
aversion and decision *see* action
avidyā 429; *see also* illusion; Māyā
awareness 300–1, 319–21, 323–4, 328, 332, 342, 347, 467

bādhita *see* fallacy (bādhita)
Ballantyne 256
Bāṇa 373
Banerjea, K M , Prof , 364, 368
Bārhaspatya-sūtra *see* Bṛhaspati-sūtra
(The) Beginning of the Epic Sāṁkhya 517
Belvalkar, Prof 397
Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur 24 486
Bhāgavata-purāṇa see Purānas *Bhāgavata*
Bhagavati 373, 376
Bhaguri 73, 379, 386, 397–8
Bhāmatī 392; selected translation 240–6
Bhartṛhari 503
Bhāsarvajña 141
Bhattacharyya, Ananta Kumar, *Cārvāka darśana*: translation 452–73
Bhattacharyya, Chiranjib 427
Bhavabhūti 423
Bhāvaviveka 512
bhikṣu 52–4, 56–8, 71; mendicant 34, 37, 39, 41; recluse 41, 52–3, 57–60, 62–3, 66, 71
bhūmis 71
bhūta *see* matter
bhūtacaitanyavāda 85, 87–91, 93, 125, 456, 457
birth *see* action (rebirth)
Bodas 75
Bodhicaryāvatāra 388
body 3, 12, 14, 20, 22, 56, 58–9, 61, 64, 70, 93–5, 97–9, 102–7, 109, 111–28, 158–9, 162, 164, 166, 171, 173–6, 178–80, 182–3, 193–9, 202–3, 205, 207, 209–11, 216, 234–46, 250, 254, 261–3, 266, 271–4, 286–90, 293, 300–6, 308–11, 317, 319–27, 330–3, 344, 365, 370, 374, 378, 383, 392, 396–7, 406–10, 412, 419, 421, 426–7, 433, 436–9, 446, 453–6, 463, 476–8, 481–5, 505, 508
Bouddhisme Indien 363
Brahmajāla-Sutta 53
brahman *see* Self (brahman)
Brahmanas 355; *Śatapatha Taittirīyas* 403; *Vaṃsa* 255
Brahmasūtra 363
Brahmanee, Similie of *see* Similie (of Brahmanee)
Bṛhadāraṇya *see* Upaniṣads Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Bṛhaspati 154–6, 248, 247, 423, 498; as teacher of gods propagates false knowledge to the daityas 6–7, 481; his doctrine 248–9, 253–4, 267–78, 347, 351–3, 433, 504; Prof Wilson's interpretation of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa 353; quoted by Guṇaratna 379; Older than Kauṭilya 381–2; father of Indian materialism (i e. Cārvāka/Lokāyata) 386–7, 390, 393, 396–7, 418–19, 427–8, 430, 435, 453, 481, 494, 499, 517; the word 'darśana, introduced by his school 399; philosophical significance of his doctrines 400–4, 410, 414, 455, 506–7, 511, 517, 524, 527–8; his wife and Indra 417; as Synonymn of Cāru 429; followed by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa 431, 502, 516, 520–3, 525–8, 530
Bṛhaspati-sūtra 355, 365, 380–4, 386–7
Buddhaghoṣa 64, 67–72, 371
Buddhapālita 512–13
Buddhism 8–9, 32–4, 37–9, 41–2, 65–7, 71–2, 115–17, 148, 153, 159–60, 165, 193, 200–1, 214, 257, 276, 313, 361–3, 367, 369–70, 378–80, 382–3, 385, 389–90, 394, 412–14, 419, 421–3, 425, 427, 431, 434, 444, 449, 452, 476, 478, 482, 502–3, 510–12, 514–16, 524–6, 528; Yogācāra 160, 363; Vijñānavāda 368, 510; Sūnyavāda 447, 522; Mādhyamika 363, 517; *see also* Arhat
Buddhist Logic 518
(The) Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux 147
Burnell, A C , Dr. 255, 363, 376
Burnoruf 65, 67–8, 70–1

Caitanya 426
Caitanyacandrodaya 423
Cakradhara 155
Cāṇakya *see* Kauṭilya
Caṇḍidāsa 426
Candragomin 342
Candrakīrti 386, 512
Candraprabha Sūri 496
caravan, similie of *see* similie (of caravan)
Cārvāka 3, 33, 75, 79–82, 111, 113, 115, 124, 147, 154–5, 156–7, 187, 246–8, 251, 254, 258, 263–7, 269, 273–6, 278, 284–5, 298, 304, 315, 326, 343, 345–7, 355, 358–60, 365–6, 369, 373, 377–9, 384–7, 392, 396–7, 413, 415–19, 421–2, 429–31, 435–6, 443–4, 449, 452–9, 461–3, 465–72, 481, 486, 491–5, 497, 501, 517, 520–1, 527–9, 530 *see also* Lokāyata
Cārvāka darśana: translation 452–73
causation 133–4, 148, 262; causal relation 84, 225–6, 458, 465–6; effect 85, 98, 102, 113, 126, 151, 162, 168, 172–3, 176–7, 180, 182, 195, 227–8, 257, 307, 447–8, 450; cause 85, 91, 98–9, 102, 113, 126, 162, 168–75, 176–9, 187, 189–90, 192, 194–6, 224–33, 244, 253, 257, 276, 286–7, 289–90, 294, 306–8, 312, 322–4, 326, 330, 333, 402, 405, 431, 442–50, 458, 474
Chain 165–7, 169–70, 180–2, 189–91, 199, 209–11
Chāndogya Upaniṣad *see* Upaniṣads Chāndogya
Childers 66
Codana sūtra 151
cogniser *see* self (Cogniser)
cognition 91, 94, 96–8, 100, 106, 116, 134, 136, 140, 153–5, 162–5, 167–71, 173–6, 178, 180–4, 186, 188–99, 202, 204, 206–8, 210–14, 218, 223, 225, 232–3, 243, 287–8, 314, 316–17, 328, 332, 342, 437, 439, 470–1, 507

see also ālayavijñāna; consciousness; knowledge; viññāna
Colebrooke 255, 355, 362–3
comparison *see* upamāna
(The) Concept of Buddhist Nirvāṇa 518
concomitance, invariable *see* inference
contradiction *see* fallacy (bādhita)
consciousness 86–7, 90, 92–4, 99–102, 106, 110–14, 116, 122–3, 125–8, 158–9, 161–2, 164–6, 174–6, 180, 184, 186, 192–3, 197, 199–206, 208–9, 237–40, 244–5, 262–3, 266–8, 273–4, 278–80, 283–7, 298–300, 302–8, 311, 320–31, 344, 406–9, 421, 436–9, 453–4, 482, 525 *see also* ālayavijñāna; cognition; intoxication, power of; knowledge; modification
Contradiction *see* fallacy (viruddha)
Cowell, E B. 247

Dahlmann, J. 518
daityas 3, 5–7, 353–4, 358–60, 387, 403, 481
Dānavagga 9
daṇḍanīti 380, 391, 393, 413, 435
Das Mahabharata als Epos und Rechtsbuch 518
Daśakumāracarita 388
Dasgupta, S N. 3, 73, 146, 517–19
death *see* action (rebirth)
dehātmavāda 110, 234–40, 258, 419–20
Dehātmavāda of Śaṅkara 234–40
deliberation *see* uha
delusion *see* māyāmoha
demerit *see* action (demerit)
demons *see* daityas
desire and aversion *see* action (desire and aversion)
destruction *see* abhāva (destruction)
Dhamma-saṅgamani 70
Dhammapada 8–9
dharma *see* action (dharma)
Dharmakīrti 141, 145–6, 153, 513–14
Dharmottara 514–15, 518
Dialogue on Hindu Philosophy 368
Dialogues of the Buddha 8, 369–76
Die Philosophie des Buddhismus 517
Dīghanikāya 387–9
Dignāga 146, 507, 513
disgust *see* pratisaṅkhyāna
dissolution 48, 58, 60–1 *see also* abhāva; elements; evolution
Dixit, K K. *(The) Indeological Affiliation of Jayarāsi* 520–30
doer *see* agent
doubt 82–4
dream *see* sleep
dualism 420

effect see cousation (effect)
elements 48–9, 86–90, 92, 113–14, 127, 162, 171, 174, 187–9, 237–9, 248, 250, 344–5, 378, 391–2, 406, 409, 413–14, 434, 453–4, 479, 481–2, 494, 497, 506, 521, 524, *see also* dissolution; evolution
equanimity 58, 70
Essay on the Heretical Sects 363
eternality 97, 100–101, 107, 114, 152, 158, 170–1, 192, 194, 319, 466–7
evolution 60–1, 71 *see also* dissolution; elements; flood, deadly
existence 79, 161, 170, 199, 201, 229–31, 291, 299, 331, 343, 520

fallacy 79, 146, 149, 151, 256; Siddhasādhanadoṣa 79; vyāghāta 82–4; tarka 82, 84, 154, 256, 333, 336, 342, 392, 495; vipakṣa 145; badhita 82–3, 151; viruddha 82–4, 151, 212, 216, 221–2, 228; asiddha 151; sapakṣa 151; sat-pratipakṣa 151; pakṣābhāsa 152; vitaṇḍā 371, 373, 400, 429, 443, 449–50, 452, 503, 511; jalpa 503
feelings 215–22
floods, deadly 62, 72
see also evolution
form 184–5, 193, 212
see also name
Franke, Prof. 389
Fraüwallner, E. 8, 517–18; his *Materialism* 474–87
freedom 412–14
fruition *see* action (fruition)

Gadādhara 150
Gahapati-vaggas 46
Gaṅgeśa 84, 150
Gangopadhyay, Mrinal Kanti 144, 152
Gautama 10, 43, 71, 110, 141, 147, 154, 419, 503; his Nyāyasūtra: translation of selected text and translation 75–93
generality *see* universal gift 30–2
Gītā 429
god 5, 8–9, 12, 15, 38, 51, 104, 140, 156, 158, 169–70, 192, 224, 258, 267, 295, 315, 353–4, 357, 359, 361, 364, 368, 377, 380, 385, 388, 391, 397, 402, 412–13, 420–1, 432, 434, 441, 449, 468, 470, 474–7, 481, 483, 486, 502, 506
Gogerly 65–9
Gotama *see* Gautama
Gough, A E 247
grammatical literature and Lokāyata 73
guṇa *see* quality
Guṇaratna 257, 266, 379–80, 383, 393, 422, 424, 448, 450; translation of his *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* and Commentary on *Saḍdarśane-Samuccaya* 266–98

Hardy, Spence 70
Haribhadra Sūri 379–80, 492–4, 500; his *Saḍ-darśana-samuccaya*: translation of selected texts and commentary 257–98
Harṣacarita 373
Hattipadopama-sutta 38
heaven 8–9, 11, 59, 62, 72, 253, 259–60, 266, 268–9, 271, 273, 275, 277, 295, 352, 365–6 381, 411, 435, 461, 472, 484 *see also* action
hedonism 388, 391, 396, 418
hell 272, 477, 483, 486 *see also* action
heretic 6, 353, 360–1, 373, 378, 387, 419, 422, 427–8, 444
hetu *see* inference (probans)
hetūśāstra *see* logic
History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature 361–2
History of Buddhism 342–3
History of Indian Materialism 385
History of Indian Philosophy (of Dasgupta) 146, 517
History of Indian Philosophy (of Fraüwallner) 474
History of Materialism in India 432–40

idealism 198, 384–5, 392, 506, 511–13, 525
(The) Ideological Affiliation of Jayarāśi 520–30
illusion 169, 189, 316–17, 462–3, 510–11, 525–6 *see also* avidya; maya
Indra 3–7
infants, new born *see* recollection
inference 76–82, 85–7, 93, 96, 106–7, 111, 113, 128, 130–3, 139–41, 143–6, 148, 150, 152–6, 235, 242–3, 248, 250–3, 260, 270–1, 273, 278, 280–1, 290, 302, 308, 312–17, 319–21, 328, 332, 335–6, 340, 392, 396–7, 405–6, 412, 421, 444–5, 455–6, 458–9, 461, 470, 485, 494, 503, 506,510, 516, 523, 526–9
Inscriptions de Payasi 67
intelligence 100, 102, 105, 126,

234–5
intoxication, power of 240, 244, 263, 266, 273–4, 284, 305, 318, 320–1, 330, 378, 438, 481–2 *see also* consciousness
īśvara *see* **god**
Iśvarabhaṅgakārikā 388
Iti-vuttaka 40
Iyer, K. A. S. 146

Jacob 147
Jacobi 67–8, 75
Jaimini 420
Jainism 34, 67–8, 257, 285, 298–99, 305, 307, 311, 313, 331, 364, 373, 379, 382, 388–9, 419, 422, 427, 444, 452, 476, 480, 503 *see also* Arhat
jalpa *see* fallacy (jalpa)
Jātaka 68
jatila, similie of *see* similie (of jatila)
Jāvāli 354–5, 358, 367
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa 109–10, 115, 119, 123, 126, 141, 147, 152–3, 156–7, 421–2, 436–7; selected translation of his *Nyāyamañjarī* 109–57
Jayarāśi Bhatta 395, 400, 431, 502; follows Brhaspati 431, 502, 516, 520–3, 525–8, 530; Sanghavi and Parikh's introduction to his *Tattopaplavasiṃha* 491–504; W. Ruben's critique of his *Tattvoplavasiṃha* 505–19; Dixit critique of his *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* 520–30
Jha, Ganganatha 93, 160
Jīvaka 42–4
jñāna *see* knowledge
Journal of Indian Philosophy 144
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 75

Kakuda Katyayana 480
kāla *see* **time**
kālavāda 294, 391
kalpanā 513–14
Kalyāṇa Rasika 388
Kamaśīla 153, 160, 421–2
Kāmaśāstra 379
Kambalāśvatra 396, 413
Kaṇāda 75, 152, 251, 419
Kangle 74
Kapalikas 6–7, 380, 382–3
Kapila 362–4, 373, 420, 423–5, 427
karma *see* action
kartṛ *see* agent
Kassapa 9–22, 24–30, 32, 43, 45–6 67, 396, 479
Kātyāyana 73
Katyayana, Kakuda *see* Kakuda Katyayana
Kamla sect 496
Kauṭilya 379–81, 390, 393, 429, 435, 475, 511; translation of the 1st chapter of his Arthaśāstra 73–5
Kavikarṇapūra 423
Kaviraj, Gopinath *Likayata and the Doctrine of Svabhava* 441–51
Kesi, 476–8
Khaṇḍakas 40
Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya 82, 141–2, 494–5, 515
Knower *see* self (knower)
Knowledge 65, 85–7, 89–90, 92–3, 96, 109–10, 112, 114, 117, 122–6, 130, 132–5, 139–41, 144, 146, 149–52, 155–7, 200, 204, 213, 229, 236, 242, 246–8, 250–3, 256, 262–3, 272–3, 278, 280–4, 287–9, 293, 295, 300, 302, 309–18, 320, 322, 328, 332–37, 345, 347, 391, 396–7, 401, 405–6, 409, 430–1, 436–7, 455–6, 458–64, 470–2, 481–6, 491, 498, 502–4, 506–10, 512, 514–17, 520–1, 523–4, 527–30
Kṛṣṇa Miśra 382, 386, 414, 422–3; selected translation of his *Prabodhacandrodaya* 344–8
kṣaṇa *see* time (moment)
Kṣatravidyā 390 *see also* nītiśāstra

Kumārila 150–1, 364, 370, 375, 388, 429
Kuppuswami Sastri, MM 74–5
Kūṭadanta-sutta 37, 369

lakṣaṇa 132
Lakṣaṇasāra 499, 501
Lalitavistara 390
Lassen 362
Laukāyatikas *see* Lokāyata
Leumann, E. 486
liberation 110, 250, 253, 258, 264–9, 275, 277, 295, 433, 489, 500, 523; salvation 417
life, previous/another/after death *see* rebirth
logic 74–5, 392, 528–9; hetuśāstra 360, 392–3 *see also* nītiśāstra
Lohicca 38
lokavyavahāra 79
Lokāyata 3, 6, 33, 73–6, 110–11, 157, 161, 248, 255, 257–8, 264–5, 267, 276, 342, 353, 364, 369–77, 379–93, 395–8, 400, 404, 406–9, 412–14, 418–25, 427–9, 435, 443–6, 449–50, 452–3, 481–4, 486–7, 492–4, 499–501
Lokāyata (of H. P. Sastri) 377–83
Lokāyata and the Doctrine of Svabhāva 441–51
Lokāyata-sūtra 73, 167
lotus, filament of 223, 225, 233, 401
love 426, 433–5

Mādhavācārya 343, 355, 378, 422–3, 492–3; selected translation of his *sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* 246–57
Madhusūdana Sarasvati 446, 450
Mādhvas 255, 429
Mādhyamika *see* Buddhism (Mādhyamika)
Maha-govinda-suttanta 9
Mahā-tantrā-saṅkhaya-sutta 38
Mahā-Vibhaṅga 65
Mahābhārata 358, 366, 368, 372–3, 376, 378, 388, 403, 429, 449–51, 511, 518
Mahābhāṣya 397, 429
Mahāvastu 70
Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad *see* Upaniṣads Maitrāyaṇa
Maitri Upaniṣad *see* Upaniṣads Maitri
Majjhima-nikāya 38–39, 65, 67
Makkhali 46, 48, 67–8
Mālatimādhava 423
maltīṣena Sūri 388, 495
Mānameyodaya 141
Maṇibhadra Commentary on *Saḍdarśana-Samuccaya* 258–66; *Laghuvṛtti*: translation 257–66
Manu 360, 364–6, 368, 388–9, 403, 428, 444
materialism 161, 163, 166–8, 174, 187, 195, 200–1, 214, 221, 235, 237, 345, 358, 364–5, 368–72, 378, 383–4, 386–7, 389, 391, 394, 396–9, 402, 408, 413, 418–19, 421–4, 429–39, 443, 474–6, 478–81, 491, 505–7, 511, 516–17, 523–9; materialistic literature 439–40
Materialism (of Fraüwallner) 474
Matsya-purāṇa see Purāṇas Matsya
matter 112–13, 125–6, 157–8, 163, 244–6, 262–3, 266–8, 272–4, 279–80, 282, 284, 286–7, 289, 291, 295, 298–300, 302–8, 320, 322–3, 326–8, 330–1, 408, 414, 430, 432, 437–438, 450, 453, 460, 467, 474, 506–7, 517 *see also* pudgala
māyā 236; māyāvāda 491, 498, 500; *see also* avidyā; illusion
Māyāmoha 6, 344, 346–8, 365, 367, 403
memory *see* recollection
mendicant *see* bhikṣu

merit *see* action (dharma)
Milindapañha 373, 390
Mīmāṃsā 364, 368, 370, 375, 526, 528; Mīmāṃsakas 136, 150, 226, 388, 460, 502–3
mind 93–5, 97, 98, 100–2, 104–5, 135, 138, 149–50, 162, 163–4, 169, 176–7, 182–3, 192, 194, 202, 205–6, 209, 212, 251, 327–9, 406–9, 420–1, 463, 481
Misc. Essays (of Colebrooke) 355, 362, 364
modifications 176–8, 208, 464–5
mokṣa *see* liberation
moment *see* time
motion 235–8, 438–9, 446, 450, 508
Muir, J. 75, 355–68
Muktāvalī 150
Mūlamādhyamika-kārikā 386
Muller 361–2
mysticism 356, 385

Nāgārjuna 512, 515–16
Nāgasena 41–2
Naiṣadhacarita 378
Naiyāyikas *see* Nyāya
name 211–13, 236 *see also* form
Nārāyaṇa 141
nāstika 156, 220, 243, 245, 258, 266–7, 344, 360, 367, 370, 382, 384, 386–9, 397, 422–3, 425, 427–9, 444, 450, 452–3, 474–5, 494, 521–2, 528 *see also* atheist
nature *see* svabhāva
negation *see* abhāva
negativist *see* nāstika
Neumann 70, 72
Nigaṇṭha 49, 68
nihilist *see* nāstika
Nīlakaṇṭha 451
nirvāṇa 37, 201, 389, 512 *see also* liberation
nītiśāstra 384–5, 390, 392 *see also* *Arthaśāstra*; daṇḍanīti; kṣatravidyā; logic; statecraft; vārtā
niyati 295–6
non-existence *see* abhāva
Nyāya 74–5, 80–1, 89, 109, 114–15, 117, 146, 151–2, 154, 156–8, 165, 257, 364, 386, 392, 438–9, 450, 463–7, 470, 509, 515, 518, 528; Naiyāyikas 80–1, 256, 311, 502–3; Nyāya-Vaiśeśika 122–3, 525–6
Nyāyabhāṣya 154, 507, 517
Nyāyabhūṣaṇa 141–2, 145, 151–3
Nyāyabindu 141, 145, 518
Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā 152, 518
Nyāyakandalī 93, 141, 152
Nyāyakoṣa 517
Nyāyakumudacandra 298, 317–42, 487
Nyāyakusumāñjali 79, 82, 158–9, 447
Nyāyamañjarī 109–57, 436
Nyāyaratna, Maheśa Candra 377
Nyāyasūtra 74–93, 110, 114, 124–5, 127–8, 141, 146–7, 151–2, 437, 447, 450, 507, 511–12, 517–19

Padārthadharmasaṅgraha Padmapurāṇa *see* Purāṇas. *Padma* *see* Praśastapāda
Paesi, King *see* Pāyāsi, King
Pāṇini 255, 428–9
Pāñjikā 160
Paññā *see* knowledge
Papers of Stcherbatsky 432
paraloka *see* liberation
Parameṣṭhin 430
Pāramitās 9
Parikh, R C. 492, 516
pariṇāmavāda 391
parīśuddhi 76
Pārśva 68
particulars 184–5, 334
Patañjali 73, 362, 379, 420, 429

Patimokkha 40, 65, 69
Pāyāsi, King 8–11, 13, 16, 24, 26–8, 30–1
Pāyāsi-Suttanta 8–32
penance 260, 262, 264, 269, 272, 275–6, 346
perception 79, 94, 96, 100, 102, 105–6, 111, 116–17, 134–6, 138, 141, 143, 146, 149–51, 154–5, 157, 162, 171, 173, 195, 198, 209, 224, 228, 230–1, 233, 241–3, 248, 251–2, 259, 268, 273, 278, 280–4, 288, 300, 312–14, 316–17, 319–21, 331, 339, 345, 357, 363, 367, 389, 391–2, 396, 399, 405–6, 421, 444, 455–6, 458, 460–3, 467, 472, 491, 494–5, 503, 506, 509–10, 513, 516, 521, 523–4, 526–8, 530
pessimision 389
person *see* Self
phlegm 219–20
pilu-pāka
piṇḍa *see* body
Piṭhakas 34, 40
pleasure 248–9, 259–62, 264–5, 271–2, 275–6, 298, 319–20, 330–2, 345, 383, 396, 411, 413–15, 417–18, 423–5, 480
positivist 380
Poṭṭhapāda 38, 64
Prabhacandra 487; his *Nyāyakumudacandra* 298, 317–42; his *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* 298–317
Prabhākara 150, 154
Prabhāvaka-carita 496
Prabodhacandrodaya 344–8, 365, 367, 382, 423
Prajāpati 3–4, 6
Prajñāśāstra 386
Prakaraṇapañcikā 388
pramāṇa 79, 110–12, 128, 141–3, 150–1, 154–6, 259, 272–3, 296–7, 306, 312–13, 315–16, 333, 342, 389, 392, 431, 461, 467, 470–2, 491, 494–5, 497–8, 500, 502–3
Pramāṇasamuccaya 518
Pramāṇavārttika 141
prameya 110, 155–6, 272, 318, 500
Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa 298–317
Praśastapāda 93, 152; his *Bhāṣya* called *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* 93–109, 128, 141
pratyabhijñā *see* recognition
partisaṅkhyāna 216
pratyakṣa *see* perception
pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa 502
presumption *see* arthāpatti
Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress (1926) 384
proof 229–32, 242
pudgala 305 *see also* matter
Pupphadanta 386
Puranas 75, 355, 431; *Viṣṇu* 351–3, 355, 364, 387, 403; *Bhāgavata* 368; *Matsya* 387; *Padma* 404
Purandara 142–3, 386, 396, 421
puruṣa *see* Self (puruṣa)
Pūrvamīmaṃsā-Sūtra 236

qualities 107, 112, 114–15, 119–20, 122–7, 302–4, 310, 467

rākṣasa *see* daityas
Rājaśekhara Sūri 380
Rāmāyaṇa 351–2, 354–5, 358, 367, 372, 378–9, 429, 444
raxasas *see* daityas
Rāyapasenaijja 8, 389
realism 389
reality 155–6, 299, 304, 317–18, 321, 323, 330, 333, 344, 388, 436, 453, 502, 505–7, 510–12, 523, 528–9
rebirth *see* action (rebirth)
recluse *see* bhikṣu
recognition 113, 115–19, 121, 309, 408
recollection 93–4, 113, 115–16, 121,

123, 158–9, 194, 303, 327, 329, 456–8, 464; memory 60, 215, 439, 514; impression 91, 158, 161, 179, 213–14, 218; remembrance 97–8, 100–1, 105–6, 109, 194, 204, 214–15, 237; new born infant 211–13
Reden des Gotamo 70
remembrance *see* recollection (remembrance)
reminiscence *see* recollection
Rhys Davids, T. W. 8, 32–3, 389; his *Dialogue of the Buddha* 369–76
Ruben, W. 517–18; his *On the Tattvopaplavasiṃha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa* 505–19

Śabara Svāmin 236, 255
Sacred Books of the Buddhists 8, 32
sacrifice 5, 30, 37, 237, 249, 253, 345, 352–4, 356–7, 365, 381–2, 411, 413, 422–3, 433, 459–61, 473, 479–80, 484
Saḍdarśanasamuccaya 275–98, 379, 392–3, 450, 492–3, 500
Sadānanda 421–2
Sadda-nīti 371
Saddharma-puṇḍarīka 372
Sahajia 383, 425–7
Śaivas 429
Śāktas 366
Sakuludāyi 39, 41
salvation *see* liberation
Sāmānna-phala-sutta 32–72, 413
sāmānya *see* universal
sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyasatti 150
sambhava 503, 523
Sāṃkhya *see* Sāṅkhya
saṃskāra *see* recollection
Saṃkṣepa-sārīraka 450
Saṃyutta-nikāya 9, 41
Sanghavi, Sukhlalji 492, 505, 516–18
Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta 431, 511–12
śaṅkā *see* doubt
Śaṅkarācārya 6, 255, 368–72, 375, 380, 394, 421–3, 448, 491, 494, 498, 515, 517; selected translation of his *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* 234–40
Sāṅkhya 74, 81–4, 145, 364, 373, 388, 450, 503, 506
Sāṅkhya-kārikā 145
Sāṅkhya-sūtra 363
Śāntarakṣita 159–60, 515; translation, with commentary, of his *Tattvasaṅgraha* 159–233
sapakṣa *see* fallacy
Śārīraka-bhāṣya: selected translation 234–40
Sarvadarśana-samuccaya 380
Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha 153, 257, 351–2, 355, 358, 365, 376–8, 392, 487, 492–3; selected translation 246–57
Sarvamata-saṅgraha 421, 493
Sarvasiddhānta-saṅgraha 380, 422
Śāstravārtā-samuccaya 493, 500
Sastri, H. P. 6; his *Lokāyata* 377–83
śāśvatavāda 447
satpratipakṣa *see* fallacy
Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa see Brahmanas *Śatapatha*
Śataśāstra 386
Sāyaṇa 255, 375
scepticism 394, 403, 430–1, 521, 528
science 374–5, 435
(A) Second Handful of Popular Marxims 147
self 3–5, 90–8, 102–3, 105, 107–17, 123, 127–8, 145, 157–8, 234–5, 235–44, 246, 263, 266–70, 278–84, 287–91, 293–5, 299–300, 309–12, 318–22, 324, 326, 329–31, 333, 396–7, 409, 419–21, 450, 454, 468; ātman 3–5, 94, 96, 274, 378, 389, 393, 498, 515; brahman 4, 37, 234; puruṣa 4, 145; knower 90–1, 116–17, 318, 332; cogniser 99–100, 106 *see also* soul
self-possession/restraint 49, 55, 57–8
Sénart 70

sense 70, 93–103, 105–7, 111, 127–8, 130, 149–50, 155, 157, 161–2, 164–5, 168, 174–6, 183, 202, 206–7, 218, 135–6, 242, 251, 258, 260, 268, 262–3, 272, 274–5, 283–4, 287, 293, 299, 301–5, 309–10, 317, 327–30, 332, 357, 397, 406, 409, 412, 414, 420–2, 425, 444–5, 455–6, 458, 463–5, 471, 479, 481, 484–5, 505, 508, 513, 529
Sept Suttas 65
Shastri, D. R. *A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism* 394–439
(A) Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism 394–439
siddhasādhanadoṣa *see* fallacy (siddham)
Sigālovada-sutta 65
similie of brahmanee 18; of ball of iron 20; of trumpeter 21–2; of Jaṭila 21–3; of caravan 24–6; of gamester 27; of load of hemp 28–9
Sinharay, Haridas, Prof. 505
(A) Sketch of Indian Materialism 384–93
Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus 365
sleep 205–6, 326–8, 408; dream 19, 189, 205, 240
Ślokavārtika 150–1, 388, 429
smṛti *see* recollection
Soṇadaṇḍa 37
soul 7, 19–2, 37–8, 49, 69–70, 104, 161, 164–5, 169, 178, 202, 248; 250, 253, 344, 352, 365, 370, 409, 421, 427, 432, 434, 437, 474–8, 480–1, 483, 503, 506, 515, 524–5 *see also* self
space 226–7, 230, 241–2, 315, 318, 334
specific individuality *see* particular
spiritualism 420, 528
śrāddha 342, 352, 354, 356–7
Śrīdhara 93, 152
Śrīharṣa 82–4, 141, 422, 494–5, 515, 517
Stcherbatsky, Th. 432, 518; his *History of Materialism in India* 432–40
Śukra 7
Śūnyavāda *see* Buddhism (Śūnyavāda)
Sūtrakṛtāṅga 431
svābhāva 222–4, 228, 233, 253, 296–7, 319, 374–5, 389, 391–2, 396, 401–2, 404, 409–10, 419, 425, 427, 441–51, 458, 474–5, 480
svabhāvānumāna 503
svabhāvavādins 296
svābhāvika-sambandha 80
svatautpādavāda 447
Syādvādalatikā 494
Syādvādamañjarī 388, 495
Syādvādaratnākara 143, 146, 152–5

Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa see Brahmanas *Taittirīya*
Tanjur 160
Tārānātha *History of Buddhism* 342–3
tarka *see* fallacy (tarka)
Tarkapañcānana, J. 377
Tarkasaṅgraha 256
Tarkavāgīśa, P. 74, 76, 79
Tatparyaṭīkā 76
tatsvābhāvikavāda 228
tattva *see* reality
Tattvabodhavidhāyinī 487
Tattvacintāmaṇi 144, 150
Tattvasaṅgraha 143, 145, 153, 159–33, 518
Tattvavṛtti 152
tattvopaplava 431, 495, 497, 500, 502, 520–1, 526
Tattvopaplavasiṃha 395, 404; introd. by Sanghavi & Parikh 491–504; study by Ruben 505–19; study by

Dixit 520–30
Tevijja 38
Thibaut, G. 234
Thomas, F.W., Dr. 381–2, 386
time 169, 226–7, 230, 241–2, 293–5, 297, 314, 318, 326, 333–4, 391; moment 115, 121, 171, 190, 199, 363, 408, 482–3; momentary 189, 198
Tiṣaṭṭhimahāpuruṣa-guṇā laṅkāra 386
trasareṇu *see* atoms
Trencker 72
trumpeter, similie of *see* similie (of trumpeter)
Tucci, G. *A Sketch of Indian Materialissm* 384–93

Udayana 79, 81–84, 91, 141, 149, 158, 256, 447, 527–8; selected translation of his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* 158–9
udbhaṭa 152, 155
Udyotakara 76, 79, 150, 513, 518
uha 314–15
universal 130–1, 184–6, 344, 523, 526
unseen *see* action (adṛṣṭa)
upādhi 80
upamāna 154, 243, 256, 282, 293, 405, 461, 503, 523
Upaniṣads 434; *Chāndogya* 3–6; *Maitri* 6–7, 387, 428; *Bṛhadāraṇya* 157; Maitrāyaṇa 403
Upaskāra 147, 152
Uśanas 435, 511
Uttarādhyayana sūtra 32, 67

Vācaspati Miśra 76, 91, 141, 147–50, 152, 345, 437; selected translation of his *Bhāmatī* 240–6
Vaiśeṣika 93, 157, 251, 257, 364, 453, 463, 466–7, 481, 506, 515
Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 94–6, 147, 152, 517
Vaiṣṇavism 383, 425, 428
Vākyapadīya 143
Vaṃśa-brāhmaṇa see Brahmanas
Vaṃśa Vārhaspatya-sūtra see Bṛhaspati-sūtra
vārtā 380, 382–3, 391, 393, 413, 433 *see also* nitiśāstra
Vasubandhu 517
Vātsyāyana 74–6, 78, 87, 90, 114, 375, 379, 413, 507–8
Veda 7, 74, 108, 157, 234, 249, 345, 347, 351–4, 361–2, 364–5, 388, 396–8, 400–1, 411–12, 417, 419–20, 426, 428, 433, 443–4, 452, 460, 472–3 *see also* verbal testimony
Vedanta 234–6, 355, 373, 503, 516–19, 529
Vedānta-kalpataru 449
verbal expression 106, 129, 210–11, 213
verbal testimony 114, 141, 154, 260, 271, 281, 293, 321, 459, 461, 471, 503, 523; *see also* Veda
vice *see* action (vice)
Vidvanmodataraṅgiṇī 427
Vihārabhadra 388
Vijñānavāda *see* Buddhism (Vijñānavāda)
Vijñāneśvāra 390
Vimāna-vatthu 8
Vinaya texts 9, 33, 65–6, 69
Vinītadeva 152
Viññāna 70–1 *see also* cognition
vipakṣa *see* fallacy (vipakṣa)
Virocana 3
virtue *see* action (virtue)
viruddha *see* Fallacy (viruddha)
viśeṣa *see* particulars
Viṣṇu-purāṇa see Puraṇas *Viṣṇu*
Visuddhi-magga 69
vitaṇḍā *see* fallacy
Vitaṇḍā-sattha 372
void 193, 234, 363, 447, 512
Vṛhaspati *see* Bṛhaspati
vyāghāta *see* fallacy (vyaghāta)

vyāpti *see* inference

Weber 373, 376
Wilson, Prof. 351, 353, 365–6, 369
wolf, footprint of 260, 268–70, 381
world, after/other/this *see* action (paraloka)

yadṛcchā 297, 448–50
yadṛcchāvādins 297
yaśovijaya 494
yoga 39, 74, 420
yogācāra *see* Buddhism (Yogācāra)
yogasūtra 149
yogin 285